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Introductory chapter: aims, methods 
and sources
Inter articifes longa differentia est et ingenii et naturae et doctrinae et institutionis.
Dig. 46.3.31 (Ulpianus)

Aims, methods and sources 15
IntRoduCtIon
This study focuses on the ways in which the urban labour market of Roman Italy func-
tioned. The framework of the urban labour market is exploited with the intention of 
presenting a novel, integrated analysis of the Roman labour force in Italian cities in 
roughly the first three centuries AD. Pre-industrial working populations in general were 
not coherent bodies.1 An inherent diversity is therefore a priori likely to have been char-
acteristic of the Roman labour force. There is a need for a conceptual framework capable 
of accommodating this diversity.
There is a significant collection of scholarship about Roman labour. A number of 
more general monographs relevant to the subject have appeared over the course of the 
twentieth century. The legal background of labour and labourers has been extensively 
documented in Italian by De Robertis.2 The language barrier made this work inaccessible 
to large proportions of the anglo-saxon world, however, which is also the problem with 
the work of Calabi Limentani.3 The scholarly world was better served by the monograph 
of Burford, Craftsmen in Greek and Roman society.4 Her book was based on an extensive 
knowledge of various sources ranging from material culture (the book opens with a 
potter’s signature) to literary sources and Roman law. Burford’s book remains valuable 
because of its meticulous collection of data, but its interpretive framework echoes the 
sentiments of the ancient writers, and is outdated. In line with the times, the Aufstieg 
und Niedergang of the Roman world coloured the perceptions of the influential work 
of Louis.5 There is much of merit here, but the ancient sources are secondary to the 
(invalid) narrative, which diminishes its use. Similarly, Mossé developed Finley’s views 
about labour in the ancient world, in a strict universe of city states and consumer cit-
ies and is therefore of limited use to any of us who disagree (even in part) with Moses 
Finley.6 The value of many of these earlier monographs, then, lies predominantly in their 
integrated approach of the sources, but not in their overarching interpretations of the 
Roman empire.
1 Ehmer (2014) 105.
2 De Robertis (1963), also (1946). On collegia, idem (1971).
3 Calabi Limentani (1956), Il lavoro artistico, still helpful though limited in scope, focusing on the ‘art’ 
in artisan.
4 Burford (1972). Taylor (1979) reads like a useful, brief summary of Burford for a general audience 




Since the early 1980s, the debate on the nature of the Roman economy has moved on 
considerably, and this has freed the way for a novel interpretation of labour.7 Moreover, 
the continuous digital revolution starting in the 1990s has facilitated the analysis of 
large amounts of epigraphic and papyrological data to support a more wide-ranging 
view of work in the Roman world.8 In the meantime, significant progress has been made 
in the debate on the nature of Roman slavery and slave labour.9 Recent work has also 
shed new light on the exceptional position of freedmen in Roman society, and in the Ro-
man economy.10 Similarly, the sizeable freeborn population of Roman Italy has received 
increasing scholarly attention within accounts of the Roman economy, with a particular 
focus on free artisans and craftsmen.11
The broader subject of urban labour and labourers in the Roman world is revelling 
in scholarly attention, as the recent collections of papers edited by Laes and Verboven 
(2017), and by Wilson and Flohr (2016) may show. But the papers in them concern largely 
bits and pieces relevant to the broader picture: despite converging trends they do not 
present one coherent account. Even Hawkins’ monograph, Roman artisans and the urban 
economy, 2016, is merely complementary to my own. It presents many new insights such 
as the major theme of unstable labour demand, but his focus is on the skilled artisan 
or craftsman, not on the unskilled mass of urban labourers.12 A recent book with one 
coherent, integrated approach of the urban labour force, that also links up with the de-
velopments on the subject of the Roman urban economy in the early empire, is lacking.
outline
The second chapter of this thesis defends the assumption that there was an ‘urban 
labour market’, arguing that this hypothesis is both plausible and useful to think with, 
provided that the specifics of the Roman case are kept in mind. The concept of a labour 
7 See, e.g., Hawkins and Mayer eds (forthcoming); de Callataÿ, ed. (2014); Scheidel ed. (2012a); Temin 
(2013a); Bowman ed. (2009); Morris, Saller and Scheidel eds (2007); Scheidel and Von Reden eds 
(2002); the papers in Garnsey (1980) in my view formed an important turning point in Roman 
labour studies.
8 Joshel (1992) on individual labourers in CIL 6 is the first systematic study; see below.
9 Bradley and Cartledge eds (2011), particularly the overviews by Morley, and Bodel; Scheidel 
(2008); Bradley (1994) especially chapter 4 on slave labour; Harper (2011) on late antiquity has 
many valuable observations for the early empire.
10 Garnsey and De Ligt (2016), De Ligt and Garnsey (2012) on their numerical importance; Verboven 
(2012a) on the freedman economy; Mouritsen (2011a) provides a very full and useful account 
concerning freedmen, with chapter 6 (206–247) on freedmen in the economy.
11 Cf Their incorporation in the reference articles on labour and the labour market by Hawkins (2013) 
and Tacoma (forthcoming); also Brunt (1980).
12 Hawkins (2016) 14-15. This book is reworking of his 2006 dissertation. Due to constraints of time, I 
have retained many references to his 2006 manuscript.
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market, as it is known in economic theory, is based on simple price theory: the law of 
supply and demand. This entails assumptions about labour in Roman Italy that need 
to be clarified at some length. It will become clear that the economic definition of a 
labour market should be expanded to an integrated approach of the social and cultural 
backgrounds of the society under scrutiny. Such an approach serves to highlight factors 
producing market imperfection and segmentation.
The way the urban labour market functioned is determined by structural factors in 
society of a social, cultural, economic and/or legal nature. In line with the basic tenets of 
New Institutional Economics, it is now commonly recognized among Roman economic 
historians that institutions are crucial determinants of how economies function. Roman 
labour and labourers did not exist in isolation. It is my contention that the position of 
an individual Roman in the labour market was decided largely by his or her position 
within (predominantly) social institutions. It will be argued that the most important of 
these institutions was the family. Family of birth largely determined future economic 
opportunity, expectations of marriage and childbirth were important in negotiating the 
position of women, and so on. Non-familial collectives, however, should also be factored 
in and were probably particularly influential for those (temporarily) not surrounded by 
their family, such as migrants, or widows.
The structure of this book is based on the importance of institutions for understand-
ing the urban labour market. Having established first that Roman Italy did indeed 
have a functioning urban labour market, the focus of my attention shifts to structural 
determinants of its performance.13 Centre stage is reserved for two chapters on the 
social institution of the Roman family, in its various shapes and sizes. The division of 
the Roman family into two chapters is prompted by a fundamental difference between 
small-scale families on the one hand, and elite households on the other, in terms of their 
demographic make-up as well as their motivation for participation in the labour market. 
It is hoped that this binary classification can do some justice to that specificity.
The next chapter considers non-familial labour relations. The obvious example is 
the much-debated professional collegium. However, recent scholarship has made an 
important leap forward by placing the professional collegia within the context of private 
voluntary associations more generally.14 It is clear that here, too, the social and economic 
functions of associations were seamlessly connected. An analysis of what I have termed 
‘the economics of association’, then, will highlight the role played by voluntary asso-
ciations. Social ties and trust networks beyond the family must have been crucial in a 
society where much hinged on personal security and fides, something that was perhaps 
even more difficult to come by within an urban context than in the countryside.
13 Cf the volume edited by Laes and Verboven (2017).
14 E.g. the papers in Wilson (1996).
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In the concluding chapter the argument is brought together and some of the implica-
tions drawn out. Roman labour did not exist in a historical vacuum: the contribution of 
the Roman case in the context of global labour history should be explicitly addressed. 
The global perspective may serve to highlight the particularities of Roman labour rela-
tions. The discussion of Roman labour relations, conversely, may help us to perceive the 
merits and deficiencies of existing models aiming at universality.
method
The use of theory, models and comparison has become increasingly common in ancient 
history since the pioneering works of, among others, Moses Finley and Keith Hopkins, 
and needs no justification. Much progress in ancient history has been achieved through 
ever increasing engagement with other fields of research to develop new theories and 
models, particularly during the last one or two decades. Very few students currently 
working in the field of Roman socio-economic history have refrained from the applica-
tion of economic concepts of, for example, transaction costs or social network theories. 
It seems that the editors of the Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World 
were not wasting their breath, when in 2007 they urged the ancient historian to con-
tinue “engagements with the social sciences” and “to pursue comparative analyses”.15
The current investigation thus conforms to a wider trend in ancient history. It takes its 
cue mainly from New Institutional Economics (NIE). The subject calls for a more multi-
faceted approach, however, and I will frequently resort to insights drawn from other 
socio-economic theories, from simple price theory of supply and demand, to human 
capital theory and family economics. Many of these theories were developed for the 
early modern or modern period, opening up various lines of comparison. There may be 
those who object to this methodological eclecticism. However, the merits of multiple 
models and comparanda far outweigh the deficits of in-depth knowledge of each. They 
are introduced mostly to develop models and hypotheses, or to illustrate the inherent 
(im-) plausibility of explanations offered. A full comparison is often unnecessary and 
beside the point. The same goes for applying only one theory in a rigid way.
The range of topics dealt with in this book in consequence is much wider than labour 
or the labour market, and includes the Roman family, associations, demography, price 
theory, slavery and more. It is my belief that Roman labour cannot be understood without 
taking into account such structural factors in Roman society. Conversely, an understand-
ing of the urban labour market in Roman Italy is significant to an understanding of the 
complex web of correlations that was Roman society. What is more, ancient historians’ 
exploration of other fields of study should ideally take place along a two-way street. The 
particularities of Rome have a contribution to make to the larger picture.
15 Morris, Saller and Scheidel (2007) 7.
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setting boundaries
The chronological scope of the analysis is the early empire, starting from the reign of Oc-
tavian Augustus (31 BC–14 AD), up to and including the reign of the emperor Diocletian 
(284–305), who issued the important Prices Edict. That is a period of a little over three 
centuries. Emphasis is on the structural continuity of the empire as the background for 
this analysis of the working population of Roman Italy. That is not to deny the fact that 
political change, social conflict, demographic shocks such as epidemics, and resulting 
potential market fluctuations, occurred in this period. Think only of the many changes 
which took place during the crisis of the third century. But the impact of conflict or 
epidemic disease, as well as long-term trends in demography, are virtually impossible to 
trace through the scattered and fragmentary data for prices and wages, and inscriptions 
that are not often securely dated. It seems appropriate to choose a structural approach 
that incorporates the evidence for the whole period.
The period coincides with the time frame for which ancient sources are most abun-
dant, including the inscriptions that form the most important body of evidence for this 
thesis. The so-called epigraphic habit peaked in the late first, early second century AD.16 
And although the epigraphic habit continued under Constantine and his followers, the 
body of epitaphs became more and more Christianized and demonstrates a significant 
change in labour ethics, evident in Christian perceptions of the family and the labour 
participation of women.17 For this reason, Christian inscriptions and other Christian 
sources are not taken into account. Other evidence for the Roman period is similarly 
concentrated in the Principate.
This study concentrates on Roman Italy, the core region of the early Roman empire. 
A high urbanization rate and an unprecedented degree of sophistication of the urban 
network had consequences for the development and the nature of the Roman Italian 
labour market. The population of the imperial heartland was more dense than in the 
provinces, and the wealthy elite was disproportionately based there.18 Moreover, Roman 
Italy was where the exceptional city of Rome was located: the capital functioned as an 
engine generating economic opportunity throughout Roman Italy.19 Socio-political 
circumstances in the Roman empire were also conducive to economic prosperity. Under 
the first emperors a relatively stable government was established. The Pax Augusta was 
firmly in place, and the population of Roman Italy in particular benefited from Italy’s 
16 MacMullen (1982). Here, the epigraphic habit refers to the overall output of inscriptions, whereas 
in the following analysis local and regional variation will certainly be taken into account.
17 E.g. Pleket (1988) 275 on the Christian doctrine of the dignity of labor.
18 Scheidel (2007a) 47 with table 3.1 on page 48.
19 Cf Morley (1996).
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exceptional position through exemptions from taxation. From the perspective of NIE, 
then, prospects were particularly good for the Italian part of the Roman economy.
Because the scope of this work is considerable and impinges on many other topics, it is 
important to signal the boundaries of its reach. My focus is specifically on the non-elite. 
The elite was a relatively closed segment of the population. The boundaries between 
the elite and the subelite were nevertheless permeable. The elite probably needed a 
continuous influx of newcomers to sustain itself, both in terms of numbers and in terms 
of wealth; freedmen may not have been allowed in, but their descendants were.20 But 
the resulting elite was engaged in a very distinct ‘labour market’, for magistracies, priest-
hoods, and the like. The elite therefore features mainly on the sideline of this work, so 
to speak, as employers, investors, and specifically as heads of household. Much that will 
be said about elite domus holds true as well for that one very particular household, the 
familia Caesaris. But as the imperial household grew into the bureaucracy of an empire, 
the specific nature of the familia Caesaris deserves the more detailed separate treatment 
that it has received elsewhere.21
Most Romans were engaged in agriculture and, to a lesser extent, the exploitation of 
other natural resources: Roman society had an organic economy.22 Scheidel’s educated 
guess is that “there is no good reason to believe that more than one person in eight 
would have been permanently or predominantly engaged in non-agrarian labour”.23 
Hence, it could easily be argued that a focus on the urban labour market largely ignores 
the majority of the population, but this is not strictly speaking true. Roman Italian cities 
survived on the products from the land that surrounded them. Some craftsmen lived 
in the countryside and some farmers lived in the city. Farmers sold their surplus in the 
urban market, and potentially hired extra labourers there for the harvest. Conversely, 
many city-dwellers must have been migrants from the countryside who moved to the 
city for seasonal labour, or who settled their more permanently. The distinction between 
the urban and rural population was not clear-cut.24 But a focus on city dwellers in the 
context of labour is justified by the fact that labour differentiation as a rule takes place in 
an urban environment, and occupational inscriptions are largely from an urban context.
Work in the army, too, is a world apart that still awaits treatment in a full-length 
monograph: there were indeed those employed as artisans and craftsmen in the army, 
20 Cf Tacoma (2006) on the Roman Egyptian elite. Much of the discussion is also relevant for Roman 
Italy; Broekaert (2012) 58-60 on elite and intermarriage with wealthy merchants.
21 Chantraine (1967); Weaver (1972); Boulvert (1974); Schumacher (2001); see now also the disserta-
tion of Penner (2013) on imperial households.
22 This includes mining, and could include glass works, potteries and brickmaking.
23 Scheidel (2007a) 80, talking about the whole of Greco-Roman Antiquity.
24 Cf De Ligt (1991).
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travelling or stationed with the legions.25 Most of them are not part of this discussion for 
obvious reasons. Occasionally, the army men do feature in this book – but only insofar 
as they returned home safely and lived out their days in the cities of Roman Italy. Thus, 
a certain Lucius Artorius was a veteran of the legio XIX commemorated in Cesena in the 
early 2nd century when, judging from the motifs on his funerary relief, he had presum-
ably become a butcher.26
Labor omnia vicit improbus: ConCePtuAlIzIng lAbouR And woRk27
There was much work and there were many workers in the ancient world but one 
clear, unequivocal concept, which abstractly and unequivocally denoted labor, 
was lacking.28      
Work, as we know it, is a modern invention.29
Pleket and Gorz point to a fundamental difficulty in studying Roman labour. What are 
we studying when we study Roman work, or labour? To the Romans, there was not 
necessarily a concept of work, as opposed to leisure: the cum dignitate otium glorified by 
Cicero probably was not something the non-elite could really relate to.30 The linguistic 
antonym of otium, negotium, does not actually mean ‘work’, but ‘business undertaking’. 
25 To my knowledge Rink (1983); Strobel (1991) are the exceptions that briefly discuss the manual 
labourers in the army. See now also Herz (2017).
26 CIL 11. 348: L(ucius) Artorius C(ai) f(ilius) mil(es) / veteran(us) leg(ionis) XIX / Artoria L(uci) l(iberta) 
Cleopatra / L(ucius) Artorius L(uci) l(ibertus) Licinus; with Zimmer (1982) no. 8 who argues that the 
freedman L. Artorius Licinus was the butcher because of the placing of the butcher-motifs on the 
monument; the survival of a veteran of the fated legio XIX that was almost completely lost at the 
Battle of the Teutoburg Forest in 9 AD incites questions about the dating of this inscription in the 
120’s, since the number XIX was never again used for any Roman legion.
27 Verg. Georg. I. 145–6, “Toil triumphed over every obstacle, unrelenting Toil”, translation H. Rushton 
Fairclough, rev. G.P. Gould (Loeb Classical Library 1999).
28 Pleket (1988) 268–9.
29 Gorz (1989) 14. Cf also Von Reden, Brill’s New Pauly (first appeared online 2006), s.v. ‘Unemploy-
ment’: “Unemployment was not an economic problem in Antiquity, because concepts such as 
full employment and working population did not exist”. For a good attempt to tackle the issue of 
unemployment in Antiquity, Pleket (1988) 271–5.
30 Cic. Sest. 98. Cf in this context the useful conceptual difference made by Van der Linden (2011) 
27–8: there must have been times of ‘non-work’, “recovery from work through, for instance, relax-
ation or sleeping”, but probably less time reserved for leisure, or ‘anti-work’, “all playful activities 
that cost a lot of energy but are not meant to produce useful objects or services” – in other words: 
otium.
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The citation from Gorz underlines the fact that the historian’s understanding of what 
‘work’ is, differs over time.
“Obviously, labour history is about labour”, Van der Linden and Lucassen write in 
their programmatic paper, Prolegomena for a global labour history.31 But that does not 
necessarily make it clear what labour is. Is labour the same thing as work? If not, what is 
work? In common parlance, both labour and work can refer to any variety of activities; 
in scholarly analysis, they are often used more specifically. Thus, labour history has long 
focused on labour in a relatively restricted sense, specifically referring to wage-labour 
in the context of early capitalism.32 By contrast, the concept of work appears to be a 
relatively recent one, that addresses the limitations of the earlier use of ‘labour’. Ancient 
history cannot yet rely on a clear labour/work terminology, and a clear definition of both 
concepts is urgently called for.33
This thesis studies Roman labour in a very specific sense, that is according to the 
definition of labour in the Oxford English Dictionary:
Work (esp. physical work) considered as a resource or commodity, typically when 
necessary to supply the needs of the community or for the execution of a particu-
lar task; the contribution of the worker to production.34
Labour in the sense of “work (…) considered as a resource or commodity” has a Marxist 
ring to it, which in the formulation of the OED is probably a reflection of the current 
Western capitalist interpretation. Its history suggests a distinct difference between the 
commodification of work, and the commodification of workers, however, which would 
effectively exclude slave labour from the definition. Since slave labour is explicitly meant 
to be included in this analysis, commodified labour should be taken to encompass la-
bourers as a commodity throughout.
“Work (…) considered as a resource or commodity”, presumably means that it is a 
money-making engagement, where in case of a dependent labourer the money may 
also be made by someone else. Latin labor carries the same connotations as its deriva-
tives labour, Italian lavoro, Spanish labor, etcetera, associating it with (physical) pain or 
hardship.35
31 Van der Linden and Lucassen (1999) 8.
32 See concluding chapter.
33 For another attempt: Verboven (2017a).
34 OED online (accessed 26-10-2016), ‘Labour’, s.v. 10a.
35 OED online (accessed 26-10-2016), ‘Labour’, s.v 1 and esp. 2a: “Bodily or mental exertion particu-
larly when difficult, painful, or compulsory; (hard) work; toil; esp. physical toil”. Hofmeester and 
Moll-Murata (2011) 15 note the ambiguity in early modern vocabulary.
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The efforts of labour, specifically hard work and manual labour may also be indicated 
by opus; it is no coincidence that condemnation to hard labour, is damnatio ad opus. 
Operae, conversely, indicates service and implies choice.36Operae is also the legal term 
for the requirement that manumitted slaves had to provide a certain amount of labour 
for their former masters in return for their freedom.
Work as a concept appears to be broader than labour, referring to a wide range of 
actions inclusive of labour.37 Greek ergon/ ergazesthai appears to cover a similar width.38 
Labour historians broadly adhere to the definition of work drawn up by the sociologists 
Chris and Charles Tilly.39
Work includes any human effort adding use value to goods and services. How-
ever much their performers may enjoy or loathe the effort, conversation, song, 
decoration, pornography, table-setting, gardening, house-cleaning, and repair of 
broken toys, all involve work to the extent that they increase satisfactions their 
consumers gain from them. Prior to the twentieth century, a vast majority of 
the world’s workers performed the bulk of their work in other settings than the 
salaried jobs as we know them today. Even today, over the world as a whole, most 
work takes place outside of regular jobs.40
Their definition is important for two reasons: first, Tilly and Tilly correctly emphasize the 
importance of non-wage labour in many historical societies. The Roman Empire is no ex-
ception to that. Wage-labour may not have been as marginal as it is sometimes thought 
to have been, but Rome was a slave society, and the existence of a large number of 
slaves and ex-slaves alone significantly complicated the makeup of the labour market.41 
A highly inclusive definition of work like this is therefore necessary in order to do justice 
to the complexity and diversity of Roman labour relations, encompassing unfree and 
free labour, dependent and independent labour, as well as the regularly unremunerated 
economic contribution of women, and children.42 Moreover, the definition of Tilly and 
Tilly is the one that labour historians embarking on the path of global labour history 
36 Lewis and Short (ed. 1958), s.v. opera, write “opus is used mostly of the mechanical activity of work, 
as that of animals, slaves, and soldiers; operae supposes a free will and desire to serve”.
37 OED online (accessed 26-10-2016), ‘work’, for work being inclusive of labour, s.v. 4 and 5.
38 Pleket (1988) 268.
39 E.g., Van der Linden and Lucassen (1999), Hofmeester and Moll-Murata (2011), and in ancient his-
tory also by Verboven (2017a) 4-6.
40 Tilly and Tilly (1998) 22.
41 On the marginality of free hired labour, famously: Finley (19982) 68, 127, 136.
42 The economic value of unremunerated labour had been stressed earlier by feminist scholars; see 
the influential work of Tilly and Scott (1974).
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seem to adhere to.43 Opting for the same definition thus opens up enormous potential 
for comparison.
In sum, whereas ‘work’ indicates the recent broadening of scope in the scholarly field, 
the term ‘labour’ acknowledges a debt to neo-classical and Marxist labour history. There 
is a fertile tradition of labour history to build on, and a wealth of comparative material. 
That said, it is important to acknowledge a fundamental difference in the meaning of 
labour and work that is conceptually useful, where labour is a ‘money-making engage-
ment’ and work is “any human effort adding value”. This thesis is about Roman labour, 
but in the context of Roman work.
the dIsCouRse on woRk: the RomAn elIte
Most of the ancient evidence was written by and for men from the elite. This is hardly a 
new observation, nor is it unique to the Roman empire:
Elite discourses are dominated by members of the elites and by intellectuals. In 
all the periods under consideration, members of the subordinate classes, and 
particularly wage dependents and manual workers, participate rather indirectly, 
as objects, in discourses on work. Very seldom do they appear in the sources 
as active speakers. The great exception, however, is made up of people of the 
‘middling sort’ such as merchants and artisans, who based their identities, self-
esteem, and political demands upon their work.44
The study of work through literary sources and legal texts, explicitly became a study of 
‘attitudes towards work’, rather than ‘work’.45 Roman labour was conceptualized mainly 
through the eyes of those who derived status from the fact that they did not have to 
work: the Roman elite.
One famous passage that is repeatedly invoked in this context, is Cicero’s De Officiis 
1.150–1.46 In this passage, Cicero distinguishes between trades and employments that 
are becoming to a gentleman (liberalis) on the one hand, and those that are not-so-
becoming (illiberales) and lowly (sordidae) on the other. A list of the latter follows, 
43 E.g., Van der Linden and Lucassen (1999) 8; Lucassen (20082) 45; Hofmeester and Moll-Murata 
(2011) 6.
44 Ehmer (2014) 112, with reference to Lis and Soly (2012).
45 See for example the diachronic studies of Lis and Soly (2012); Lis and Ehmer (2009); Van den Hoven 
(1996); Applebaum (1992).
46 Apart from the aforementioned works (n. 45), also in e.g. Dixon (2001c) 113 ff, Joshel (1992) 66–7, 
Kampen (1981) 114–5, Treggiari (1980), Finley (19732) 41–57.
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including such jobs “which incur ill-will” (like tax collectors), and all wage-workers, “for 
in their case their very wages are the warrant of their slavery”. There is, says Cicero, some 
merit in the more skilled jobs, particularly those that benefit society “such as medicine 
or architecture or teaching – they are respectable for those whose status they befit”.47 
Ultimately, however, Cicero advocates that agriculture (in the sense of landholding) is 
the only fitting source of income.
This is just one source, of course, but the reason for its frequent appearance in discus-
sions of the subject is that “Cicero the moralist has proved not a bad guide to prevailing 
values”.48 The Roman elite looked down on those who had to work for a living. A very 
similar attitude regularly prevailed among the higher classes at least up until the Indus-
trial Revolution and even after, when manual labour was still held in relative contempt 
compared to landholding.49 For the majority of the population, however, it would be a 
luxury to engage in philosophical reflections about work or non-work: work to them 
was a necessity, a simple fact of life. Elite disdain towards the working population would 
make no-one give up their occupation. There is one thing that a strong elite ideology 
potentially could have done, however: it may have changed the way that individuals 
arranged to be remembered.
the dIgnIty of woRk: the non-elIte
[J]ob titles, in contrast to jobs, exist because (...) men and women actually called 
themselves foot servants, financial agents, silversmiths, and jewelers.50
The literary sources appear to show a rather coherent picture that does not take very 
kindly to work and labourers. It is now realized that this ideology, however, does not 
match well with the way the labourers themselves refer to their work. De Robertis al-
ready pointed to the significant difference of opinion between what he called l’ambiente 
volgare, that is views toward labour among popular ranks, and l’ambiente aulico, or at-
titudes from within the elite milieu.51
47 Cic. Off. 1. 150: Qui in odia hominum incurrunt (…); est enim in illis ipsa merces auctoramentum 
servitutis; 1.151: ut medicina, ut architectura, ut doctrina rerum honestarum, eae sunt iis, quorum 
ordini convenient, honestae. Translation Finley (19732) 41–2.
48 Finley (19732) 57.
49 For preindustrial Europe, see most extensively Lis and Soly (2012). A substantial section of this 
impressive volume is devoted to the attitudes towards work and workers in Greek and Roman 
Antiquity.
50 Joshel (1992) 71.
51 De Robertis (1963) 21–97.
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occupational inscriptions
The voice of the non-elite is not lost entirely. The members of the working population 
themselves occasionally disclose both occupation and their opinion of it to the histo-
rian, in the documentary texts on papyrus that survive from Roman Egypt, for example, 
that include detailed letters, and contracts.52 From Roman Italy, however, occupations 
are known mainly through inscriptions. An occupational title is recorded on the epitaph 
of between two and three thousand Romans from Italy; around a hundred of them had 
tools of the trade or scenes from work depicted on their funerary monuments. Profes-
sional associations professed their shared occupation publicly through their very name, 
adding roughly two hundred inscriptions. The occupational inscriptions and reliefs form 
the most important body of evidence for the current investigation.
My understanding of occupational inscriptions includes epigraphic texts with an 
indication of employment or job-title, including individual job indicators such as ‘spin-
ning woman’, or ‘two brother carpenters’, as well as inscriptions set up by a collective 
like the ‘association of bargemen’.53 Not included are the instrumentum domesticum, that 
is any writing on artefacts (a great many signatures and/or stamps), and inscriptiones 
parietariae, that is wall-inscriptions or graffiti – the second type is de facto limited to 
Pompeii and Herculaneum.54 These two types of sources are of a fundamentally different 
nature than the other inscriptions with job-title, and on top of that are often fragmen-
tary and offer very little information on the labourers themselves.
It must be presumed that on a tombstone, occupation was recorded as a result of 
a conscious choice of the deceased (for a funerary monument constructed se vivo), 
or their heirs: a slab of marble can only contain so much text, so the decision what to 
record becomes highly significant. Epitaphs are set up at a very particular time: at death. 
Their importance transcends death, however. Remembering the life of the deceased, 
with the active participation of the living, these texts are highly informative about life 
in Roman society. An occupational title predictably is added most for the dedicatee, 
but not uncommonly for the dedicator as well, and occasionally only for the dedicator. 
To many artisans, to collegiati, and others, work ostensibly was a source of pride and an 
important part of their identity.55 The well-known monument of the baker Eurysaces in 
Rome traces back his wealth to his occupation in every detail: in the inscription that is 
rephrased similarly on all four sides, on the elaborate relief like a frieze that runs along 
52 E.g. Gibbs (2011), Van Minnen (1987).
53 Quasillaria, e.g. CIL 6. 6339; duo fratres fabri tignuarii, CIL 6. 9411; collegium naviculariorum, CIL 6. 
1740.
54 Instrumentum domesticum, collected in CIL volume 15, and see most elaborately the papers col-
lected in Harris ed. (1993); the inscriptiones parietariae are collected in CIL volume 4.
55 Joshel (1992) passim.
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the top, and perhaps even in the shape of the actual monument.56 And not just the 
ostentatiously successful, like Eurysaces, felt that work was significant enough to record. 
There are examples of slave, freed and freeborn workers, men, women and children, 
and each category is attested on humble as well as lavish monuments. It is difficult to 
tell from a job-title alone who would be able to afford an inscription, or what their work 
meant in terms of social status and identity; even an alipilus, a ‘plucker of armpit hair’, 
was able to set up quite a sizeable tomb and dedicate it to his wife and to an unknown 
number of freedmen.57
What one does for a living has become one of the main features of identification in 
the present day. Roman job-titles are evocative and often have a familiar ring to them. It 
seems to me that this has invoked a certain feeling of identification with these ‘ordinary’ 
Romans among many historians.58 Partly for that reason, perhaps, there has been no 
lack of scholarly attention for the occupational inscriptions, especially considering the 
fact that occupational indicators are found in merely a small minority of all inscriptions. 
A percentage is difficult to provide because I will not hazard a guess as to how many 
inscriptions from Roman Italy have come down to us altogether. Despite that, it seems 
56 Petersen (2003); cf George (2006) 23-4 for the exceptional nature of this “blatant celebration of 
work”, but with p. 24 for the fact that through its scale the monument also conforms to elite views: 
“The frieze does not memorialize Eurysaces’ own work as much as his authority over the work of 
others”.
57 CIL 6. 9141. There is a ‘job-description’ of the alipilus by Seneca, that does not suggest that it was 
a very respectable occupation: Sen. Ep. 56.2, “alipilum cogita tenuem et stridulam vocem, quo sit 
notabilior, subinde exprimentem nec umquam tacentem, nisi dum vellit alas et alium pro se clamare 
cogit” – “Think of the hair plucker with his thin, creaking voice, constantly squealing to be more 
noticeable and never quiet, except when he plucks armpits and forces another to scream for him”.
58 Compare the title of León (2007) written for a general audience: Working IX to V (who actually 
emphasises the more ‘exotic’ nature of Greco-Roman occupations for comic effect).
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clear that the occupational inscriptions would probably come to well below five per 
cent.59
Job-title is thus seen as a significant distinctive feature in inscriptions by the ancients, 
but also by historians of the ancient world. This is apparent, for example, in large corpora 
of inscriptions, that generally include a sub-header for occupational inscriptions.60 Oc-
cupation was also singled out as one of the criteria for the subject-based collection of 
Hermann Dessau.61 This longstanding awareness of occupations mentioned in ancient 
sources greatly facilitates research. However, the inclusion or exclusion of a text in a 
corpus or under a sub-header depends entirely on the editors’ choice, and on their 
understanding of work. As we will see, the same is true of the selection criteria used 
for epigraphic investigations into labour and labourers specifically. The fact that this 
relatively small sub-set of epigraphic evidence tends to be highlighted, may also have 
distorted historians’ understanding of how much we actually know about labour in the 
Roman empire.
In the last decades of the previous century, the occupational inscriptions became a 
point of interest in and of themselves. A series of pioneering articles by Susan Treggiari 
carefully analyzes and contextualizes occupational inscriptions from Rome. Treggiari 
raises many important questions in her considerations of Roman labourers, and of par-
ticular groups among them, such as elite households and especially female workers.62 
Astrid Händel employs the epigraphic evidence for preliminary observations about 
trade and wholesalers in Rome.63 The fullest exploration to date of the occupational 
59 If around half of the ca 2,500 occupational inscriptions come from Rome, a very rough calculation 
for that city would come to 1,250/60,000 = 2.1 per cent. 60, 000 is based on the estimate in Tacoma 
and Tybout (2016) 358 n. 46. Cf Eck (1998) 32: “Von den rund 35000 funerären Texten, die in CIL 
VI publiziert sind, geben nur rund 5000 einen genaueren Hinweis auf die soziale Stellung. Doch 
höchstens rund 1300 von ihnen beziehen sich auf ‘normale’ Berufe (…)” – that would be 3.7 per 
cent; Sigismund-Nielsen (2006) 206 for a reassuring finding of 4 per cent in CIL 6 (with table 7 on 
page 211). Her ‘random sample’ of CIL 6 is very problematic, however. Contrast e.g. her finding 
of 1 per cent with occupational title in the monument of the Statilii with the thorough study of 
Borbonus (2014) 128 table 9, who finds no less than 28.8 per cent for that columbarium; Huttunen 
(1974) 48 finally, talks about 9.5 per cent of dedicatees or 4.4 per cent of dedicators. His estimates 
should in my view be discarded entirely, however, because he works with a radically different 
understanding of what ‘occupation’ means, explicitly including senatorial or equestrian status 
among the occupational indicators for example (p. 47).
60 E.g. CIL: Apparitores et officiales (magistratum, imperatoris, vectigalium); Artes et officia privata.
61 Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae (ILS) (1892).
62 Treggiari (1973); (1975a); (1975b); (1976); (1979a); (1979b); (1980) ; cf also the insightful chapter on 
written sources on working women in Kampen (1981) 107-29.
63 Händel (1983). Unfortunately I have not been able to locate the “entstehenden Dissertation, die 
über die hier vorgelegte Inschriftenanalyse hinaus weitergehende Untersuchungen zum Gegen-
stand hat“, mentioned on p. 90, but see also Händel (1985).
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inscriptions is a monograph by Sandra Joshel called Work, identity, and legal status at 
Rome.64 She analyzes occupational inscriptions set up by or for individuals from the city 
of Rome. Joshel’s book characterizes the various groups who recorded or were com-
memorated with occupational title, and sheds light on the motivations to do so. Rather 
than an investigation into the Roman workforce, this work is all about the inscriptions, 
and it has become an essential guide to a full understanding of the material.
Since Joshel’s book, there have been others who focused on occupational inscriptions 
in other geographical areas. A thick description of the occupational epigraphy from 
Picenum was published by Alessandro Cristofori.65 Outside of the Italian Peninsula, F.P. 
Rizzo devoted a book to the occupational epigraphy of Sicily.66 These works both of-
fer an interpretive framework, but the scarcity of the material makes it difficult to go 
beyond general observations on labour and the economy, and even their more general 
observations must therefore remain mostly conjectural. The value of these undertak-
ings lies in Rizzo’s and particularly Cristofori’s painstaking collection and thorough 
commentary of the individual inscriptions. Beyond the scope of my research, but very 
interesting and useful material for comparison, is the work of Frézouls on Gallia and 
Germania.67 The importance of the observations of Onno van Nijf in his monograph on 
professional organisations in the Roman East, exceeds both professional organisations 
and the Roman East: especially his finding of a chronological development in the record-
ing of occupation in epitaphs is valuable, though I have not been able to detect a similar 
trend for Roman Italy.68 Epigraphic sources regarding collegia have been collected in the 
extensive work of Waltzing, supplemented by Menella and Apicella.69 Waltzing remains 
the starting point for sources on the collegia, though his careful interpretative volumes 
have long been superseded by a rich scholarly tradition on associations.
Some Roman labourers have attracted more attention than others, which must in part 
be due to the fact that they are the most common in the epigraphic record. Thus, the 
ambitious Wirtschaftliche Untersuchungen of Gummerus have resulted in two meticulous 
epigraphic analyses of doctors, and the more general group of jewellers/metalworkers.70 
Well-documented and well-studied occupations for women are those in the medical 
64 Joshel (1992).
65 Cristofori (2004).
66 Rizzo (1993), to be consulted with the critical review of Clauss (1994) in mind.
67 Frézouls (1991); on the city of Narbonne specifically see Bonsangue (2002); cf also Tate (1991) for 
Syria.
68 Van Nijf (1997) 40–2; on p. 42 he does suggest regional differences in trends.
69 Waltzing (1895–1900) 4 vols; Menella and Apicella (2000).
70 Gummerus, Wirtschaftliche Untersuchungen I, II (1915), and III (1918); Medical occupations: idem 
(1932) with additional material in Rowland (1977). For doctors, see also the archaeological ap-
proach of Jackson (2005).
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sector, with special attention for midwives and – not strictly medical – wet-nurses.71 The 
epigraphic record plays a large part in all of these studies. Other scholars have focused 
not so much on occupation, but on a particular find-spot of the inscriptions. The co-
lumbarium tombs from Rome and the individual households included among them are 
relatively easy to demarcate, which is probably why they have received ample scholarly 
attention.72 Similarly, the epitaphs from the Isola Sacra necropolis are now readily acces-
sible in a detailed and well-organized monograph.73
The main dataset used in this study is a catalogue of job titles in Latin, derived chiefly 
from lists provided by Joshel, Treggiari and Von Petrikovits.74 Their catalogues proved to 
be complementary, presumably because they had a different workforce in mind. Joshel 
lists the occupations that are attested for individual Romans in the city of Rome.75 Treg-
giari talks about a more specific, but not clearly delineated group of opifices (craftsmen) 
and tabernarii (shopkeepers).76 Von Petrikovits, finally, seems to have aimed simply to be 
as inclusive as possible, listing everything that might be considered a job. Compiling a 
new catalogue of my own, I occasionally excluded a title from the list that to my mind 
is not securely attested in epigraphy or other sources from the period under scrutiny.77 
The resulting catalogue was then expanded by adding occupations discovered in epi-
graphic, literary and legal sources. This has resulted in a list of 564 job-titles. I hasten to 
add, however, that the exact number is elusive: some job-titles refer to the same or very 
similar jobs and usage may have changed over time.78
The spectrum of occupations ranges from the humble (such as a litter-bearer, lecti-
carius) to the more privileged (gem engraver, gemmarius sculptor). Even legal infamy was 
no reason not to be proud of an occupation: a number of male and female entertain-
71 Laes (2011b) and (2010) with catalogue; Sparreboom (MPhil-thesis 2009); Flemming (2000); Joshel 
(1986).
72 Among others, Borbonus (2014), Hasegawa (2005), Caldelli and Ricci (1999). See chapter 4.
73 Helttula et al. (2007).
74 See appendix 1. Joshel (1992) 176–82; Von Petrikovits (1981) 83–119; Treggiari (1980) 61–4.
75 Joshel (1992) 176: ”only the titles borne by named individuals”.
76 Treggiari (1980) 48: “The area of employment to be discussed is roughly that condemned by 
Greco-Roman philosophers”.
77 Such as carnarius (butcher), only attested in Greek in papyri; clusor with no references and Von 
Petrikovits (1981) 192 “fraglich, ob ein Handwerker”; paracharactes CTh. 9. 21. 9 – ‘forger’, which 
is not in my view a job-title; or tomacularius, supposedly a Bratwurst-dealer, with Von Petrikovits 
(1981) 117, only reference to Not. Tir. 103, 80 “(hier irrig tomatularius)”.
78 The catalogue also includes a number of decisions on my part: for example, the hapax anellarius 
was included as a variant of the more common anularius (ring-maker), for example, but vestifex is a 
separate entry from vestificus because of the evident variation in job-titles for ‘tailors’; Gummerus 
(1932) identifies some chronological changes in usage for medical job-titles; more generally, 
Neumann (1981) and Händel (1985) 501.
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ers comes up in the sources, and there is also a lanista (trainer/owner of gladiators).79 
Some wage-earning engagements apparently inspired more pride than others and are 
far more commonly attested, as indicated for doctors and wet-nurses above. Various 
merchants and tradesmen (mercatores and negotiatores/negiotiantes) are also common.
Some members of the working population of Roman Italy used Greek on their 
tombstone, not Latin. To my knowledge Greek epitaphs from Roman Italy have not sys-
tematically been taken into account by any of the previous studies into Roman labour. 
The necessary tools are available: there is a catalogue of occupational titles in Greek, 
albeit compiled for Roman Egypt, and IGUR and IG include in their indices headers for 
artes et officia privata.80 There are various forms of cultural interaction attested. From the 
Isola Sacra necropolis, for example, comes a beautifully carved inscription set up by Q. 
Marcios Dem(etrios), archiatros – a high-ranking doctor (figure 1.1).81
Ἰουλίᾳ Πρ[όκλᾳ]/ Τ. · Μουνατίω · Πρ[όκλῳ] / Μουνατίᾳ · Ἐ[3] / Κ. · Μάρκιος · Δη[μήτριος] / ἀρχιατρος [
To Julia Procla, to Titus Munatius Proclus, [and] to Munatia E(…). Quintus Marcius Demetrios, physician, [set 
up this monument]
79 Lanista: CIL 6. 10200. Legal infamy and profession: Edwards (1997).
80 Catalogue for Roman Egypt: Drexhage (2004) ; cf Ruffing (2008) vol. 2.
81 SEG 13, 473 = IPO A 158 = ISIS 149; photo from Helttula et al. (2007).
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The inscription is written in latinized Greek, by and for people with Latin or latinized 
names.82
Access to online databases for most of the ancient sources, including inscriptions, 
papyri and the entire corpus of known Latin and Greek literary and documentary texts, 
makes it relatively easy to locate and access the sources for a particular occupation once 
a job-title is known. The index vocabulorum to CIL 6 is also an incredibly valuable tool, 
since most of the sources come from the capital. Identification of the occupations is not 
straightforward, however, and it is here that my catalogue of job-titles should be helpful.
Inscriptions are not without biases. It is well known that the inscription-erecting popu-
lation was not a direct reflection of the Roman population: men receive commemora-
tion more often than women, and the young are overrepresented, to name but a few 
characteristics.83 There is local and cultural variation in epigraphic habit.84 Occupational 
inscriptions come with a number of additional biases. It should be stressed once more 
that only a very small minority of epitaphs records an occupation at all (see above). That 
could theoretically be the result of a general negative view of labour and labourers in 
Roman society, as encountered in the elite discourse. Monuments inscribed with a job-
title or with an ornamental representation of work, however, would seem to emphasize 
pride in, and identification with, a job.85 It is hard to believe that the elaborate funerary 
altar of the blacksmiths Lucius Cornelius Atimetus and his freedman Lucius Cornelius 
Epaphra, for example, represents anything but self-respect – it is a large monument 
with tools, a vending scene, and a work scene within the smithy on the sides.86 Nor do I 
support the view that the small numbers of occupational inscriptions might be due to 
the fact that entrepreneurs or supervisors of a business in particular are commemorated 
with job-title, to the exclusion of their employees.87 Whereas it is true that the occupa-
tion of the head of household is more likely to be mentioned, there are many inscrip-
tions for dependent labourers including those within the family (wives or children), and 
82 Compare IPO A 184 = ISIS 157 (D(is) M(anibus) / T(ito) Munatio T(iti) f(ilio) Proclo / Quir(ina) Iuliano 
/ fec(it) Iulia Ti(beri) f(ilia) Procla / m(ater) f(ilio) p(iissimo?) vix(it) ann(os) VI die(s) XIIII) and the sar-
cophagus with inscription IPO A 185 = ISIS 158: T(ito) Munat(io) / T(iti) f(ilio) Proclo – both in Latin, 
clearly related because both mention Titus Munatius Proclus (Iulianus), son of Titus, and IPO A 184 
also refers to Julia Procla.
83 Hopkins (1966), (1987); this difference is particularly marked in Rome, cf Garnsey and De Ligt 
(2016) 93 with references.
84 Hemelrijk (2015) 30–1 with references for a concise, nuanced update on MacMullen (1982) and the 
concept of epigraphic density.
85 Joshel (1992) 163 and throughout.
86 CIL 6. 16166 (Rome 1st c. AD), now in the Galleria Lapidaria of the Vatican Museums: L(ucius) 
Cornelius / Atimetus / sibi et L(ucio) Cornelio / Epaphrae lib(erto) / bene merenti / ceterisq(ue) libertis / 
lib(ertabus) posterisque / eorum.
87 Tran (2007b) 124-5.
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the extended household (freedmen, colliberti, slaves): the monument of Atimetus and 
Epaphra belongs in that category, too.
In my view, the most logical explanation would be a general preference among the 
majority of the inscription-erecting population to record familial ties before anything 
else. Particularly women were generally commemorated in a familial context, in ac-
cordance with Roman ideals: If women were unlikely to put up or receive inscriptions, 
this phenomenon becomes even more pronounced for inscriptions with job-title.88 
Slaves and ex-slaves, conversely, may not have had family to commemorate or to be 
commemorated by, which helps to explain that they are the ones most likely to have an 
occupational title in the epigraphic record.
The amount of epigraphic sources is impressive, but that should not obscure the fact 
that their interpretation is not always straightforward. The epitaphs are often brief and 
offer little or no context, and it is not always clear whether an occupational indicator 
is meant to be a job-title, or a cognomen.89 Fortunately, more often an occupational 
title is unquestionably an occupational title. But then it is not always clear what the job 
entailed. Was a margaritarius a dealer in pearls, or a pearl-setter? Or was he both, selling 
his own wares in his home-shop taberna? What exactly did an aquarius do with water?90 
Context matters.
With certain occupations missing from the record, with other jobs under- or over-
represented, and with such a low percentage of ‘workers’ attested altogether, it is clearly 
not possible to equate the individuals in the occupational inscriptions with the working 
population. Most pieces of that puzzle are probably missing, though definite patterns 
can still be discerned. Other ancient sources, models and theories are necessary to de-
cide whether these are patterns of commemoration, accidents of tradition, or reflections 
of reality.
Reliefs
There is no lack of interest from students of the Roman world, as well as from the general 
public, in figurative scenes of Romans at work on stone or frescos; the scenes of fulling 
from the walls of a fullery in Pompeii have been reproduced countless times, for exam-
88 Cf Groen-Vallinga (2013), and chapter 2. This pattern is most marked in the city of Rome.
89 Cf. Gummerus (1926).
90 Von Petrikovits (1981) 69: “Die auffallende Tatsache, dass schon seit Plautus im Lateinischen selten 
zwischen den Produzenten und Händlern einer Ware unterschieden wird, dürfte darauf zurückge-
hen, dass diese Unterscheidung oft auch in der Wirklichkeit nicht existierte”. Cf Morel (1992) 232. 
Händel’s brave attempt to identify jobs ending in –tor as executive employees and those in –arius 
as owners/wholesalers simply does not hold, think e.g. of the aerarius (coppersmith), or albarius 
(stucco worker), brattiarius (gold leaf beater), and so on.
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ple.91 Occupational reliefs, however, are considerably less numerous than occupational 
inscriptions. They signify a more expensive form of funerary commemoration, which 
goes a long way to explain their smaller numbers. Probably for the same reason, slaves 
are hardly ever commemorated on a monument with a relief, and that includes occupa-
tional reliefs. Freedmen predominate. It is interesting that the Gallic provinces are best 
represented in scholarly literature: occupational reliefs seem to have been part of the 
commemorative habit there more than anywhere else.92 The Italian heartland neverthe-
less brought forth many pictorial sources for work.
Zimmer’s collection of Römische Berufsdarstellungen (1982) contains about one hun-
dred funerary reliefs, shop signs, stones and frescos from Roman Italy portraying scenes 
from work, and monuments depicting tools. It is the only illustrated catalogue of this 
type of evidence to date that I know of, and as such remains invaluable.93 Kampen also 
includes a catalogue of work-reliefs in her book on working women in Ostia, but her 
criteria are significantly different.94 Her catalogue includes women from Italy and the 
provinces, and men only from Ostia. Kampen chose to include only scenes of work, not 
tools, but she does include the category of mythological illustrations of work, such as an 
image of Amores and Psychae with garlands. In my view, this category of mythological 
work is mainly that: mythological. The Amores and Psychae may hint at the occupation 
of garland-making, but it does not necessarily refer to the occupation of the deceased. 
Still her catalogue adds a number of reliefs not covered in the work of Zimmer. Neither 
collection can – or does – claim completeness.95
It would be a laborious task to collect all occupational illustrations for Roman Italy, 
and it is my contention that doing so would not add much to my argument. Originally, 
however, inscription and relief were part of the same funerary monument, and they 
should be studied as such wherever possible. As often as not only one of the two re-
mains. Whenever we are fortunate enough to find both preserved, profession as a rule 
91 The fullery is VI. 8.20.
92 Larsson Lovén (2007); Langner (2001); Béal (2000); Chevallier (1997); also Rose (2007), particularly 
on Metz. George (2006) 28 suggests that the prevalence of the imagery of work in the north-
western provinces was due to the fact that the elite ideology, which was after all developed in and 
extended out from Rome, carried less weight there.
93 Zimmer (1982) is more inclusive than Gummerus’ pioneering study of 1913; Schulze (1998) offers 
a diachronic catalogue for all types of ancient images of child-minders (nutrix and paedagogus). 
The findings from the Roman period are small in number both in absolute and in relative terms.
94 Kampen (1981) 137–161; the catalogue does not contain many images, only for the few reliefs 
depicting working women. I hasten to add that this choice is quite sensible, considering the focus 
of her book.
95 The occasional relief is still being published, see e.g. Wilson and Schörle (2009) for a funerary relief 
with scenes from a bakery.
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is not mentioned in the text, but is conveyed solely through the image – or vice versa. 
The earliest freedmen monument with explicit reference to work is the lavish tomb of 
the Gavii, depicting four life-size portrait busts of the family. Only in the inscription, 
added in uneven writing in the right-hand corner, as if it were an afterthought, is the 
text ‘duo fratres fabrei tignuares’, two brothers, who were carpenters.96 George tentatively 
suggested that the freedmen monuments show a swift development throughout the 
first century AD, from the modest monument of the Gavii, to increasing visibility of work 
in emblematic motives added to the stones, to vending scenes – that is, an honour-
able perspective on industry –, to the ostentatious pride shown on the monument of 
Atimetus and Epaphra.97 In my view, the perceived ‘evolution’ must remain conjectural, 
because it relies on very precise dating based on stylistic rather than factual aspects, and 
they all fall within the broad first century AD. In epigraphy, however, dating is even more 
problematic. For these and other reasons it is a pity that inscription and monument are 
not consistently studied together; in spite of converging trends, iconography still is 
mostly the prerogative of art historians and archaeologists, whereas textual evidence 
tends to be reserved for historians and classicists. Bridging the gap is not easy, especially 
when dealing with large numbers of data.
Although digital humanities greatly facilitate the search for occupational inscriptions, 
the problem with an online database is that much information is lost in the process: a 
careful note from the editors of CIL that a sickle or a comb is depicted on the monu-
ment, for example, is as yet untraceable online. Pictures of the inscriptions and their 
monuments are thankfully becoming available in larger numbers, and this is a great 
help. But there is a long way to go before every single monument with an inscription can 
also be viewed. The images that are currently available, are not searchable; the photos 
accompanying inscriptions often lack quality, and regularly do not present a full view of 
all sides of a monument.
literature, law, and material remains
There is other, more indirect evidence available as well. Glimpses of working life may 
be found in fragments from the satirists, like Martial 2.17 remarking on the practice of a 
tonstrix (barber) in the Subura:
96 CIL 6. 9411, Rome 40 BC, now in the S. Giovanni in Laterano, Chiostro; George (2006) 20-1 for dating 
and discussion of how this monument highlights socially conservative values (the family) rather 
than occupation, under the influence of elite views on labour; For occupation only on the relief, 
not in the text, e.g. the altar of Lucius Cornelius Atimetus and Epaphra above with CIL 6.16166; also 
IPO A 273–5, all three part of the same monument for a smith in the Isola Sacra necropolis, in this 




Tonstrix Suburae faucibus sedet primis,
cruenta pendent qua flagella tortorum
Argique Letum multus obsidet sutor:
sed ista tonstrix, Ammiane, non tondet,
non tondet, inquam. Quid igitur facit? Radit.
A female barber sits just at the entrance of the Subura, where the blood-stained 
scourges of the executioners hang, and many a cobbler faces the Potter’s Field. 
But that female barber, Ammianus, does not crop you: she does not crop you, I 
say. What then, does she do? She skins you.98
The text paints a rather vivid picture of a woman who has her business well in order, and 
incidentally tells us that in Martial’s social universe at least one tonstrix worked in the 
Subura.99 Similarly, a novelist like Apuleius brings to the stage more than one labourer 
as part of the lively décor to his story of Lucius the Ass.100
Roman labour law or, to put it less anachronistically, the evidence from passages that 
refer to labour and labour relations in the Roman legal texts, is also an invaluable source. 
Law is at the heart of the influential monographs of Francesco De Robertis.101 Mima 
Maxey based her work on occupations of the lower classes in Roman society on attesta-
tions of job-titles in Justinian’s Digest.102 The jurists provide a wealth of information about 
the possibilities for hiring labour or labourers, and about liability and enforcement. The 
position of slaves and freedmen in the economy, for example, is illuminated greatly by 
the knowledge that their position of dependence makes them particularly well-suited 
as agents for their masters.103 The question always remains, however, to what extent 
written law can be equated with actual practice. Many labour agreements may have 
been mere verbal agreements, and one can wonder to what extent an unskilled labourer 
98 Translation Delphi Classics 2013. The meaning of radit is crucial to the interpretation of the epi-
gram; it is likely to be a pun on finances: one gets ripped off, cf the commentary of Williams (2004) 
83.
99 There are four tonstrices in the occupational inscriptions, three from Rome: CIL 6. 941, 5865, and 
9493 = 33809; one from Venafrum, AE (1999) 473.
100 Bradley (2012) is a wonderful collection of papers on the historical value of Apuleius’ work.
101 De Robertis (1946) (1963).
102 Maxey (1938).
103 Garnauf (2009), De Ligt (1999), Aubert (1994), Kirschenbaum (1987).
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could resort to (expensive) measures of contract enforcement. Nevertheless the legal 
framework is vital for an understanding of the economy more generally.104
Apart from textual evidence, there is also a great wealth of archaeological data avail-
able, ranging from the remains of settlements and the location of industry and tabernae 
in the town plan, to artefacts, tools, stamps, and finished product. This material has led 
to a wealth of studies on technological aspects of the production processes that actu-
ally created the artefact,105 on the organization of particular workshops like the pottery 
workshops at La Graufesenque, and on the patterns of trade that can be discerned in 
the distribution of finds. The building trade in particular, but also other trades have be-
come the subject of intensive scholarship.106 The details of individual crafts and trades, 
although valuable, are by and large left out of consideration in this thesis, as they would 
contribute little to the broader picture. In recent years, however, a renewed dialogue 
between historians of the Roman economy and archaeologists has opened the way to 
new and fruitful approaches of Roman labour and work in Roman Italy starting from the 
material remains.107
uRbAnIsAtIon
A focus on the urban labour market requires some discussion of urbanisation. What is 
urban and what is not? Up to a point, the choice of what counts as urban is based on 
the evidence: most inscriptions are commonly thought to originate in or near towns. 
This principle works both ways, however. If many inscriptions are found in one place, 
it will likely be termed ‘urban’. To opt for the epigraphic approach, as is also the point 
of departure for this book, is to settle for an urban outlook. Occupational inscriptions 
thus cover mainly individuals who worked and/or died in the city. The implications of 
choosing an urban outlook are profound and deserve to be dealt with in some detail.
The urbanisation of Roman Italy is a much-debated topic. From a historical perspec-
tive, the urban landscape of Roman Italy was well developed.108 From a contemporary 
perspective, too, Roman Italy was flourishing: Italy could boast a population that was 
104 Terpstra (2008); Hawkins (forthcoming).
105 E.g. Strong and Brown (1976).
106 Building trade: Bernard (2017); DeLaine (1997); other trades, see e.g. the papers in Mac Mahon and 
Price (2005).
107 See Wilson and Flohr eds (2016); also the contributions of Bond, Flohr and Murphy in Laes and 
Verboven eds (2017); Flohr (2012), (2007).
108 Erdkamp (2012) is a useful introduction to the ‘urbanism’ of the urban economy. Patterson (2006); 
Jongman (1990) 43; cf De Vries (1984) for early modern Europe.
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more dense than in the provinces, plus higher urbanisation rates and a greater concen-
tration of urban settlements than anywhere else in the empire.109
Overall urbanisation rates for Roman Italy have been estimated at 15–20 per cent, 
without taking into account the supercity of Rome, and its harbour city Ostia.110 Rome 
of the first century AD, with its 800,000 to one million inhabitants, was one of a kind: 
the city would not be surpassed by any other city in history until the rise of London 
around 1800.111 The next city in line was Capua, which was significantly smaller with a 
population of between 40,000 and 50,000 people.112 These are exceptions to the general 
pattern, however: there were only a few large towns in the Italian peninsula.113 The urban 
landscape can therefore be characterized by a great variation of settlements of medium 
and small sizes. Regional differentiation was probably significant as well: Campania was 
more urbanized than Picenum, for example.114 Apart from variation in settlement sizes, 
it is likely that there was also variation in their nature. While the economies of most 
cities seem to have been sustained by governmental or elite expenditure, entrepot trade 
or production of manufactured goods for export played an important part in at least 
some cities. The existence of an intricate road network unlocked at least the potential for 
urban integration and migration towards the cities.115
The diversity of the urban network is reflected in the sources: about half of the oc-
cupational inscriptions comes from Rome or Ostia, whereas the sizeable city of Hatria 
in Picenum only brought forth one.116 The number of occupational inscriptions is not 
always related to settlement size. Cities of roughly equal size sometimes also spawned 
rather different evidence for employment. It remains to be seen whether this is because 
of a distinctive nature of the towns, to variation in epigraphical patterns, or whether it is 
simply due to the accidents of survival.
109 Scheidel (2007a) 47 with table 3.1 on page 48. His map 3.2 on p. 76 shows the cities of the empire 
with greater clustering of cities in Roman Italy.
110 De Ligt (2012) chapter 5, esp. 213, 239–40.
111 Jongman (1990) 43.
112 De Ligt (2012) 236; Scheidel (2007a) 78.
113 De Ligt (2012) 235–8 with map 5.2 on page 237. Cf Erdkamp (2012) 244 without reference to De 
Ligt. See also Patterson (2006) 38-39 and Morley (1996) 182, both emphasising wide variation 
in urban population sizes. This was apparently still true for Italy in the late twentieth century, 
Garnsey (1998) 112–3.
114 De Ligt (2012) 231; this was predicted by Garnsey (1998) 113.
115 Laurence (1999).
116 CIL 9. 5018 from Hatria records a freeborn scribe (scriba). Cf Cristofori (2004). According to De Ligt 
(2012) 312 Hatria is one of two large towns in Picenum, but see De Ligt (2016) 55 for a correction of 
its estimated size from 45ha to 37ha, which makes it a ‘medium-sized’ settlement. The remaining 
large town is Asculum, which has 6 occupational inscriptions (to the list in Cristofori 2004 should 
be added CIL 9. 5189).
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the urban population
The city’s inhabitants were always changing; at any one time they could include 
tourists, merchants on a regular visit, farmers in for market, immigrants who were 
likely to die there and natives who still hoped to get out.117
This quote was written about Rome. Even so, the words probably hold true for other 
urban settlements to some extent, many of which were performing the role of market 
centre where goods and services were manufactured and/or exchanged. Reading such 
comments, it would appear that the urban population was a rather heterogeneous body.
An urbanisation rate of about 25 per cent and the existence of a number of sizeable 
cities in Roman Italy both imply a significant level of migration to towns. Urban migra-
tion theory dictates that cities need a continuous influx of migrants to keep up their 
population. One tier of the theory is known as urban graveyard theory, based on the fact 
that preindustrial cities were notoriously unhealthy places. For that reason preindustrial 
cities have often been portrayed as ‘population sinks’ in need of massive numbers of 
immigrants to keep up their dwindling population numbers. The second argument 
is thought to reinforce the first. It is based on migrant fertility, assuming that a lower 
marriage rate and therefore a lower fertility rate among migrants – who were mostly 
young males – must be postulated, leading to excess mortality rates and the need for 
yet more immigrants. It has convincingly been argued that urban migration theory was 
applicable to ancient Rome, and it can be presumed that this argument extends to the 
largest cities of Roman Italy.118 It may not necessarily hold for all, or even for most, of 
the cities in Roman Italy, however. Whereas there is no apparent population threshold 
for the migrant fertility problem to apply, some settlements may have been too small to 
actually become population sinks.119 If part of urban migration theory does not apply to 
all settlements in Roman Italy, however, that does not mean that there was no migration 
into towns. The promise of employment opportunities and better wages were a sure 
draw.
The subject of migration in the Roman world has experienced an upsurge of inter-
est in the last decade or two.120 The relationship between migration and labour is not 
117 Morley (1996) 33.
118 Tacoma (2016), especially chapter 5; cf De Ligt (2013) 155; Holleran (2011) for migration into the 
city of Rome; Jongman (2003) 106.
119 Tacoma (2016) 247–253 for the applicability of urban migration theory to cities other than Rome; 
Hin (2016) for a nuanced view of migrant fertility; De Ligt (2012) 245-6; the threshold for popula-
tion sinks is traditionally thought to be 10,000 people.
120 See e.g. the edited volumes by Lo Cascio and Tacoma (2017); De Ligt and Tacoma (2016); and the 
monograph by Tacoma (2016); Cf Noy (2000); Scheidel (2004), (2005a).
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straightforward, all the more so because the Roman world was familiar with both forced 
and voluntary migration.121 Were the migrants able to find work in the city? Their op-
tions depended largely on the openness of the labour market. Was all work open to 
migrants? Information about labour opportunities and actual vacancies in the city must 
have affected migration patterns; conversely, the size and nature of migration flows will 
have influenced the structure of the urban population and workforce. The dominance 
of slavery in some sectors of the urban economy, especially in the domestic sector, may 
have reduced labour opportunities for free women; the presence (and influx) of slaves 
and ex-slaves in towns more generally could have severely impeded the opportunities 
for voluntary labour migration.122 An analysis of the openness or segmentation of the 
labour market is one of the underlying goals of this work.
Rome and the rest
There was no place like Rome. Rome potentially accounted for up to 18 per cent of 
the entire population of Roman Italy.123 The existence of a primate city is not in itself 
anomalous; it is the absence of secondary centres in Roman Italy that makes Rome so 
extraordinary.124 Therefore the structure of the population and the nature of institutions 
in the capital may also have been very different from any other urban settlement in 
Roman Italy. Rome is where the emperor and the imperial government resided. Rome 
was also the main attraction for both the elite, and the poor. The elite spent lavishly, 
and their taste for luxury goods and services created money-making opportunities for 
a whole segment of urban labourers. The clustering of urban poor in the capital, the 
(imperial) building trade and other jobs in which they scraped a living, and the grain 
distributions to help support them are well known and have been the subject of many 
scholarly works to date.125
The nature of the ancient evidence from the capital should also be considered. Con-
temporary Rome still is a cosmopolis and is now home to some 2.9 million inhabitants. 
The current built-up area obscures much of the ancient city, and much remains to be 
learnt. The other side of the coin is that much of the ancient city remains visible in the 
current town plan. Moreover, there is no other city that has been studied and excavated 
so extensively.126 Ancient Rome was exceptional, but because it has also been treated 
121 Chapter 2 below; cf Tacoma (2016) chapter 6; Holleran (2011) for voluntary migration to Rome.
122 Garnsey and De Ligt (2016) for Herculaneum (and other cities in the Bay of Naples by proxy, p. 74): 
imported slaves may have been the majority of migrants, p. 94.
123 De Ligt (2012) 195.
124 Outside of Roman Italy, one might mention Alexandria and Carthage, although it remains to be 
seen exactly how sizeable these cities were.
125 E.g. Bernard (2017); Holleran (2011), Aldrete and Mattingly (1999), Brunt (1980).
126 With the possible exception of Ostia, but see below.
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as such by many generations of scholars it is also much better documented than any 
other settlement. The fact that about half of the occupational inscriptions from Roman 
Italy actually originates from Rome is therefore more than a reflection of reality. The gap 
between Rome and the rest deepens.
That Rome was a very distinct place should be kept in mind throughout this analysis. 
There are good reasons to believe that the functioning of collegia, for example, was dif-
ferent in Rome.127 Subterranean columbaria are attested virtually exclusively in the capi-
tal.128 Rome had a large free proletariat, which is why the proportion of slaves among the 
population is likely to have been lower in the capital than in other urban settlements.129 
The only settlement that approximates Rome at all is Ostia, which to some extent might 
be viewed as an extension of the capital itself.130
urbanisation and labour differentiation
Urbanisation is often causally linked with economic growth and complexity, and vice 
versa.131 Economic prosperity may lead to a division of labour between town and coun-
try: Adam Smith in the Wealth of nations noted that job differentiation develops when 
sufficient agricultural surplus is produced to allow part of the labour population to take 
up other occupations than agriculture.132 Urbanisation therefore leads to increased job 
differentiation.133 It is tempting to conceptually locate the labourers with an ‘urban’ oc-
cupation in towns, and to place farmers and farmhand on the land. That idea is in fact 
corroborated by Garnsey’s answer to the question where Italian peasants lived – that is, 
mostly on the land –, and it is also the distinction that Hopkins used for his calculation of 
urbanisation rates in Roman Italy.134 To be sure, the division between the urban and rural 
workforce of Roman Italy was not as convenient as that. Not all artisans and craftsmen 
lived in the city, and not all farmers lived on the land. There was industrial activity in the 
rural areas, too.135 There certainly was plenty of movement between town and country. 
127 See chapter 5.
128 See chapter 4.
129 Cf Garnsey and De Ligt (2016).
130 Not everyone agrees, e.g. Bruun (2010) 110–11 with n. 5.
131 Erdkamp (2012) 243-4; Scheidel (2007a) 81: “institutional arrangements and even moderate levels 
of intensive economic growth appear to have been the main driving force behind the success of 
urbanism”.
132 On the rural-urban distinction, but starting from Procopius rather than Adam Smith, see also 
Erdkamp (2012) 241–3.
133 As opposed to ‘specialisation’ in the sense of breaking up the production process, cf. Van Minnen 
(1987) 45.
134 Garnsey (1998) 107–33, contra the concept of agro-towns, cf Lo Cascio (2009) 89–91; Hopkins 
(1978) 68–9.
135 Cf De Ligt (1991).
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But the nature of the evidence in this thesis legitimates a model of non-agricultural cit-
ies as opposed to an agricultural countryside.
The high degree of occupational differentiation is a defining feature of the urban la-
bour market in Roman Italy – my catalogue of job titles records no less than 564 different 
occupations.136 Treggiari remarks for the city of Rome: “The opportunities available con-
trast favourably with the 101 jobs (...) for which regulations were made in 13th-century 
Paris (where specialisation went far enough to allow three types of rosary-makers)”.137 
This phenomenon has been noted by many scholars, but it has led to radically different 
explanations.
The high degree of specialisation attested has been connected to the existence of 
large workshops exhibiting extreme specialisation: such specialisation in the sense 
of breaking up the production process demanded only low levels of skill, because all 
workers made only a tiny contribution to create a complex final product that nobody 
knew how to manufacture anymore.138 A similar argument was advanced recently by 
Cam Hawkins, who stresses the risks of investing in the acquisition of a full skill-set, 
because of the inherent instability and insecurity of the market in ancient Rome.139 The 
most eloquent ancient source for this type of decentralization perhaps, is Augustine’s De 
Civitate Dei 7.4 from the early fifth century, which has relevance for the early empire too. 
Augustine notes how polytheistic deities are all active within a specific territory, “like 
craftsmen in the quarter of the silversmiths, where one vessel passes through the hands 
of many artisans in order to come out finished, when it could have been completed by 
one perfect artisan.”140 Further on in the text, Augustine’s description of the silversmiths 
hints at the existence of industrial districts, where those in the same line of work clus-
tered together to facilitate subcontracting.141 It is more a metaphor than it is an actual 
attestation concerning the work of silversmiths, but in order for the metaphor to work 
it must reflect reality.
136 See appendix 1: catalogue of job titles.
137 Treggiari (1980) 56; cf Tran (2007b); compare Harris (2002) for the extensive differentiation of oc-
cupational designations in classical Athens.
138 Morel (1992) 232-4 on the existence of this type of decentralization.
139 Hawkins (2016); Also Hawkins (2017) 44-5 for the option of decentralization on the level of the 
‘firm’ (workshop).
140 Hawkins (2006) 52-58 on this text and its relevance for the early empire, at 52 cites Aug. Civ. Dei 
7.4: tamquam opifices in uico argentario, ubi unum uasculum, ut perfectum exeat, per multos artifices 
transit, cum ab uno perfecto perfici posset. It is not difficult to identify the tenor of the ‘one perfect 
artisan’ of the metaphor.
141 Topographical names hinting at clustering like this are well-attested for the early empire, Holleran 
(2012) 51–60, MacMullen (1974) 70–79. The extent to which economic zoning existed despite 
these names may be debated, however. See chapter 5.
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It is likely that this division of labour, or breaking up the production process, accounts 
for some of the job differentiation attested in the cities, but there is more to it. Highly 
specialized jobs attested regularly are also highly skilled, such as a gemmarius (gem-
setter) or caelator (engraver); their high skill-levels are also to be argued on the basis of 
the quality of products that have come down to us. Large-scale and factory-like settings 
where decentralization may have taken place are solely attested in Rome and Ostia, 
and even then only to a limited degree.142 There are fulleries where it does seem that 
some employees were either trampling clothes or rinsing them all day. More generally, 
however, it appears that fullers were engaged with the whole process from A to Z.143 In 
some jobs it was riskier to invest in job-training than in other occupations with a more 
stable demand, as Hawkins allows.144 The modest mean size of workshops in the urban 
landscape suggests that very often one artisan or craftsman did possess the complete 
set of skills. Occupational variation as a reflection of economic complexity therefore 
should not be overlooked, all the more since it is generally thought that the Roman 
economy was thriving.145
Some of the attested job differentiation must also be a result of conspicuous con-
sumption or, in other words, the fact that elite owners liked to show off by employing 
a slave for every single task one can think of, however petty or insignificant. The elite 
domus thus account for a large share of the occupational differentiation, particularly in 
the city of Rome.146 There is a margaritarius who appears to be a caretaker of pearls, a cu-
bicularius (bedchamber servant), and a capsarius (carrier of scroll-holders), for example, 
none of whom we might perhaps expect to have spent all day at their appointed tasks.147 
Not all of these occupations fell to slaves, but the fact that freedmen and the occasional 
freeman are also attested in the elite household does not diminish the conspicuousness 
of a large and differentiated household.
Each of these explanations accounts for part of the attested occupational differentia-
tion, and none of them is exclusive of the others. In other words: these factors taken 
together account for the wide range of occupations attested.
142 Flohr (2007).
143 Flohr (2013).
144 Though see Hawkins (2006) 68-74 on the existence, but the marginal influence of, markets with a 
more stable demand.
145 Scheidel, Saller, Morris (2007) 5–6; Temin (2006), or Saller (2002/2005). Examples could be multi-
plied.
146 For elite domus and occupational differentiation, see also chapter 4. Cf Joshel (1992) 73–6, Bradley 
(1994) 57–80, who mentions on page 58 that in the familia rustica as well as the familia urbana “the 
number of occupations discharged was virtually limitless”.
147 Bradley (1994) 60 takes as examples an ostiarius and scoparius.
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the RomAn eConomy And new InstItutIonAl eConomICs
The enormous influence of Moses Finley can perhaps largely be held responsible for the 
fact that it has taken so long for ancient historians to catch up with economic theory. 
It is no secret that Finley propagated the ancient economy as something fundamen-
tally different from modern economies. In the eyes of Finley and his followers, Roman 
society had an economy that was embedded socially and culturally. The publication 
of Finley’s The ancient economy initiated a debate between those who agreed that the 
ancient economy should be studied by itself, and those who chose to make the link with 
economics.148 Recent decades have seen important converging trends in this primitivist-
modernist debate, which has lost much of its intensity.149
The ultimate reconciliation between the two came, perhaps, with the introduction of 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) to ancient history.150 Douglass North introduced the 
concept of institutions to economics, at a time when economics was concerned chiefly 
with performance, particularly the performance of contemporary entities: North held 
that contemporary economies as well as historical economies are embedded.151 This ap-
proach opens up all of history as comparative material for economic theory. A focus on 
social and cultural factors does not mean that NIE has dismissed the matter of economic 
performance. On the contrary, the focus on institutions stems from an interest in the 
structural determinants of economic performance, and therefore takes into account 
both structure, and performance.
If neo-institutional economics can be seen as an attempt to bring history to the 
attention of economists, it may equally well be a way to make economic theory 
serve the interests of historians; it is situated at the crossroads of the two disci-
plines.152
NIE is therefore well-suited to the needs of ancient historians and has been taken up 
with enthusiasm, particularly in the last decade or so. An indication of the widespread 
acceptance of NIE is the explicit acknowledgement of the importance of the work of 
North in the Cambridge economic history of the Greco-Roman world already referred to 
above.153 The first part of the book is devoted entirely to structural determinants of the 
148 Cf Jongman (1988) for a Finleyan analysis that does make use of modern economic theory.
149 E.g. Saller (2002/2005).
150 For a useful introductory piece, Bang (2009).
151 Esp. North (1990). See also North (2005).
152 Bang (2009) 197.
153 Morris, Saller and Scheidel (eds)(2007) 1, 6. Bang (2009) is in fact a review of that work.
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economy or, in the words of the editors, “core analytical categories”: the chapters are 
dedicated respectively to ecology, demography, household and gender, law and eco-
nomic institutions, and technology.154 NIE was also implemented in both Bang’s influen-
tial Imperial Bazaar and its theoretical opposite, Temin’s Roman market economy – two 
main contributions to the discussion on the nature of the Roman economy.155 Others 
have engaged with the institutional framework provided by Roman law, transaction cost 
theory, or the collegia as social institutions.156 New Institutional Ancient Economics has 
become an established, vibrant field of research.
the knights who say nIe157
It must be expressed that New Institutional Ancient Economics hardly resembles the 
original New Institutional Economics. NIE itself has gone through important develop-
ments, and is now better suited for the Roman case. A full understanding of institutions 
includes the ways in which they furthered market forces, as well as the ways in which 
they may have restricted them. A distinction was made between formal and informal 
institutions, the latter based on social and cultural beliefs. It is simple enough to under-
line that relevant institutions existed, but the mere existence of institutions does not 
imply that they were economically efficient.158 Cultural beliefs and social circumstances 
largely determine the shaping of institutions and an individual’s choices, recognition of 
which led NIE to branch out into behavioural economics. Strictly speaking, then, New 
Institutional Ancient Economics is perhaps not NIE, but it is more eclectic, benefiting 
also from behavioural and development economics more generally.
With all this in mind, how should this modern, inclusive understanding of NIE be ap-
plied to the study of Roman labour? The advantages of applying NIE to studies of labour 
in Antiquity specifically, were advocated by Zuiderhoek.159 His view of what a focus on 
institutions could mean, is explained in this fragment:
Focussing on institutions/organisations allows us to bring some analytical order 
to the great variety of different categories of labour and types of labourers which 
we come across in ancient sources. This is so because institutions/organisations 
functioned as structuring actors, that might simultaneously ‘consume’, i.e. buy/
hire and employ, and supply labour to third parties. Thus, they in effect operated 
154 Morris, Saller and Scheidel (eds) (2007), at 9.
155 Bang (2008); Temin (2013a).
156 Terpstra (2008) and Hawkins (2017); Hawkins (2016) and Venticinque (2006); Liu (2017).
157 Reference to the title of Verboven (2015), which is a programmatic article and the basis for much 
of what follows in this paragraph.
158 E.g. Ogilvie (2007); Liu (2017) 204-6, Bang (2009) 203.
159 In his contribution to Workers of the world 1:3 (2013), a special issue on Global labour history.
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as allocation mechanisms (or channels) via which labour and labour power were 
distributed in ancient society. An institutional/organisational focus, moreover, 
can also provide us with some rationale for the great diversity of labour statuses 
which we encounter in antiquity, since within a given institutional/organizational 
context, different status positions and the specific labour relations associated 
with them might well serve to reduce costs of oversight, transaction and informa-
tion so as to maximize ‘efficiency’, in terms of output, profit or, indeed, exploita-
tion (rent-seeking, predation).160
The number of institutions that are relevant to Roman labour, are probably too numerous 
to list. For a very brief exploration, Zuiderhoek selects the institutions of the household, 
associations, and cities. In my analysis of urban labour, too, I have opted to deal with the 
family, and associations, both in an urban context. That is not to deny the importance of 
other institutions or organizing principles like Roman law. But in Roman labour history, 
that ground has been covered relatively well. Verboven acknowledged the widespread 
use of many aspects of NIE amongst ancient historians, but emphasized the need to in-
corporate more fully the impact of cultural beliefs.161 Cultural values and norms certainly 
also had a profound impact on the functioning of the urban labour market. They had 
an influence on familial norms and values, and family form, and on the social and more 
formal characteristics of associations. To me, ancient history is about real life individuals, 
in this instance, individuals who were subject to many factors that worked together to 
determine his or her daily occupation, be it in the household or the workshop.
discovering the Roman family162
Easily the most important structural factor that determines labour, is the family.163 
Considering the hypothesis that the family was so crucial in labour economics, the first 
question that should really be addressed is what we mean by ‘family’.
In modern-day English, ‘family’ can denote basically any group of individuals, or even 
any group of things, all according to context.164 It is used, for example, in the expression 
‘having a family’, that is having children, or in a ‘family weekend’, indicating a meeting 
160 Zuiderhoek (2013) 43.
161 Verboven (2012b) 599: “Historians of antiquity are now familiar with several key concepts of the 
New Institutional Economics – such as transaction costs or path dependence – but until now 
they have paid very little attention to the role of cultural values and norms”. See now more fully 
Verboven (2015).
162 This is the title of Bradley’s influential 1991 monograph on the Roman family.
163 See also the preliminary observations of Saller (2007).
164 OED online (2013)3 s.v. family: A. I “Senses relating to a group of people or animals”; A. II “Senses 
relating to things”.
Aims, methods and sources 47
attended by a random selection of close as well as more distant relatives, and sometimes 
even by unrelated friends from outside the nuclear family.165 Generally, however, family 
is defined by kinship. Whereas the English word family is certainly derived from Latin 
familia, familia is not equivalent to family.166 The Romans, however, were no less versatile 
in their use of both familia and domus.167
Familia can cover a wide variety of meanings. With reference to persons, not things, 
familia may refer to the agnatic kin group, which appears relatively familiar to us. More 
exclusively, it may also indicate the slaves of the household. Throughout my thesis, how-
ever, I will limit the use of familia to one of its more specific legal definitions: the familia 
encompasses all persons under the power (potestas) of the paterfamilias, including wife, 
children, slaves and freedmen:
Dig. 50.16.195.2
Familiae appellatio refertur et ad corporis cuiusdam significationem, quod aut 
iure proprio ipsorum aut communi universae cognationis continentur. Iure pro-
prio familiam dicimus plures personas, quae sunt sub unius potestate aut natura 
aut iure subiectae, ut puta patrem familias, matrem familias, filium familias, filiam 
familias quique deinceps vicem eorum sequuntur, ut puta nepotes et neptes et 
deinceps.
The term familia also refers to a collection of persons, connected either by their 
own legal rights vis-à-vis each other, or by a more general kinship relationship. 
We say that a family is connected by its own legal bond when several persons are 
either by nature or by law subjected to the potestas of one person – for example, 
the paterfamilias, materfamilias, and son and daughter under paternal control, 
as well as their descendants, such as grandsons, granddaughters, and their suc-
cessors.168
165 Bradley (1991) 3-4: “even at the level of ordinary discourse, family is an ambiguous, elusive term, 
whose meaning for any individual is shaped primarily by the variables of age and marital status, 
and if divorce and remarriage have anywhere entered the picture, the complications of under-
standing and defining are greater still”.
166 It is interesting that the lemma of the OED online (2013)3 s.v. family still includes a historical defini-
tion that does sometimes approximate the Latin OLD s.v. familia.
167 Saller (1994) chapter 4 offers a good analysis of Roman ‘family, familia, and domus’; See also Dixon 
(1992) 1-12, and Saller (1984).
168 Dig. 50.16.195.2 (Ulpian); translation Dillon and Garland (2005) 342.
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Technically a wife was only part of the familia if married cum manu, whereas sine manu 
marriage was common during the Principate. It is nevertheless likely that she was often 
implicitly considered a part of the familia.
Latin domus can include both cognate and agnate kin, and is perhaps a better ap-
proximation to our broader understanding of family. But it, too, has a variety of other 
meanings, and was also used to refer to the household and everyone in it (including 
servants), or merely to the physical house.169 For this reason I have limited the use of 
domus to the elite domus of chapter 4.
Households may be defined concisely as “those sets of relationships, historically vari-
able yet relatively constant, that have as one of their principal features the sharing of 
sustenance gained from the widest possible variety of sources”.170 In terms of economic 
functionality, then, the household provides a better focus than the family. It includes 
non-kin living in the household.171 The addition of non-kin is significant for the current 
analysis of the Roman situation as well, where many households contained a number of 
slaves and freedmen. It should be noted that the criterion of coresidence is applied more 
loosely than in various other publications.172 Household members who are temporarily 
away for seasonal labour or apprenticeships – and who may contribute substantially to 
the family income by doing so – are to be included.173
The economic unity of the family has been well established in scholarly literature, 
and requires little further elucidation.174 The study of the family as an economic unit of 
individuals working and acting together took off with the development of New Home 
Economics in the second half of the twentieth century.175 It was recognized that within 
the family, decisions on family expenses are made, the demand for which is in turn 
determined by the structure of the family. Likewise, how to manage the family income, 
labour allocation, and investment in human capital, is typically decided within the 
169 See, for example, Harlow and Laurence (2002) chapter 2.
170 McGuire, Smith and Martin (1986) 76; quoted by Van der Linden (2002) 4.
171 An important notion found first in Laslett (1972) 24–5.
172 Laslett (1972) 27 speaks not of household, but of ‘coresident domestic group’ – still opting for a 
coresidence criterion. His wish to uphold this measure results primarily from the fact that non-
coresident individuals would not have been registered in the census records that are the main 
source of evidence for many sociologists, rather than from any functional criterion.
173 E.g. Netting, Wilk and Arnould (1984), introduction; also Van der Linden (2002) 4: “households do 
not necessarily entail co-residence”.
174 Van der Linden and Lucassen (1999) 9: “workers simply cannot be understood as individuals”. 
E.g. Cigno (1991) 2: “It is not, therefore, the economic relevance of household organization and 
behaviour – even when looked at from the narrow point of view of the traditional interests of 
economists – that can be in any doubt”.
175 The development is summarized in Engelen e.a. (2004a) 124.
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family group.176 With reference to occupation, family was important to everyone: to an 
emperor who inherited his position, to a slave or a slave’s slave bound to their master’s 
family, and to everyone in between.
There is a significant difference between family forms, and their relation to labour and 
labourers.
... there were considerable differences in household composition between the 
elite and the lower classes, and between urban and village populations. Com-
position and size of households depended on the economic basis from which 
the family made its living, since different forms of property and economic ac-
tivities required different kinds of labor. Families that were smaller and simpler 
in organization have been observed for day laborers, small traders, craftsmen, 
and fishermen, whereas peasant farmers usually lived in larger, more complex 
families because they needed a sufficient pool of labor to meet peak periods of 
labor demand.177
This thesis focuses on urban labourers. It seems reasonable to distinguish between 
broad categories of urban families: small nonelite family features in chapter 3, and elite 
domus in chapter 4. In both instances, it will be argued that adaptive family strategies can 
account for the choices that were made in their engagements with the labour market. 
Family was an important indicator for economic success and development. The larger 
rural families also referred to by Hübner largely fall outside of the scope of my research, 
except at those times when they migrated to the city for (seasonal) labour.
non-familial labour collectives: private associations
The Roman empire expanded to encompass increasingly more people, people who 
thronged together in cities to find an income through work. Associations provided a 
solution to the anonymity of being part of an enormous population, a situation that 
we may envisage as particularly vivid for the city of Rome.178 The collegia gained mo-
mentum over the course of the second and third centuries, when the formation of the 
empire transformed the civic make-up to give pride of place to the associations and 
176 Mincer and Polachek (1974) 397.
177 Hübner (2011) 82.
178 This view is eloquently summarized by MacMullen (1966) 174: “Their objects were simple, 
summed up in the phrase ’social security’: to have a refuge from loneliness in a very big world, …”. 
Cf Hopkins (1983) 214.
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their members.179Collegium membership was a privilege and was always reserved for a 
minority of the population.
The associations are generally referred to as ‘voluntary’ or ‘private’ associations in 
scholarly research, a useful terminology that was “designed to distinguish them from 
institutions such as the state, city, or family, where membership was automatic – a ques-
tion of birth rather than choice”.180 I deliberately adhere to this broad definition. The 
advantage of an open approach like this is that it includes all relevant social collectives: 
for current purposes, the gains of understanding the workings of group formation and 
group processes trumps the loss of the specific. Needless to say, this does not obviate a 
general need for investigations into particular associations in any way.181
The Latin terminology of association is varied. Most common both in Roman antiquity 
and in secondary literature on the subject today is collegium, but in Antiquity corpus, 
sodalitas, sodalicium, koinon, and other synonyms in both Latin and Greek, were also 
widespread, which in itself indicates the reality of a large variety in social collectives.182 
Not all associations were recognized by the law as formal collegium. It has proven virtu-
ally impossible to distinguish formal from informal associations and most scholars in-
clude most or all recognizable collectives in their analysis; because all types of collective 
are meaningful contributions to an individual’s economic and social network I will do 
the same here. For the sake of clarity, throughout this thesis the current terms ‘collegia’ 
and ‘association’ will be used to indicate any private collective.
Roman private associations were named according to religious affiliation, location (ei-
ther current location or place of origin), or occupation. A strict distinction into separate 
categories, however, will not hold: religious, funerary, convivial/congregational/social, 
and economic functions often overlapped.183 Even the primary identity reflected in the 
names of associations may not be an indication of their main activities, as members of the 
cult for Asclepius and Hygieia were very likely doctors, for example.184 Perry’s conceptual 
179 Patterson (2006) especially chapter 3; see also Patterson (1992) 23.
180 Wilson (1996) 1, defining ‘voluntary’ in the ‘voluntary associations’ of the title of Kloppenborg and 
Wilson (1996). On the same page, Wilson writes: “the term ‘private association’, which some prefer, 
is a possible alternative, though it too would have required careful definition”.
181 Liu (2009) 4–11 on the merits of a synthetic analysis, and on the need for complementary inves-
tigations into particular collegia, to which her study of the collegia centonariorum is an important 
contribution.
182 For a brief overview of terminology, see Ausbüttel (1982) 16–22, with n. 10 for earlier references.
183 Van Nijf (2002) 311–5; Van Nijf (1997) 10–11; Van Minnen (1987) 51-2 on Roman Egypt; Ausbüttel 
(1982) 29, 30.
184 Verboven (2017b) 176 n12 with reference to CIL 6. 10234, Rome 2nd century AD. Compare AE 1937, 
161 for a collegium Aesculapi et Hygiae structorum Caes(aris) n(ostri), who were apparently not doc-
tors, but masons.
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deconstruction of collegia funeraticia (burial colleges) as identified by Mommsen, “calls 
into question the need to ‘categorize’ colleges at all, a notion owed, in great measure, to 
this exposition of the subject in the De collegiis [Mommsen (1843)].”185 In sum, in order 
to investigate the structural influence of associations on the labour market, it is not suf-
ficient to take into account only collegia identified by a common occupation.
The category of ‘professional’ or ‘occupational’ collegia when singled out in second-
ary literature, generally collects collegia that were occupational in name. Similarly, in 
this monograph, the terms ‘professional’ or ‘occupational’ collegia will be used to refer 
to such associations. It bears repeating, however, that there was no clear dividing line 
between professional and other associations: scholars have become increasingly aware 
of the social function of occupational collegia and, conversely, of the economic activities 
also of collegia that – at least in name – were not trade-based.186
ConClusIon
The daily labour of the people in the Roman empire has left many traces for a historian 
to follow. From an ancient historian’s viewpoint in particular, the sources for workers are 
very promising. Documentary texts including occupational inscriptions, law, contracts, 
letters, anecdotes from a literary context that refer to labour in passing, a wealth of ma-
terial remains such as tools, or the countless artifacts that are the result of unflagging in-
dustry, reliefs or frescos of people at work, and the archaeological remains of workshops, 
have come down to us. The wealth of evidence has of course not gone unnoticed, and 
many ancient historians have already been motivated by this remarkable opportunity to 
explore what life was like below the elite.
Although many valuable studies exist on work in the ancient world, and although 
many of the sources that I will be using are well-known in themselves, a systematic 
analysis of occupational data placed in their historical context is lacking. The aim of this 
monograph is to offer such an analysis for the cities of Roman Italy in roughly the first 
three centuries AD.
This study has the advantage that much of the evidence has been made available 
before and that many of the biases in the evidence are now known. Constructing an 
image of Roman labourers from the ancient sources alone, however, can only go so far. 
In my opinion, the advance of the use of New Institutional Economics makes it possible 
to use comparative material from other historical periods in order to delineate inter-
pretative frameworks. In other words, comparative history can be used, not to accept 
185 Perry (2006) 32, with reference to his dissertation from 1999 on collegia funeraticia.
186 Verboven (2017b).
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without thinking that the situation in Rome must have been similar, but rather to build 
hypotheses and models, that should always be tested against the evidence.
An economic subject like labour screams for numbers. One inscriptions tells us very 
little about the economy as a whole, but a few thousand texts that document workers 
may well further our understanding of the labour market by uncovering underlying pat-
terns. The quantitative aspect of this thesis cannot go much further than that, however. 
It has of necessity become a qualitative account of the urban labour market of Roman 
Italy, not a quantitative one. As such, however, I believe that the context of social struc-
tures provides a rich and insightful picture of how the Roman labour market is likely to 
have functioned.
Chapter 2
The urban labour market
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IntRoduCtIon
Labour market theory revolves around the commodification of free labour, and the un-
derstanding that labour and labourers can move to the market. The existence of forced 
labour – slavery – in a historical society effectively negates the existence of a labour 
market in theory. However, scholars are increasingly aware that price theory is subject 
to various non-economic restraints. The most important of these is labour market seg-
mentation: restrictions and limitations will occur in any given labour market on the basis 
of various socially and culturally determined factors for discrimination, such as gender. 
It is my contention that in Roman society, legal status is just another such discriminat-
ing factor. Slave, freed and free certainly were not always interchangeable, but it is my 
contention that they were part of the same labour market.1 Therefore, I believe that an 
integrated analysis of the labour force in its entirety is the only way to comprehend the 
workings of the Roman labour market and to bring out the options available to any one 
individual. This chapter lays out the conceptual framework for a structural analysis of the 
functioning of the urban Roman labour market in the remaining chapters.
That there was such a thing as a Roman labour market is not commonly accepted. 
Der Neue Pauly offers a recent entry under ‘Arbeitsmarkt’ that may serve to illustrate this:
Mit Bohannan und Dalton ist zwischen dem Markt a) als Ort und b) als preis-
regulierendem Mechanismus von Angebot und Nachfrage zu unterscheiden. 
Während sich ein A. im Sinne von b) in der Ant. nicht herausbildete, war Arbeit 
wie andere Waren auf dem Marktplatz erhältlich. Entweder konnte sie dauerhaft 
in Form eines Sklaven gekauft, oder temporär von einem freien Lohnarbeiter 
“geliehen” werden (lat. locatio; …). Umgekehrt konnte jeder seine Arbeit auf dem 
Markt anbieten.2
This reference article may be labelled ‘labour market’, but it negates the existence of a 
labour market in Antiquity, as opposed to a market for labour. In this view, moreover, 
the market for labour appears to be limited to the actual marketplace. The author is a 
well-respected scholar working on the ancient economy, whose views may be expected 
to have wider support. This chapter therefore aims to convince the reader that it is useful 
to analyse Roman labour and labourers in terms of a Roman labour market, taking into 
consideration that the concept of a labour market is more complex than merely serving 
1 Cf Temin (2004a), (2013a) 114–38.
2 Von Reden, Der Neue Pauly s.v. ‘Arbeitsmarkt’. Brill Online, first appeared online 2006. The English 
version translates it as ‘job-market’.
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the law of supply and demand. And if we can speak of a labour market, then in what 
ways can labour market theory contribute to our understanding of the Roman situation?
Chapter outline
Neither the active presence of market economics, nor the reality of an integrated labour 
market, is entirely self-evident in a slave society that was predominantly leaning on ag-
riculture. It is therefore necessary to justify the use of such modern economic concepts 
in a Roman context. I will argue that the question whether or not the Roman economy 
was a market economy is the wrong question to ask. Few historians would deny that 
sources for the Roman economy attest to market transactions and market forces at work. 
The focus of research should be on how the Roman market functioned, and in what 
way economic theory can contribute to an understanding of it. It will become clear that 
Roman market economics demonstrate the existence of market regions rather than an 
integrated market economy.
This chapter explores the idea of a Roman labour market. According to economic price 
theory, a labour market is characterized by freedom of movement and wages that move 
in response to supply and demand.3 This narrow definition does not take into account 
that societies are governed by social and cultural factors that will always lead to market 
segmentation, and it will therefore be argued that a broader concept of labour market is 
necessary to operationalize it for the Roman world. The subsequent investigations into 
labour mobility, therefore, focuses not only on possibilities and factors that facilitated 
movement, but also on restrictions to (labour) migration within Roman Italy.
The very idea of a free labour market, with wages that move in accordance with the 
laws of supply and demand, seems irreconcilable with forced labour in a slave economy. 
The question to what extent slave and free can be considered to have been part of a 
unified labour force will therefore have to be dealt with in some detail. The percentage 
of slaves is thought to have been significantly higher in Roman Italy than for the rest of 
the empire, which makes the matter all the more interesting in the context of this the-
sis.4 It is not just the dichotomy between slave and free, however, that might preclude 
full labour market integration. The same holds true of the historically unstable balance 
between male and female workers, and that between skilled and unskilled work. The 
Roman labour market is likely to have been made up of multiple local labour markets 
with limited movement between them. Market segmentation explains this pattern of 
restrictions to individual movement and opportunities within the Roman labour market.
3 E.g. Temin (2013a) 115; Temin (2004a) 515.
4 De Ligt (2012) 190 table 4.3 for a tentative percentage of 40% slaves in the cities of Roman Italy, cf 
Hopkins (1978) 68.
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The last section of this chapter deals with labour supply and labour demand. The 
combination of a dense population and high urbanisation rate in Roman Italy made for 
a thick urban labour market: in other words, there were more workers than work. This is 
likely to have been particularly relevant for unskilled wage labourers. A copious labour 
supply in this sector is underlined by the scarce evidence for remuneration, that sug-
gests that wages were low; for the majority of people, living standards were therefore 
probably low. Labour demand in Rome was variable due to fluctuations and seasonality 
of consumer demand and the building/shipping trades, which were conducive to cycli-
cal unemployment or underemployment. It was difficult to scrape a living in the city. But 
the city was the place to do it.
the RomAn eConomy
The publication of Moses Finley’s The ancient economy in 1973 sparked off the debate 
on the Roman economy, and arguably remains the starting point for any discussion on 
the ancient economy. Many Roman economists adhered to Finley’s ‘primitivist’ idea that 
the Romans had an ‘underdeveloped’ economy.5 In this scenario, the ideal was autarky, 
cities were very much self-sufficient, and although it was acknowledged that there was 
a certain amount of trade, there could be no market integration. It was to be expected 
that this view has evoked a counter-reaction from a substantial group of other Roman 
economic historians. The ‘modernists’ advocated trade and market integration as impor-
tant characteristics of the Roman economy. It has convincingly been argued that the 
primitivist and modernist interpretations are not as mutually exclusive as their followers 
have led us to believe. The debate has been solved diplomatically by pronouncing it 
obsolete.6
There probably are not many ancient historians who would deny that there were 
market forces at work in Roman society. The regular attestation of prices, contracts, 
rents and wages, points to the existence of market forces in the Roman economy. The 
plentiful use of coinage in the Roman empire is well known and does not require further 
elaboration here.7 The one document that provides most of the Roman price data we 
know, Diocletian’s Prices Edict of 301 AD, is price regulation on a massive scale that was 
5 Garnsey and Saller (1987) entitled their chapter three, p. 43-63, ‘An underdeveloped economy’; 
Finley’s continued influence shows from the fact that The ancient economy was reprinted most 
recently in 1999, the third edition; see also Andreau (2002), entitled ‘Twenty years after Moses I. 
Finley’s The Ancient Economy’.
6 Saller (2002), reprinted as Saller (2005); cf De Ligt (1993). Compare the introduction for the influ-
ence of this debate on the use of economic theory in ancient history.
7 E.g. Howgego (1992); cf Harris (2006) on other means of payment.
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likely a response to market-driven inflation; moreover, market forces were so strong that 
they may well have caused the Edict’s failure.8 It is absolutely correct to state “[t]hat the 
Roman economy was not simple — that it set market prices, sustained development, 
and had room for growth — is old news”.9 But what form this took, and to what extent 
economic theories can be applied, is still the subject of much debate.
the Roman market economy
There is a lot of information, but hardly any of what economists call data.10
Roman historians have not shied away from using various economic principles in their 
analysis of the Roman economy.11 Many of such economic principles rest upon the 
null hypothesis of a functioning market economy in the society under scrutiny.12 The 
logical corollary that the Roman economy therefore may have functioned like a market 
economy, however, has only recently found a true protagonist in Peter Temin. It is worth 
pointing out that the initiative to promulgate the more general view of a Roman market 
economy came from an economist rather than an ancient historian.13 Temin advocated 
his views in a series of articles, culminating in a monograph with the title The Roman 
market economy.14 Economists seem to accept the view that Rome had a market econo-
my.15 Responses from scholars of the ancient world are more reserved than economist 
reviewers. One ancient historian reviewed the book for the Times Literary Supplement, 
concluding that “Temin has, I fear, done a good job of persuading me that there was 
really nothing resembling an integrated Roman market economy”.16 In this reviewer’s 
8 Temin (2001) 173; Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2017).
9 Von Reden (2014) 536.
10 Temin (2006) 134.
11 Contrary to what Temin writes, (2006) 133: “Ancient economic history is in its infancy, both be-
cause few economists have learned much about the ancient world and because ancient historians 
have typically not incorporated economics into their analysis”.
12 Temin (2001) 170, repeated verbatim in Temin (2013a) 6: “This is a problem for the study of the 
Roman economy, because it is precisely this typical null hypothesis that needs to be tested”.
13 Cf Temin (2013a) 1: “The application of economic reasoning to ancient history is growing, but 
more ancient historians than economists are interested in ancient economies”.
14 Temin (2001).
15 E.g. Berg (2014) 37; Also Grantham, unpublished paper for the conference ‘Work, labor and profes-
sions’, Ghent 31 May 2013.
16 Thonemann (2013) Times Literary Supplement. The review by Ivanov (2013), trained as an econo-
mist, interestingly does not fit into the category of economists nor that of ancient historians and 
is quite insightful.
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opinion, the Roman economy does not lend itself to ‘new economic history’, because it 
leaves the social aspect of economic transactions out of the equation.
In my view the problem with Temin’s work can, perhaps, be summarized as follows: the 
market economy is too theoretical, too abstract and all-encompassing a concept and it 
cannot just be imposed on the Roman empire. It needs to be tailored to fit the specifics 
of that empire. The question is not whether or not the Roman economy was a market 
economy – there is no yes or no answer – but to what extent the market economy model, 
and the closely related presumption of a functioning labour market, have explanatory 
power for the Roman Empire. It does not matter whether or not Finley was wrong. We 
need to move further, from the theoretical model of a market economy to the specifics 
of market forces in the empire; from the existential question whether Rome had market 
economy, to a utilitarian perspective that can usefully apply the economics of the mar-
ket to Roman Italy.
The value of The Roman market economy to my mind lies in the far-reaching hypoth-
esis of an integrated market in the Roman empire. It is a bold hypothesis that seems to 
work at face value, even if it lacks a firm evidential basis. Precisely the extreme attempt 
to emphasize a supposed complete interconnectedness within the early Roman empire, 
however, brings out how the market was broken up into segments and regions.
With market integration comes price correlation. Temin suggested that the wages 
for work in the mines of the Roman empire supports the existence of a functioning, 
empire-wide labour market, since the wages of the miners at Mons Claudianus in Egypt 
resemble those for gold-miners in Dacia (Alburnus Maior). The mining trade, however, 
is likely to have been largely under imperial control. The imperial administration would 
have set standard wages which may even have limited labour migration.17
To illustrate that the Roman empire constituted an integrated market, Temin places 
much emphasis on his analysis of the grain trade. On the basis of just six references to 
grain prices, he establishes a supposed correlation between price, and distance to Rome, 
which would illustrate an integrated market for wheat.18 This argument does not hold 
and has been the focus of justified criticism. Quite apart from problems deriving from the 
law of small numbers, he ignores the importance of non-market channels for the supply 
of grain, and the fact that much grain was cultivated with the primary goal of personal 
consumption.19 Temin lumps data together from varying time periods and provinces. 
17 Nuanced critique Holleran (2016) 96-7 with references. For the approximation of wages Egypt/
Dacia: Cuvigny (1996) 142-145; as evidence for integrated labour market Temin (2013a) 118, who 
does note the possibility of intervention of the Roman state.
18 Temin (2013a) chapters 2 and 5.
19 See Bransbourg (2012) s.v. ‘the law of small numbers’; with response by Temin (2013b); Erdkamp 
(2014) with reference to Erdkamp (2005) for a very different analysis of the grain market.
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“No amount of regression analysis is going to convince many ancient historians that six 
pieces of data, taken from a period of more than two centuries, are sufficient to demon-
strate the integration of the entire Roman wheat market”.20 In a thorough analysis of the 
(qualitative as well as quantitative) evidence for the grain trade, Erdkamp demonstrated 
earlier on that there was a certain amount of market integration, but that it was regional 
rather than empire-wide.21 The grain trade may serve as an illustration of a more general 
pattern. In Antiquity, the infrastructure for goods and, more importantly, information, 
was slow and therefore largely unsuitable for full empire-wide integration.22 Market 
integration therefore was also slow, and may rather have been compartmentalised into 
smaller market regions within the empire.
Market forces are also identified by Temin in the instrumental behaviour that shows 
from Roman literature. Instrumental, that is economically rational, behaviour is indicative 
of the free competition in a market economy.23 There certainly were Roman gold-diggers 
and profit seekers. Temin’s favourite Roman example of economic rationality is Cato the 
Elder, as portrayed by Plutarch. This famous anecdote speaks both of Cato’s clever way 
of investing in shipping enterprises, minimising risk by taking on only 1/50th share, and 
of the way he bought slaves to sell them for double after a year of solid education.24 
However, there is no way of knowing if Cato’s behaviour was truly economically rational, 
or to what extent his decisions were also determined by considerations of reputation 
or social capital, and convention. Seeking profit is no evidence for market integration.
The historical circumstances of the early Roman empire facilitated market exchange. 
The trading opportunities that came with the foundation of the empire were unprec-
edented. Formal institutions created the necessary infrastructure to maximize profit: the 
Pax Romana, a relatively stable government, and an empire-wide legal system greatly 
contributed to the increase and the success of business enterprises and commercial 
partnerships.25 Not every historian is convinced of the effectiveness of these institu-
tions, however. The role of formal institutions was regularly complemented or replaced 
by informal networks of family, friendship (amicitia), patronage and (professional and 
20 Morley (2013) with reference to Temin’s “tendency to adopt unrealistically sharp distinctions and 
polarities” (unpaginated). The economist reviewers, too, invariably mention these six data.
21 Erdkamp (2005), (2008).
22 As Temin himself notes, e.g. (2001) 179. See also Bang (2008); Terpstra (2008), especially 352-4.
23 Temin (1980) on instrumental behaviour, which is to be expected in market exchanges, as op-
posed to customary and command behaviour – see also the brief summary in Temin (2001) 171-2.
24 The reference is to Plut. Cat.Mai. 21. Temin (2001) 175; Temin (2006) 134; Temin (2013a) 103, 129, 
188. Columella’s careful description of the vineyard business and the cost involved is another 
choice illustration; Colum. RR 3.3, 7-11, cited in Temin (2006) 143; cf Temin (2013a) 136.
25 But see Woolf (1992) for the view that it was the expansion of empire in the last centuries BC rather 
than the stable empire that created the largest integrated markets.
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other) associations.26 The social structure of society was crucial in the development and 
maintenance of networks, and these are likely to have been of a local, or at most regional 
nature. This pattern is demonstrable in trade, but also in human mobility, that is, migra-
tion patterns. Temin’s chapter on financial intermediation and Roman banks and loans 
incidentally provides an excellent illustration of this phenomenon.27
The evidence for market activity typically originated from an urban context, and the 
literary and juristic references sprung from the top layers of society. The peasant farm-
ers of the Roman empire are hardly represented at all, and it remains to be seen how 
market-oriented they were.28 Temin points out, “[a]lthough market activity was only 
a minority of all productive activity, it was the dominant mode of activity of ‘literate 
Rome’”.29 In other words: the presumption of market activity goes a long way to explain 
the evidence that has come down to us, much of which is in written form. And so accept-
ing the possibility of market exchange in Rome becomes essential to our interpretation.
Integration and market forces in the Roman empire were probably strongest among 
the cities of the Italian heartland, with the city of Rome in particular taking centre stage. 
The concept of a market economy has explanatory power for the Roman empire, if only 
because much of the ancient evidence comes from market transactions. That is all the 
more valid for Roman Italy, where there may have been more of a market economy than 
anywhere else in the empire because of its high degree of urbanisation and strongly 
integrated city-networks. Rome itself functioned as the single biggest market for food, 
goods, and people in the empire.30 Even within the boundaries of Roman Italy, however, 
regional differences occurred and we have to allow for variation in the degree of market 
integration within and between cities, and between city and countryside.
the RomAn lAbouR mARket
The labour market deals in a particularly elusive good. Labour is immaterial, unlike 
physical capital that can change hands. That distinctive feature is complicated by the 
existence of slavery in Rome: slaves and slave-labour are material and can change hands. 
The Roman labour market therefore is not only an interesting subject that deserves 
26 Temin (2013a) 100; Cf Hawkins (2016); Broekaert (2012), (2011); Verboven (2012a), (2002); Terpstra 
(2008).
27 Temin (2013a) 157-189.
28 De Ligt (1993) argues that they were not market dependent.
29 Temin (2001) 180.
30 One economist writes: “To my mind the existence of the city of Rome with a population of close 
to a million pointed to the existence of a sophisticated division of labour that was inconceivable 
without a flourishing market economy”, Koyama (2013) 270.
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closer scrutiny in itself, but as a preindustrial labour market with slave labour it is also a 
particularly instructive case study to test labour market theories.
It is necessary to identify first and foremost what is meant by the designation ‘labour 
market’. Temin characterizes a labour market in economic terms.
A functioning labor market couples a labor demand with a labor supply. Two 
conditions must be filled, at least partially: workers must be free to change their 
economic activity and/or their location, and they must be paid something com-
mensurate with their labor productivity to indicate to them which kind of work 
to choose.31
This definition readily presents two guidelines for testing whether there was a labour 
market or not: the extent of labour mobility, and market integration for wages and 
labourers. An analysis of Roman labour mobility and market integration in accordance 
with price theory cannot present the full picture, so I suggest to opt for a socio-economic 
interpretation of the concept of ‘labour market’. The Dictionary of Sociology offers some 
insightful additions to this principal definition and is worth quoting at length:
In a labour-market, human effort (or labour power) is made into a commodity, 
which is bought and sold under terms which in law are deemed to constitute a 
contract. The purchase and sale of formally free labour developed extensively 
with capitalism, but alternative paths to industrialization (...) have entailed wage 
employment, though not strictly a free market for labour. Economists argue that, 
as with other factors of production, the market for labour can be understood as 
a special case of the general theory of prices, with the price (wages or salaries) 
being determined by supply and demand. However, research on actual labour-
markets has shown that, in practice, many of the basic conditions assumed by 
price theory are usually absent. Mobility of workers between jobs is often slug-
gish or non-existent; the anarchic structure of earnings differentials bears only 
the loosest relation to labour supply and demand; discrimination, labelling, rac-
ism, and sexism are rife. Economic explanations of labour-market processes have 
to be supplemented, and sometimes replaced, by sociological analysis, creating 
a promising field for interdisciplinary research.32
Market imperfections will be a recurrent theme in the following investigation into the 
Roman labour market. Thus, distinct patterns of mobility will become apparent that may 
31 Temin (2013a) 115.
32 Scott and Marshall (2009) s.v. ‘labour-market’.
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have facilitated or restricted labour movement. Labour market segmentation will have 
limited market integration. Seen in this way, the Roman case may not present us with 
the numbers or statistics for a strictly economic analysis, but there is plenty of qualita-
tive evidence that can increase our understanding of the Roman urban labour market, 
and that adds to its value in a historical comparison.
labour mobility
Economic theory, then, holds that a functioning labour market requires freedom of 
movement for labourers.33 Freedom of movement includes geographical movement, as 
well as movement between employers, or between occupations. The socio-economic 
concept of a labour market furthermore predicts that there will be certain restrictions 
and governing principles to labour mobility.
Geographical mobility: labour migration
The pull of the city was strong. Despite unsanitary conditions, overall living standards 
were probably better in the urban centres than in the countryside of Roman Italy – even 
if inequality was high and a large part of the urban population lived in poverty. The hope 
of a better life must have been irresistible to many. Many of the rural-urban migrants in 
Roman Italy will have been attracted by the (expectation of ) labour opportunities in 
towns.34 That is particularly true for Rome, but the expectation of better wages is likely 
to have drawn labour migrants to smaller urban settlements, too.35
There appears to have been no fundamental predisposition favouring local labour 
over migrant labour in Roman Italy.36 That does not necessarily mean that migrants’ 
chances in the labour market were equal to those of city-born Romans. Labour-induced 
migration is governed by different factors than trade or market integration. Human mo-
bility of the free population is guided by social networks, institutions and services, both 
in the place of origin and in the place of destination.37 In Roman cities, this networking 
is substantiated by the (professional) associations, and a close-knit system of patronage, 
33 Temin (2013a) 115, “[L]abor needs to be mobile enough to bring wages for work of equal skill near 
equality”, or rather “approximately equal”, page 120.
34 Tacoma (2016) 172: “Much – though certainly not all – migration is related to work”; For an indi-
cation that wages were higher in the city of Rome than in the Egyptian countryside, see Temin 
(2013a) 254; On inequality in towns generally see Gilbert (2013) 685; cf Holleran (2011) on the city 
of Rome; Holleran (2016) offers an insightful account of labour migration to mining centres.
35 The analysis of Herculaneum in Garnsey and De Ligt (2016) indicates that there may have been 
few options left open to free labour migrants in smaller centres like Herculaneum (p. 84). Cf Hol-
leran (2016) 98 with n. 16.
36 Tacoma (2016) chapter 6. Most of his analysis for Rome holds true for Roman Italy.
37 Lucassen (2013); Holleran (2017) 96-7.
64 Chapter 2
both of which may not have been easy to access, which potentially made it difficult for 
migrants to resettle permanently. The necessary reputation to gain credit to set up a 
business, or credibility as a business-partner or employee  was generally built on these 
very same networks. Migrant networks and family were therefore the supporting instru-
ments of chain migration, though there is little evidence for them.38
There were perhaps more opportunities for migrants seeking temporary hired 
labour, especially for the unskilled.39 The temporary and seasonal nature of much of 
the available work in this category made slave labour unprofitable.40 Instead, many of 
these temporary labourers will have been freeborn farmhands from the surrounding 
countryside. The life cycle of rural families and the seasonal cycle of agricultural work 
left many able workers underemployed for extensive periods of time.41 As a result, many 
farmhands would attempt to find some additional form of income in the city. These 
cyclical migrants were not just the poor; it has been reasonably argued that particularly 
farmers who were better off could profit most from these opportunities.42 Patterns of 
(seasonal) occupational pluralism are also attested in other historical societies.43 Many 
of the available urban labour opportunities, however, were found in sectors that did 
not always match the seasonal cycle of the work of the farm: the building trade and the 
shipping trade are likely to have been their main employers and were also subject to a 
seasonal cycle of their own. The building trade could nevertheless support a number of 
workers for around nine months a year. It is likely that there were some vacancies left for 
wage workers who wanted to settle, or who already lived, in the city.44
Humans typically move over shorter distances than goods, which implies that free 
labour markets were probably local, or regional at most.45 Unfree labour, conversely, 
may have moved over somewhat greater distances, similar to perceived market patterns 
for goods. This concerns soldiers, convict labour and, above all, slaves.46 Slaves were a 
much-needed addition to the urban population. In all likelihood they were purchased 
and moved to the city in order to fulfil labour demands for domestic service in an elite 
domus, or to work in smaller workshops: slave migrants were thus a direct result of urban 
38 Tacoma (2016) 201-202, 232-240; Zuiderhoek (2013) on these allocative institutions; Holleran 
(2016) 96-100 on the importance of migrant networks for finding work in Rome.
39 Cf Zuiderhoek (2013) 47. Holleran (2011) is pessimistic about migrants’ chances in the capital.
40 Erdkamp (2016) 37-8.
41 Erdkamp (2016), (2008), (1999).
42 Erdkamp (2016) 37-8.
43 McCann (1999) on 19th-century Nova Scotia.
44 Garnsey and De Ligt (2016) 84, 90-1.
45 For local labour markets, cf Holleran (2013) 238.
46 Woolf (2017); Convict labour: Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2015).
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job opportunities and this will have meant significant competition for free labourers 
looking to find work.47
The nature of the urban labour market also determined the character of labour-
induced migration.48 Urban labour demand in Roman Italy is likely to have been volatile. 
This was due to the seasonal trades, but also because of fluctuating demand for (luxury) 
goods.49 High mortality in an urban environment theoretically leads to job openings.50 
But there was no lack of job applicants either. Not for every fortune-seeker a year round 
stable occupation could be found. Because of unstable labour demand, there must have 
been a large group of unskilled labourers who migrated to the city only temporarily. 
Such unskilled wage workers historically were mostly young males.51 The Roman city 
had very little to offer in terms of social security or security of employment, and the 
annona in Rome was an exceptional arrangement for which most labour migrants would 
not have been eligible.52 To cushion these insecurities, they generally maintained close 
bonds with their family in the countryside, and many must have returned there. To 
skilled workers, however, the cities of Roman Italy may have provided a more stable en-
vironment to settle permanently. Skills strengthened their position in the labour market, 
and they may also have benefited more from the institutional framework of voluntary 
associations, such as the manifold professional collegia.53
47 Garnsey and De Ligt (2016) 82-4; De Ligt (2013) 155: “the vast majority of the cities of the Roman 
empire seem to have grown as a result of local or regional processes of migration and as a result 
of elite expenditure on urban slaves”; for elite domus, see chapter 4. The pattern is most clear for 
the capital, but there are indications that it is also realistic for other cities, see De Ligt and Garnsey 
(2012); This supposition holds even if some slaves were acquired mainly to add to the prestige of 
their owner, cf Bodel (2011) 312: “Everything a slave did, except what was done at the master’s 
sufferance, was done for the master and thus constituted work”.
48 Lucassen (2013).
49 Fluctuating demand: Hawkins (2016), (2006).
50 Garnsey and De Ligt (2016) 91.
51 Tacoma (2016) 113-23 argues that migrants to the city of Rome were mostly young males. On 
(the limits of ) female mobility in Roman society, compare Woolf (2013), and the current research 
project of Lien Foubert, e.g. (2013).
52 Erdkamp (2016) 47; Brunt (1980) 94–5; Holleran (2017) 87. But compare Jongman (2007) 605 who 
believes that “public subsistence support was indeed one of the salient features of Roman life”.
53 Compare Tacoma (2016) 202: “In practice this meant that those who had already had success at 
home would be the best placed to make the move, but at the same time they were exactly the 
persons who might have had the least incentive to do so: they would have already have settled 
and might have started a family”; Holleran (2016) 114; See also chapter 5.
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Job-hopping
Changing employers or changing jobs in the Roman city was not particularly difficult, 
at least in theory. Much of the available labour was hired labour performed under 
limited-term contracts, varying from day labour and bespoke assignments to longer-
term agreements.54 Various passages in the Digest for example discuss the theoretical 
situation of a slave apparently rented out for the period of a year.55 The problem, then, 
was not the theoretical possibility of changing jobs, but the practical implications of 
finding work.56
Slavery, it seems, did not preclude freedom of movement in the labour market. There 
is some evidence suggesting that slaves were allowed to exploit their own labour for a 
wage during the times their owner had no work for them. In such instances, the slave 
apparently paid his owner a set remittance each day; if he earned more than he owed, 
the slave could thereby enhance his own assets (the peculium).57 This was a mutually 
beneficial arrangement: the slave could earn money, and saved his owner the trouble of 
finding employment for him. Hiring out slaves, by their masters or by slaves themselves, 
was a common way of cutting costs in other slave societies: in British and antebellum 
America, as well as in ancient Athens.58 The Digest presents a number of clear references 
to such practices in the Roman empire.59 Labeo, for example, discusses liability in the 
case of an incompetent muleteer:
54 Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2017) on the predominance of hired labour and the various forms of 
remuneration in Diocletian’s Prices Edict; Holleran (2016) 95-6; Treggiari (1980) 51.
55 Dig. 24.3.7.10 (Ulpian book 31 ad Sabinum); Dig. 33.7.19 (Paul)
56 Holleran (2017) for the mechanisms of finding work in the city of Rome.
57 Cf Hawkins (2006) 207-9 with reference to Colum. RR 1 pr. 12. Columella seems to refer to a self-hir-
ing slave when he mentions a wage-worker’s daily tribute (quotidianum tributum = remittance?). 
Hawkins also lists the valuable evidence from an account book from Roman Egypt listing such 
slave remittances among the household income (P. Mich. Inv. 1933); Incidentally, a slave could also 
hire out his/her under-slaves (vicarii) and make a profit from that (Dig. 14.3.11.8).
58 Hawkins (2006) 205 with references.
59 For other indications of slave self-hire in the Digest, see the references in Brunt (1980) 88 n. 42; 
Hawkins (2006) 204 ff; and for both hire and self-hire of slaves, see especially Jonkers (1933) 112 
n.1; Bürge (1990) has argued at length that the term mercennarius refers exclusively to another 
man’s slave, renting himself out. Möller (1993) however argues convincingly that the converse is 
true and that mercennarius refers to freeborn wage-labourers, unless the addendum servus (vel 
sim.) appears. See also the comments of Scheidel (1994) throughout pages 153–202.
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Dig. 19.2.60.7
Servum meum mulionem conduxisti: neglegentia eius mulus tuus perit. si ipse 
se locasset, ex peculio dumtaxat et in rem versum damnum tibi praestaturum 
dico: si autem ipse eum locassem, non ultra me tibi praestaturum, quam dolum 
malum et culpam meam abesse: quod si sine definitione personae mulionem a 
me conduxisti et ego eum tibi dedissem, cuius neglegentia iumentum perierit, 
illam quoque culpam me tibi praestaturum aio, quod eum elegissem, qui eius-
modi damno te adficeret.
You hired my slave as a muleteer; your mule died because of his carelessness. If 
he leased himself out, I say that I will be responsible to you only up to the value 
of his peculium or the amount of my enrichment. If, however, I leased him out, 
I will not be responsible to you for more than the absence of my bad faith and 
fault. If you hired a muleteer from me without specification of the individual, and 
I gave you the man from whose carelessness the mule died, I think that I will be 
responsible to you also for that fault, because I chose the one who caused you 
the loss in question.60
The text specifically discusses the possibility that the slave hired out his own labour, 
contrasting it with the option in which the slave was hired out by his owner.
Changing occupations was perhaps more difficult for a freeborn specialist, an artisan 
or craftsman. Tied to one skill-set and possibly also to work-related property, chang-
ing jobs was reserved for the next generation. In the early empire, occupation was not 
always inherited. On the one hand, there is ample evidence for family businesses and for 
sons following in their father’s footsteps; such intergenerational continuity would be the 
obvious strategy when the family owned a workshop. On the other hand, many children 
had a different occupation from their father or mother. If a workshop was rented, this 
would have facilitated career changes.61 The family business could not always be handed 
down to biological children, which could be remedied by apprenticeship, adoption or 
even manumission. Families with more than one child (that is, more than one heir) might 
seek to differentiate in order to spread the risk of unemployment or underemployment.62
There were no guild restrictions in Roman Italy that would have impeded a change 
of occupation, or location. The comparison between professional associations and 
60 Dig. 19.2.60.7. Translation: Martin (2001) 112-3 n. 17.
61 Tacoma (2016) 196.
62 The hereditary nature of jobs and intergenerational dependency will be discussed in more detail 
in chapter 3.
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medieval guilds has proven useful in some respects, but the Roman associations did 
not entertain a monopoly like the medieval guild may have done.63 Affiliation with an 
association was not an inherited right, but was based on individual merit. Significant 
numbers of artisans and craftsmen did not even join the associations and operated 
independently or through separate networks. That situation only changed in the late 
third and early fourth centuries.
Despite the fact that there were no structural inhibitions to labour mobility, actual 
evidence of Romans switching jobs is scarce. The fact that there are few people whose 
careers we can trace is in line with the nature of the evidence: someone like Lucian, for 
example, would not be commemorated for his brief endeavour as an apprentice sculp-
tor in his epitaph.64 The closest thing to a ‘career’ perhaps is a provocative graffito from 
Pompeii scolding someone who held various jobs in the past, and supposedly would do 
anything for money now: nunc facis si cummu(m) linx<s>e<e>ris, consummaris omnia. 
“The joke would surely only work if changing occupations were possible”.65 The most 
obvious advancement, however, is a career within the elite household, from slavery 
to freedom. There is some evidence for slaves moving between jobs (or tasks?) in the 
Digest and in epigraphy; similarly, Petronius outlines the fictional career of Trimalchio in 
some detail – page boy, apprentice accountant, paymaster, as well as his engagements 
in business as a freedman.66
market integration and labour market segmentation
Previous studies on Roman labour have tended to pay much attention to status distinc-
tions of labourers. This has prompted many to centre either on free independent artisans 
and craftsmen, or on slavery. It is my contention that the entire working population 
can and should be studied together. The distinction between slave and free workers 
was important in the notoriously hierarchical society that was Rome, and will receive 
due attention in the analysis. But in addition two other dichotomies seem to govern 
the discussion about the Roman labour market: the dichotomy between skilled and un-
skilled, and male and female workers.67 Economic theory of a functioning labour market 
predicts full market integration. Labour segmentation theory however predicts that the 
63 But see chapter 5 below for the fact that medieval guilds may not have had such a monopoly 
either.
64 Luc. Somn. 1, discussed in chapter 3 below.
65 CIL 4. 10150, Holleran (2017) 88 n.12. It is the only example of changing occupations she adduces.
66 For multi-tasking slaves, see chapter 4 below; Trimalchio’s career is outlined in Petr. Sat. 29, cf the 
summary in Petersen (2006) 3–4.
67 See also Tacoma (2016) 170-203 for the same three basis distinctions plus a paragraph (195-9) 
on permanent, temporary and seasonal work; Tacoma (forthcoming) distinguishes also between 
dependent and independent labour; Hawkins (2013) singles out gender and legal status.
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labour market was not fully integrated, but divided into corresponding ‘segments’ or 
smaller ‘labour markets’, that were not automatically interlinked. In other words, these 
dichotomies are likely to reflect real restrictions to what jobs were open to an individual.
Slave and free labour
The Roman elite likened wage employment to slavery. Cicero wrote of wage labourers 
that “their very wages are the warrant of their slavery”.68 The close connection between 
working for wages and slavery is reinforced also when Chrysippus tries to soften the 
position of a slave by calling him a “perpetual wage-labourer”.69 They may be among 
the first uses of the concept of ‘wage slavery’ that would become prominent in the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The elite openly expressed their loathing of manual labour in general: agriculture was 
the only decent way to earn a livelihood.70 Joshel sums up nicely the picture painted in 
the ancient sources:
Doctors kill their patients, and teachers corrupt their students (...). Businessmen 
always cheat, and rich auctioneers are usually crass. Men who make their living 
in commerce are materialistic, and they will try to use their wealth to claim pre-
cedence.71
On closer inspection, however, some occupations apparently were not deemed quite as 
disreputable as others. Jobs can be perfectly respectable for those “whose status they 
befit” (quorum ordini conveniunt), such as architects.72 Elite disdain of work focuses “on 
the relationship of dependency that work signified rather than on the status of who 
performed it”.73 The equation of workers and slaves perceived in ancient literature is 
therefore largely superficial.
68 Cic. De Off. 1.150: est enim in illis ipsa merces auctoramentum servitutis; transl. M.I. Finley (19732) 
57. Cf Treggiari (1980) 52: “most of the passages cited to prove [that the Romans equated wage-
earning with slavery] seem insubstantial or ambiguous, except for Cicero’s famous and rhetorical 
phrase”. For Cic. De Off. 1. 150 and elite views on labour, see also the introduction.
69 Mercennarius perpetuus; Chrysippus in Sen. De ben. 3.22.1.
70 E.g. Van den Hoven (1996) 49.
71 Joshel (1992) 63–4. Similarly, Van den Hoven (1996) 49: “This train of thought in both pagan and 
Christian authors often resulted in not so much a dislike of trade as a dislike of traders. This is, of 
course, very similar to the traditional opinion of the Greeks and Romans concerning crafts: the 
product of the craftsman was not frowned upon, nor his skills, but the craftsman himself was”.
72 Cic. De Off. 1. 151. Compare Or. 9
73 Bodel (2011) 317.
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A more literal reading of the Roman elite view of manual labour however, has coloured 
historians’ perception of labour in the Roman world in the past.74
Economists sometimes express surprise that free labour should have played 
so small a part in the Roman world, whilst besides the slaves a plebs of several 
hundred thousand men inhabited the capital and other plebes not subject to the 
authority of any owner lived in all the large towns under both the Republic and 
the Empire. But all surprise is removed when one considers the institutions [i.e. 
the annona] which permitted this proletariat to live in idleness. (...) Free labour, 
which however never completely yielded to servile labour, lost its power of 
resistance in proportion to the ability of the civis romanus to live at the expense 
of the State.75
The opinion voiced here by Louis downplays the contribution of free labour to the econ-
omy. The freeborn in the countryside – the majority of the population – were thought to 
have been farmers;76 the idle poor in the city did not work, they were mollycoddled by 
means of bread and circuses instead – at best, they could be employed in the imperial 
building projects.77 Note that in this, once again, the situation of the city of Rome is 
extrapolated to assumptions about the Roman empire.
The assumption that all manual labour was performed by slaves was supported by the 
fact that ancient evidence on slave labour and working freedmen is more abundant than 
that on free labour: slaves and ex-slaves predominate in the occupational inscriptions by 
a wide margin. It is now known, however, that this is partly the result of biases in the 
material. Slaves nevertheless made up a significant percentage of the urban population, 
perhaps over 40 per cent. The percentage may well have been lower for the city of Rome, 
but it would still amount to between 25 and 30 per cent.78 Percentages of this order of 
magnitude clearly indicate the importance of slave labour within the urban economy. 
They also illustrate that the majority of the working population must have consisted of 
free labour.79
74 See also Holleran (2017) 87 with references; Tacoma (2016) 176 with n.34.
75 Louis (1965) 2. Cf Sall. Cat. 37.7.
76 Also, e.g., Treggiari (1969a) 90: “...leaving [the free Romans] two occupations only, farming and 
war”, although she hastens to add that “displaced and unemployed citizens were often glad to 
undertake [‘servile’ work]”.
77 On the importance of the building trade, e.g. Brunt (1980). But see Holleran (2011) 171–2.
78 Cf De Ligt (2012) 190 table 4.3; De Ligt and Garnsey (2012) for Herculaneum; Joshel (1992) 46–9.
79 Holleran (2017) 87-90; Tacoma (2016) 176-8; cf Temin (2004a) 526: “…slaves were not the dominant 
labor force either in the city or the countryside of the early Roman empire.”
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In Roman society, overall welfare levels were low (see below). It was only in the city of 
Rome itself that the dole satisfied (or partly satisfied) a basic need for grain for a select 
group of the urban nonelite; even the dole, however, will have left people in need of 
additional income.80 Common sense dictates that the group of free labourers in the cit-
ies must have been substantial, if only because a life of leisure in accordance with elite 
ideals was probably out of reach for most. The urban labour market therefore was not 
solely populated by slaves, although it is clear that slaves held an important share in 
it. The existence of a large urban slave population, combined with the hypothesis that 
the free urban population had to work for a living, leads to the expectation that slave 
and free often must have worked side by side. Slaves thus constituted not an economic, 
but primarily a legal category.81 If slavery is regarded as just one type of labour relation 
among a spectrum of possible labour relationships, the question remains: why was this 
quite extreme type so popular?
Slave and free were part of the same labour market, and if that labour market func-
tioned according to economic price theory, it means they would have had to compete in 
price. But the relative price of slave labour is hard, if not impossible, to calculate. There is 
little evidence for wages from Roman antiquity to work with. Even if there were more at-
testations for wages, slaves do not always receive it. An attempt to account for the price 
of freedom (which is invaluable) from a modern perspective, as undertaken by White, 
may be morally sound but it is also anachronistic and cannot lead to an understanding 
of the economic contribution of slavery within Roman society.82 It is equally difficult 
to put a price-tag on the prestige and social capital of slave-holding in the eyes of the 
Romans, or their perception of the economic security of dependent labour.83 Some 
interest in the economic value of slave labour is nevertheless reflected in slave prices: 
male slaves commanded higher prices than female slaves under the Roman empire. If 
slavery were based on traditions of honour involved in owning slaves, rather than on 
their economic value, we should expect prices to be similar for all slaves.84 A definite 
awareness of the profitability of slave labour is also present in, for example, Columella’s 
careful calculations of how many slaves and supervisors are needed to work a vineyard, 
or in Varro’s advice to hire doctors, fullers or builders rather than provide expensive job-
80 Erdkamp (2016) 46-7; cf Brunt (1980) ; LeGall (1971). On the dole, see e.g. Aldrete and Mattingly 
(1999).
81 Bradley (1994); Temin (2004a).
82 White (2008).
83 Scheidel (2005b) and (2008); cf Hawkins (2017) 48ff.
84 Harper (2010) 234; historically, female slaves were often more expensive than males, more presti-
gious and more numerous.
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training for slaves.85 The antique authors never explicitly compare the cost and benefits 
of slave versus free labour, however.
It should be emphasized at this point that slave and free were not static categories. 
An individual could move from one to the other category: slaves could be granted their 
freedom through manumission, and free men could be enslaved through debt-bondage, 
penal slavery, and self-sale. Freed status was not permanent either, because the next 
generation would be freeborn.
One could say that slavery offered additional labour opportunities. Self-enslavement 
is in its very essence simply a particularly striking form of freedom of labour movement 
and economic strategy. Historically it is a desperate measure for individuals to turn to 
when there is no other option for sustenance left – “rather as when in seventeenth-
century India, as Braudel records, a Persian ambassador acquired ‘innumerable slaves 
... for almost nothing because of the famine’”.86 However, it has also been argued that 
in Roman Italy the prospect of enslavement sometimes was in itself desirable when 
compared to the life of the free urban poor.87
A remarkably open slave system and frequent manumission are commonly listed as 
the core characteristics of Roman slavery.88 In some noticeably optimistic approaches 
to Roman slavery – undoubtedly inspired by a willingness to see the Roman Empire as 
the sophisticated forerunner of modern civilization – it has been argued that virtually all 
slaves were freed eventually, and that when they were freed they could expect full social 
integration in an open slave system.89 Urban slaves in particular do seem to have stood 
a good chance to be manumitted once they had reached the legal age of manumission, 
though manumission was certainly not universal.90 The frequency of manumission and 
the openness of the Roman slave system are still the subject of debate.
It is undoubtedly true that the Roman ex-slave was accepted into society to a remark-
able degree.91 I would argue that this acceptance is the result of the overall integration of 
slaves within Roman society, and of an ex-slave’s continued bonds with his or her former 
85 Colum. RR 1.9.4-5; Varro RR 1.16.4.
86 Braudel (1981) quoted by Harris (1999) 73.
87 The economic opportunities of contractual slavery are explored at length by Silver (2011); see also 
Ramin and Veyne (1981); Temin (2013a) 132-133; Temin (2004a) 526.
88 E.g. Kleijwegt (2006) 22. See chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of manumission practices.
89 Watson (1980) on open and closed slave systems. Quasi-universal manumission: Alföldy (1986), 
Weaver (1972), Harper (1972).
90 Perhaps more than 50%, see Garnsey and De Ligt (2012) and (2016); see chapter 4 below for a 
more elaborate discussion of manumission rates.
91 Kleijwegt (2006) 56: “In no other slave society do we observe so many freedmen reaching impor-
tant political positions and accumulating capital and property in commerce and entrepreneurship 
as we see in ancient Rome.”
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owner. Both these facts secured freedmen a place within Rome’s hierarchy. Acceptance 
was emphatically not the result of assimilation of the freed among the freeborn. Freed-
men were never wholly free from stigma. A freedman became a Roman citizen, but he 
did not have full citizen rights. He was barred from the senatorial, equestrian and decu-
rial classes, and thereby excluded from a number of political offices; intermarriage with 
the senatorial order was restricted.92 More importantly, freedmen remained dependent 
on their patron, although the practical implications of that bond could differ.
To a certain extent, then, slave, freed, and freeborn were interchangeable. Keith 
Harper noted that “[i]t is an open question, and one which has not been posed often or 
explicitly enough, to what extent slave and free labor acted as substitutes in the Roman 
economy”.93 Although most jobs appear to have been open to all, regardless of legal 
status, some sectors were predominantly staffed by either slave or free and they should 
therefore be seen as “imperfect economic substitutes”.94
Skilled and unskilled labour
Occupational inscriptions testify to high job differentiation in Roman Italy; some of the 
recorded jobs were clearly highly skilled.95 There were surgeons and ophthalmologists, 
architects and gem engravers.96 The fine quality of many material remains from Roman 
antiquity also attests to the fact that there were highly skilled artisans and craftsmen 
in Roman Italy. No one could deny the skills of the architect of the harbour facilities 
at Portus or the Baths of Caracalla, or the talent of the sculptor who copied the Greek 
original of the Apollo of Belvedere, and the vase-maker who decorated the Warren cup. 
It is therefore unlikely that high job differentiation was merely the result of low levels of 
skill in Roman society, in a scenario where all workers merely made a tiny contribution 
to the manufacture of a more complex final product.97
92 Kleijwegt (2006) 3: “In ancient Rome, enslavement automatically wiped out free birth (...). In con-
trast, manumission documents from Brazil contain the standard clause that the act of manumis-
sion turned the slave into a free man, ‘as if free from birth’.” See also his p. 38 ff, specifically 41 on 
the “incomplete transition from slave to free” throughout history, and in Rome.
93 Harper (2010) 213.
94 Tacoma (2016) 183, his emphasis; idem (forthcoming); Bradley (1994) 65; Temin (2004a) 518.
95 Tacoma (2016) 184 on a spectrum of skills; idem (forthcoming).
96 Medicus chirurgus: CIL 6. 3986, CIL 11. 5400; medicus ocularius: CIL 5. 3156 and CIL 6. 33880; archi-
tectus: CIL 5. 3464, CIL 6. 8724 – examples for these three occupations could be multiplied. There is 
only one gemmarius sculptor: CIL 6. 9436.
97 As argued by Morel (1992). On labour differentiation, see introduction, and ch. 4.
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The dichotomy between skilled and unskilled crosses the boundaries of legal status.98 
This is a point that deserves emphasis, because – like manual labour – skills are some-
times thought to have been exclusive to slaves.99 The perseverance of that idea may 
once again be attributed to the overwhelming predominance of slaves and freedmen 
in the occupational inscriptions. Occupational inscriptions, but also other evidence like 
the chapter on wage in Diocletian’s Prices Edict, chiefly attest to skilled labour.100 The 
reasons why skilled occupations are overrepresented in the occupational inscriptions 
are not difficult to come up with. It may be assumed that people took pride in a job 
they had trained for. Moreover, it was a job that earned more money than unskilled 
wage-labour, so that it allowed them to set up an epitaph in stone more often than 
their unskilled counterparts. Even if they were commemorated in an inscription, many 
unskilled labourers were probably more like jacks-of-all-trades and not easily collected 
under the heading of a single job-title.
Most people commemorated with a job-title on their epitaph were both skilled, and of 
servile background – but that does not mean that all skilled labourers were of a servile 
background. No doubt it is true that some of the men and women who were enslaved 
during the expansion of the empire were clever Greeks.101 Moreover, investment in the 
education of home-born and bought slaves could certainly be a profitable undertaking 
and it must be assumed that many slaves were trained in the household. Conversely, the 
prospect of manumission might also have encouraged some slaves to pursue an educa-
tion.102 It will be argued in the remainder of this thesis that skills were also accessible to 
the free population. Job-training was available to slave and free alike, and to both men 
and (if not as regularly) women. Investment in human capital was not exclusive to slaves 
98 Temin (2004a) 538: “The fundamental economic division in the early Roman empire (…) was 
between educated and uneducated – skilled and unskilled – not between slave and free”.
99 E.g. Casson (1978) 45; and see chapter 4.
100 Cf Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2017).
101 Cf Garnsey (1980) 44 and chapter 4 below. Tacoma (2016) 201 on (exceptional) trades that were 
“associated with foreignness”: (Eastern) astrologers and (Greek) doctors. Of course, origin can be 
faked to create the same effect. I wonder if the owl-statuette at the Rijksmuseum van Oudheden 
in Leiden belongs in that category, with a Greek inscription signposting the seer Achates Petrios’s 
business in Rome.
102 Or to pursue it with more enthusiasm, insofar as they had choice in the matter; Temin (2013a) 
131. “The observation that educated people became slaves reverses the causation noted earlier 
in this chapter that open systems of slavery with manumission promoted education. The earlier 
statement was that manumission led to education; the previous paragraph asserts that educated 
slaves led to manumission. Which is correct?” Temin argues that both were caused by the conquest 
of the Mediterranean.
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and slave-owners. Slaves and ex-slaves just had better reasons to record their skills in 
stone – or less to substitute it with on their epitaphs, in terms of family ties.103
Skilled labour paid at least twice as much as unskilled work, which could theoretically 
indicate that it was in relatively short supply.104 Investment in education was relatively 
costly, and despite the skill premium it was not an investment that everyone could af-
ford to make. A low life expectancy (and thus a shorter time-span to cash in on the 
investment), and competition for employment between slave and free workers made 
job-training less alluring for the freeborn. The evidence for investment in human capital 
by the freeborn, however, is better than that for slave education. Moreover, intergenera-
tional dependence predicts that skilled labourers will often have been able to provide 
similar training for their children. It also indicates that unskilled workers very likely could 
not do the same for their offspring. In sum, job-training presumably was not as common 
or self-evident as it is in the Western world today – but that does not mean that skilled 
labour was necessarily scarce.105 Scarcity depends on labour demand as well.
Roman society must have had a significantly higher demand for the muscle power of 
unskilled labourers than for the work of specialists. Combined with the limited scope 
for job-training just outlined, a large group of unskilled labourers must therefore be 
postulated. Despite the difficulties of quantification, scholars agree that especially in the 
capital employers had at their disposal a virtually limitless pool of unskilled workers.106 
The market for unskilled labour in the city may have been more casual, temporary and 
seasonal in nature than that for skilled labour, since labour demands were relatively un-
stable. The building trade and the transport sector should be highlighted in this context. 
This demand for unskilled labour power was probably met not only by urban residents, 
but must have been supplemented by temporary, cyclical labour migrants (see above).
Male and female labour
Gender distinctions are present within the other categories, slave and free, skilled and 
unskilled. In virtually every type of jobs men are more prominent and more often at-
tested than women. For many families, however, the additional income of women must 
have been an economic necessity.
Scholarly discourse on Roman labour implicitly or explicitly focuses on male labour, 
for which the sources are much better. The current work is no exception. Thus, whereas 
‘gender’ indicates the balance between male and female, the fact that everything else 
103 Joshel (1992).
104 Hawkins (2017) 44-8.
105 See chapter 3 for investment in human capital of the freeborn, chapter 4 for investment in human 
capital of slaves.
106 Holleran (2017) 102-3.
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is mostly based on sources about men’s work turns this section about male and female 
labour into one that is really mostly about women’s work. Roman women are often 
researched with a focus on their familial role, defining the women by the men in their 
lives – just as the Romans seem to have done.107 Accordingly, when looking at female 
labour in the context of the Roman family, it is often assumed that when women were 
economically active, they did not have a money-earning occupation, but helped out 
their husbands in the family business.108 This is noteworthy, because working women 
in Rome are actually not that uncommon in the sources and they have certainly not 
lacked scholarly attention. Much of the evidence is therefore well-known, but there is 
a tendency to explain away evidence for independent and skilled women in favour of 
these generalizations.109
Women’s contribution to the family income, like that of children, is difficult to measure. 
In many historical as well as contemporary societies, women’s primary involvement with 
family economics has been with domestic housekeeping and childcare, which is gener-
ally unremunerated. Because of that, “[t]he woman at home was said to be economically 
nonfunctional”.110 Though historical analyses of past economies and labour have long 
since started to take the economic value of domestic work into consideration, women’s 
engagement with the labour market, particularly in a pre-industrial context, is still often 
underexposed. This section reveals that the focus on men is only partly justified and that 
when speaking of Roman labourers, this really does include many women.
Roman society was governed by men, and male dominance pervaded the organization 
of labour and the economy as well. Referring to such social systems as ‘patriarchy’ often 
carries a pejorative connotation, but it also facilitates comparison, which has proven to 
be useful.111 Patriarchy is not unique to Rome. In other historical societies, patriarchy did 
not so much ban women from the labour market, but it has kept women confined to 
inferior, often unskilled jobs, with lower wages and fewer opportunities in what is called 
a secondary, or dual labour market – calling to mind the glass ceiling that is still regularly 
107 E.g. Dixon (1988) The Roman mother; Hallett (1984) Fathers and daughters in Roman society – both 
titles are telling.
108 E.g. Saller (2007) 105-7; Saller (2003) 194; Kampen (1981) 112–13, 125; Treggiari (1979a) 73, 76 and 
(1976).
109 Groen-Vallinga (2013) with references; Holleran (2013). Malaspina (2003); Dixon (2001a) and 
the important methodological chapter on working women in (2001c) 113-134; Eichenauer 
(1988); Günther (1987) for freedwomen; Kampen (1981); LeGall (1970); worth mentioning here 
is especially the work of Treggiari (1976)(1979a)(1979b) which already poses many fundamental 
questions.
110 Tilly and Scott (1978) 5.
111 Groen-Vallinga (2013) 297-8; Honeyman and Goodman (1991) on patriarchy in general.
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discussed as a serious issue today.112 Such an engendered dual labour market limited 
women’s opportunities of employment, and it was firmly in place in Roman society.113 In 
the words of Richard Saller:
A gendered division of labor makes Rome no different from nearly every other 
human society, but it is worth reflecting on the consequences of the particular 
configuration of gendered labor in Rome’s slave society.114
A gendered labour market is a result, as well as a reflection, of gender ideals: the Roman 
elite endorsed the ideal that a woman should not need to work. This ideal image be-
came widespread among the rest of the population and, as a result, women’s work is not 
usually recorded in the ancient evidence.115 Because of a widespread gender bias and 
the resulting low wages, as well as the expectation of a relatively early marriage which 
shortened their time in the labour market and limited returns on investment in their 
human capital, it is likely that girls had fewer opportunities for job-training than boys.116 
Their economic prospects therefore were limited, discouraging investment in female 
human capital even more. One of the implications is likely to have been that women 
actually participated in the labour market to a lesser extent than men. Women had a 
biological comparative advantage in the home, men had a comparative advantage in 
the labour market because they generally commanded higher wages.117 Regardless of 
their weak position in the labour market, it should be emphasized that many women 
will still have had to contribute to the family income to make ends meet. But when a 
woman was trained in an occupation, her profession was not the first thing she was 
remembered for in an epitaph.118
Women were therefore not only less actively involved in the labour market than men, 
but working women are also likely to be underrepresented, which goes a long way 
to explain the scarcity of the evidence from ancient Rome. The material we do have, 
112 See e.g. Ridgeway (2011) 92-126, “Gendering at work”. The glass ceiling is a phenomenon of an 
engendered, but not of a dual labour market.
113 Groen-Vallinga (2013); see also Gardner (1995) and Dixon (1984) for women’s position in Roman 
law.
114 Saller (2003) 201.
115 Groen-Vallinga (2013) 295-9.
116 Women’s wages are seldom attested, and when they are gender differentiations are not clear; on 
wages for women in Diocletian’s Prices Edict, Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2017) 113; on invest-
ment in human capital of women, see chapter 3 below.
117 Cf Cigno (1991) 28.
118 Larsson Lovén (2016); Groen-Vallinga (2013) 295-9; Hemelrijk (2004) on the laudatio Turiae; Lars-
son Lovén (1998).
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however, shows that women were operating in a remarkably broad range of jobs. There 
is no reason why they should not be: there was no law against women in commerce, 
production and business, and their income presumably presented a welcome addition 
to the family budget.119
lAbouR suPPly And demAnd
According to economic price theory, “[a] functioning labor market couples a labor de-
mand with a labor supply”.120 This section therefore takes a closer look at labour demand 
and labour supply in Roman Italy. The expectation here, too, is that there will have been 
socio-cultural constraints to reaching an equilibrium between supply and demand.
Urbanisation rates in Roman Italy were high. That fact prompts a number of supposi-
tions about supply and demand within the urban labour market: it suggests that there 
were plenty of workers available in what would be considered a thick urban labour 
market. If so, the ample availability of labour would then reduce the value of labour, 
implying low wages. Low wages lead to an increase in labour supply, because people 
will have sought to increase their income by looking for more work. However, a large 
urban population also means that there was a larger pool of consumers: people have to 
eat and so a large population raises product demand. But was the increase in product 
demand enough to increase labour demand, and to increase it sufficiently to satisfy 
everyone’s need to find an income? Was it idle hope to find a new life, a better income 
in the city?
living standards and the working population
Aggregate labour supply in economic theory is determined by the numbers of the 
working population, multiplied by the hours worked and the intensity of effort in those 
hours, taking into consideration such factors as demographics and human capital. Obvi-
ously, no such sophisticated cliometric analysis is possible for ancient Rome. But there 
is a lot to be said about the numbers and the structure of the total urban population 
of Roman Italy, which is the maximum potential work force. It will be argued that most 
of the population lived at or under subsistence level, and that therefore the potential 
working population at least roughly approximates the actual work force: everyone who 
could do so, had to work for a living.
119 Larsson Lovén (2016); Groen-Vallinga (2013), and on the family as a whole see chapter 3 below.
120 Temin (2013a) 115.
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Temin contends that “ordinary Romans lived well”.121 The amount of scholarship trying 
to make sense of the scarce data on Roman living standards already indicates that the 
argument is not easy to substantiate, however. In recent years, students of the Roman 
economy presented various efforts to calculate Roman gross domestic product (GDP) 
for the early Empire, mostly in the context of analysis of Roman economic growth but 
also in connection with investigations into Roman living standards.122 There is no way to 
identify per capita GDP accurately for the Roman empire. Some findings are suggestive 
for our current investigation, however. Comparative evidence suggests that regional dif-
ferences in the distribution of GDP occur; in the case of the Roman empire it is likely that 
wealth was concentrated in Roman Italy, raising GDP there. As a rule, GDP and urbaniza-
tion rates are linked, and indeed the high urbanization rate of Roman Italy matches the 
suggested higher GDP in the Italian heartland.123
The proposition that Roman Italy had a higher GDP than the rest of the empire does 
not necessarily mean that the inhabitants of Roman Italy were well-off, nor that they 
were any better off than those in the provinces. Temin’s assumption that Roman Italy 
can best be compared to the blossoming economy of the Netherlands in 1600, rather 
than the less wealthy ‘early modern European economy’ proposed as comparandum by 
others, does not prove the hypothesis that “ordinary Romans lived well”. Calculations of 
per capita or aggregate GDP effectively mask income inequality; and the distribution of 
income may have been more unequal in Roman Italy than elsewhere, because wealth 
tended to concentrate in the hands of a small group of people.124
Real wages are perhaps a better indication of living standards than per capita GDP. 
The most comprehensive dataset of prices and wages to calculate real wages is the list 
contained in Diocletian’s Prices Edict. The conclusions drawn on the basis of the wage 
of an unskilled worker in the Edict are consistent: real wages were low in comparison 
with other historical societies.125 The more abundant wage data from Roman Egypt 
lead to the same inference.126 It was postulated here that a large part of the urban 
121 Temin (2013a) 2 and chapter 11; cf Temin (2006) 133, “Many inhabitants of ancient Rome lived 
well”; cf Jongman (2007).
122 Temin (2013a); Lo Cascio and Malanima (2009); Scheidel and Friesen (2009); Bang (2008); Mad-
dison (2007); Temin (2006); Goldsmith (1984); Hopkins (1980).
123 Temin (2013a) 253, 256; whereas the correlation is clear, Temin notes that the causality is unclear 
– is it wealth that leads to urbanization, or does that work the other way around?
124 Temin (2013a) 256–7. Cf De Ligt (2012) 19, with reference to Van Bavel (2008) and Maat (2005) for 
income inequality in the Dutch Republic of the Golden Age; Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2017) 
118-22 note that Diocletian’s Prices Edict points to high income variation.
125 Allen (2009) and Duncan-Jones (1978); Scheidel (2014) for a less clear-cut negative answer; See 
also Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2017) 118 with further references.
126 Scheidel (2010a) 433; cf Drexhage (1991) chapter 9.
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population consisted of these unskilled labourers who had to get by on a very low 
wage. Most ancient historians therefore infer that “the majority of the Romans were not 
very well off”.127 The effects of low real wages may theoretically be cushioned by the 
regular participation of all family members, not just the male head of household.128 This 
phenomenon also suggests that the labour supply was high. But in fact labour supply 
may have been so high that it could not always be satisfied, in which case large groups 
of people were underemployed, or unemployed at any one time.129 This presumption 
supports the argument that the large majority of the Italian population may still have 
been living at or under subsistence levels.130 Somewhat paradoxically, a city like Rome 
was the best place to live in structural poverty, because it offered the largest variety of 
casual and informal ways to survive.131
Price theory suggests that low real wages indicate an abundant supply of labour. 
This is supported by the evidence: the urban population in the Italian peninsula was 
substantial in any calculation. There were quite simply very many people in Roman Italy, 
no matter whether we choose to adhere to the so-called ‘low count’ – six or seven million 
people – or the ‘high count’ – fifteen or sixteen million – of the Italian population. Recent 
estimates suggest that perhaps twenty-five per cent of the numerous Italians lived in 
cities.132 Warfare and other unnatural population checks did not interfere greatly with 
the population of Italy in the period under scrutiny. It is clear that there was no shortage 
of labour in the urban labour market, at least in terms of population numbers.133
The value of these people’s human capital – the intensity of work – was also dependent 
on health: in line with what was said before about the material well-being of the urban 
population, Jongman wrote that “[m]any inhabitants of the Roman empire only eked 
127 Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2017) 118. But see Jongman (2007) for a rather more optimistic view 
on the standard of living under the early empire, and Rathbone (2006) who holds that Roman 
Egypt in the early empire was relatively prosperous overall.
128 Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2017) 119-20; Groen-Vallinga (2013) on female labour participation; 
Scheidel (2010a) 433–5, 454.
129 Holleran (2011) 165: “Cities in developing countries typically demonstrate high levels of unem-
ployment, underemployment and poverty”.
130 Gilbert (2013) on rising inequality in cities throughout history; Temin (2013a) 250 on the subjectiv-
ity of the term ‘subsistence’; Holleran (2011) for the concept of chronic poverty in Rome; Scheidel 
and Friesen (2009) for income distributions and the percentage at or under subsistence levels; on 
poverty in the Roman world see also Harris (2011) 27-54, ‘Poverty and destitution in the Roman 
empire’; Scheidel (2006); Garnsey (1988).
131 Holleran (2011) 177–8.
132 De Ligt (2012) 231-3, 238-46.
133 Cf Holleran (2017) 103 notes that there is no mention of labour shortages in Rome; See also Suet. 
Vesp. 18, where Vespasian refuses a labour-saving device with the argument that he needs to feed 
his people – suggesting that there were many in need of work.
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out a meager living, their skeletons grim testimonies to malnutrition and disease”.134 By 
contrast, slaves may have been fed relatively well, since caring for slaves was equivalent 
to preserving property. Bioarchaeology as well as less direct approaches to analyse the 
physical well-being of the ancient Romans form an expanding and promising new area 
of research.135 This developing research into skeletal evidence and the physique of the 
ancient Romans does not yet allow for firm conclusions on topics like malnutrition or 
stature.
Some more general patterns may still be sketched out, however. In the unhealthy 
environment of a preindustrial city endemic diseases were omnipresent and will have 
decreased the efficiency and ability of people to work.136 The urban population was 
also more likely to be susceptible to epidemic disease.137 If an epidemic led to a sudden 
drop in population numbers, the labour supply dwindled and that would have led to 
higher labour participation of women and children; it will also have raised wages, at 
least in a functioning labour market. Too little is known about epidemics in the ancient 
world to determine their effects with any certainty. It is only the great Antonine Plague 
of the later second century AD for which scholars have attempted to find some tentative 
answers about its economic effects: population losses of perhaps as much as 20-30 per 
cent seem to have doubled the price of labour in Roman Egypt.138
economic insecurity and fluctuating demands
Labour demand is a derived demand, based on demand for services and products. It 
was noted several times in passing in this chapter that urban labour demand is likely to 
134 Jongman (2007) 594; that said, note that Jongman argues that the majority of Romans in the early 
empire were actually relatively well-off, and that increasing inequality and poverty was a thing of 
late Antiquity.
135 The contributions of both Jongman (‘Consumption’) and Sallares (‘Ecology’) to the Cambridge Eco-
nomic History of the Greco-Roman world (2007) illustrate its incorporation in studies of the ancient 
economy; see also the edited volume by King (2005); Bisel and Bisel (2002); Tacoma (2017) for its 
use in migration studies.
136 Oerlemans and Tacoma (2014) for imperial Rome; Gowland and Garnsey (2010) on the correlation 
between urbanization and disease; Eventually the problem ‘solved’ itself: Parkin (2003) 235, “When 
a person’s failing state of physical and mental health led to total inability to be self-supporting, 
then, in the absence of effective medication (...), dependence on others may have been short-lived 
anyway”.
137 Duncan-Jones (1996) 109–11; Sallares (2002) on endemic malaria; Scheidel (2003) for Rome; 
Laurence (2005) for Herculaneum and Pompeii.
138 Temin (2013a) 118, 84-85; Rathbone (2009) 305; Scheidel (2012e) and (2002) to be read with the 
critical comments of Bagnall (2002); cf Duncan-Jones (1996).
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have been particularly unstable in the cities of Roman Italy.139 In part this was due to the 
seasonality of the building and transport sectors, where many unskilled city-dwellers 
and temporary migrants should be located. The influx of cyclical labour migrants in turn 
added to the general consumer demand in the cities. Conversely, there is a possibil-
ity that some of the unskilled urban population moved away from the city in summer 
to assist on farms during the harvesting season.140 Though seasonality and instability 
certainly apply, the trough in demand during the off-season was perhaps not as severe 
as we might expect. The building sector could continue for most of nine months a year; 
the shipping trade, with due acknowledgement of the dangers involved, may have been 
not as strictly limited to the sailing season (traditionally April to October) as has gener-
ally been thought.141 The sailing season of course also influenced mobility in general, 
and tourism and migration may have spiked in the safer period. The seasons or, more 
accurately, the weather obviously affected many trades more generally.
Equally cyclical were religious festivals and other festivities on the calendar, that pre-
sented a major incentive in demand, be it for the required ritual clothing or through the 
habit of exchanging gifts; merely the crowd of people will have increased consumption 
and attracted merchants.142 Especially in the city of Rome, celebrations such as triumphal 
processions, and the mere presence of the emperor will have attracted many people. 
The elections of the magistrates in January apparently drew many to the city; Augustus 
implemented a summer low-period for the Senate and a recess for the courts which had 
the opposite effect:143 outside of the political high season, many nobles moved to the 
countryside to survive the (literally) murderous summer heat.
These seasonal and cyclical peaks and troughs in demand required a certain flexibility 
of the workers, but at least they were to a certain extent predictable. Throughout the 
year, workshops produced on commission, however, which was largely unpredictable. 
Many of the luxury trades catered specifically to the needs of the elite – much of the 
139 Much of what follows rests on this basic idea from Hawkins (2016) chapter 1, who derives this 
model from a comparison with medieval and early modern cities. Briefer, Hawkins (2013) 339-46.
140 So Hawkins (2013) 341; but see Erdkamp (2016): it is probable that the rural population had 
enough manpower for the harvest without the help of urban residents. A short holiday on a farm 
in the north of the Netherlands taught me that even today farmers work together and simply 
rotated the machinery and manpower for grass silage within the one week that this had to be 
brought in.
141 The building trade: Erdkamp (2016) 39 with reference to the work of DeLaine (1997), ca 220 days 
a year. On the sailing season, Hawkins (2013) writes it was May-September, but see now Gambash 
(2017) and especially Beresford (2012).
142 De Ligt (1993) 60 for markets during the ludi in Rome.
143 Plin. Ep. 2.11.10 (the crowd in January); Suet. Aug. 32 (recess of the courts in Nov-Dec), 35 (only the 
presence of a minimum of senators, which ones was determined by lot, was required in Sept-Oct).
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money that went round in the city simply was spent by the elite.144 Larger (building) 
projects could present entrepreneurs with a sudden peak in labour demand.145 For day 
labourers, insecurity was a daily fact of life: even if they had regular employment with 
one employer, his sudden leave of absence could mean a day without work – and with-
out pay: Apuleius’ has a poor carpenter return home unsuccessfully from work, stating 
that “although our shopkeeper, wrapped up in a public matter, has made this a holiday 
for us, still I have raked in our daily bread” – in this case, by selling an unused dolium.146 
The implications are twofold: firstly, he expected to leave for work like every other day 
but was unexpectedly sent away, and secondly, he did not get paid.
The city was the place where supply and demand for labour could meet.147 The con-
gregation of people looking for workers, or work, in itself was also a powerful generator 
of consumer demand, increasing the pull of the city even more. Fluctuating demand 
increased the insecurities of the urban economy, prompting various economic strate-
gies that would increase flexibility for labourers and employers alike.
ConClusIon
Labour in the Roman empire clearly was subject to market forces and it is therefore pos-
sible to speak of a Roman urban labour market. This chapter illustrated that market inte-
gration was far from perfect, however. The Roman market economy is likely to have been 
local or regional in many instances. Moreover, the importance of social structures that 
determined and restricted the integration of a market for labour should be emphasised. 
In the chapters that follow it will be argued that family ties and non-familial networks 
were the chief determinant of an individual’s labour opportunities in the market. Again, 
these socio-economic networks will generally have been of a local, or at most regional 
nature. The section on labour migration showed a similar dependence on institutions: 
there was movement, but there were certainly restrictions as to who moved, and what 
options were open in the receiving labour market.
Labour mobility is likely to have accounted for a large part of migration streams in 
Roman Italy. Migrants moved to the city in the hope of finding additional income or bet-
ter wages. Rural-urban migration flows kept the urban population intact, even if many 
144 On the correlation between urbanization and elite expenditure, see chapter 4.
145 Erdkamp (2016) 48, “the labour demand of the urban economy fluctuated, in part following a 
pattern of predictable and regular, seasonal cycles, in part as a result of less predictable and less 
short-term trends that were primarily caused by imperial spending”.
146 Apul. Met. 9.5-6: licet forensi negotio officinator noster attentus ferias nobis fecerit, tamen hodiernae 
cenulae nostrae propexi.
147 Holleran (2017) on the ways in which employer and employee may have found each other.
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labour migrants were only temporary guests. The urban infrastructure was probably 
more conducive to permanent settlement of skilled labourers than to that of unskilled 
wage workers, but the city had an appeal to both groups. The possibility of movement 
between jobs was enough to allow for some flexibility in the light of labour demands, 
which holds true for slave workers as well. Changing or finding jobs was easier in theory 
than in practice, however.
Opportunities on the labour market were governed by legal status, skills, and gender. 
Perhaps contrary to expectations, it was not the split between slave and free that stands 
out as the most important limiting factor. Most occupations appear to have been open 
to slaves, freedmen and the freeborn alike. It is only in domestic service that a strong 
preference for slave labour comes to the fore, closely connected to the phenomenon 
of conspicuous consumption. Because women historically often find work in this sector 
and the Roman society was familiar with a similar gender ideal, this is likely to have 
impacted most on free women’s chances to find work.
Skills were highly valued in Roman society, and here, too, there is little to indicate that 
chances were better for slave or free – both seem to have had access to job-training. The 
one group that is less well represented again, is that of freeborn women. There were 
certainly women who were trained as artisans, or who gained other skills, and they 
should not be explained away – still it is safe to say that gender was the most distinctive 
criterion that determined one’s potential in the labour market.
Labour was undoubtedly the most widely available production factor in Antiquity. La-
bour supply often was greater than labour demand in Roman Italy, leaving large parts of 
the free urban population under- or unemployed for regular periods of time. The urban 
population was large. The cities of Roman Italy were the home of the freeborn, freed 
and slaves, and of men, women and children. The individuals that made up the urban 
population were not equal, in the sense of perfectly interchangeable. For example, it 
is likely that elite domus simply employed slaves to fulfil vacancies in their household, 
effectively closing off part of the service sector for the freeborn. In very many instances, 
however, the labour demand was met by both slave and free labourers. That should 
not be surprising, considering the fact that the majority of the working population ef-
fectively consisted of free labourers. Some of the labourers possessed a particular skill 
set, others were unskilled wage labourers. It was postulated that skilled labour may have 
been relatively scarce, and very valuable because of it. The labour supply for unskilled 
wage work, in particular, is likely to have been abundant.
Since the supply of labour was at times more profuse than labour demand, wages 
tended to be low. Roman Italy may have demonstrated a relatively high per capita GDP, 
but income inequality was also high, particularly in the Italian heartland; comparative 
evidence suggests that inequality was most pronounced in an urban context. The evi-
dence indicates that the majority of the urban population in Roman society did indeed 
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work for low wages and that their living standards were low. Quite possibly many of 
them were living in chronic poverty. The emperor and the urban elite needed to provide 
more than bread and circuses to keep the people happy: work, in the form of large build-
ing projects for example, was vital.
Strong labour segmentation within an urban labour market that was characterized 
by fluctuating demand and high labour participation, a large proletariat of unskilled 
labourers that is poorly reflected in the epigraphic evidence and a small group of highly 
skilled workers that is well represented, are the backbone for the rest of this thesis.

Chapter 3
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IntRoduCtIon
More often than not we have little or no knowledge of the context of an occupational in-
scription: we do not know the monument it was part of, and it is often unclear precisely 
where or when the text was set up. Many of these inscriptions probably belonged to the 
modest environment of the nonelite household. Naturally, some will have been a little 
less modest than others. The aurifex brattiarius from Rome whose statue base is now in 
the Galleria delle Statue of the Vatican, can hardly be considered modest.1 Similarly, the 
conspicuous monument to the famous baker M. Vergilius Eurysaces, still standing at the 
Porta Maggiore in Rome today, shows that he was not exactly modest, nor of modest 
means.2 Their households may have contained a significant number of slaves and freed-
men, but were not comparable to the sizeable elite domus of T. Statilius Taurus or Livia 
Augusta, whose domestic staff members were buried in large columbaria.
What is the nonelite household? For want of a better distinguishing criterion, I would 
define ‘nonelite households’ broadly as family units in which family members contrib-
uted their labour power for the wellbeing of the collective. In the cities of Roman Italy, 
the nonelite household generally consisted of a household head, the nuclear family, 
plus any slaves or freedmen in their power. I refer to these family units as nonelite house-
holds, or small families, to draw an explicit contrast with the large elite domus of chapter 
4, where the principal family could afford not to get their own hands dirty and have oth-
ers perform all kinds of work necessary. The nonelite made up the vast majority of the 
total population of Roman Italy.3 Because my definition concerns such great numbers, 
it includes a noticeably broad range of nonelite families: they came in many shapes and 
sizes, ranging from Eurysaces’ successful business to a street vendor and his family. A 
nonelite family of freedmen may also have originated from an elite domus. There was 
not just a great variety of family forms, but individual households also changed over 
time in a life cycle of their own.
This chapter starts out from the hypothesis that the dynamics of the family are key 
to understanding the Romans’ engagement with the labour market. That includes the 
dynamics of demography and family structure, as well as the fluctuations in family eco-
nomics. My aim is to illuminate how these factors interlinked to eventually determine 
the economic strategies that a Roman family adopted.
1 CIL 6. 9210.
2 On the monument see Mayer (2012) 112-14; Petersen (2003); the inscription preserved on three 
sides of the monument is CIL 6. 1958a.
3 Scheidel and Friesen (2009) 76 table 6, estimate ca 1.5% of households belonged to the economic 
elite (senators, equites and decuriones), leaving no less than 98.5% nonelite households.
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Economic analyses of the family in early modern Europe generally consider the pre-
industrial family as “the unit of production and consumption and the household the 
locus of work and residence”.4 This model of convergence of supply and demand within 
the family, is called the ‘family economy’. This premise is also implicit in studies on the 
Roman family.5 Agricultural families are thought to have been largely self-sufficient, for 
example.6 In the context of urban commerce and production, the family economy model 
is met by the widespread view that small-scale tabernae/workshops were the dominant 
production units in the ancient Roman economy.7 It will become clear throughout this 
chapter that this perception of the family can explain much – though not all – of the 
ancient evidence.
The Industrial Revolution profoundly changed the nature of the family economy. 
A new model was introduced to accommodate the fact that many workers were now 
employed as wage-workers in large-scale factories: the new nineteenth-century stan-
dard was labeled the ‘family wage economy’. Although this model has firm origins in 
historical analysis of the Industrial Revolution, even in preindustrial families the family 
is not necessarily the locus of work, and hiring out labour outside of the family was also 
a very real possibility. The model of a family wage economy could perhaps be detached 
from its industrial origins and be applied to earlier societies. In Rome and Ostia, large 
production facilities have been recovered archaeologically, even if they are only attested 
sporadically.8 But we shall see that wage-labour in general was more widespread and 
that there were many wage-earning families in Rome.
The historical demographer Richard Wall felt that both the family economy and the 
family wage economy could not account for the historical data he found for his research 
into nineteenth-century Colyton, and so he came up with a new model: the ‘adaptive 
family economy’.9 The adaptive family economy model allows for diversification of la-
bour and for flexible strategies of the family, both inside and outside the confines of the 
house, with the aim of maximizing “economic well-being”.10 Flexibility is key.
4 Wall (1986) 265.
5 Or explicit, as in the case of Saller (2011), (2007) 87, where he opens his paper with “In the Greco-
Roman world the household was the basic unit of production as well as consumption”, and Saller 
(2003) 189.
6 Implicit in e.g. Dyson (2011), a sweeping overview of scholarship on rural families.
7 Loane (1938) 63; Händel (1985) 499; Holleran (2012) 27, 125; most elaborately the recent work of 
Flohr (2017).
8 E.g. Flohr (2007) on the differences between Pompei and Ostia; Saller (2013) considers the large 
domus as productive units – but they are also unique to Rome, at least in an urban context.
9 Wall (1986) 265; and see Groen-Vallinga (2013) for an earlier introduction of the adaptive family 
economy to the ancient Roman evidence for female labour.
10 Wall (1986) 265.
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Virtually the same solution was reached through scholarly endeavors into the concept 
of ‘family strategy’:11 the study of strategy was the natural result of a scholarly shift from 
investigating structural functionalism to individualism and agency.12 In other words, 
families became historical actors with an active contribution to make to the course of 
history, rather than objects whose life-course was determined solely by external circum-
stances. As with the adaptive family economy, the addition of ‘adaptive’ to family strate-
gies emphasises flexibility in the way that families may ‘adapt’ to their circumstances.13 
The focus in this chapter therefore lies on ‘family adaptive labour strategies’: a family’s 
actions on the labour market.
Family strategy is the outcome of a process of decision-making within the family. That 
process is guided by internal power structures on the one hand, and by the larger cultural, 
social, and economic factors in society on the other. The decision-making process itself 
is fundamental in understanding subjects like marriage, investment in human capital, 
or labour allocation, and will be brought in whenever appropriate.14 Out of necessity, 
on the lower end of the scale household strategies were directed primarily towards the 
modest goal of staying alive. As a result, in the nonelite household motivations were 
chiefly economic and choices were relatively limited.
Chapter outline
Families had various economic strategies open to them in theory, the range of which 
varied according to the situation they were in. Can actual forms of economic strategy 
be detected in the ancient sources, and how does it help to interpret and explain the 
ancient evidence?
Economic strategies of the family can be divided into two categories: quantitative and 
qualitative strategies. The quantity of the family concerns the demographic make-up of 
the family. Family demography to a large extent was a conscious choice, as in the case 
11 For a conceptual approach to family strategy, see especially the research program on family and 
labour of the NW Posthumus Institute (the Dutch National Research School for Social and Eco-
nomic History); the results of the research group were published in special volumes: Economic and 
social history in the Netherlands 6 (1994); History of the family: an international quarterly – special is-
sue ‘Structure or Strategy?’ (1997) and History of the family 9 (2004) – special issue ‘Labor strategies 
of families’. Contrast, e.g., the loose application of family strategy in Judd (2010) on contemporary 
rural west China, or Ornstein and Stalker (2013) on modern Canadian families.
12 E.g. Engelen (2002) 453–4.
13 Moen and Wethington (1992).
14 By incorporating the decision-making process, and structural factors into the decision-making 
process, this analysis counters the most fundamental points of critique of ‘family strategy’ that led 
Theo Engelen to suggest we abandon it altogether, Engelen (2002) esp. 464; Engelen came back 
from that, however, see Engelen (2004a).
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of marriage, or buying a slave. However, the conscious decisions about the structure of 
the family can go much further: it starts with the choice whether to raise a child, or not. 
The quality of the family encompasses decisions concerning the labour allocation of 
the various family members, and the related matter of investment in education and the 
family’s collective stock of human capital.
Family structure and the family life cycle
The typical family in the United Kingdom in 2006 consisted of a conjugal couple, 1.8 
children and half a dog; they drove a Ford Focus and owned a mortgaged house and a 
computer, and they earned on average 32,779 pounds a year.15 Obviously that does not 
mean that the Ford Focus was the only car to be seen driving along the M1: there is a 
considerable diversity to be found in cars. Even more apparent is that there is no such 
thing as a 0.8 child. Thus, this typical family merely represented the dominant family 
type in the UK in 2006, which is helpful for a more general analysis of the population. 
That does not preclude the fact that there was in reality a wide variety of family forms.
In a similar way, the first section of this chapter investigates what we are actually talk-
ing about when talking about ‘the Roman family’. For all the scholarly attention that has 
been devoted to the subject over the last decades, there has been no clear answer to 
this question. It will be argued that there is such a thing as a dominant family form for 
the cities of the early Roman empire, despite its various manifestations. An awareness of 
the particularities of the urban Roman family could prove to be helpful in determining 
the parameters for family labour supply and demand. Matters to be investigated are 
different from those in the UK in 2006, of course: some Roman families may have owned 
a dog (as indicated by the cave canem mosaics in Pompeii), but a significant proportion 
of them included one or two slaves, and potentially also freedmen.
The very family dynamics that have made the Roman family such an intangible 
concept, are key to our understanding of the family unit. Families come in all shapes 
and sizes, and because the make-up of a family is always in flux, that family’s economic 
needs and abilities also change over time. This so-called household cycle, or family life 
cycle, is a great influence on economic choices of the family. Although we usually do not 
have the data to follow a historical family over the life cycle, many of the demographic 
parameters can be modelled. The section on the dynamics of demography therefore fo-
cuses on the life-changing events of marriage, the birth of a child, and non-kin additions 
to the family. Marriage forged important bonds, and also made for the most efficient 
economic cooperation. Children were considered to be an economically valuable asset 
to the family. Family ties were unstable, however, and in skilled work in particular the 
family firm often extended itself with one or two slaves.
15 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7071611.stm, accessed 16-8-2016.
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Human capital and the allocation of labour
If labour was the most important production factor in Antiquity, as it is widely assumed 
to have been, it follows that significant profit could be gained principally through invest-
ment in population quality, that is human capital. Human capital is a convenient term 
for the combined characteristics of a worker. Such characteristics may include age, sex, 
health and physique, and innate ability, as well as levels of education, and possibilities for 
migration. Significantly, then, human capital concerns more than schooling – although, 
to my mind, education remains its most powerful aspect. Human capital theory breaks 
down the production factor labour into more specific components, in order to give due 
credit to personal ability and output of labourers – which can then be taken into con-
sideration when calculating profit and investment. Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations 
was the first to mention “a capital fixed and realized, as it were, in his person”.16 As an 
economic concept, however, human capital was developed fully only in the second half 
of the twentieth century.17
The application of human capital theory to Roman history is relatively new. Of neces-
sity it must remain very basic.18 It is my contention that it is precisely these basic prin-
ciples that may help understand the predominantly qualitative evidence for investment 
in human capital. Physical well-being and health are important to economics, and this 
subject receives increasing attention from ancient historians.19 Life expectancy, general 
unhealthy urban environments and the Antonine Plague have been briefly referred to in 
the previous chapter. In the context of the labour market, however, it seems justified to 
focus on education and the acquisition of skills.
In human capital theory, “[t]he individual is assumed to maximize the present value of 
future expected lifetime net earnings, where net earnings are take-home pay (...) minus 
any direct human capital investment costs incurred, such as the costs of training”.20 The 
expectation of private returns differs per person: men, for example, would expect to 
spend more active time in the labour market than women in many historical periods: 
women often dropped out of the labour force upon marriage or just before the birth 
16 Smith (1776).
17 Eide and Showalter (2010) is a useful introductory piece on human capital. Key works are Schultz 
(1961) and (1980), and Becker (1964) and (1985).
18 Pioneering works by Hawkins (2016) and (2006), Saller (2013) and (2007), and Verboven (2012a). 
Human capital in Roman agriculture is the subject of Stringer’s working paper (2012). For an 
indication of the full complexity of human capital in economics see, e.g., the handbook by Burton-
Jones and Spender (eds) (2011).
19 E.g., Scheidel (2012c); Jongman (2007); Laurence (2005).
20 Bosworth e.a. (1996) 35.
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of a first child.21 Future expected earnings are dependent on market demands as well. 
Labour demand is a derived demand, in that it depends upon product demand – which 
will have influenced the choice for an occupation.22 For example, there is no reason to 
train a child as a scribe when the current local scribes have years ahead of them, and 
when there is a strong demand for potters in the city. The resulting balance predicts that 
investing in human capital also has social returns: effects that benefit society, like the 
security of having enough doctors to service everyone.
demogRAPhy of the fAmIly: fAmIly stRuCtuRe
The demography of the family has been steadily gathering ground in ancient history.23 
Family and family structure have become integral to the subject of ancient demogra-
phy.24 The parameters of high mortality and high fertility are well-known25; the effects 
of high mortality on the population and the reality of high fertility are only measurable 
in the context of the Roman family. Conversely, demography will have affected Roman 
family life and the social and cultural preferences surrounding it. This section deals with 
the preferred family structure in the cities of Roman Italy. In a similar undertaking for 
Roman Egypt, Hübner has expressed well what is at stake.
Decisions about the marriage of a daughter, a new family enterprise, the pur-
chase of more land, sending a son away for an apprenticeship, and provision for 
old age and death did not affect only one individual, but all the family members 
who lived together. The timing of those decisions was the response to the op-
portunities or needs that arose from certain household constellations. On the 
other hand, certain cultural patterns of predominant living form influenced 
decision-making to achieve the household form that was considered the ideal 
for traditional and economic reasons. Household composition also affected the 
way an individual or family coped with situations of crisis, the death of a spouse, 
divorce, orphanhood, or childless old age.26
21 The literature about women and human capital is extensive, but see e.g. Schultz (ed.)(1995), 
Becker (1985), Mincer and Polachek (1974).
22 Eide and Showalter (2010) 283 “Observed outcomes in the Marketplace will be the result of an 
equilibrium process where the demand for specific skills and abilities is balanced with its supply”.
23 Parkin (1992); Scheidel ed. (2001a); Holleran and Pudsey (2011).
24 Holleran and Pudsey (2011) 2.
25 E.g. Scheidel (1996), (2001a), (2001b), Parkin (1992).
26 Hübner (2013) 31.
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Family form therefore must have had economic implications as well. The addition of 
slaves and freedmen in the household will also have had important consequences in 
view of the family labour supply.
family form
In search of what the Roman family generally looked like, ancient historians turned to 
household structure and family typology. A classic progress paradigm was proffered 
by early modern historians, with the nuclear family at its apex.27 Before industrialisa-
tion and modernisation, the extended family was thought to have been the norm. The 
hypothesis predicts that in ancient Rome most families would have consisted of two 
or more generations of conjugal couples. However, with the work of Peter Laslett and 
the widely influential Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure, 
it was argued that the nuclear family, also termed the ‘stem family’ or ‘simple family 
household’, had in fact been the most important family focus as far back as AD 1300.28 
Ancient historians readily picked up on this. A leading article published by Saller and 
Shaw in 1984, shifted consensus towards the supposition of a dominant nuclear Roman 
family system. They demonstrated a clear predominance of nuclear family ties in com-
memorative inscriptions.29
The ideal of the nuclear family was indeed valued greatly in Rome.30 Marriage appears 
to have been mainly neo-local, which means that the newlyweds set up their own 
household after the wedding. It is suggestive that the wedding ceremony consisted of 
a procession with which the bride would leave her birth home and enter the marital 
home.31 It is possible that there sometimes were economic reasons to start out mar-
ried life in the household of the groom’s father instead; however, I know of very little 
evidence for such arrangements outside of Roman Egypt, where patri-local marriage 
appears to have been the norm.32
27 LePlay (1871), who deserves credit for being the one who established research into family typol-
ogy. Cf Saller (1997) on the parallel discussion on the Roman concept of kinship.
28 Laslett and Wall (eds)(1972). Saller and Shaw (1984) on the predominance of the nuclear family in 
Rome.
29 For a critique of their work see Martin (1996); Scheidel (2012b); See also Gallivan and Wilkins 
(1997) for regional differences in family structure.
30 For the focus of sentimentality on the nuclear family, Dixon (1991) passim and at 111: “[The 
ideal] ignored the reality that family life frequently included people beyond the nuclear, idealized 
group”.
31 Hin (2013) 186-190 cautions against the assumption that neo-local marriage was universal (the 
argument was made for the second and first centuries BC but has relevance for the imperial 
period); On the wedding ceremony see, e.g., Dixon (1992) 64–5.
32 Economic reasons, cf Hin (2011) 113; On Roman Egypt see Hübner (2013) 48–50.
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Ideal and reality are not quite the same thing, however.33 Keith Bradley discovered 
that families were often of a composite nature, and included others besides the nuclear 
triad of father, mother and children. Composite families were shaped by death, birth, 
marriage, divorce, and remarriage.34 The implications are profound in a society familiar 
with high fertility and high mortality rates. The servile component of the family only 
adds to the changeability of the Roman family.
Roman epigraphy offers a great many illustrations of what the family could look like at 
a fixed moment in time. In funerary epigraphy that moment is marked by the death of a 
family member. CIL 6. 18404 is a good example of a household tomb.35
ciL 6. 18404
D(is) M(anibus) / Flaviae Primae fecit / T(itus) Flav(iu)s Daphnus vern(a)e / suae 
q(ui) v(ixit) a(nnos) XII m(enses) VIII d(ies) XXV / et sibi et Flaviae Eu{E}<f>ro/
syne coniugi suae et L(ucio) / Laberio Hermeti cogna/to suo et Cassiae Synethe 
/ amic(a)e optim(a)e et liber{t}/tis libertabusque / suis posterisque eorum / h(oc) 
m(onumentum) h(eredem) n(on) s(equetur)
To the divine spirits. Titus Flavius Daphnus [set up this monument] for Flavia Pri-
ma, his verna who lived 12 years and 25 days; and for himself and Flavia Eufrosyne 
his wife, and for Lucius Laberius Hermetus his kinsman, and for Cassia Synethe 
best of friends, and for his freedmen and freedwomen and their descendants. 
This monument shall not go to the heirs.
The example shows a conjugal couple (as yet) without children, in whose household 
lived a freed girl, Flavia Prima, a verna whose death at age twelve was the incentive 
to build the tomb, a male relative (cognatus) and a female friend (amica). The formula 
libertis libertabusque suis posterisque eorum is a commonplace that can occur in a variety 
of similar forms; it allows a place in the tomb for any up until now nonexistent offspring, 
33 Hübner (2011) 78.
34 Bradley (1991). In this light LePlay’s terminology for the nuclear family – he calls it the “unstable 
family” – is actually very much to the point, although he elected to name it unstable rather be-
cause the family dissolved when children moved out and the parents died: LePlay (1871) 17.
35 This particular example of a household tomb was brought to my attention by Sigismund-Nielsen 
(2013) 295–296, who at 296 notes that “all these persons did not necessarily live in the same 
house”. Sigismund-Nielsen at (2006) 202 suggests that the term household tomb is used too 
widely (“despite the scarcity of close kin”), but my interpretation of the Roman family does the 
opposite and argues that a ‘household inscription’ like the one cited here, provides clues about 
who should be included in our understanding of the Roman family.
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as well as all freedmen of the family.36 I would classify this example as an extension of the 
simple family, where ‘extended’ is a relatively elastic notion.
The Cambridge typology may provide a useful way to characterise a family at a fixed 
point in time, but it does not allow for changes in family structure.37 Regional differences 
in family form can be significant and need to be taken into account. Moreover, Hübner 
cautions against the value of inscriptions for the analysis of household structures: her 
comparison of Roman Egyptian inscriptions on the one hand, and the census docu-
ments on the other, show wholly different patterns, and Hübner implies that the census 
documents are to be preferred over the epigraphic evidence. By analogy, she argues that 
family structure in the Roman West is virtually impossible to reconstruct, since there are 
only inscriptions and no census documents to work with.38 Hübner, however, is also the 
one who demonstrates most clearly that Roman Egypt is not Roman Italy – particularly 
in matters of the family.39
Roman Egypt shows a clear preference for a multiple family form. However, the urban 
context of the metropoleis shows a marked preference for simple families. Significantly, 
the pattern of smaller households and simple family forms in the city is not restricted 
to Roman Egypt, but recurs everywhere throughout history.40 It appears that urbanisa-
tion is the dominant determinant of the prevalent family form. The sources therefore 
suggest to me that the predominant family form, in the cities of Roman Italy at least, 
was the nuclear family, regularly extended by co-resident kin or slaves and ex-slaves. 
There is a considerable variety in the attestations, because of the dislocation and re-
composition as well as the element of extension. In my view, it is precisely this variety 
that characterizes the Roman family, more than any family in a non-slave society after 
the demographic transition. The likelihood that many urban families were of the simple 
family type, but with extensions, matches the model of the family economy, the idea of 
the small workshops where an artisan worked with the help of his nuclear family and 
one or two slaves. However, it can also account for more divergent family strategies. The 
composition of the family reflects its livelihood.
36 Crook (1967) 136 suggests that the liberti-clause is not mere generosity, but should also be under-
stood as a disguised commission to maintain the monument.
37 Pudsey (2011) 82: “The evidence reveals that the Cambridge typology of households is particularly 
useful to the extent that it categorises a household at a particular point in its life course”; Hübner 
(2011) 78: “It must be stressed here that these different types of household forms – solitary, 
nuclear, extended or multiple – should not be seen so much as alternatives rather than as stages 
in a household cycle reflecting the age and reproductive status of its members”.
38 Hübner (2011) 90; cf Hübner (2013) 31-57.
39 This to me is the essence of Hübner (2013).
40 Hübner (2013) 32–3 with references, cf Hin (2013) 188-189.
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slaves and freedmen in the family
Rome was a slave society41, and so the Roman family often included slaves. Slaves are 
part of the household in the legal definition of familia, which encompassed everyone 
under the power of the paterfamilias.42 Slaves generally lived in with their masters. A 
well-known example from Apuleius’ Metamorphoses is the servant-girl Photis, the girl 
who tells the protagonist about her mistress’s magic – an event that eventually leads to 
Lucius’ metamorphosis into an ass. Non-fictional instances can be found in epigraphy, 
as in CIL 6. 12366:
ciL 6. 12366
D(is) M(anibus) / Cn(aeo) Arrio Agapeto / Arria Agapete mater / et Bostrychus 
pater / et Helpis mamma et / Filete(?) nutrix filio / pientissimo b(ene) m(erenti) 
f(ecit) / vixit a(nnis) III diebus / XXXXV
To the spirits of the dead. To Cnaius Arrius Agapetus, their well-deserving, dutiful 
son. He lived three years and 45 days. Arria Agapete his mother, and Bostrychus his 
father, and Helpis his mamma and Filete his wet-nurse set up [this monument].43
A nurse and a second child minder (labelled mamma) are given a prominent place in a 
family commemoration of a three year old boy. Their inclusion in the inscription makes 
it probable that both these women lived in with the family, and it can be assumed from 
their single names that they were slave women.44
Bagnall and Frier’s analysis of the Roman Egyptian census data shows that metropoli-
tan households were more likely to own slaves than agricultural families.45 It may well 
be that this was also true for Roman Italy; the majority of slaves in Roman Italy lived in 
cities and not all of them were employed by the elite domus.46 It is quite likely that many 
41 As opposed to a society with slaves, see Bradley (1994) 12.
42 Dig. 50.195.16.1-4 (Ulpian). In a sine manu marriage there could be two familiae in the family: the 
slaves of the husband, and the slaves of the (legally independent) wife which, as Edmondson 
(2011) 343 notes, adds to the complexity of the family unit.
43 See Bradley (1991) 76-102 on Tatae and Mammae in the Roman family. The reading of ‘Filete’ is 
uncertain.
44 The father of the boy, Bostrychus, appears to be a slave as well.
45 Bagnall and Frier (1994) 48-9, 70–1.
46 Edmondson (2011) 339-40; he does not extend his paper on ‘slavery and the Roman family‘ much 
beyond the elite families; Harper (2011) 49–53 is insightful for subelite slaveholding in late antiq-
uity.
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households owned one or two slaves. The frequency of the formulaic libertis libertabus 
posterisque eorum is further evidence of that.
Hawkins has argued that entrepreneurs were likely to employ slaves rather than hire 
free labourers in the small permanent workforce of their family undertaking.47 He of-
fers various reasons for this: whereas the Romans may not have calculated the actual 
cost-effectiveness of having a slave rather than hiring labour, they would know that 
educating their slave greatly enhanced his or her value, and that it would ensure them 
of skilled labour in a labour market where such skilled labour was not in ample supply. 
If the cost of maintenance became too high, manumission could alleviate, if not fully 
abolish, this cost item – an attractive option since the freedman’s labour might still be 
available (see below).48 The slave presence in the household thus supports the idea of a 
small workshop-based economy in the Roman cities and thus the family economy, but 
it also underlines the importance of flexibility – adaptive family strategies – in the face 
of economic change.
dynAmICs of demogRAPhy: the fAmIly lIfe CyCle
Family structure changes over time as the family goes through its own ‘family life cycle’. 
The concept works differently with regard to the labour force of elite households and 
nonelite families, because whereas the elite domus were reliant chiefly on dependent 
labour, nonelite families were actively engaged in the labour market. As a result, in 
the elite domus structural changes in family structure and the family labour force took 
place mainly in the larger slave segment of the family, but for the nonelite household, 
economic relevance lies primarily in the demography of the freeborn family members.
The economic actions and decisions of the family are influenced greatly by family 
structure, and vice versa. What the family looks like at any one point is determined by 
the family life cycle, and this in turn affects the range of options open to a family when 
they choose whether or not, and how, to employ the various family members. Moen and 
Wethington argue for a life course approach of family strategies:49
47 Hawkins (2017) 51ff.
48 Hawkins (forthcoming). This is in line with Scheidel (2005b) 13 who postulates that Roman slaves 
were relatively expensive compared to free labour. Therefore there had to be other reasons why 
so many still preferred to employ slave labour.
49 A life course approach of family strategies is implemented by e.g. Paping (2004) and Knotter 
(2004) for later periods.
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Families move in and out of positions that make it possible to mobilize effectively 
in the face of external and internal threats. Their spheres of control, and their 
corresponding repertoire of strategies, shift over the life course, along with shifts 
in household composition, family needs, and family resources as well as external 
supports, demands, constraints, and opportunities.50
In other words, at various stages in the family life cycle, family demands change as well 
as its collective supply of labour. Demand for sustenance increases when young children 
are born into the family, for example, and labour power increases as these children start 
to contribute to the family income. The changeability of the family structure means 
that labour power of the family could differ greatly over time and that expectations of 
prospective earnings and future time allocations were governed by “internal threats”, 
that is uncertainties of their supply of labour, through illnesses for example, as well as 
by “external threats”, such as uncertainties in labour demand in the market. The family 
life cycle was not just governed by threats, however. It is significant that a deliberate 
alteration in family structure, through marriage for example, also provided economic 
opportunity, and could add to capital, status, and networks.51
The standard family life cycle automatically induces a number of life cycle squeezes, 
when there are more mouths to feed than there is income.52
At three points in the life cycle of a household, tensions emerge between the 
income of the male head and household expenditure: when the family is being 
established, in the years when the children are not yet generating income, and as 
the parents reach old age.53
A life cycle squeeze necessitates additional forms of income, such as additional family 
members starting to do paid work, and/or resorting to the grain dole, loans, etcetera. 
It is clear that in Rome high mortality, particularly the potentially early demise of the 
paterfamilias and the resulting loss of the main income, would present a major life cycle 
squeeze for many young families. Under these circumstances, it may be expected that 
children were put to work as soon as possible. In many ways, therefore, it can be seen 
50 Moen and Wethington (1992) 246-7.
51 Cf Broekaert (2012) 42.
52 E.g. Knotter (2004) who identifies a pattern for families of Amsterdam (casual) dockworkers in the 
20th century. The term life cycle squeeze appears to have been coined by Wilensky (1963).
53 Engelen e.a. (2004a) 128, with reference to Oppenheimer (1974)(1982).
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that the family life cycle determined the individual life course of family members and 
vice versa.54
The variability of family structure to a large extent can be connected with a number 
of set events. These structural factors that govern the family life cycle can be predicted, 
as they are either biologically determined or governed by cultural convention. Think of 
culturally determined neo-local marriage practices, the self-evidence of a slave pres-
ence in the household, and demographic factors such as mortality, marriage ages, and 
fertility, which are, in part, also culturally determined. The demographics of the family 
life cycle can be modelled: at least potentially, then, it can be a powerful tool of analysis.
A life course approach has compellingly found its way into ancient history.55 The 
problem is that the evidence is generally inadequate to follow a Roman family through 
the family life cycle. There are some examples in the census documents from Roman 
Egypt and in Roman Egypt, too, some family archives were found; 56   in Roman Italy, 
conversely, we are fairly well informed on the life of a few well-known (but not very 
representative) families such as that of Cicero, but there is not much else to go on.57 The 
ancient evidence provides snapshots, frozen moments in time that reflect the family 
situation at a specific moment. Most occupational inscriptions thus are a snapshot of the 
family at the death of a family member.
The closest thing we have to following a family over time perhaps is a micro-simu-
lation of the Roman population that was presented by Richard Saller.58 Saller’s micro-
simulation gives an overview of chances of survival and the chance for an individual at 
54 Cf. Dixon (1992) 6: “Hareven (1987) insists that life course is more appropriate than life cycle, which 
presupposes that each generation eventually repeats the pattern of earlier generations, but there 
is a sense in which household composition does go through a fairly predictable cycle”(her italics), 
reference to Hareven (1987) xiii.
55 Various of the contributions to Harlow and Larsson Lovén eds (2012), e.g. Laurence and Trifilò 
(2012); Parkin (2011), Pudsey (2011), Laurence (2005), Harlow and Laurence (2002). Note that the 
basic notion of a family life cycle was already included in Dixon (1992) 133–159 and Rawson’s 
introduction to her influential edited volume of 1991, 5: “…the family in their household must 
have been differently constituted at different times – not because of life-cycle changes due to 
the changing age of parents and children but also because of death, divorce, remarriage, and 
adoption or (more likely in the lower classes) fostering of young children”.
56 Scheidel (2012d) = working paper (2007) 19: “empirical data on household composition are lim-
ited to Greco-Roman Egypt, where we encounter a substantial range of levels of complexity – from 
solitary households to those formed by conjugal, extended, or multiple families - and significant 
differences between urban and rural settings”. For Greco-Roman Egypt, see Bagnall and Frier 
(1994), Pudsey (2011) on eight recurring families in the census returns from Roman Egypt, and 
Hübner (2013).
57 E.g. Bradley (1991) chapter 8: “A Roman family”, on the Tullii Cicerones.
58 Saller (1994) with the help of James Smith and his CAMSIM simulation programme.
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a certain age of having a living grandfather, sister, uncle, niece, and so on: the result is a 
tabulated blueprint for the demography of the family life cycle. The kinship universe of 
the simulation is restricted, and some of the parameters used can be questioned, but the 
simulation offers a valuable insight into family structure and the implications of a high 
mortality regime that has not been possible before.59 However useful, tables, numbers 
and chances without context tell us little about the implications of changes in family 
demography. Rather than sketching out the myriad possible life courses of the family, it 
is more sensible for my current purposes to focus on specific transition points in family 
formation and the economic implications that come with it. Marriage is one of those 
benchmarks in the development of the family, as is the birth of a child, or the addition 
of other individuals to the family through adoption for example. A transition point of 
the life cycle that significantly does not occur in the Roman life cycle, is institutionalized 
retirement.60
marriage
Marriage is crucial to family formation: Roman marriage is the formation of a family. It 
was already mentioned that Roman marriage was largely neo-local. Thus, in Rome the 
new household unit was established on the wedding day. Conversely, the ending of 
marriage through death or divorce equals the dissolution of the family.61 The event of 
a girl’s first marriage signified her transition into adulthood.62 What the family looked 
like at any one point in time can best be extrapolated from what it looked like at the 
beginning.
The age at which the Romans married is much debated in spite (or because) of the 
relatively rich evidence for it from epitaphs, legal sources, and literature. The estimates 
for age at first marriage vary, from roughly 15-20 years for women, and 20-30 years for 
59 Saller is right to emphasize though that changing parameters, like age at marriage, does not sig-
nificantly alter the general patterns that the simulation brings forth. However, these parameters 
do change the life course of individuals considerably.
60 Ehmer (2014) for this transition point in the economic life cycle. Parkin (2003) 234–5 for its absence 
in Rome, even if he connects that to a supposed absence of wage-work with which I disagree. His 
conclusion on p. 235 holds: “When a person’s failing state of physical and mental health led to total 
inability to be self-supporting, then, in the absence of effective medication (...), dependence on 
others may have been short-lived anyway”. There was one type of retirement: for soldiers.
61 Noted also by Pudsey (2011) 64.
62 Harlow and Laurence (2002) ch. 4.
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men.63 The dominant marriage pattern can have important consequences. A significant 
age-gap between spouses seems likely, which will have led to a large number of relative-
ly young widows, who can be expected to have participated in the labour market more 
extensively than married women.64 It may not seem like such a great difference whether 
a girl married at age 15 or at age 20, but it is exactly those years that would allow or 
preclude an education or apprenticeship (see below). In this context it is significant that 
the attestation of early marriage ages for both men and women has been explained as 
evidence for the existence of an elite pattern of early marriage, as opposed to a more 
general later marriage pattern for the nonelite.65 If girls were commonly married in their 
late teens rather than in their early teens, the time constraint to women’s job-training is 
thereby removed. Moreover, marriage may have been costly, which is especially true for 
neo-local marriage, so some may have chosen to postpone it until finances were suffi-
cient.66 This accounts for a later age at marriage for males, who were generally expected 
to be the family breadwinner.
Marriage was a family matter. In general the union was arranged by the paterfamilias 
in quasi-formal consultation with his own family, and the family of an eligible bachelor(-
ette).67 Marriage, divorce, and remarriage have long been recognized as strategies of the 
elite to forge political alliances.68 Conversely, for the majority of the population there 
may well have been economic motives in marriage policies: the lack of a male heir or a 
suitable candidate to take over the family business, or a need for economic allies may all 
have guided the choice of marriage partner. “Marriage extended familial ties: on divorce 
or bereavement, remarriage was expected by other blood relatives to ensure that their 
collective network of affinity and kinship was maintained”.69 Marriages could consolidate 
business connections or forge local or supra-local economic networks, and sometimes 
allowed for socially upward mobility.70 The desire to prevent fragmentation and keep 
the property within the family, for example, was a major incentive for the formation of 
63 The debate is ongoing, mostly on the basis of epigraphic data. Scheidel (2007b); Lelis, Percy and 
Verstraete (2003) with review by De Ligt (2005); Saller (1994) 25-41; Treggiari (1991) 39-43 for legal 
sources; Saller (1987) for men; Shaw (1987a) for women; Syme (1987) for elite males; Cf Bagnall 
and Frier (1994) 112-3 for Roman Egypt; Hopkins (1964/5), a follow-up on the efforts of Harkness 
(1896).
64 Young widows: Tacoma (2016) 111–12; Pudsey (2011) 61.
65 Saller (1994) 37; Shaw (1987a).
66 Hin (2011) 112.
67 Cantarella (2005) 28–9; Bradley (1991) 112–3; Dixon (1992) 62–4 and index s.v. consilium.
68 Corbier (1991).
69 Harlow and Laurence (2002) 104.
70 Most elaborately Broekaert (2012); briefly noted by Cantarella (2005) 28.
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consanguineous unions in Roman Egypt.71 The potential of marriage alliances underlines 
the hypothesis that despite a cultural ideal of the ‘one-husband woman’ (univira), remar-
riage of women after divorce or the death of a spouse will have been quite common in 
the pre-christian Principate.72
Economic theory offers additional reasons why it is economically rational to form 
a marriage bond. Simply put, two can produce more than one, three more than two, 
and so on.73 However, the bond of marriage is not the same as simply putting together 
two (or more) individuals. A family unit has “a double advantage over a non-family 
household with comparable membership and resources”.74 Through the intimate and 
long-term familiarity with each other’s capabilities, immediate availability and bonds of 
trust, a family firm saves on transaction costs for finding labour. Within this theoretical 
framework, an internal division of labour allows the conjugal couple to benefit even 
more from their respective comparative advantages.75 The argument is quite nuanced, 
but crudely speaking it can be read to predict that one partner will take up full respon-
sibility for the unremunerated domestic work if their wage in the labour market is lower 
than that of the other. That said, the ideal of preserving separate domains for husband 
and wife must have been largely an elite prerogative, as in many instances the additional 
income of women was vital to the family.76 Another economic privilege of marriage is 
that the expectancy of a stable, long-term liaison allows the family to engage in “lengthy 
production processes”, such as raising a child.77 Children are an important structural ad-
dition to the family.
Children
Once it has been initiated through marriage, the natural way of expanding a family is 
through having a child. Children ensured continuity: the importance of children had 
71 Hübner (2013) chapter 7 and idem (2007) on the likelihood that the brother-sister marriages con-
cern adoptive children and biological children, contra Remijsen and Clarysse (2008), Rowlandson 
and Takahashi (2009) .
72 On Univira, see Lightman and Zeisel (1977).
73 Cigno (1991) 37-8, and chapter 5. The economic benefit of growth in household size is not infinite.
74 Cigno (1991) 38.
75 Cigno (1991) part I, e.g., 24, 41-2.
76 Groen-Vallinga (2013) 295; Hemelrijk (2015) 9–12 for a brief overview with references on the fluid 
notions of the public versus the private domains of men and women (or perhaps rather, as she 
puts it, forum/domus); cf Scheidel (1995) 205–6.
77 Cigno (1991) 37.
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everything to do with passing on the family name and the family assets.78 The birth of a 
biological child to the paterfamilias was not the only way in which infants came into the 
family, however, nor was it the only manner to beget heirs, or the only means of passing 
on the family name.79 The family could also be expanded through adoption, fosterage, 
and care for foundlings.
Raising and killing children80
In western developed countries today, when a couple thinks about the possibility of 
having children, economic considerations regularly play a part in the decision to try and 
go for it or not, but also in the timing, spacing, and number of children they would like. 
Many potential parents want to be able to provide for their children, covering primary 
needs such as food and clothing, but also secondary needs like a college education. This 
decision-making process must have been comparable in ancient Rome, even if it was 
informed by very different socio-cultural and demographic circumstances. Moreover, 
the actual element of ‘choice’ was limited, considering the lack of reliable methods of 
contraception.
When a child was born to the freeborn couple at the head of the household, that 
child had much to offer. Emotions and affection must have had a large part to play.81 
Quite apart from being heir in name and property, necessary for the continuity of the 
family line, an infant also had economic potential. The son or daughter would become 
a labourer who could supply the family with additional income or who could increase 
production. An extra pair of hands could make all the difference in some families. A cor-
relation between income and the number of children in a family – the poorer the family, 
the more children – is not unlikely, though virtually impossible to substantiate for the 
Roman empire.82 A child may also have meant insurance against the possible economic 
hardships of old age, which is one of the life cycle squeezes identified earlier.83 “Even a 
rough understanding of ancient Mediterranean demography suggests that (...) women 
78 E.g. Rawson (2003)108: “The political, social and inheritance value of a child, especially a son, is 
clearest for the upper classes”. Informed overviews on the various types of children in the Roman 
family are Rawson (1986b) and (2003), Dixon (1992) 98–132, and more recently Sigismund-Nielsen 
(2013).
79 Manumission would also continue the family name, see below.
80 A reference to the title of Shaw (2001).
81 The locus classicus is Golden (1988).
82 Knotter (2004) 235 with references to early modern examples of this pattern.
83 Old age came with economic as well as social hardship. Cf Hübner (2013) for Roman Egypt; Parkin 
(2003) esp. 203–35; Rawson (2003) 108, Harlow and Laurence (2002).
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and children were important potential sources of labor”, writes Saller.84 It was therefore 
economically beneficial in many ways for the family to raise a child.
Various scholars have nuanced the importance of economic motivations for having 
children, however.85 They point out that having children is a decision typically governed 
by cultural norms rather than economic rationality. Certainly a Roman marriage was 
contracted with the ideal of reproduction in mind.86 Girls were expected to marry, and 
bear children. For Roman women, motherhood was clearly valued over occupation: a 
preference for commemorating familial roles rather than economic contribution surely is 
one of the reasons why occupational inscriptions of women are relatively rare (see below).
The birth of a child is another life cycle squeeze: a raise in costs, and a drop in income. 
The ‘break-even point’, that is the moment that the total income generated by a child 
starts to outweigh the costs incurred in his or her upbringing, was possibly never reached 
in a society with a life expectancy at birth that may not have exceeded 25.87 Bringing up 
an infant required substantial investment in food and shelter, and potentially in educa-
tion as well. As childcare would limit the parents’ (or rather: the mother’s) time working, 
a lower-class family that already had a number of children may not have been able to 
feed another mouth. A wealthy, higher-class family, conversely, may not have wanted 
to raise another heir at the risk of having to split up the family property any more than 
necessary.88 It is not too difficult to think of other reasons, such as divorce, adultery, or a 
pregnancy out of wedlock, why an unborn child was less than welcome.89 For all these 
reasons the Romans may have wanted to exercise some form of family planning one way 
or the other, either to stimulate or to prevent further births in the family.
Contraception was not unheard of in ancient Rome, but the methods used were not 
always safe or reliable.90 Continued breast feeding ensured only partial protection (and 
there is some discussion as to whether Roman women generally breastfed their own 
infants or not), a kind of condoms made of sheep’s bladders were expensive, and the 
herbs that were used as abortifacients were inefficient at best, and could also be danger-
84 Saller (2007) 87.
85 Hin (2011), spec. 100–4; De Ligt (2004) 750-1.
86 E.g. Dixon (1992) 61–2.
87 Hin (2011) 101. Significantly, on page 102 she suggests that perhaps an urban environment is the 
one place where children could find the employment that would earn enough to break even. 
88 The Romans endorsed partible inheritance, so all children male and female inherited equally from 
their parents; Rawson (2003) 114; cf Champlin (1991) 114–7 for the fact that Roman wills show a 
tendency to bequeath the bulk of an inheritance to one son.
89 E.g. Evans Grubbs (2013) 84-92 for motivations that might lead to exposure of an infant. Many of 
these arguments hold for slave babies, too (p. 89), though it is likely that slave births were less 
common in smaller families than in elite households.
90 Contra Riddle (1992), see e.g. the critique by Frier (1994) and Hin (2011).
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ous to the mother.91 Many of these forms of contraception may have been reserved for 
the elite.92 As a result, there were Romans who turned to other, more secure, methods of 
family planning: infant exposure and infanticide.
The Roman practices of infanticide and exposure have been accentuated in scholarly 
literature, because they go directly against contemporary norms and values.93 It is likely 
that a number of Roman infants was indeed exposed, abandoned or in a few extreme 
cases even killed shortly after birth, but the exact numbers cannot be known. However, I 
would argue that this was not so much a sign that there was a large number of ‘unwanted 
children’: the Romans could be ruthless, but that did not preclude emotional attachment 
to their living offspring.94 Many of the newborns who were abandoned were swaddled 
for protection. They were sometimes provided with some kind of token, indicating the 
parents’ hope to reclaim their child when they had the opportunity. Moreover, it seems 
plausible that in Rome, as in later historical periods, infants were regularly left in a public 
place where they stood a very real chance of being found – that is to say, the parents did 
not wish for them to die.95 This points to a predominantly economic motivation behind 
exposure. Infanticide seems to have been rarely applied.96
The ‘social birth’ of the infant, that is its acceptance into the family, took place after eight 
(in case of a girl) or nine days (for a boy).97 The decision to raise a child presumably lay 
with the paterfamilias. It has long been thought that the father would literally raise the 
child (tollere/suscipere liberum) up from the ground to indicate his willingness to raise the 
newborn. The fact that the existence of this particular ritual acceptance of the child is 
now seriously in doubt, probably does not change the father’s influence in this matter.98 
91 Contraception: Bracher (1992); On a possible low level of breastfeeding Parkin (2013) 52, and at 
53: “In preindustrial societies, to feed an infant unpasteurized animal milk was tantamount to 
manslaughter” – but wet-nurses were also common in Roman society; on the dangers involved for 
the woman, most vividly Ov. Am. 2.13.
92 Hin (2011) 108–9.
93 Evans Grubbs (2013); Garnsey (1991), Harris (1994), Corbier (2001), Shaw (2001).
94 Cf the popular Horrible histories: The Ruthless Romans (2003).
95 Corbier (2001) 69, taking into consideration what she considers a good chance for the exposed 
infant to survive, writes: “Roman parents probably did not consider exposure a form of ‘infanti-
cide’”. Cf also her references to literary recognition scenes, and legal texts relating to the possible 
continued influence of the biological father over a child exposed at birth and raised by another.
96 Evans Grubbs and Parkin (2013) on page 1 bring to mind that DeMause as recently as 1974 (his 
page 51) still classified “Antiquity to the Fourth Century AD” as the “Infanticidal Mode”, a notion 
that has long since been refuted. When infanticide did occur, it may have been for reasons of 
serious health problems and deformity, although some disabled infants were brought up, see Laes 
(2013) 129-31; O’Hara (1998) 211.
97 Hänninen (2005) 56–59.
98 Köves-Zulauf (1990), Shaw (2001) 32-56. It is, however, certain that the decision remained with the 
paterfamilias, says Corbier (2001) 58.
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If he chose not to bring up the newborn infant, we may presume that the child would be 
exposed or perhaps even killed. It has been convincingly argued that this is the context in 
which we should read the paterfamilias’ power of life and death (ius vitae necisque), where 
the power of death was probably acted out sporadically, and then predominantly in the 
case of serious health problems that would complicate life for the newborn.99
With all this talk of exposure and infanticide, it should not be forgotten that most 
children were treasured in Roman society.100 Where for some a child had become a dif-
ficulty that ultimately led to exposure or abandonment, for others it was crucial to beget 
a child. “In a society where childbearing and the passing on of property were considered 
the primary purposes of marriage, women were under enormous pressure to produce a 
healthy heir.” 101 And that may not always have been easy.102
The Laudatio Turiae is a famous funerary text for an infertile woman who allegedly 
offered to divorce her husband so that he might have children with another.103 Roman 
society, like many preindustrial populations, was characterized by high fertility rates on 
the one hand, and high mortality on the other.104 Mortality was particularly high during 
infancy and early childhood, and mortality rates were raised by the unsanitary circum-
stances of the larger cities.105 Raising a child until maturity was not guaranteed.
The wish for a baby or the need for an heir might theoretically lead Romans to turn to 
‘non-natural’ methods of begetting a child, such as adopting, or taking up a foundling. 
Neither of these options appear to have been very common in ancient Rome, however. 
Foundlings could be picked up and raised as one’s own. However, it is significant that as 
far as it can be known, most foundlings were raised as slaves.106 There is a distinct pos-
sibility that the evidence does not explicitly identify a foundling brought up as a natural 
son or daughter. Even more likely to go undetected when successful, is supposition.   
Evans Grubbs notes the possible supposition of babies, who might also be foundlings.107 
If only because of its highly specific requirements, however,  – an infant of the same age 
99 Cf n.96 above, with reference to Laes (2013) and O’Hara (1998); for a different explanation of the 
ius, see Shaw (2001) 56–77.
100 Dixon (1991) 109–111.
101 Evans Grubbs (2013) 87.
102 Corbier (1991) 67; Hänninen (2005) 49 on the very real danger of the death of the child, mother, or 
both in childbed.
103 Right-hand column, lines 25–50; Hemelrijk (2004), (2001a),(2001b) with Dutch translation and 
commentary.
104 Parkin (2013) 44: “Children in classical antiquity were a very large proportion of the population, 
and a lot of them were dying.”
105 Parkin (2013).
106 Corbier (2001) 66–7. For more on foundlings as a source of slaves, see chapter 4.
107 Evans Grubbs (2013) 87.
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available at just the right time through just the right channels to ensure secrecy – sup-
position is unlikely to have been common.108 Adoption of infants was legally recognized, 
but it was rare.109 Corbier thinks that the childless ‘Turia’ and her husband may have 
considered adoption of a baby girl, but that was only after the husband decided that the 
apparently more customary response to infertility, divorce and remarriage, was not an 
option for him.110 It is in fact characteristic of adoption in Roman society that adoption 
typically took place at a later age.111
other additions to the family
It was already emphasized that many Roman families consisted of a free and a slave 
segment. It is known that at least some urban households in addition also contained 
lodgers. Both house-owners and lodgers can be identified in the Egyptian census data; 
these lodgers are mainly male adults.112 If a similar pattern existed in Roman Italy, the 
rent will have been a welcome addition to the family income. The evidence does not 
permit me to conclude any more on this strategy, however. Two other categories of 
family members, however, do deserve to be mentioned in somewhat more detail. It is 
likely that there were more children in the house than the children we just considered. 
The elusive category of alumni, or foster-children, contains some who were raised in the 
household from birth, and others who found a temporary home there. More secure fam-
ily ties were constructed by adoption. Adoption could be an effective family strategy, at 
least for free citizens.113 It was a means to transfer an adult into another family in the eyes 
of the law, as a natural son or grandson.114
108 Corbier (1991) 65: “Precautions would be taken at the time of a widow’s confinement to prevent 
the substitution of the child”, with reference to Dig. 37.9.1.15 (Ulpian).
109 Lindsay (2009) 69–70 briefly considers adoption of minors.
110 Corbier (1991) 63; but Lindsay (2009) 153 disagrees.
111 Lindsay (2009) makes extensive use of cross-cultural comparisons, spec. chapter one p. 4–28. An 
earlier, more pointed version of this chapter was published as Lindsay (2001), with 201–4 spe-
cifically on ancient Rome. See Hübner (2013) for the significant differences with the practice of 
adoption in the ancient eastern Mediterranean.
112 Pudsey (2012) 167: “Lodgers were a feature of households in the large towns and metropoleis”, and 
in n. 22 she gives the example of Bagnall and Frier (2006): 103–Ar–1 (9 lodgers).
113 An excellent, concise account of adoption as familial strategy, is Corbier (1991). I have not been 
able to access Corbier ed. (1999). The technicalities of adoption by life or testamentary adoption, 
and adrogation are deliberately left out of my discussion. These aspects do not change the nature 
of the resulting kinship bond, that is decisive for adoption as a family strategy. For those interested 
in these details, I recommend Lindsay (2009) esp. ch. 4 and 5.
114 For the adoption of a grandson, Lindsay (2009) 66; Corbier (1991) 67–8.
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Alumni
Alumni were children who were raised from infancy by people who were not their 
biological parents.115 This much can be said, as well as the fact that the term alumnus/ 
-a professes affection and quasi-familial bonds.116 Other than that, they make for a 
heterogeneous and complex group that defies direct definition. Some were raised as 
slaves, others were free; despite obvious similarities with children who were exposed 
or abandoned, alumni may or may not have been foundlings.117 It is their status that 
was fundamentally different from foundlings who were adopted as a natural child: free 
alumni were not legally kin. The designation alumnus may merely indicate that the child 
was literally ‘nurtured’ by a wet-nurse. There is some evidence to suggest that sometimes 
its meaning comes closer to apprentice than to nursling, however, as in the following 
inscription from Puteoli.118
ciL 10. 1922
D(is) M(anibus) / G. Atilius Fortu/natus faber in/testinarius q(ui) v(ixit) / an(n)is 
XXXI f(ecit) Iulius Felicis/simus alum(no) mere(nti)
To the spirits of the dead. [Here lies] Gaius Atilius Fortunatus, inlayer/cabinet 
maker, who lived 31 years. Iulius Felicissimus set up [this monument] for his well-
deserving student.
Fortunatus died relatively young, at the age of thirty-one. At that time he was fully edu-
cated as a faber intestinarius. He was commemorated by one Iulius Felicissimus. There-
fore, it appears that Felicissimus either raised Fortunatus or taught him the trade of 
fine carpentry, or indeed a combination of the two: the term alumnus can point in both 
directions. The lack of any mention of other family bonds suggests that Fortunatus was 
unmarried, and that his biological parents were out of the picture. Perhaps Felicissimus 
was indeed a surrogate father to Fortunatus. Both their cognomina, Felicissimus and 
Fortunatus, are names that suggest a servile background. Although the duo and tria 
nomina could technically also indicate freeborn status, it would not be surprising that 
libertination is not explicitly mentioned if Fortunatus were a Iunian Latin, since Iunian 
115 Sigismund-Nielsen (2013) 289. On alumni, see especially Sigismund-Nielsen (1987), Bellemore and 
Rawson (1990).
116 Dixon (1992) 129: “The term alumnus and its cognates are less likely to be employed of an adult 
than of a child, which suggests that the special relationship might vary over the life cycle.”
117 Sigismund-Nielsen (2013) 289 argues that they were not.
118 Sigismund-Nielsen (2013) 289 mentions this option, but with reference to the rather unconvincing 
examples of CIL 6. 10158, CIL 6. 8454, and CIL 6. 8697 (in this last case no alumnus is mentioned).
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Latins were not allowed to boast libertination. His age – he was 31 – suggest that he 
may well have been manumitted before the legal minimum age of 30. This would also 
explain why Fortunatus was not formally adrogated by Felicissimus, a fact that can be 
gathered from the dissimilarity of the gentilicia. As an ex-slave, Felicissimus was legally 
able to adrogate (though not technically adopt) another citizen, but Iunian Latins were 
not considered to be citizens. In this instance it appears that Fortunatus was raised to 
be Felicissimus’ successor in the business, which was expressed in the inscription by the 
term alumnus as a replacement for formal adrogation. At other times apprentices were 
taken in temporarily to master a trade, only for them to return to their family of birth – an 
investment of the birth family that will be dealt with in detail below.
Adoption
The main motive for adoption in Rome appears to have been the need for an heir. It 
generally concerned adult males who were adopted in the event that no heir was pres-
ent. Adopting when a (male) heir existed, or even when the adopter was still under 60 
– which was the age before which he might reasonably expect to still beget children of 
his own according to the law – was frowned upon.119 Close relatives were the preferred 
choice for adoption, but it was also possible to adopt the child of a friend for example.120 
In theory, the adopted son became heir to his new family. In practice, ties with the family 
of origin were simultaneously recognized. This enabled the procedure to function as a 
way of strengthening the bond between two families. A patron might choose to adopt 
a freedman, to solidify a claim to the freedman’s wealth for example.121 For the freed-
man himself, his new status as a ‘natural’ son to his patron did not remove the practical 
consequences of the freedman stigma, however. Apparently even adoption could not 
change that. Corbier illustrates that the possibilities to rearrange lineage provided 
by adoption were virtually endless; the practice “recognized [the] right of a father to 
reshape his relationships”.122 The evidence is heavily biased towards the imperial elite, 
however, and even then adoption does not appear to have been very common.123 There 
is no way of knowing whether a legal construct like this was ever exploited by the rest 
of the population, though the benefits of adopting a particularly talented apprentice to 
continue the family business, to name but one possibility, are obvious.
119 Corbier (1991) 66–7.
120 Corbier (1991) 67.
121 Lindsay (2009) 132–6 offers a very brief account that mostly raises questions rather than answers 
them. He only hints at the possibility that freedmen may have wanted to use adoption to bring 
together their natural family born in slavery.
122 Corbier (1991) 76.
123 Lindsay (2009) 2–3 mentions a few estimates by previous scholars that range from 2 to 9 per cent.
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humAn CAPItAl
Just like many other life-changing events such as marriage, investment in a child’s hu-
man capital was decided on by the family.124 If decisions on raising a child or buying a 
slave concern the quantity of the family labour supply, investment in human capital 
involves the quality of the family.
Modern economists have demonstrated that there is a direct correlation between 
years of schooling and income.125 This correlation appears to be equally valid for an-
cient Rome, although we have few numerical data on wages in Rome.126 The example 
of Diocletian’s Prices Edict of 301 AD illustrates that skilled labour typically brought in 
two times the unskilled daily wage, or more.127 This points to significant returns on 
education. Why then did not everyone attempt to obtain an education for themselves, 
their children or their slaves?128 Economic theory predicts that “[i]n principle, we would 
expect all individuals to be grouped at the highest educational level, to benefit from the 
increased income opportunities”.129 This is obviously not the case today, and it was not 
in ancient Rome – quite the reverse. Several possible answers can be found in modern 
economic theory. Investment in schooling can be restricted through high child mortal-
ity, financial constraints, and what is called ‘intergenerational persistence’.
Intergenerational persistence refers to the fact that a poor family regularly could 
not afford job-training for their children, so that the next generation remained poor, in 
perpetual self-confirmation; conversely, skilled workers earned more and hence they 
could more likely afford their children’s education; and so on.130 In the calculations of 
Scheidel and Friesen, close to 90 per cent of the population lived at or under subsistence 
levels, which surely means that these people did not have the resources to ensure an 
education for themselves or their children.131 Family background mattered. The fact that 
job-training was not available to everyone in the freeborn population therefore largely 
124 Bradley (1991) 112-113; and see introduction.
125 E.g. Checchi (2006) 5-10.
126 Szilágyi (1963); Mrozek (1975); Corbier (1980); and see Szaivert and Wolters (2005) for the literary 
wage data. Roman Egypt: Johnson (1936), Drexhage (1991).
127 Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2017) 113-4, 118-122 with references. Rathbone (2009) 214 for two 
to threefold differentials, and the suggestion that the latter was more common in urban contexts. 
Bernard (2017) 83 points out that the Roman skill premium is normal in comparative perspective.
128 Similarly, Saller (2013) 76–7: “If an apprenticeship (…) doubled his daily wage (…) why did more 
parents and slave masters not apprentice their sons and slaves. (…) I have no answer.” This section 
is an attempt to answer the question.
129 Checchi (1995) 10.
130 Checchi (1995) chapter 7 on intergenerational persistence.
131 Scheidel and Friesen (2009) 82-8.
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is the result of intergenerational persistence, although the same principle also implies 
that freeborn skilled labourers were a continuous presence.
The comparatively high mortality rate in the Roman empire meant that on average, 
there were relatively few years left to reap the benefits of an education, or to develop 
human capital further through experience. In other words, investing in any kind of train-
ing did not always pay off. As a result, high (child) mortality probably was an additional 
limiting factor on investment in, and accumulation of, human capital.132
Specific to Rome is the fact that much skilled work was carried out by slaves, thereby 
restricting job opportunities for freeborn skilled workers. Since investment in human 
capital correlates with expectations of prospective earnings, the competition of slave 
labourers in the market has a direct effect on the time, effort and money spent on educa-
tion by the freeborn population. Hawkins concludes that apprencticeship was not easily 
affordable and, on the assumption that employers were more likely to hire or buy slaves 
than the freeborn to do their skilled work, “those who could afford to pay for such train-
ing probably did so with an eye to establishing their sons as independent producers 
rather than as wage workers”.133
Even without slave competition, general labour demands predict that there cannot 
have been an unlimited demand for skilled labour, and that there was a definite need for 
menial labour as well. For many it was more profitable to step in where there was work 
in the unskilled sector, rather than to be trained for unemployment.
It is likely that such factors had a limiting effect on the total amount of time and effort 
spent by the free population on acquiring occupational skills in ancient Rome, and as a 
result skilled hired free labour became harder to come by.134 Despite these limiting fac-
tors, aggregate investment in human capital in the Roman world was far from negligible, 
even if it was not in any way comparable to the modern western world.135 There were 
opportunities for slaves as well as the freeborn, both boys and girls, to receive some 
kind of basic education. Although there was no formal schooling system, let alone an 
educational program set up by the government, in theory the class of the ludimagister 
132 And vice versa: it has been demonstrated that at least in the late twentieth century, lower-educat-
ed people had a lower life expectancy as well, Checchi (1995) 18 with references; Cf Saller (2013) 
76: “In order to derive the greatest return on the investment in training, it should be provided at 
that developmental moment after the ravages of childhood diseases when the children have the 
physical and mental capacity to learn the skills and pull their weight in the workshop”.
133 Hawkins (2017) 46-8, quote at 48.
134 On the scarcity of skilled labour, see also Hawkins (2017).
135 Saller (2013) 71–2; Verboven (2012a) 95 suggests that “freedmanship may have been the decisive 
factor explaining the significantly higher investment in human capital in the Roman empire than 
would be seen for a thousand years to come”.
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was open to all from about age seven.136 Rates of literacy for Roman Italy were unprec-
edented, especially taking into account basic literacy or craft literacy.137
Arts and crafts
Some children went on to learn a trade. Many of them will have eased into the busi-
ness, learning by doing in the household, taking up more tasks as they grew older and 
stronger.138 If the parents were master artisans, they were well capable of teaching their 
children to become master artisans themselves. The benefits of educating a child at 
home are simple: there would be virtually no loss of labour input – no forgone earnings 
– while building human capital. Specialist job-training was not necessarily based in the 
household, however, and it remains to be seen just how many children followed in their 
parents’ footsteps (below). Just like a basic primary education, a job-training regularly 
was obtained elsewhere: children, both slave and free, could be apprenticed out. The 
boundaries between formal apprenticeship, and arrangements to have a child trained 
in the household of birth, or that of a relative or friend, are not clear-cut. Formal ap-
prenticeship contracts might a priori be considered a relatively straightforward source 
for investment in education, but as it will turn out these documents provide evidence for 
much more varied investment strategies.
Apprenticeship
Formal job-training is relatively well-attested for the Roman empire, particularly in ap-
prenticeship contracts from Roman Egypt. The contracts provide a valuable insight into 
the considerations of investing in human capital, and it is well worth taking a closer look 
at these documents here.139 There are no apprenticeship contracts from outside Roman 
Egypt, however, and one may wonder whether they present a picture that is representa-
tive of Roman Italy as well. Scattered references in Roman law, literature and epigraphy 
suggest to me that the practice was not reserved to Roman Egypt.
Ulpian mentions a rather unfortunate apprentice in Digest 9.2.5.3:
A shoemaker struck with a last the neck of a freeborn apprentice (puero dis-
centi ingenuo filio familias), who did not do what the shoemaker instructed well 
enough. The boy’s eye was knocked out.140
136 Laes (2011a) 107–147, which is actually most illustrative of what we do not know about Roman 
(primary) education; Laes and Strubbe (2008) 75 ff.
137 Woolf (2002) provides a useful overview of the debate on literacy.
138 Saller (2013) 73–75 assumes that this kind of informal learning was the way most Romans gained 
their skills, certainly in agriculture but also in the arts and crafts.
139 For a general overview, most recently Bergamasco (1995); see also Zambon (1935).
140 Ulpian takes the example from Julian. Sutor [inquit] puero discenti ingenuo filio familias, parum bene 
facienti quod demonstraverit, forma calcei cervicem percussit, ut oculus puero perfunderetur.
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In epigraphy the rare attestations include a medical apprentice from Pula:141
ciL 5. 89
D(is) M(anibus) / P(ublio) Coesio Ortensi[a]/no medico / ann(orum) XVIII(?) / 
Miluso Primo / discipulo
To the divine spirits. To Publius Coesius Ortensianus, doctor, who lived 18(?) years. 
To Milusus Primus, his student.
Lucian recounts his brief experience as an apprentice sculptor in his ‘autobiography’, The 
Dream.
luc. somn. 1
Ἄρτι μὲν ἐπεπαύμην εἰς τὰ διδασκαλεῖα φοιτῶν ἤδη τὴν ἡλικίαν πρόσηβος 
ὤν, ὁ δὲ πατὴρ ἐσκοπεῖτο μετὰ τῶν φίλων ὅ τι καὶ διδάξαιτό με. τοῖς πλείστοις 
οὖν ἔδοξεν παιδεία μὲν καὶ πόνου πολλοῦ καὶ χρόνου μακροῦ καὶ δαπάνης οὐ 
μικρᾶς (5) καὶ τύχης δεῖσθαι λαμπρᾶς, τὰ δ’ ἡμέτερα μικρά τε εἶναι καὶ ταχεῖάν 
τινα τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀπαιτεῖν· εἰ δέ τινα τέχνην τῶν βαναύσων τούτων ἐκμάθοιμι, 
τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εὐθὺς ἂν αὐτὸς ἔχειν τὰ ἀρκοῦντα παρὰ τῆς τέχνης καὶ μηκέτ’ 
οἰκόσιτος εἶναι τηλι- (10) κοῦτος ὤν, οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν δὲ καὶ τὸν πατέρα εὐφρανεῖν 
ἀποφέρων ἀεὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον.
No sooner had I left off school, being then well on in my teens, than my father 
and his friends began to discuss what he should have me taught next. Most of 
them thought that higher education required great labour, much time, consider-
able expense, and conspicuous social position, while our circumstances were 
but moderate and demanded speedy relief; but that if I were to learn one of the 
handicrafts, in the first place I myself would immediately receive my support from 
the trade instead of continuing to share the family table at my age; besides, at no 
distant day I would delight my father by bringing home my earnings regularly.142
The passage is highly instructive of the possible considerations involved for the family 
when deciding on an apprenticeship. Among the ‘friends’ present is Lucian’s uncle, a 
sculptor – and indeed it is decided that Lucian should be apprenticed out to him to 
141 Schulz-Falkenthal (1972) collects references for discipuli and discentes.
142 Luc. Somn. 1; translation Harmon (1913, Loeb Classical Library).
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become a sculptor too. The arrangement is economically motivated: there is no money 
for higher education. Through an apprenticeship Lucian would no longer burden the 
family income (“continuing to share the family table”) – he would even contribute to it 
(“bringing home my earnings regularly”). It may also be significant that sculpting runs 
in the family, with two uncles and his grandfather in the trade. The example is from 
second-century Syria, but it will become clear that it is representative of a wider context 
in many respects.
Even the job of hairdresser (ornatrix) apparently required a training of at least two 
months to qualify, judging from Digest 32.65.3 – it states that only those who have 
trained with a magister at least two months qualify as legated hairdressers. The women 
in this text are clearly slaves.143
From these examples I conclude that even in the absence of apprenticeship contracts 
from Roman Italy, it can safely be assumed that a similar apprenticeship system existed 
in Roman Italy.144 As far as can be ascertained, it seems that the contracts come from an 
urban context: the majority come from Oxyrhynchus. This underlines the relevance of 
these documents to the present inquiry into the Roman urban labour market.
The number of Egyptian apprenticeship contracts currently known lies around 50 for 
the early Roman empire, but the list is ever expanding.145 They refer mostly to apprentice 
weavers, which appears to be the result of coincidence rather than a reflection of any 
particular aspect of the weaving trade. The majority of the contracts that have survived 
were set up for freeborn children: roughly 40 out of 50 contracts. These numbers strongly 
suggest that job-training was not reserved exclusively for slaves, and that the freeborn 
did have a chance to receive an education. So what considerations for investing in job-
training can be gathered from apprenticeship contracts?
Because of the nature of the documents we are well informed about the cost of 
apprenticeship. None of the master artisans receives an instruction fee for a freeborn 
apprentice. Even for slave apprentices, only in two instances does the master artisan 
143 Dig. 32.65.3: Ornatricibus legatis Celsus scripsit eas, quae duos tantum menses apud magistrum 
fuerunt, legato non cedere, alii et has cedere, ne necesse sit nullam cedere, cum omnes adhuc discere 
possint et omne artificium incrementum recipit: quod magis optinere debet, quia humanae naturae 
congruum est.
144 Bradley (1991) 112-6; Laes (2015a).
145 See appendix 2 for a catalogue. The most recent collection is Bergamasco (1995) who lists 42 
documents (Ptolemaic and Roman), to which should be added SB 24. 16186 (Bergamasco 2004), 
P.Col. Inv. 164 (Bergamasco 2006b), P.Oxy. 67. 4596 (Bergamasco 2004), P. Mich. Inv. 4238 (Eckerman 
2011). Bergamasco has announced that work on a new collection of the apprenticeship contracts 
and apprenticeship registrations is currently under way, Bergamasco (2004) 31 n.1 and (2006b) 
207 n.1.
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receive a fee for the instruction.146 In BGU 4. 1125 from Alexandria, 13 BC, a certain C. 
Iulius Philios pays 100 drachmae to have his slave boy Narkissos instructed in the art of 
flute-playing over the course of a year. And in AD 155 a certain Apollonius from Oxyryn-
chus receives 120 drachmae to have his son teach the slave boy Chairammon shorthand 
writing in 2 years.147 In all likelihood this can be related to the type of employment: the 
pupil of a flute player or stenographer cannot perhaps be put to work as easily as an 
apprentice weaver.
Economic theory suggests that the main expense of education, however, is not so 
much the instruction fee as forgone earnings: the income not collected during the time 
spent in training. In Roman Egypt, forgone earnings were mitigated by the fact that the 
apprentices were usually paid for their efforts – in accordance with Lucian’s remark: “at 
no distant day I would delight my father by bringing home my earnings regularly”.148 
This could be either in the form of a lump sum to be paid at the beginning or the end of 
the contract, or in the form of a monthly wage. The master craftswoman Aurelia Libouke 
pays the lump sum of 60 drachmae for a year in return for the efforts of a slave girl ap-
prentice, in a third-century document.149 When a monthly wage is specified, sometimes 
the contracts take account of the fact that a student accumulates ever more skills over 
time. For example, the slave girl Thermoution from late second-century Oxyrynchus 
earns 8 drachmae a month in the first year of her apprenticeship, but this modest figure 
is raised to 12 in the second year, 16 in the third year, and to 20 drachmae a month in 
the final year when she earns quite a respectable monthly wage.150 In most instances the 
master artisan also met the cost for food, clothing, taxes and all other expenses related to 
the trade – again, just like Lucian: “I myself would immediately receive my support from 
146 This difference in remuneration caused a desire to separate the apprenticeship contracts ana-
lytically into two groups, cf Bergamasco (1995) 100–4 for the various typologies that have been 
applied; e.g. Lehrvertrag und Unterrichtsvertrag (Adams 1964), or Lehrvertrag and Lehrlingsvertrag 
(Berger 1911).
147 P.Oxy. 4. 724.
148 See also Hengstl (1972) 92-5. Payment is not always specified, since not all documents are com-
plete. In P. Mich. 5. 346a the apprentice is fed and clothed by the master, but she does not receive 
a wage; Cost or payment is unknown for St. Pal. 22. 40.
149 P. Mich. Inv. 5195a.
150 P.Oxy. 14. 1647. Cf Drexhage (1991) 425-9 for monthly wages attested in contracts on papyrus. 
20 drachmae appears to be about the average monthly wage for unskilled work in the first 2 
centuries AD; a similar regular wage-increase can be observed in P. Oxy. 41. 2977 (AD 239). PSI 3. 
241 (3rd c.) documents a contract where the apprentice does not receive a wage for the first six 
months, which is a different way to account for her inexperience at the outset. These examples are 
all for slave apprentices, but the principle is no different for free boys and girls, e.g. P. Oxy. 4. 725 
(5-year contract for a weaver’s apprentice; wages of 12 rising to 24 drachmae a month from the 7th 
month of the 2nd year onwards).
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the trade instead of continuing to share the family table at my age”.151 Having a child or 
a slave in job-training would thus seem to be an economically sound investment.152 It 
would have been attractive for parents/carers or masters because as a rule the child was 
fed and clothed, brought home wages, and learnt a trade, which would bring in more 
money than menial labour at a later age.
Apprenticeship could be a compelling option for another reason. Freeborn children 
were sometimes apprenticed out in connection with loans contracted by their parents 
or relatives. It appears that the labour of the apprentice was a security pledge that the 
advanced sum would be repaid, that it was traded for the interest on the loan, or perhaps 
both. A good example is P. Tebt. 2. 384 (AD 10).
p. tebt. 2. 384, 15–25
[Ἁ]ρμιῦσις καὶ Παπνεβ[τῦ]ν ̣ις οἱ δο(*) Ὀρσενούφι[ος Πέρσαι]
τῆς ἐπιγονῆς ὁμολογοῦμεν ἔχειν π ̣[αρὰ Πασώ-]
νιος τοῦ Ὀρσενούφιος ἀργυρίου δραχμὰς [δεκά-]
εξ [καὶ] ἀ̣ν ̣τὶ τῶν τούτων τόκων καὶ [τρο]φ ̣[είων](*)[ καὶ]
ἱματισμοῦ καὶ λαογραφίας κώμης Ὀξυρύνχω ̣[ν καὶ]
τέλους γερδίων καὶ τῶν τούτων μισθῶ[ν παρ-]
εξόμεθα τὸν ἀδελφὸν ὑμῶν(*) Πα ̣σ ̣ί ̣ωνα π ̣[αραμέ-]
νοντα αὐτῷ ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα ἀπὸ̣ τ ̣ο ̣ῦ̣ τ ̣ε ̣[σσα-]
ρακοστοῦ ἔτου[ς] Καίσαρ[ος ἐ]ργαζόμενον [κατὰ τὴν]
γερδιακὴν τέχνην καὶ ποιοῦντα τὰ ἐ̣π ̣[ιταχθη-]
σόμε[να] πάντα
... We, Harmiysis and Papnebtynis, both sons of Orsenouphis, Persians of the 
Epigone, acknowledge that we have received from Pasonis, son of Orsenouphis, 
151 Lucian Somn. 1, quoted above; Bergamasco (1995) 149 on remuneration; P. Oxy. 67. 4596 even 
specifies that the apprentice receives food and clothing from the master artisan “instead of wages” 
(l. 15, ἀντὶ μισθῶ̣ν). A slave apprentice often moved in with the master, e.g. P. Mich. 346a (13 BC), 
P.Oxy. 41. 2977 (AD 239).
152 P. Wisc. 1. 4 is the one exception that proves the rule. The apprentice’s father provided the master 
artisan with fourteen drachmae for clothing, and five silver drachmae a month for food. No other 
costs or wages are specified. Pace Hawkins (2017), who adduces P. Oxy. 4. 725 as an example of 
the assumption that the cost of apprenticeship was considerable (his n. 32). Although the parents 
pay for food, and the apprentice starts earning wages only after two years and four months, the 
master still pays for clothing. It is also the single most unfavourable example from the parents’ 
perspective; therefore I believe the actual costs generally were less substantial than Hawkins sug-
gests.
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16 drachmas of silver, and in return for the (remission of ) interest upon this sum 
and the boy’s keep and clothing and poll-tax at the village of Oxyrhyncha and 
weavers’ tax and wages will produce our brother Pasion to stay with Pasonis for 
one year from the 40th year of Caesar and to work at the weaver’s trade and 
perform all that he is bidden...153
In this text, two brothers ‘hand over’, or ‘entrust’ (the verb is a form of parechomai, com-
monly used for ‘apprenticing out’) their brother Pasion to a master weaver, Pasonis, for 
the duration of one year, in exchange for a loan of 16 silver drachmae; Pasonis in return 
will charge no interest on this sum, and see to Pasion’s food and clothing as well as 
the weaver’s tax. The advantages to the family are evident: Pasion’s brothers save the 
expense of his keep, and they stand to gain not only from the remission of interest on 
the silver drachmae, but also from their brother’s (unspecified) wages.
There are other such instances. It appears that Hermaiskos, son of Herakleides, was 
apprenticed out to the nailsmith Nilus in return for a loan of 100 drachmae, made out 
to his father and a certain Taurion. This we learn from BGU 4. 1124 (Alexandria, 18 BC), 
a document specifying the annulment of the teaching contract (that has not been pre-
served), because Herakleides and Taurion had paid off their debt with Nilos.154 Similarly, 
P. Oxy. 67. 4596 (AD 264) is an apprenticeship contract for four years, where the instruc-
tion takes place in return for a loan of 400 drachmae to be returned – explicitly without 
interest – at the conclusion of the contract.155 In this contract, a girl is to be educated as 
a weaver.156 The text adds the significant clause that the father “is not allowed to take 
away his daughter within this period nor after the end of this period until he repays 
the four hundred silver drachmae in full”.157 An apprentice as surety for a loan therefore 
seems to me the more conclusive reading of these particular texts.158 These loans have 
sometimes been explained the other way around, that is, as caution money ensuring 
153 Translation by the editors of P. Tebt. 2.
154 In my opinion this document is about a loan, not a return of an advance payment of wages, as 
(very) tentatively suggested by Sijpesteijn (1967) in his commentary of P. Wisc. I. 4, lines 9-10. Com-
pare BGU 4. 1154 (Alexandria, 10 BC) which demonstrates a similar construction, the synchoresis 
explicitly drafted to pay back a loan. P. Oxy. 31. 2586 also includes the sum of 400 drachmae from 
master to father, to be returned at the end of the contract; unlike the other examples, however, 
this contract also specifies wages for the apprentice.
155 See J. David Thomas’ 2001 edition of the papyrus, and Bergamasco (2004) 35–38 for its date.
156 An interesting detail is that she is taught in the weaving trade by an overseer (histonarches) rather 
than a weaver, on which see Migliardi Zingale (2007) 207-8.
157 Lines 21-25: ο ̣ὐ̣κ ̣ [ἐξόντος αὐ-] τῷ ἐντὸς τοῦ χρόνου ἀποσπ ̣ᾶ̣[ν τὴν θυ-]γατέρα ̣ α ̣ὐ̣τοῦ οὐδὲ̣ μετὰ 
τὸν χρ ̣ό ̣ν ̣ο ̣ν ̣ [ -ca.?- ] π ̣ρ ̣ὶ̣ν ̣ ἂ̣ν ̣ ἀ̣π ̣οδῷ τὰς τοῦ ἀργυρ ̣ί ̣[ου] δ ̣[ραχμὰς] [τετρ]α ̣κ ̣ο ̣σ ̣ί ̣α ̣ς ̣ π ̣λήρη[ς]. Transla-
tion David Thomas, editor.
158 Compare Pudsey (2013) 503–4 for pledging of children, with references in n.20.
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that the master craftsman fulfilled his obligations to the parents/carers. The clause of P. 
Oxy. 4596 is clear, however. The explanation of caution money does not clarify the early 
termination of Hermaiskos’ teaching contract either (BGU 4. 1124).
In line with this interpretation, it may be pointed out that the master artisan had most to 
lose in case of an early termination of the contract, not the parents or carers: the students’ 
labour input becomes more valuable after some time of training. The implication may be 
that artisans were not always keen on accepting apprentices. However, I believe that ap-
prenticeship was actually appealing for craftsmen, too, because it added a relatively cheap 
pair of extra hands in the workshop. There is no other way to explain why Pasonis, for 
example, would agree to bear all the costs for Pasion in a relatively short-term contract.159 
The fact that many apprentices, Pasion included, receive wages from day one is a clue that 
their labour was valuable – even if their wage usually only increases with time spent in 
training.160 As an extra precaution, there usually is a monetary penalty set to the parents or 
owners in case they should take the child away before the contract ends.
The cost of apprenticeship may therefore have been relatively low compared to the 
benefits. The exception seems to lie in the luxury trades on the one hand, as exemplified 
by the slave apprentice flute player, which fits in nicely with our understanding of the 
concept of conspicuous consumption. The stenographer on the other hand may per-
haps be seen as an investment in a highly skilled slave that may fetch a nice price on the 
market or prove his worth in the household itself. The non-economic, social benefits of 
apprenticeship should not be underestimated either.161 But there were still restrictions 
in access to job-training. One of them was the availability of positions and the social 
network to get in; the other was gender.
Pausiris
The relative abundance of documentary papyri results in the added advantage that we 
can sometimes trace the same person in several documents over time. Four first-century 
documents pertaining to apprenticeship mention the same man: Pausiris, son of Am-
monios, who lived in the Cavalry Parade Quarter of Oxyrynchus.162 This set of documents 
159 Unless of course Pasion was already experienced to a degree, continuing the apprenticeship he 
started elsewhere with Pasonis. Hermaiskos the nail smith’s apprentice (BGU 4. 1124) whose con-
tract was terminated would also have to engage in another apprenticeship to finish his training, 
so this is a possible scenario.
160 P. Oslo Inv. 1470; PSI 10. 1110 verso 1; P. Oxy 14 .1647; P. Oxy. 38. 2875; P. Oxy. 31. 2586; PSI 3. 241.
161 Liu (2017) 219; Munck, Kaplan and Soly (2007) 5.
162 The family archive of twenty-three documents, referred to as the archive of Pausiris Jr, son of 
Pausiris, is the subject of Gagos, Koenen and McNellen (1992). The documents are listed in their 
appendix II on pages 201-204. There is a family tree on page 181. On page 181-2 they announce 
their work on a forthcoming text-edition.
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offers an interesting insight in economic family strategy over (part of ) the life cycle. One 
is an apprenticeship contract, the others concern apprenticeship registrations – ap-
parently for tax purposes, since two texts are explicitly addressed to the eklemptoreis 
gerdiôn, tax farmers of the weavers’ tax. Let us take a closer look at Pausiris and his family.
In P. Mich. 3. 170 from AD 49, Pausiris asks for registration of his eldest(?) son, Ammo-
nios, as the apprentice of Apollonios, master weaver. Because it concerns a registration, 
the particulars of the contract itself, other than the year it commenced, are unknown. 
It is specified, however, that both Pausiris and the master artisan are based in the same 
part of the city. Four years later, an apprenticeship contract (P. Wisc. 1. 4) testifies to 
the fact that Pausiris sends another son, Dioskous, to the same master artisan, Apol-
lonios. The boy is to learn from Apollonios “the whole weaver’s trade, as he also knows it 
himself”.163 Apparently Dioskous stays with Apollonios for the year of his apprenticeship 
despite their physical proximity, because the master is compensated by Pausiris for the 
boy’s maintenance.
So far there is little that is unusual about these arrangements. As it turns out, how-
ever, Pausiris is a master weaver himself.164P. Mich. 3. 171 (AD 58) is a copy of a letter 
to Panechotes and Ischyrion, farmers of the weaver’s tax. It is a request from a certain 
Helen to register her orphaned nephew, Amoitas, as apprentice to Pausiris. And in AD 62, 
Pausiris writes to register a third son, Pausiris junior, as apprentice in the weaver’s trade. 
This time, however, Pausiris entrusts his son not to Apollonios, but to Epinikos son of 
Theon – the aforementioned Helen´s husband (P. Mich. 3. 172).
It is clear that Pausiris had his sons trained in the weavers’ trade, presumably to suc-
ceed him in the family business when the time came. But if Pausiris was a master weaver, 
why did he not instruct his sons himself? Similarly, why did Epinikos not take on his 
wife’s nephew as an apprentice, rather than entrust him to Pausiris?
Reputation and quality control have been suggested as reasons not to train one’s own 
child.165 There is no denying that the proposition makes good sense. The suggestion that 
some sort of minimum standard was upheld, would be corroborated if the apprentice-
ship contracts offered evidence for something like a final exam to assess the acquired 
skills – as scholars have tentatively suggested that they do.166 However, a closer look at 
the four texts adduced by Bergamasco in this context, illustrates that the passages are at 
the very least ambiguous and in need of careful reconsideration.
163 Line 5-7: ὥστ ̣[ε μ]α ̣θ ̣εῖν ̣ τὴν γερδιακὴν τ ̣έ ̣χνην πᾶσ ̣[αν αὐτὸ]ν ̣ ὡ[ς] καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπίσταται. Translation 
Sijpesteijn (1967) 13.
164 This can also be gathered from P. Mich. 10. 598 from AD 49, which is a receipt for four installments 
of Pausiris’ payment of the weaver’s tax.
165 Laes (2011a) 191; see also Schulz-Falkenthal (1972) 210.
166 Bergamasco (1995) 133-4; Laes (2015a) 476 and idem (2011a) 191. Laes also adds P. Oxy. 2. 275, but 
in it I see no references to the apprentice undergoing a test.
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In P. Fouad. 1. 37 (AD 48) the master writes in ll. 7-8 that he will present (ἐπιδείξομ ̣αι) 
the apprentice weaver to his father “before [vel sim] three colleagues” (ἐπὶ ὁμοτέχνων 
τριῶν). It may be that a similar wording recurs in SB 22. 15538 (13 BC), where a slave boy 
is to be taught how to play the flute. The heavily damaged text is reconstructed as [... 
ἐξετασθήσεται ὑφʼ ὁμοτέχ]ν ̣ων τριῶν (l. 10), in which case the boy would “be examined 
by three colleagues”, but the reference to an examination remains conjectural.167 The 
epideixis – demonstration – of P. Fouad. 1. 37 could of course refer to an exam. But both 
phrases may just as well have been included to prevent favouritism from the master. If 
what is meant in these two texts therefore is not an exam, but the simple clause that the 
apprentice is to be treated equally to the other apprentices, there is an unambiguous 
example which illustrates that this is a good possibility: this principle is also known from 
P. Oxy. 4. 725.168 The other two texts that may indicate the existence of a master exam, 
are difficult to interpret for other reasons. The apprenticeship contract for a slave girl in P. 
Mich. 5. 346a (AD 13) states the consequences for the master “if she is judged unfledged” 
(ἐὰν … κρίνηται μὴ εἰδυειαι, l. 9-10).169 Bergamasco concedes that krinetai here does not 
necessarily refer to an official judgment, but may merely mean that the owner is dissatis-
fied with the slave’s progress.170 The last possible reference to a master exam is P. Aberd. 
59, which is not only a late example (late fifth, early sixth century AD) but which is also 
extremely fragmentary. I am hesitant to use this text to substantiate any argument.171
The attestations are few, and at least two of them refer to slave apprentices. While it is 
therefore difficult to exclude the possibility of a master exam altogether, I do not believe 
that it was very common, or that the quality control it exemplifies could be the reason to 
apprentice out a son to another weaver.
Perhaps part of the answer to why Pausiris did not tutor his own sons, should rather be 
sought in fluctuations in labour supply and demand.172 In the household of Epinikos and 
Helen, for example, Helen’s nephew probably was an unexpected addition to their fam-
ily when Amoitas’ father suddenly passed away. It is therefore not unlikely that Epinikos 
167 = BGU 4. 1125 line 1-15.
168 AD 183; this similarity was pointed out by Scherer, the editor of P. Fouad. 1. 37. In P. Oxy. 4. 725 the 
possibility of an exam is unlikely because of the context. It should be noted, however, that unlike 
myself and (in his view) contrary to P. Oxy. 4. 725, Scherer believes that P. Fouad 1. 37 does refer to 
an exam of sorts.
169 Interestingly, the penalty is to pay what he has received, but an instruction fee is not specified.
170 Bergamasco (1995) 134.
171 For the date, see BL 5, page 1; cf below, n.189.
172 The main point of Hawkins (2016), (2006) is that the lives of urban artisans in Rome are governed in 
large parts by such fluctuating demand; cf Saller (2013) 75-76: “Apprenticeship was a mechanism 
that allowed labor to be moved from the natal family to a household where it was needed and 
could be supported with food”.
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already had apprentices and labourers under contract at that time, which is why for 
them it was more profitable to apprentice out their nephew Amoitas.173 Although we do 
not have such contextual evidence in the documents concerning Pausiris, if he, too, had 
sufficient men (or women) at work in his workshop, it might have been a reason to send 
his sons elsewhere to learn the trade. We can at least infer that when Pausiris took in 
Helen’s nephew, Pausiris junior was still too young to add anything to the weaving busi-
ness: He must have been under 10 years of age in AD 58, because he was still referred to 
as a minor (in Roman Egypt that means under 14 years of age) in his own registration as 
an apprentice in AD 62.174
Alternatively, having a son apprenticed out to another weaver might refer to different 
types of weaving, which points to specialization and diversification of the weaver’s trade, 
partly to preclude competition.175 This suggestion cannot be substantiated, however. 
To my knowledge only one apprenticeship contract casually refers to a specific type of 
weaving: P. Fouad I. 37 speaks of ‘horizontal’ weaving.176 Moreover, the history of another 
family of weavers suggests that it is legitimate to speak of a family business, regardless 
of whether a son was educated in the craft at home or not.
Whereas these explanations may all be true to some extent, I believe that the most 
convincing explanation is in socio-economic networks. Recently there has been consider-
able attention for guilds as professional networks, and the social and familial ties of guild 
members, all of which are relevant here.177 It is obvious that the exchange of apprentices 
between Pausiris and Apollonios on the one hand, and Pausiris and Epinikos on the other 
hand, indicates the existence of social and economic bonds between the weavers of Oxy-
rhynchus.178 This does not preclude the interpretation that these documents offer glimpses 
of the professional network provided by guilds, through which the weavers found each 
other and which helped to minimize production costs and transaction costs. In the case 
of Pausiris and Apollonios, we may presume that weavers in the same part of town knew 
each other well; as we have seen both were from the Cavalry Parade Quarter.179 It should, 
however, be emphasized that there is no explicit reference to collegia.
173 This may be the reason that orphan apprentices are relatively prominent, a pattern that is more 
often attested historically (Lemercier for 19th-century France); however, Laes (2015a) 476 points 
out that the percentage of apprentices without a father is in line with the expected percentage of 
boys without a father at that age.
174 P. Mich. 3. 172, l. 8.
175 Hawkins (2006) 176-7; also Sijpesteijn (1967) 14 in his commentary on P. Wisc. 1. 4; Biscottini on the 
Tryphon-archive (1966) 65 ff.
176 Sitting down as opposed to standing up.
177 Liu (2017); Hawkins (2006) 125–133, spec. 132, idem (2012); Venticinque (2010). See also chapter 5.
178 Liu (2017) 217-221; Venticinque (2010) 291.
179 Hawkins (2006) 126-33; Liu (2017) 217-224 with figure 10.1 on p. 218.
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Tryphon
The weaver Tryphon was born in 8/9 AD; like Pausiris and his family, this family lived in 
the first century AD. It is a stroke of luck that much of the family archive has survived.180 
It tells us that Tryphon’s grandfather, Dionysios, was a weaver, and so were his father, also 
named Dionysios, his uncle, and one of his two brothers (who were both younger than 
he). Therefore, it comes as no surprise when we learn that Tryphon’s eldest son started 
paying the weaver’s tax from age 10.181 For Tryphon himself, and for his eldest son, how-
ever, there is no apprenticeship contract. Therefore, it is possible that in this family we 
have two instances of the eldest son learning the trade at home, from his father.
For the other weavers in the family, an apprenticeship contract was recorded. By the 
time Tryphon’s younger brother Onnophris was of an age to start his apprenticeship, in 
AD 36, Tryphon’s father may have passed away: the contract, P. Oxy. 2. 322, was drawn 
up by their mother, with Tryphon acting as a guardian. Tryphon was now of an age to 
take on apprentices of his own (27–28 years old), yet it was decided that Onnophris 
should be apprenticed out to another weaver.182 In AD 66 Tryphon’s second son, Thoonis, 
was apprenticed out (P. Oxy. 2. 275). This decision may have had to do with Tryphon’s 
advancing age, or the fact that he lost part of his eyesight some years before.183 Other 
considerations unknown to us may have played a part as well: the network theories 
outlined above with the more elaborate example of Pausiris are evocative. It appears 
that some learnt their trade within the family, and others were apprenticed out – but 
all save one remained in the family business.184 Perhaps the simplest solution is also the 
most elegant: whenever a son was his father’s apprentice, there was no apprenticeship 
contract. But absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
The archives of Pausiris and Tryphon give evidence for two or more generations of 
weavers each; and although there usually is very little evidence for what happens be-
tween generations, here at least we can point to intergenerational persistence ensuring 
the next generation’s entry into the weaving trade.
180 Piccolo (2003); Pestman and Clarysse (1989) 74-80; Vandoni (1974); Biscottini (1966); Brewster 
(1927).
181 P. Oxy. 2. 310, 56 AD, cf Brewster (1927) 147 chart B.
182 It is not specified at what age artisans could take apprentices, which in any case had to do with 
skill not age, but the master carpenter in P. Mich. Inv. 4238 is 25 years old, and the master weaver 
of P. Tebt. 2. 385 is about the same age as Tryphon was here.
183 Brewster (1927) 140 suggests that it is because of his incapacitation. However, Biscottini (1966) 
64–5 points out that Tryphon can nevertheless be seen actively involved in the weaver’s trade, as 
his purchase of a new loom dates still later than the accident.
184 According to Brewster (1927) 138, Tryphon’s other brother (Thoonis) left the district “without trade 
and without means” in AD 44 – with reference to P. Oxy. 2. 251.
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Freeborn female apprentices
Slave apprentices concern both boys and girls, in roughly equal numbers.185 Most of 
the freeborn apprentices, however, were boys. But not all. Bradley’s often-cited conclu-
sion that there were no freeborn female apprentices should therefore be qualified, as 
Van Minnen attempted to do in 1998.186 At the time, Van Minnen’s publication failed to 
convince many scholars, but the publication of a new papyrus from Oxyrhynchus has 
added another persuasive example of a freeborn female apprentice.
In P. Heid. 4. 326 (AD 98), included by Van Minnen, the girl Syairûs is apprenticed out 
by her parents Ischyras and Didyme to another married couple, Isidorus and Apollonari-
on.187 The document is extraordinary in many ways. The text does not state explicitly 
that we are dealing with an apprenticeship contract, nor does it say anything about 
wages, or about what exactly the girl is to be taught. The information we need comes 
from another contract, dating to a year later: AD 99. In this contract, P. Heid. 4. 327, the 
son of Ischyras’ deceased (?) brother Nikanor is apprenticed out by Ischyras (this time 
without mention of Didyme) to Apollonarion (the wife) to learn the somfiake techne, an 
unknown art which appears to be the work of an undertaker. In lines 35-39 they refer to 
their previous arrangement.
p. Heid. 4. 327, 33-40
ἐ̣πὶ δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὴν Ἀπο\λ/
λ ̣[ωνά]ρ ̣ιον μη[δ]ὲν παραβῆν[α]ι ̣
ἢ ἔ[νοχ]ο ̣ς ̣ ἔ̣σται τῷ [ἴ]σῳ ἐπιτίμῳ, με-
νο ̣[ύ]σ ̣η ̣ς κυ ̣ρί[ας ἧ]ς ἔχει ἡ Ἀπολλω-
νά[ρ]ι ̣ο ̣ν τοῦ [Ἰσχυ]ρᾶδος ἑτέρας
συ[γχω]ρ ̣ή[σεως] διδεσκ ̣α ̣λείας
[τῆς θυγ]α ̣τ ̣ρὸς α ̣[ὐτ]οῦ Συαιρ ̣[ο]ῦ̣δος.
Unter these terms, Apollonarion will be bound not to trespass or she will be 
subject to the same penalty, while the other teaching agreement remains ap-
plicable, [the one] Apollonarion holds from Ischyras, concerning his [i.e. Ischyras’] 
daughter Syairûs.
The connection between 326 and 327 seems to be a safe one: Syairûs is a name that we 
hear of more often, but it is only spelled like this twice – in our documents. Therefore we 
185 Laes (2015a) counts 12 slave-contracts of whom 6 were girls; appendix 2 has 11 (5 girls).
186 Voiced by Bradley (1991) 108-9. Van Minnen (1998).
187 This text and its connection to P. Heid. 4. 327 is also explained in Van Minnen (1998).
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may presume that P. Heid. 4. 326 was indeed a synchoresis didaskaleias, the term used in P. 
Heid. 4. 327 (l. 38) to refer to the earlier text: an apprenticeship contract for a freeborn girl.
Another girl is now also securely attested in P.Oxy. 67. 4596 (AD 264), a relatively recent 
discovery:188 Aurelia Aphrodite is the daughter of Aurelios Polydeukes (line 7) and ap-
prenticed out to learn the weaving trade. Their name (Aurelius, -a) is a clear indication of 
citizen status, so there is no doubt that Aphrodite was born free.
In addition to female apprentices, there are a few female master artisans.189 That fact 
also suggests some form of job-training for women.190 The woman Apollonarion was 
already referred to in my description of two apprenticeship contracts (P. Heid. 4. 326-7). 
A master weaver, Aurelia Libouke, features in the apprenticeship contract P. Mich. Inv. 
5191a = SB 8. 13305. Finally Aria, a master of unknown trade writes a letter (P. Mich. Inv. 
337) to her son about the financial problems she has to support her (male) apprentice.191
The scarce attestation of freeborn females in the apprenticeship contracts is likely not 
coincidental. That does not mean that women necessarily were without an occupation, 
however. Van Minnen suggested that girls were more likely to learn a job at home to pre-
serve their chastity: “That was safer”.192 Girls could be married in their early teens at an age 
when other children, that is mainly boys, began their apprenticeship.193 The age of most ap-
prentices is unfortunately lost to us, but apprenticeships seem to commence shortly before 
age 14.194 The marriage pattern of Roman Egypt was perhaps not all that different from that 
of Roman Italy: nonelite girls seem to have started marrying from age 12 onwards, but with 
a similar peak in the (mid and) late teens as their counterparts in Roman Italy.
Human capital theory would nevertheless suggest that investment in human capital 
for girls was less extensive than investment in boys, based on the expectation that 
women’s future earnings were lower than what could be expected in the case of men. 
That is not just because of the expectation that a girl would be married soon, and that 
188 P. Oxy. 67. 4596 was already briefly referred to above in the context of loans and apprenticeship.
189 I hesitate to include the fragmentary example of P. Ross. Georg. II. 18. 450 (AD 140) that merely hints 
at an apprenticeship contract for a girl; it has the occurrence of some form of the verb manthanein 
in connection with the accusative auten. Nor am I inclined to bring in the late example of P. Aberd. 
59 (late 5th–early 6th c.) which is also very fragmentary. Van Minnen names two others besides P. 
Mich. 4. 326: on pages 202–3 he suggests a conjecture through which P. Mich. Inv. 5191a = SB 8. 
13305 would also include a freeborn girl, but the suggestion has not been widely accepted; he 
also refers to an eight-century Coptic text far outside of the scope of my research (KSB 1. 045).
190 Van Minnen (1998) 201 pointed me to the existence of female artisans in the contracts as evidence 
of job-training for women, though again he did not have all the texts we have now and has to 
resort to a late example.
191 On P. Mich. Inv. 337 = SB 11588, see Bergamasco (2006a).
192 Van Minnen (1998) 203 and passim.
193 For the Egyptian marriage pattern, Hübner (2013) 48-50; Bagnall and Frier (1994) 110-16.
194 Bradley (1991) 107-8; Van Minnen (1998) 201.
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she could therefore spend less time in the labour market. There was a strong gender bias 
on the labour market as well. Women had fewer job opportunities and because of that 
they probably earned less, as was the case in many historical periods. Though Roman 
women are sporadically attested in all types of jobs, there seems to have been a limit 
to female labour participation, and the apprenticeship contracts suggest that this may 
have limited investment in their human capital through formal apprenticeships.195
fAmIly mAtteRs: eConomIC stRAtegIes
All business was family business, if not always in the literal sense. There were of course 
family businesses in a literal sense: they were mostly entrepreneurial families working 
together in a workshop. Other, wage-earning, families hired out their labour in a neces-
sarily more diversified approach to the labour market.
The urban population of Rome was dense, hence unskilled labour was probably in 
ample supply in the Roman cities and wages were accordingly low; and though skilled 
labour was more exclusive and the work paid good money, securing a job as a skilled 
wage-labourer may have proven difficult. In most nonelite households, therefore, it is 
likely that all family members – men, women, and children – were required to contribute 
their labour power merely to maintain, or to rise above, subsistence level.196 Skilled work 
was the most important differentiating factor that had the potential to lift the family up 
from the poorer masses. Even for skilled artisans and craftsmen, however, fluctuating 
demand in the urban economy necessitated the availability of a flexible work force.197 
The most flexible work force, and the cheapest place to find additional labourers 
when business was good, was one’s family. Conversely, when demand was low, family 
members were also the labourers whose time was most easily redirected towards the 
more rudimentary tasks in and around the house.198 Labour allocation among family 
195 See introduction s.v. human capital and chapter two s.v. gender. Cf Saller (2007) 106: “the effect of 
the ideology may have been to limit the training or human capital of freeborn women”.
196 See chapter two on living standards and skilled labour; Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2017) section 
4; Scheidel (2010a) 454: “Since wages for adult male workers were often so modest, labor force 
participation by both adult women and minors must have been high in order to fend off starva-
tion”.
197 Hawkins (2016); (2013).
198 Cf. Hawkins (2017), (forthcoming) who names this as an advantage of slaves in the permanent 
work force; In my view, this holds equally well for non-slave family members; Knotter (1994) 68 
on the sudden growth of the cloth-production in the Dutch Republic of the nineteenth century: 
“Gezinsarbeid is een voor de hand liggende oplossing voor gebrek aan arbeidskrachten”.
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members, and between domestic work and the labour market, therefore, is the most 
basic form of family adaptive strategy.
male labour: occupational pluralism and seasonal labour
It is interesting to note that the ideology surrounding male labourers has received 
little scholarly attention, certainly when compared to studies into contemporary views 
about Roman women. That presumably has to do with the fact that literary sources were 
written from a male perspective in a patriarchal society, by elite men who concerned 
themselves with putting women in their place.199 The elite views about artisans and 
craftsmen outlined in the introduction to this thesis, for example, are implicitly about 
male labourers. There is very little material in terms of an ancient discourse about labour 
allocation between husband and wife. A passage of Xenophon’s Oeconomicus in which 
a farmer called Ischomachos recaps at length a conversation with his wife on how the 
gods as well as the law viewed the tasks of husband and wife. He concludes: “for to the 
woman it is more admirable to stay in the house than to be in the open air, but to the 
man it is more shameful to stay in the house than to attend to the work outside.”200 In 
other words, male labour was allocated to the non-domestic sphere one hundred per 
cent, be it on the farm as in the case of Ischomachos, in the workshop, or in the form of 
wage labour; the women, conversely, were allocated to the domestic sphere.
This extreme labour division between husband and wife is still common, even if it 
is no longer the only option available. The ideal has prevailed for a long time and has 
blended into reality, even if adhering to a labour division was regularly impossible to 
adhere to, because of the vital contribution women’s income was to the family finances. 
I suspect that the prevalence of this labour pattern until the later twentieth century is 
one of the reasons why scholars never felt the need to explicate it for ancient Rome. 
Economic theory even predicts that it is often economically rational, on the assumption 
that women have a comparative advantage in the home.201 It may be safely concluded 
that Roman men were expected to be the bread-winners of the family, as head of a 
workshop, as merchant, wholesaler or wage-labourer. Male wage-labourers were ex-
pected to find an income through a job, or when there was none, through other means. 
An unfortunate faber from Apuleius’ Metamorphoses, for example, finds himself without 
work and without pay unexpectedly one day, and decides to sell a dolium so that he 
199 See chapter 2.
200 Xen. Oec. 7. 30-1: τῇ μὲν γὰρ γυναικὶ κάλλιον ἔνδον μένειν ἢ θυραυλεῖν, τῷ δὲ ἀνδρὶ αἴσχιον ἔνδον 
μένειν ἢ τῶν ἔξω ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.
201 See introductory chapter s.v. male and female labour for this ideal of separate domains, with refer-
ence to Hemelrijk (2015) 9–12; and for economic theory with reference to Cigno (1991) part I, e.g., 
24, 41-2.
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can afford a meal in the evening.202 Apuleius’ carpenter seems to have had a relatively 
steady job with his boss for the time being. As a result of the male-female labour divi-
sion, adaptive strategies for men were not concerned with the division of their time 
between home and work, but they were aimed particularly at battling unemployment 
and economic insecurity.
An interesting historical example of adaptive strategy is my grandfather. Born in 1920, 
my grandfather Wim was a house painter, before he was drafted to serve in the royal 
navy during World War II. After the war, he found work in a butcher’s shop, and then as 
an overseer in the mines of Limburg. Two things are relevant about this historical case. 
The first is that as one of twelve children to a farmer, Wim only received a relatively basic 
education. House painter and butcher are both job-titles we might consider (semi-) 
skilled, but he was self-taught (the navy and the mining corporation provided additional 
training). Although this is just one modern case, it puts into perspective the ways in 
which much of the human capital may have been accumulated in the Roman world. 
Strategic adaptations like these must have been a general occurrence in the Roman 
world as well, but they are virtually impossible to trace. Perhaps the fact that there are 
relatively few occupational inscriptions also has to do with the fact that there were few 
Romans who identified with only one particular job. Specializing too far makes for less 
flexibility. Of course the circumstances were highly specific after the second World War, 
the ruins of which increased labour demand and decreased labour supply. My grand-
father’s career switches were responses to that demand. But the Roman world was not 
devoid of stochastic shocks either.
A certain flexibility was necessary to find employment. The seasonal and cyclical chang-
es in demand for labour in the Roman world were considered in the previous chapter. 
The agricultural calendar, the building trades and the shipping trades all contributed to 
seasonal labour migration flows between town and country, and it was pointed out that 
recurring circumstantial factors such as the political calendar at Rome, religious festivals 
and even the weather also influenced a cyclical demand for luxury and other goods in the 
urban market.203 Seasonal fluctuations in labour-intensive trades are most likely to have 
impacted larger numbers of unskilled labourers. As a result, many unskilled male wage-
labourers performed more than one different job during the year: an adaptive strategy 
termed occupational pluralism. Similarly, in the nineteenth century the shipyard workers 
of Nova Scotia were often part-time farmers or lumberjacks.204 If a worker was unemployed 
for part of the year, however, the alternative historical example of early twentieth-century 
202 Apul. Met. 9.5-6, also cited in chapter 2.
203 Chapter 2; See especially Erdkamp (2016) and (2008) for seasonal labour migration and Hawkins 
(2016) for unstable demand.
204 McCann (1999).
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Dutch dockworkers shows wives (or children) going out to find temporary work instead.205 
This is a useful reminder that the contribution of the other family members should also be 
considered. It should be kept in mind that in a high mortality regime like Rome, there may 
not have been an adult man in the home to be the bread-winner, and even if there was, he 
may not have earned enough money to sustain the family.
female labour
A persistent traditional view of the woman in the household envisages her movements 
as limited to domestic work and raising children. That was the Roman ideal as well – 
in practice, however, women must have contributed a lot more than unremunerated 
domestic work.206 Women stepped in when the family income was insufficient, or when 
labour demands were high. In the family life cycle women’s monetary contribution was 
the greatest in the year(s) before the birth of any children. Presumably their input went 
up again from the moment that older children could start looking out for their younger 
siblings.
There were no serious legal restrictions to do business with female shop-owners, 
saleswomen, or artisans, nor were there any legal obstructions for hiring women. Hav-
ing said that, a perception of female weakness did uphold the system of tutela, or legal 
guardianship.207 In practice, however, it is questionable that the male guardian had any-
thing to do with business transactions, unless they were related to a woman’s patrimony 
– which is true only for a restricted number of goods, such as land, houses, and slaves.208 
A woman was equal to a man in the labour market, at least according to the law.
In practice, when Roman women entered the labour market, their options were 
nevertheless restricted by the prevailing gender biases.209 Looking at the occupational 
inscriptions, the range of jobs open to women was far less wide than that for men: my 
catalogue of job titles contains 549 entries of jobs for men, and 62 for women, of which 
47 are attested for men and women alike. There are a mere 15 solely for women.210 These 
figures illustrate a clear pattern, though the biases in the material should caution us not 
to take them at face value. Historically, women’s work was (and is) sometimes recorded 
205 Knotter (2004) 222.
206 Cf Scheidel (1995) for an extensive argument about women’s contribution in agricultural (wage-) 
labour.
207 Dixon (1984).
208 Gardner (1995) 378.
209 See chapter 2 on engendered dual labour markets.
210 See appendix 1. Cf Treggiari (1979a) 66; Harris (2002) for a similar gender pattern in classical 
Athens.
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in broader terms than men’s.211 A lack of differentiation in the (census) records therefore 
need not mean that women’s jobs were less differentiated than men’s to the same extent 
in reality; although for all the reasons mentioned before, a smaller range of occupational 
possibilities should surely be assumed. Epitaphs for Roman women in general were less 
numerous than those for men.212 Women were perhaps also even less likely to have a 
stable job – with a specific job-title to record – than men. Moreover, it was common to 
give prevalence to family relations in the image constructed on the epitaph for a woman, 
to the exclusion of occupational titles. When occupation is mentioned alongside family 
relations, however, it is generally placed before familial bonds, as in CIL 6. 9616:
ciL 6. 9616
D(is) M(anibus) / Terentiae / Niceni Terentiae / Primaes(!) medicas li/bertae 
fecerunt / Mussius Antiochus / et Mussia Dionysia / fil(ii) m(atri) b(ene) m(erenti)
To the divine spirits. To Terentia of Nicaea, doctor and freedwoman of Terentia 
Prima. Mussius Antiochus and Mussia Dionysia her children set up (this monu-
ment) to their well-deserving mother.
As this epitaph demonstrates, Roman women and their next of kin were not always 
devoid of a sense of female occupational pride.213
In line with Roman views of femininity, most of the professions recorded for women 
in occupational inscriptions are ‘feminine’ jobs, in the service sector or otherwise in 
the domestic sphere. The one occupation that is most frequently attested is nutrix, 
wet-nurse, second is ornatrix, or hairdresser; not surprisingly a broad spectrum of 
211 Ann Ighe talking about the development of the Swedish census, 18th–21st century, at the European 
Social Science and History Conference 2012.
212 Hopkins (1966), (1987).
213 But see Dixon (2001a) 9 for two examples where the women of the family seem to be identified 
primarily by their familial role and the men by occupation.
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wool-work, spinning and weaving in particular, is also well-attested.214 The domestic 
and service sector, particularly flexible hours working as a cleaning lady, laundry lady, 
or seamstress, is where women turned for unskilled casual work in other pre-industrial 
periods. In Rome, many of the occupational inscriptions in this line of work attest to 
female slaves and ex-slaves, however. If the predominance of servile women is a reflec-
tion of reality, the chances for a freeborn woman to find work in the service sector were 
severely limited. However, since we know that occupational inscriptions over-represent 
the servile population by a wide margin, the dominance in this sector need not have 
been as pronounced as the epigraphic record suggests. There is every reason to believe 
that women were not only engaged in the service sector. Charting the possible family 
strategies and checking them against the evidence makes it possible to paint a much 
broader spectrum of women’s work in Roman society.
Women involved in family business
Cooperation of husband and wife in a business is an obvious efficiency drive.215 Actual 
attestations of informal cooperation between spouses, however, are difficult to identify 
in the Roman world. Women working with their husbands are easily obscured. There are 
historical examples for the fact that when husband and wife shared the same occupation, 
it was only recorded for the man, for example.216 Within the sample of occupational in-
scriptions, if husband and wife are both named, and the husband is recorded with job, his 
wife generally is not.217 In the rare inscriptions that record an occupation for both partners 
214 E.g. Günther (1987) 40–137 discusses occupations by sector (only for freedwomen); The job of 
ornatrix took (at least) three months of training, which can be inferred from Dig. 32.65.3 (Celsus 
apud Marcianum), but cf Forbes (1955) n. 50: “Other jurists disagreed with this”. Barber’s 1994 
monograph on wool-working has the telling title Women’s work: the first 20 000 years: women, cloth 
and society in early times. Larsson Lovén (1998) correctly demonstrated that wool-work in Rome 
could be a byword for the virtuous matron, though there is very little epigraphic evidence for the 
use of lanifica or lanam fecit solely in praise of domestic virtue (in CIL 6 I can think only of CIL 6. 
10230, 11602, 15346, and 37053). In most instances the text strongly suggests that wool-work was 
a money-earning activity, like CIL 6. 6339 which simply reads Acte quasillaria: “Acte, spinner”. Cf 
Dixon (2001b) 117.
215 Well-attested also in pre-industrial Europe: Holderness (1984) 425. Cf Van den Heuvel (2008) 218 
on commerce in the Dutch Republic: “Scholars generally assume that in commerce wives helped 
their husbands in the shop, doing the necessary business administration or filling in during their 
absence”; Van den Heuvel goes on to nuance that view by illuminating various forms of spousal 
cooperation in retail.
216 This problem pervades sources for early modern England, see Erickson (2008) 282–3 on the lists 
of women taking apprentices from Christ’s Hospital in eighteenth-century London: “The wife’s 
occupation was not recorded in addition to her husband’s if the two were identical”.
217 There is a handful of instances where a woman is recorded with job and her husband is not.
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in a marriage or contubernium, husband and wife usually do not share the same job and 
one or both are engaged with gendered work (see below). On a significant number of 
funerary monuments, a trade is only represented through an image of tools of the trade.218 
The deceased are then referred to by means of a portrait bust and/or the accompanying 
inscription. Although it is tempting to interpret the tools as the husband’s in these cases, 
the possibility that a family business is indicated should at least be left open.219
Two reliefs in particular have been adduced to illustrate the probability of an ‘unequal’ 
division of labour between men and women within the household business. One funerary 
relief shows a butcher at work, while his wife sits on a chair holding what look like a stylus 
and wax tablet – as if she is doing the administration.220 In this particular instance, however, 
I believe Zimmer is correct in suggesting that the stylus and the wax tablet refer to the 
wife’s education; the relief proudly advertises that the butcher’s wife was so well provided 
for that she did not have to work.221 The other example is more convincing, however. It is 
a funerary relief from the Isola Sacra necropolis showing a husband and wife in a smithy: 
he is hammering away at the anvil to the right, and the woman on the left appears to be 
engaged in selling the products.222 Holleran has argued that since retail requires little skill 
or training and is compatible with childcare, “[f ]or unskilled women who married skilled 
artisans, retailing the products produced by their husbands may have been the easiest 
way for them to contribute to the household income”.223 Two or three reliefs from Ostia 
support the idea of Roman women in retail, and the epigraphic evidence also attests to the 
non-negligible presence of saleswomen.224 This type of labour division between men and 
women may well be true for many historical cases, and there is no doubt in my mind that 
it was a common feature of Roman society. But it does not account for all the evidence, so 
we must look at the possibility of other strategies as well.
218 See introduction.
219 Zimmer consistently interprets the tools of the trade to refer to a man’s profession, Zimmer (1982) 
13.
220 Zimmer (1982) cat. nr. 2, p. 94–5; Kampen (1981) cat. nr. 53, p. 157 thinks that the wife is a book-
keeper. More recently, Broekaert (2012) 47 has argued for a similar division of labour.
221 Zimmer (1982) 63; cf Dixon (2001b) 9.
222 Isola sacra, tomb 29; Zimmer (1982) cat. nr. 123, p. 185–6; D’Ambra (1988) discusses the funerary 
monument and the artistic program on the reliefs and sarcophagus.
223 Holleran (2013) 321. Cf Van den Heuvel (2008) 218 on commerce in the Dutch Republic: “Scholars 
generally assume that in commerce wives helped their husbands in the shop, doing the necessary 
business administration or filling in during their absence”; Van den Heuvel goes on to nuance that 
view by illuminating various forms of spousal cooperation in retail.
224 Kampen (1981) cat. nr. 2, 3 and 4, pp. 138–9 are also part of the six reliefs at the heart of her discus-
sion. I deliberately write ‘two or three’ because the vegetable seller (nr 4) is not always identified 
as female; Herfst (1922) 36 suggests that women in classical Athens also must have played a large 
part in commerce, despite the scarcity of the evidence.
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There is evidence to suggest that some women developed skills in arts or crafts equal 
to those of their husbands. Some did so through formal apprenticeship, as we have seen, 
but a wife could presumably also acquire skills as an informal apprentice first to her 
parents, then to her husband, learning by doing.225 Through ongoing practical engage-
ment with the trade, a woman eventually created her own occupational identity.
A few inscriptions stress the professional equality of both partners by the explicit use 
of both the male and the female form of their profession.226 This is the case for Venusta, 
who married a freeborn nailsmith:
ciL 5. 7023
V(iva) f(ecit) / Cornelia L(uci) l(iberta) / Venusta / clavaria sibi et / P(ublio) Aebutio 
M(arci) f(ilio) Stel(latina) / clavario Aug(ustali) vir(o) / et Crescenti libertae et / 
Muroni delicatae
While she was still alive Cornelia Venusta, freedwoman of Lucius, nailsmith, set 
up [this monument] for herself and for Publius Aebutius of the Stellatine tribe, 
nailsmith, Augustalis, and for Crescens her freedwoman and Muron her delicata.
As a freedwoman, Venusta may, of course, have picked up the tricks of the trade earlier in 
her life during slavery in the service of a certain Lucius Cornelius, in which case her trade 
might have made her an attractive match for P. Aebutius. It is also possible, however, 
that she became a nailsmith under her husband’s guidance. The conditarii in CIL 6. 9277 
provide another telling example:227
ciL 6. 9277
[Aul(ia)] Mercurian{e}<a> fecit paren/[tibu]s su{bu}<i>s Aul(io) Maximus(!) / [con]
ditarius de castris pra/[etor]i{bu} <i>s Aul(iae) Hilaritas(!) condita/ria(e) e{o}<i>s 
in pace // ]unt / [
225 This was probably the case in eighteenth-century London: Erickson (2008) 288. Contra Hawkins 
(2006) 184, who presents “some of our literary and legal evidence (…) [implying] that women did 
not enjoy any more access to specialized craft training in ‘male’ occupations within their natal or 
conjugal households than they did outside of the household”.
226 Contrary to inscriptions such as CIL 6. 37781, where a man and freedman, but not the female 
dedicator, are explicitly indicated as aurifices; with Hawkins (2006) 185–6.
227 Other couples in the same trade: CIL 6. 9211 (brattiarii); 6963 (brattiarii); 9934 (turarii); 370820 
(purpurarii); 370826 (vestiarii tenuarii, quoted in this chapter below); with Holleran (2013) 315-6 
and Groen-Vallinga (2013) 306.
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Aulia Mercuriane set this up for her parents Aulius Maximus, dealer in preserved 
foods at the castra praetoria, and Aulia Hilaritas dealer in preserved foods. May 
they rest in peace.
Maximus and Hilaritas were freedmen, but the inscription suggests to me that they had 
subsequently set up their own independent family. Hilaritas, too, probably learnt her 
profession as a slave. Most examples of men and women working in the same business 
concern freedmen, but we shall see shortly that the same holds true for couples with 
distinct job-titles: most of the occupational inscriptions represent ex-slaves, and the 
evidence for conjugal couples conforms to this pattern.228
Work within the family business was the most acceptable alternative to domestic work 
in line with gender ideals of domesticity and feminine jobs. Whereas it is very likely that 
many women did help out in the family business – in line with the model of the family 
economy, in which the family is the unit of production – the examples just presented 
demonstrate that caution is necessary towards the often implicit assumption that 
they did so “on unequal terms”.229 Moreover, such an assumption fails to explain those 
instances of independent women, that is women with a job different from that of their 
husband, or women without a husband – but with a profession.
Independent women
Women who are attested with a job different from that of their husbands must have been 
engaged in the Roman equivalent of a double-business household, or have worked as 
independent wage-labourers hiring out their labour. Such scenarios go beyond the fam-
ily economy, or even the family wage economy, and represent a wider range of adaptive 
family strategies.
The occupational inscriptions show a noticeable pattern for non-slave couples be-
longing to this category. Many attestations of men and women with a distinct job-title 
appear to be of independent freedmen. It is significant that both husband and wife can 
generally be traced back to an elite household: they were ex-slaves, who were either 
still part of the elite household after manumission or who subsequently established a 
nonelite household of their own and are therefore part of the current analysis.230 The 
example of CIL 6. 9824 shows a conjugal couple who probably were manumitted by 
members of the same family:
228 Cf Broekaert (2012) 46.
229 Saller (2007) 105–6.
230 In fact, most attestations are for slaves or freedmen from a columbarium in Rome, in which case 
the couple was probably still employed in an elite household at the time of their death, e.g. CIL 6. 
33794; 6342 cited in chapter 4.
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ciL 6. 9824
Critonia Q(uinti) l(iberta) Philema / popa de insula / Q(uinti) Critoni |(mulieris) 
l(iberti) Dassi / scalptoris v(as)<cu=UC>lari(i) / sibi suisque poster(isque) / eor(um)
Critonia Philema, freedwoman of Quintus, cookshop owner, [set up this monu-
ment] for Quintus Dassus, freedman of a woman, carver of vessels, for herself, and 
for their dependants and their descendants.
Philema was set free by a Quintus Critonius, and Dassus was manumitted by a woman; 
that woman must have been related to Q. Critonius to give Dassus his nomen.231 Even if 
there is some discussion as to what popa may mean, as well as about the correct reading 
of vascularii, it is clear that these two people did not share the same business.232 It is very 
well possible that in slavery, both Philema and Dassus had been employed in an elite 
family in very different activities. They may well have formed a family there, and retained 
their separate jobs after their manumission upon forming their own family unit. A similar 
insight explains an altar, with three inscriptions collected as CIL 6. 37469.233
ciL 6. 37469
Nostia /(mulieris) l(iberta) / Daphne / ornatrix de / vico Longo //
M(arcus) Nerius M(arci) l(ibertus) / Quadratus / aurifex de / vico Longo //
Nostia / Daphnidis l(iberta) / Cleopatra / ornatrix de vico / Longo
Nostia Daphne, freedwoman of a woman, hairdresser from the Vicus Longus.
Marcus Nerius Quadratus, freedman of Marcus, goldsmith from the Vicus Longus.
Nostia Cleopatra, freedwoman of Daphne, hairdresser from the Vicus Longus.
231 Alternatively, one may have freed the other (either way around is possible, judging from their 
nomenclature). Manacorda (2005) suggests that Philema’s patron may be the Cretonius from 
Juvenal’s 14th Satire (vv. 86–95); Richardson Jr (1992) 209 hazards a suggestion on the identity of 
Dassus as the owner of an insula Q. Critoni.
232 For popa = popinaria, compare CIL 14. 3709 (Tivoli); vascularii has been supplemented as vir 
clarissimi in CIL 6, which I would think unlikely because of his libertine status. The variant reading 
“ocularius” has also been proffered. Scalptor has not been doubted, however, so it is clear that 
Dassus was a carver of some kind.
233 CIL 6. 37469 combines ILS 9426 with CIL 6. 9736 and 3895; see Di Giacomo (2010) for the most 
recent edition with CIL 6. 9736. Contra Solin (2000) 168 who argues that Daphnidis does not refer 
to Daphne. Treggiari (1979a) 75 already suggested the connection with CIL 6. 9736.
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Nostia Daphne and M. Nerius Quadratus, judging by their names, are freedmen who 
probably originate from two different households. The monument does not state ex-
plicitly that Daphne and Quadratus are husband and wife, but it is a distinct possibility. 
Slave unions crossing household boundaries are not unheard of; alternatively the mar-
riage may have been formed only after manumission.234 Husband and wife have very 
different jobs, but the shared monument suggests that the newly formed family set 
up shop together in the Vicus Longus. Cleopatra is Daphne’s freedwoman, of the same 
occupation.
Virtually all of the rare instances of a conjugal couple holding different occupations, 
outside of the columbaria, can be similarly explained by them maintaining a job learnt in 
their former household or households.235 Having said that, it should also be noted that as 
a general rule one or both of the spouses held an exclusively female or exclusively male 
job, which may also have prompted the commemoration of both professions: there is 
no male equivalent to the ornatrix or popinaria for example, and no female aurifex or 
scalptor is attested. In such instances this may help to explain why both professions 
were recorded. Even in the case of spouses holding gender-specific jobs, however, a 
joint enterprise is possible. CIL 6. 37811 shows a couple of freedmen who ran what looks 
like a barbershop together.236
ciL 6. 37811
Pollia C(ai)/ (mulieris) l(iberta) / Urbana ornat(rix) de / Aemilianis ollas II/ M(arcus) 
Calidius M(arci) l(ibertus) to(n)sor/ Apoloni(us) de Aemilianis
Pollia Urbana, freedwoman of a woman, hairdresser from the Aemiliani, two 
urns. Marcus Calidius Apolonius, freedmen of Marcus, barber from the Aemilian 
district.
Widows
Roman Italy, particularly its cities, suffered from high mortality rates. It was argued above 
that most women got married at a relatively early age, and that there was probably a 
significant age-gap between spouses. These factors predict the existence of a relatively 
234 See chapter 4; cf also CIL 6. 9732; 9775.
235 Same household: CIL 6. 8958; 8711 (imperial); 8554 (imperial); other households: CIL 6. 37811, 
perhaps also 9792.
236 A “uni-sex establishment” was suggested by Treggiari (1979a) 75 with n. 47.
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large group of young widows in Roman society.237 Even without an age-gap, women 
who survived were likely to be widowed at some point in their lives.
The loss of a husband did not just have an emotional impact, but also had economic 
consequences. In some instances this was solved by the dissolution of the nuclear fam-
ily: Hübner illustrates that in the extended family in Roman Egypt, the widow generally 
went back to her natal family, while the children remained in the house of their father’s 
family.238 Because it is likely that the nuclear family was the dominant family form in an 
urban environment, however, the situation may have been different in cities. The widow 
had become the new household head, who had to deal with the life cycle squeeze that 
was the structural loss of the family’s main income, and who now carried sole respon-
sibility for possible children. The widow may therefore have needed to find additional 
income, and if she was not employed in a money-earning occupation already, this was 
the time to start looking for a job.239
Widowed female household heads were freed of male supervision and freed from the 
‘stigma’ attached to the maiden, had greater liberty in society, and implicitly also in the 
economy. Widows’ economic endeavours were probably based on their employment 
during marriage. Widows could of course continue their independent jobs or work as a 
wage labourers; an artisan’s widow may have taken over from her husband.240 It should 
be stated that a widow would not inherit the household or the business in intestate 
succession: in the common variant of sine manu marriage the wife was not legally part 
of the family, thereby excluding her from a share of the inheritance. What survives of Ro-
man testamentary practice indicates, however, that spouses were generally accounted 
for in wills.241 It is therefore not unlikely that widows would have access to a workshop or 
other property. If an artisan rented rather than owned a workshop, that would facilitate 
continuing the family business.
237 Pudsey (2011) 61; Hübner (2013) 94-5 for a similar pattern in Roman Egypt. Saller’s micro-
simulation is not helpful for percentages of surviving husbands, since he presupposes universal 
marriage and universal remarriage until the age of 50 for women and 60 for men in accordance 
with Augustan marriage legislation: Saller (1994) 46.
238 Hübner (2013) 99, 103.
239 Cf Tilly and Scott (1978) 51; Wall (2007); Pudsey (2012) 167 has five examples in Roman Egypt of a 
male adult lodger living in with a single woman (widows?).
240 Unlike in early modern times, there were no guild restrictions to taking over. A widow was not 
always a full member of the guild, although she was often allowed to continue the workshop 
and take on apprentices of her own: Erickson (2008) 290, Prior (1985) 103, 105 for early modern 
England; the ‘widow’s right’ in the Dutch Republic ensured she could continue the business if 
there was a master journeyman to accompany her, Schmidt (2001) 146-54, (2007) 273.
241 Champlin (1991) 112–13, 120–26, especially 124.
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It is difficult to find attestations of working widows. Treggiari suggests that because 
a husband was also the prime commemorator, a young widow who had taken over her 
husband’s shop or workshop was perhaps less likely to receive commemoration in an 
epitaph.242 Occupational inscriptions include only a few women with job-title who may 
have been widows. Claudia Trophime in CIL 6. 9720 was a midwife who died age 75, and 
who is commemorated by her son and grandson. Her age, the fact that she has a son 
and grandson, and the absence of a husband among the dedicators, make widowhood 
the most plausible hypothesis for Claudia Trophime. The example of CIL 6. 9498 is a little 
less straightforward.
ciL 6. 9498
D(is) M(anibus) / Iuliae Soteridi / lanipendae v(ixit) a(nnos) LXXX / fecerunt / 
M(arcus) Iulius Primus /Iulia Musa Iulia Thisbe / Iulia Ampliata Iulia Roman(a)
To the divine spirits. For Iulia Soteris, wool-weigher, who lived eighty years. Mar-
cus Iulius Primus, Iulia Musa, Iulia Thisbe, Iulia Ampliata and Iulia Romana set this 
up.
The inscription is open to various interpretations. It specifies names, but not the rela-
tionship between the recorded individuals. The epitaph may have been set up by five 
children of Iulia Soteris. It is also possible that M. Iulius Primus was not a son, but her 
husband. If the four Iuliae were daughters of Soteris, their father must after all have been 
a Iulius, too. Iulia Soteris’ advanced age makes it implausible, though not impossible, 
that the father of her children was still alive, however. Finally, the epitaph could also 
be interpreted as a monument set up by her freedman and –women. Based on these 
scenarios, it is highly likely that this wool-weigher who died at the respectable age of 
eighty was a widow.
Two final examples are a resinaria (CIL 6. 9855) and a shoemaker (sutrix, CIL 14. 4698); 
both inscriptions are accompanied by a relief that depicts the profession. From the frag-
mentary image we gather that Iulia Agele, the resinaria, was not just a dealer in resin, 
but also seems to have performed beauty-treatments with it.243 The inscription was set 
up by her freedwoman. The inscription for Septimia Stratonice, sutrix, was set up by a 
friend “because of her benefactions towards him”, ob benefacta ab ea in se. In these last 
two cases, it appears that there was no family (left) to commemorate these women. They 
appear to be truly independent, and relatively well-off at that. Treggiari is right to point 
242 Treggiari (1979a) 77.
243 Zimmer (1982) 204–5.
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out that “[w]omen who appear on epitaphs alone may of course be in trade in their own 
right. But they may also be carrying on the business of a dead husband.”244 However, car-
rying on the business of a dead husband is not very likely in the case of the midwife, the 
wool-weigher, or even the resinaria;245 and the shoemaker at least shows no evidence of 
it. These examples incidentally illustrate the various social networks that a widow could 
depend on: the bond with her children, her freedmen, or a ‘friend’.246
“The chaste widow who refrains from remarriage after her first husband’s death is a 
nearly universal paradigm of female virtue across societies”.247 We saw that Rome, too, 
subscribed to the ideal of the one-husband woman, the univira. It is equally universal 
across societies that the nonelite could not afford to keep up with this ideal and that of 
economic necessity many widows remarried sooner or later.248 Despite marriage ideals, 
the emperor Augustus implanted a law stating that all Roman women were to be mar-
ried, and it stipulates explicitly how long a widow could, or should, mourn before remar-
riage.249 We can therefore expect remarriage to have been a fairly common economic 
strategy, especially for younger widows.
The benefits of marriage ties to the family economy have been outlined above. The 
widow of an artisan who had access to his workshop may have been a particularly well-
desired match. In early modern England a widow’s new spouse, if he had the proper 
training, was allowed entry into the profession and into the guild; hence the stereotypi-
cal image of the widow marrying an apprentice.250 Even if the guild restriction was not 
an issue in the Roman period, widows with substantial capital are likely to have been 
desirable marriage partners, and if she inherited a workshop, that certainly qualified as 
substantial capital. It may also have been in the widow’s interest to remarry within the 
business. Widows were not always able to continue the business on their own because 
they did not have the skills or the resources, or lacked both.251 By analogy with the 
stereotype of a widow marrying an apprentice, Roman widows may have married their 
244 Treggiari (1979a) 76.
245 The male equivalent for obstetrix and resinaria is to my knowledge not attested. There are several 
male lanipendi from elite domus: CIL 6. 3976; 3977; 6300; 8870; 9495; 37755; Herfst (1922) 53 notes 
a similar preference of the assistance of midwives rather than male medics in classical Athens.
246 Cf Müller (2010).
247 Hübner (2013) 92.
248 Goody (1990) 202. Even in Roman Egypt: Hübner (2013) chapter 6, contra Bagnall and Frier (1994).
249 Even though this law is thought to have been most effective in the upper classes, it is saying 
something that the period of ten months is based on the period in which a child of the deceased 
husband could still be born – the suggestion is that if it were not for a possible pregnancy, a 
quicker remarriage was better.
250 E.g. Brodsky (1986) 142 London, contra Todd (1985) 70-1 Abingdon.
251 Cf Hawkins (2006) 186.
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freed slaves, particularly if they themselves did not have the skills to continue the family 
firm.252
This is not to say that all widows remarried. Especially in the case of wealthy widows, it 
was in the interest of their birth family to keep them from remarrying and preserve their 
property, including a workshop, or tools, within the family – witness the lawsuit filed 
against Apuleius by the children of his new wealthy wife Aemilia Pudentilla.253
To sum up: Women evidently assisted in the family economy in various ways, despite 
the existence of pervasive gender biases. Gender ideals seem to have guided the first 
choice in labour allocation within the family. Thus, it was considered appropriate for 
women to engage in housework and childcare, which from a theoretical point of view 
can be seen as an economically profitable form of labour differentiation. Women who 
engaged in the labour market were employed mostly in feminine jobs, or participated in 
the family business in various ways – in administration, retail, or the arts/crafts – under 
the leadership of their husbands, which was an acceptable alternative to domestic work. 
When necessary, however, it can be seen that women stepped up: on the death of their 
husband they would take over as the new household head, which illustrates that in many 
instances the wife’s skills were probably no less than the husband’s. Freedwomen (and 
freedmen) sometimes continued their earlier job, as shown by the various examples of 
double-business households.
Child labour
The Romans did not have a clear concept of child labour: it appears to have been 
self-evident that children would contribute to the family economy to the best of their 
abilities. As a consequence, child labourers are seldom explicitly mentioned. This may 
be the reason that scholarship on child labour in Antiquity is relatively limited.254 Child 
labour must nevertheless have been commonplace, for the simple reason that it often 
was economically indispensable. In many historical societies, from a certain age on-
wards children’s labour was preferred over the mother’s labour. The gender patterns in 
early imperial Rome discussed above presumably led to a situation where many women 
earned less than their children outside the household.255
252 This is suggested by Temin (2004a) 529 with reference to Garnsey (1998) 30-37; cf Broekaert (2012) 
and Treggiari (1979a) tentatively suggesting marriage to men in the same business.
253 Fantham (1995). This story is but one example of the Romans’ fear of inheritance hunters.
254 The 2013 Oxford handbook on childhood and education in the Roman world, for example, includes 
no paper focussing on child labour, although it features in some of the papers. For child labour, 
see especially Laes (2011a) 148-221, Petermandl (1997), and Kleijwegt (1991); Bradley (1991) 
103–24 (‘Child labor in the Roman world’) deliberately focuses on apprenticeship contracts. For 
Late Antiquity, see Laes (2015b), Vuolanto (forthcoming).
255 Hawkins (2006) 193; Knotter (2004) 225-6 with references.
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If the Romans did not have a clear concept of child labour, they did display a general 
awareness of ‘childhood’.256 For many, both slave and free, their childhood jobs were 
probably more like chores. This is reflected in the fact that responsibilities assigned to 
children appear to have been adjusted to what they could do at their age. Columella for 
example signals bird keeping and weeding as children’s work (puerilis opera).257 Herding 
chickens and other animals, and taking care of younger siblings are all known activities 
for children. Even if they could not make a full contribution to the household income 
yet, the children will have ensured that the adults had more time on their hands for 
productive work. “Child labor was a function of people’s basic struggle for survival, a 
means of acclimatizing children to the common realities of material life around them”.258
The economic contribution of children to the family economy could take various 
forms. An artisan with his own workshop, as we have seen, may have instructed his 
children in the trade or apprenticed them out. Holleran has argued that children (like 
women) may also have taken to retailing the produce from the workshop, a job that 
required little training.259 Gaius notes that many (plerique) left boys and girls in charge 
of tabernae.260 Children from poorer families could also turn to vending, if they were not 
scavenging the streets begging and searching for food. In nineteenth century London, 
“child sellers tended to hawk cheap products that required little capital outlay, such as 
oranges, apples, or watercress; girls also sold flowers”, and child hawkers are still com-
mon among the poor in many places today.261
Children were also judged on their individual merits, being singled out for a number 
of individual occupations. They were popular performers, and are attested as actors, 
mimes, dancers, acrobats and musicians; there were also child athletes who competed 
in agonistic festivals. In the mines, too, collecting rubble from the narrow mineshafts 
was specifically reserved for children, who were relatively small and agile. If comparative 
evidence is anything to go by, on the low end of the poverty scale children might also 
end up in prostitution.262 A late antique legal case from Hermopolis suggests prostitution 
256 See, e.g., Evans Grubbs and Parkin (2013) on the history of scholarly recognition that there was a 
concept of childhood in Antiquity.
257 Petermandl (1997) 119 with reference to Colum. RR 2.2.13 (weeding, quod vel puerile opus, “work 
that is surely child’s play”); 8.2.7 (for bird keeping as suitable to old ladies or children (anus sedula 
vel puer)), among other examples.
258 Bradley (1991) 118.
259 Holleran (2012) 224, (2013) 316.
260 Dig. 14.3.8 Nam et plerique pueros puellasque tabernis praeponunt.
261 Holleran (2012) 220; The number of children hawking on the street in contemporary Nigeria, 
to name but an example, is increasing, see e.g. Ojo (2013), George (2011), Umar (2009), Oyefara 
(2005) – in this research there is a particular focus on the risks involved for girls.
262 Laes (2011a) performers 195-197; sports 197-200; the poor 200-206; mines 212-216
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provided a necessary income for some families in the Roman Empire: mother Theodora 
sues a councillor involved in the death of her (adult) daughter, a prostitute. The prefect 
assigns to her a substantial sum of money, for the sole reason that with the death of her 
daughter, she had lost her main source of income.263
Only a small number of young children with a job title can be identified in funerary 
epigraphy. In large part that is a result of the nature of the evidence. It is not very often 
that age is commemorated, and it is not very often that a profession is recorded: as a 
result, children are especially unlikely to be represented with an occupation. Moreover, 
children were not always assigned a particular occupation, when they were too young 
to have picked up a trade. And especially in the case of very young children, it is likely 
that familial bonds preceded ties of labour in their epitaphs. Nevertheless some of the 
occupational inscriptions were set up for young children. Their jobs range from unskilled 
to highly specialized occupations. A boy of four years old was commemorated as a tailor 
of fine clothing (vestiarius tenuarius); in this case I am inclined to think it was the job he 
was expected to take up later in life rather than a current occupation, although he may 
well have participated in the labour process in some small way.264 Another, twelve-year-
old boy is commemorated by his sister as a shoemaker (sutor); he, too, was probably a 
shoemaker in training.265 In most cases, however, it is likely that the (semi-)skilled work 
was actually performed by the young employees themselves. Nine year old Viccentia 
was a gold spinner (auri netrix) for example, and we know of a few hairdressers (ornatri-
ces) who were still quite young.266 And a boy named Pagus was commemorated for his 
skills as a jeweller or goldsmith (gemmarius) in an elaborate epitaph:
ciL 6. 9437
D(is) M(anibus) / quicumque es puero lacrimas effunde viator / bis tulit hic senos 
primaevi germinis annos / deliciumque fuit domini spes grata parentum / quos 
male deseruit longo post fata dolori / noverat hic docta fabricare monilia dextra 
/ et molle in varias aurum disponere gemmas / nomen erat puero pagus at nunc 
funus acerbum / et cinis in tumulis iacet et sine nomine corpus / qui vixit annis XII 
/ mensibus VIIII diebus XIII ho(ris) VIII
263 BGU 4. 1024. 6-8 exc. G; discussed by Bagnall (19964) 196–8, with n. 87 refuting the comment that 
the text may be fictional; Compare Crobyle sending her daughter Corinna to become a courtersan 
in Luc. DMeretr. 6.
264 CIL 6. 6852.
265 CIL 6. 10546; cf Dig. 9.2.5.3 quoted earlier in this chapter for an unlucky apprentice cobbler.
266 Aurinetrix: CIL 6. 9213, ornatrices CIL 6. 9726 (12 yrs), 9728 (13 and 19 yrs old), and 9731 (9 yrs).
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To the divine spirits. Whoever you are, traveller, shed your tears for this boy. Two 
times six years he carried the years of budding youth. He was the love of his 
master, the thankful hope of his parents, who did not deserve to mourn long 
after the end. He knew how to make intricate bracelets and to gently set various 
gems in gold. The name of this boy was Pagus, but now his ashes lie in a tomb, 
after a premature demise, a corpse with no name. He lived for 12 years, 9 months, 
13 days and 8 hours.
It is evident that the labour input of children was of vital importance to the family. Their 
contribution started at an early age, with simple tasks. Like Pagus, however, young 
children with an actual job title generally appear to be of servile descent. The four-year-
old boy tailor mentioned above, too, was commemorated as a freedman.267 Viccentia, 
the gold spinner, is likely to have been a slave girl because of her single name, though 
this is not stated explicitly. Many of these young slaves would have been trained within 
wealthy elite households, which seem to have catered to their own slaves’ education.268 
As we have seen, however, there are clear indications that freeborn boys and girls also 
had access to job-training, and it is likely that children adapted their labour power to the 
family economy in whatever way they could.
the hereditary nature of jobs
Based on the foregoing discussion, many Roman children may be expected to have 
followed their parents in their choice of career. Informal learning in the households 
was identified as one of the most economical solutions to build up human capital. That 
strategy automatically confers the family trade onto the next generation. The examples 
of formal apprenticeship also showed continuity of profession within the family, even 
if children were sometimes apprenticed out rather than taught by their father, as illus-
trated by the weaver families of Pausiris and Tryphon. Indeed, family ties occasionally 
are proudly stated in occupational inscriptions, as in that of the two brother carpenters 
of CIL 6. 9411 (duo fratres tignuarii), or that of the brother painters of CIL 6. 9796 (fratres 
pigmentarii). Presumably the brothers were involved in a family trade. At other times a 
family business is not stated, but can fairly securely be inferred.269
267 It is suggested in chapter 4 that this is probably a case of death-bed manumission.
268 See chapter 4. Laes (2011a) 184-189; Saller (2013).
269 As in CIL 6. 33809, discussion in Groen-Vallinga (2013) 307; A spectacular instance of family conti-
nuity that falls outside the scope of my current research is the mention of a bapheus from Thyatira, 
“the sixth of his line to head the shop”, ἐπιοτησάμενον τοῦ ἒργου ἀπὸ γένους τὸ ἓκτον, IGR 4. 1265; 
translation MacMullen (1974) 98 with n.23 p 188.
Family economics: nonelite households 145
Continuing in the line of work of one’s parents does not equal working in the house-
hold of birth. In his analysis of ‘commemorative links’ in the occupational epitaphs from 
the city of Rome, Cameron Hawkins found that artisans were rarely commemorated 
by their sons or daughters – ties of dependency between patrons and slaves or freed-
men are much more common.270 On the plausible assumption that the commemora-
tor frequently was also heir to the deceased, Hawkins concludes from these findings 
that few Romans inherited a (household) business from their parents, which seems to 
have fallen to freedmen instead. Hawkins deserves credit for stressing the importance 
of freedmen as heirs to the household business. This finding might well be related to 
the predominance of freedmen in the arts and crafts: combined with the fact that the 
freed had relatively few freeborn children, their own freedmen became the natural suc-
cessors.271 But Hawkins’ conclusion that children who did not inherit invariably had a 
different occupation from their parents does not hold; Hawkins himself points out that 
when fathers and sons were demonstrably active in the same trade, they were often 
working in separate workshops. That observation actually sits nicely with the outcome 
of my discussion of family form above, which suggests that in an urban context sons as 
well as daughters as a rule moved out to constitute their own economic household unit 
upon marriage.
Thus, Hawkins’ analysis should not be taken to mean that children generally did not 
follow in their parents’ footsteps, or that family labour was inconsequential when com-
pared to servile labour in the household.272 The evidence for family ties in occupational 
inscriptions, in my view, is inconclusive about the frequency of inherited occupations. 
Occupational inscriptions are rare, and rarer still among those with family ties to com-
memorate: a preference for recording familial bonds rather than profession is the main 
reason why freedmen and slaves are overrepresented in the occupational inscriptions to 
such a high degree.273 Family labour therefore is easily obscured. Likewise, the theory of 
intergenerational persistence does not require that persistence to be in the same job, 
but it would have been the obvious choice. It is reasonable to presume that inherited 
jobs were more frequent than the sources suggest, even if their actual share must re-
main unknown.
There is evidence both for continuity and diversification of occupation. Both are often 
implicit in the same source. Thus, Richard Saller adduces as evidence for informal learn-
ing at home Vitruvius’ remark that architects used to train their own children on the 
270 Hawkins (2006) 147-159 and 269-271. Only 10% of the artisans in his sample were commemorated 
by their children, p. 157.
271 De Ligt and Garnsey (2012) 85-90, and see below.
272 As e.g. Laes (2015a)(2015b) seems to suggest.
273 Joshel (1992).
146 Chapter 3
job.274 Vitruvius’ reference to past practice may still have been valid during the Principate, 
but he could also be reminiscing about times long gone in a silent complaint that sons 
were not trained as architects anymore.275 Legal texts attest to fullers who engaged both 
sons and apprentices in their workshop.276 The census documents from Roman Egypt 
provide a handful of examples of extended households that record the employment of 
adult males from different generations, where some sons hold the same occupation as 
their father, and others have a different job.277 Lucian initially started out in the family 
trade of sculpting, before he made a career switch to writing. Pausiris and his sons were 
all weavers, but Tryphon is known to have also had a brother who was not a weaver. 
Finally, there are some indications for family bonds within professional associations, but 
the evidence is scanty and very rarely indicates more than one generation.278
In an urban context, as we have seen, the Romans needed to be flexible enough to 
adapt to the fluctuations in the market, which is one explanation for some children 
not following an inherited vocation.279 Successful entrepreneurs will have continued 
their business, though, and it is likely that some of them did so through their children. 
The adaptive family strategies of continuity or diversification both evidently were pos-
sible during the Principate, and both strategies were actively employed. Market forces 
seemed to have functioned well to fulfil labour demands for a long time: it was only in 
the fifth century that the emperor Honorius felt the need to coordinate the process of 
continuity of trades: he made membership of the professional organizations hereditary, 
in what reads like an attempt to tie artisans’ families to their job.280
Patrons and freedmen: the freedman economy281
The Romans had a wide spectrum of options available for continuing the family name, 
and the family business. Biological children could or did not always take over, for various 
reasons. Adoption of an heir presented the Romans with an alternative, but to find the 
preferred choice of an adult male relative who was of the right age, as well as educated 
274 Saller (2013) 75; Vitruvius 6 pr 6.
275 Cf Hawkins (2006) 146.
276 Flohr (2013) chapter 2.
277 Bagnall and Frier (1994) 72–4, with some discussion by Hawkins (2006) 144–5.
278 See chapter 5; Venticinque (2010) 279–82; Liu (2009) 181–3. Hawkins (2006) 143 notes that “be-
cause most members of professional associations appear to have been independent artisans who 
ran their own enterprises, fathers and sons who held contemporaneous memberships in the same 
association were arguably proprietors of separate workshops rather than co-workers in a family 
business”.
279 Hawkins (2006). Briefly touched upon by MacMullen (1974) 98–99.
280 Cod. Theod. 14.3.21, 403 AD; Waltzing, vol. 2 (1896) 306–7.
281 This refers to the title of Verboven (2012a).
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in the right trade (see above), may have been more complicated than looking to the 
trusted and experienced slave labourers of the household and setting them free. A 
manumitted slave became quasi-family, and was family in name because the nomen 
gentilicium of the patron was bestowed on the freed slave.282 Manumission thus seems 
to have been at the heart of a particularly Roman form of family business, made up of 
patron and one or more freedmen, or of colliberti.283 This phenomenon is well-attested 
in epigraphy, and it is noteworthy that the patron when recorded regularly was a freed-
man himself – which led to a pattern of multiple generations of freedmen. If, as has 
been argued, freedmen had few children of their own, that explains their choice for this 
inheritance strategy.284
Verboven would go so far as to say that “slavery was a passing phase necessary to pro-
duce [skilled] freedmen”.285 The number of freedmen with skilled jobs and responsible 
positions recorded in occupational inscriptions does suggest that the presence of such 
freedmen in the family business was fairly common. Their role in the family firm could 
vary: “Probably some freedmen (...) were branch-managers, some had separated from 
the parent firm, some may have inherited businesses from their patrons”.286 Others will 
have stayed with their patron under the same roof.
Many of the separate nonelite, freedmen households must have originated from larger 
elite domus. Others were set up by the freed slaves of nonelite patrons. The connection 
between patrons and freedmen could take various forms, but the bond was never com-
pletely severed. It has recently been argued that the entire institution of manumission in 
fact depended on the continued guidance of freedmen by their former master. Patrons 
(or his/her heirs) could rely on a number of informal and formal ways to ensure their 
freedmen’s loyalty.287
In terms of labour economics there was a distinction between slaves who bought their 
own freedom, and slaves who were freed: those who were granted their freedom re-
mained in the debt of their patron. These freedmen owed their patron a certain amount 
of labour input called operae libertorum. Operae were a legal obligation that was gener-
ally specified as a number of working days, for which a patron could call on his or her 
282 Mouritsen (2011a) 36–51.
283 Mouritsen (2011a) 218–9.
284 Notably in the demographic model for Herculaneum by De Ligt and Garnsey (2012) 85–90; cf 
Garnsey and De Ligt (2016) 83 n. 38.
285 Verboven (2012a) 88.
286 Treggiari (1979a) 72; cf Verboven (2012a) 93.
287 “[D]efined in vague terms of obsequium, reverentia, and pietas”, Mouritsen (2011a) 51–65 (‘control-
ling freedmen’) at 57. Mouritsen in this chapter stresses the importance of social discourse, and 
the (limited) options in Roman law, for keeping freedmen ‘in their place’; cf Hawkins (forthcom-
ing).
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freedmen (who, in turn, could subcontract these working hours). Hawkins stresses the 
importance of these operae fabriles, particularly in the case of skilled work. In his view, 
manumission was a powerful tool to battle the risks of fluctuating demand that was 
characteristic of Roman society. The labour of freedmen could be called upon whenever 
the patron chose; such a flexible workforce of freedmen saved much in transaction costs 
in times of high labour demand.288 This interpretation of freedmanship as a solution in 
times of fluctuating demand is based on a majority of freedmen moving out, so that 
they did not need maintenance but could be drawn upon as a labour force.289 The sub-
ject of operae looms large in the juristic literature, although it remains to be seen how 
widespread operae were.290 However, operae were not the only method of economic 
cooperation between patron and freedmen.
Verboven envisages the bonds between patrons and freedmen as “trust networks”, 
where freedmen benefited from the funds and economic advocacy of their patron; they 
in turn promoted their patron’s interests, as agents or business partners for example.291 
It is likely that economic benefits for both sides would have resulted from the economic 
bond.
Funerary monuments set up by freedmen to their patron provide convincing evidence 
for economic cooperation after manumission, as in this example of two axle-makers 
from Rome.292 
ciL 6. 9215
M(arcus) Sergius M(arci) l(ibertus) / Eutychus / axearius sibi et / M(arco) Sergio 
M(arci) l(iberto) / Philocalo / axeario patron(o).
M. Sergius Eutychus, freedman of Marcus, axle-maker [set up this monument] for 
himself and for M. Sergius Philocalus, freedman of Marcus, axle-maker, his patron.
288 Hawkins (forthcoming); (2006) 214 ff.
289 Hawkins (forthcoming). He acknowledges that some freedmen could and did remain in the house-
hold, for which see Mouritsen (2013) and my chapter 4.
290 On the possible marginality of operae, see Mouritsen (2011a) 224–6. When a slave bought his/
her own freedom, he/she was not liable for operae; Hopkins (1978) 128-9 believed this was the 
majority of freedmen.
291 Verboven (2012a) 98–100; see also Mouritsen (2011a) 213 on the “practical economic opportuni-
ties for the new freedman”. For associations as trust networks, see chapter 5.
292 CIL 6. 9215. Joshel (1992) 128–145, specifically 136–7 for the example of the axle makers.
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There is no doubt about their relative positions or occupations. Another example is a 
little more complex, but illustrates a similar situation.
ciL 14. 2721 = 2722
P(ublius) Licinius P(ubli) l(ibertus) / Philonic[us] // P(ublius) Licinius P(ubli) 
l(ibertus) / Demetrius patrono fecit293
[For] Publius Licinius Philonicus, freedman of Publius. Publius Licinius Demetrius, 
freedman of Publius set up [this monument] for his patron.
This text is inscribed on a relief with two portrait busts (figure 3.1): presumably Philoni-
cus is the younger man on the left, and Demetrius the older man on the right (their 
names are written under their portraits). In its shape it conforms to the well-known type 
of family portrait groups of liberti, signalling that Demetrius meant to represent their 
bond as a family unit. The portraits are lined by prominent motives: fasces on the left, 
the tools of a carpenter on the right and on the tympanon. In my view, this must mean 
that Demetrius set up this relief for his patron Philonicus, and that they were bound by 
a shared occupation as carpenters.294
293 CIL 14. 2721 = CIL 14. 2722, photograph: Clauss-Slaby database. I have added the square brackets 
for Philonic[us], and the word fecit in accordance with the text in George (2006) n.24, though they 
are lacking in the Clauss-Slaby transcription. Photos clearly show that this is justified. The meaning 
of the text or even the names of the Licinii were never in doubt, however.
294 George (2006) 22-3 believes that they are colliberti and that Demetrius set up this or another 
monument for their (common) patron. It is my contention that patrono fecit here must refer to the 
monument itself, and that therefore the younger man on the left, Philonicus, also a freedman (not 
coincidentally the one with the fasces by his side, hence possibly a sevir augustalis) is the patron 
of Demetrius on the right. The structure of the text incidentally is an exact parallel of CIL 6. 9215 
above.
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CIL 6. 37826, finally, records no less than four ‘generations’ of freedmen in one epitaph.
ciL 6. 37826
[Camer]ia L(uci) l(iberta) Iarine fecit / [L(ucio)] [Cam]erio L(uci) l(iberto) Thrasoni 
patrono / [et] L(ucio) Camerio L(uci) l(iberto) Alexandro / patrono eius et / [L(ucio) 
C]amerio Onesimo lib(erto) et / [vi]ro suo posterisque omnibus / [vest]iariis 
tenuariis de vico Tusc(o)
Cameria Iarine, freedwoman of Lucius, set this up to Lucius Camerius Thrasonus 
her patron, freedman of Lucius, and to Lucius Camerius Alexander, freedman of 
Lucius, his [i.e. Thrasonus’] patron, and to her own freedman and husband Lucius 
Camerius Onesimus and all their descendants, fine tailors from the Vicus Tuscus.
The text indicates the freedmen’s working relationship in a workshop (or workshops 
– plural?) located in the Vicus Tuscus in Rome. The text records that Lucius Camerius 
Alexander was the one who freed Thrasonus, who in turn manumitted Iarine, who freed 
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(and married) Onesimus. Because L. Camerius Alexander, who is at the top of the pyra-
mid in this epitaph, was himself a freedman, we know that there was in fact at least one 
more L. Camerius (...). Their shared profession and shared location suggests that they 
were probably working closely together. Trying to maximize the information from this 
text, it could be argued that even the marriage between Cameria Iarine and L. Camerius 
Onesimus was part of an economic strategy.295
If economic ties between master and slave were regularly maintained after manumis-
sion, then what about the independent freedman? Garnsey has argued persuasively for 
the economic independence of the rich freedman: with wealth came autonomy.296 In 
this view, the freedmen made up a new class of self-made men that fulfilled a particular, 
prominent position as traders and craftsmen in the Roman economy. Garnsey’s views 
have been widespread in the historiography of freedmen as the nouveaux riches. That 
there was some competition between the new freedmen and the established patron is 
evident from the fact that the jurists consider extensively the possibility that a patron 
would object to his freedman exercising the same trade as he, in the same place. If a 
patron did object, the law prevented him to do anything about it.297 More recently, how-
ever, Mouritsen has postulated that it generally was the economic support of a patron, 
and thus dependence rather than independence, that brought forth the wealthy freed-
man.298 Even if the death of the patron de facto secured a freedman’s independence, 
the legacy of having worked for that patron may have remained influential. The familia 
Veturia, for example, appears to have brought forth many freedmen who had mastered 
the art of purple dying: purpurarii.299 Doubtlessly these freedmen learnt the trade as 
slaves in the household. They were rewarded with manumission and the opportunity to 
set up shop themselves, presumably aided by the financial support as well as the name 
295 Cf Broekaert (2012) 46 “We can therefore imagine that Roman businessmen tried to encourage 
inner-family marriages between freedmen with the same specialization as some kind of guaran-
tee for prolonged cooperation.”
296 Garnsey (1998) 28–44 = Garnsey (1981), with d’Arms (1981) 144–8, specifically on Augustales in 
Ostia and Puteoli.
297 Dig. 37.15.11 (Papinian) for a freedwoman(!); Dig. 37.14.2 (Ulpian); Dig. 37.14.18 (Scaevola); The ju-
rists are quite resolute in their protection of freedmen rights, but see Dig. 38.1.45 (Scaevola), “’Can 
a freedman of a cloth merchant exercise the same trade in the same society and the same place as 
his patron – who does not want this?’ He responded: ‘I can profer nothing, why he should not, if the 
patron experiences no damage from it’”, Libertus negotiatoris vestiarii an eandem negotiationem in 
eadem civitate et eodem loco invito patrono exercere possit? Respondit nihil proponi, cur non possit, si 
nullam laesionem ex hoc sentiet patronus. Cf Verboven (2012) 96; Mouritsen (2011a) 212 n 28.
298 Mouritsen (2011a) 228–247, e.g. at 234: “Since the one advantage which the freedmen enjoyed 
was their familial background and patronal connection, an ’independent’ freedman would gener-
ally have been a disadvantaged freedman”.
299 Dixon (2001b) collects the evidence: CIL 6. 9498 and 37820; CIL 14. 2433; NS 1922, 144.
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of their patron(s), which appears to have become a distinguished purple-dyers’ brand: 
Veturius.
In sum, the occupational inscriptions suggest that freedmen constituted “extended 
familiae”.300 Economic family ties, it should be added, ran horizontally between colliberti 
as well as vertically between patron and freedman.301
ConClusIon
The family lay at the heart of Roman society. It was crucial in determining the life course 
of an individual in every way, ranging from their birth, to investment in education and 
participation in the labour market. This chapter attempted to show the importance of 
the family in economic decisions.
The Roman family was ubiquitous. It was constituted upon marriage, and for free-
born Romans and for Roman women in particular, marriage was virtually universal. A 
largely neo-local marriage pattern was identified in the city, which means that every 
marriage constituted a new economic family unit. The family itself was characterized by 
the dynamics of demographic and cultural determinants: the prevailing cultural norms 
were that the couple would have children; the prevailing high mortality regime pre-
dicted that the marriage would not necessarily last very long. The urban family generally 
started out as a conjugal couple and expanded with children, with the possible addition 
of slaves or freedmen. In an urban context, it appears that the dominant family structure 
was the simple family, with extensions of slaves, freedmen and/or relatives. That should 
not obscure the fact that the family changed quickly over time as it fell apart, and was 
subsequently reconstituted.
The family changed over time in a natural life cycle as well. The demographic life 
cycle presented economic restrictions to the economic contribution of individual family 
members: a mother’s labour opportunities were restricted by childbirth and the care 
of young children; very young children were not yet able to contribute (much), even if 
they were put to work from a very early age onward. This chapter underlined the fact 
that the money-earning activities of women and children were vital to the family. The 
economic benefits of family cooperation are clear. In this context it is significant that 
in the Roman empire, the family included servile labour. Servile labour is not restricted 
by demographic restrictions to the same extent as free labour of family members is. 
Where the adaptive element of the early modern family largely consisted of women and 
300 Extended familiae: Verboven (2012) 99.
301 Dig. 17.2.71.1 (Paul) mentions a colliberti societas. For more examples of inscriptions with colliberti, 
see chapter 4.
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children, therefore, the slave component made the Roman family more versatile and 
capable of adapting to the market. Slaves could be bought, educated, hired out, sold, or 
manumitted, all according to needs. Children could only be educated or hired out. Even 
in the continuity of the family business, substitutes for biological children in the form of 
foundlings, adoptive children and freedmen were not uncommon.
An interpretation of Roman society on the basis of the family economy model would 
expect to find predominantly small workshops or artisans and craftsmen in the city: 
family businesses with one or two slaves and/or apprentices. That does not explain all 
of the sources, however. There were variations to the theme of ‘family business’, notably 
because of the significant role that freedmen played in the economy: freedmen were 
part of the extended family and were therefore included in family ties. Sometimes they 
even made up an economic unit of colliberti with or without their patron. The evidence 
attests to a complex web of labour relations that extended beyond the household. 
Household businesses are most likely to explain the situation of artisans and craftsmen 
– not surprisingly also the group that is best attested in the occupational inscriptions, 
but not everyone was an artisan or craftsman. The pull of the city must have attracted 
large numbers of unskilled workers as well, seasonal workers as well as permanent 
migrants. Particularly in the city the importance of skilled and unskilled wage-labour 
should therefore not be underestimated.

Chapter 4
Family economics: elite domus
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IntRoduCtIon
The occupational inscriptions include a striking number of working individuals who can 
be connected to a larger elite household. Slaves and ex-slaves in the epigraphy from the 
city of Rome are especially likely to reveal a connection with one of the aristocratic houses. 
A correlation between the presence of aristocratic households and urban slavery will have 
had a significant impact on employment opportunities for the free urban population. It 
will be argued that the elite domus were a non-negligible presence in the larger cities of 
Roman Italy, and that this had important consequences for the urban economy. The elite 
domus and their role in the labour market might be termed the ‘domus economy’.1
The elite domus of this chapter should be offset against the smaller family units of 
the preceding chapter. Whereas it is difficult to present a clear-cut definition, I take elite 
domus to be wealthy families, who could afford to have most of the required labour 
production carried out by subordinates rather than by their own hands. Although some 
of these dependent workers were freeborn, it must be presumed that in practice this 
characterisation implied a significant servile presence in the household. Smaller families 
may of course have included a modest number of dependent labourers, including ap-
prentices, slaves and/or freedmen but, in contrast with the elite, in smaller families the 
household head and his or her direct relatives would actively contribute their own labour 
power. It was argued that nonelite families’ labour strategies were largely governed by 
economic motivations. Financial restrictions can be expected to have been less decisive 
in the more wealthy households of this chapter. Throughout the text I refer to the elite 
domus as upper-class familiae, aristocratic households, large domestic household, or 
other synonyms indiscriminately.
A large servile presence certainly was characteristic of the Roman aristocratic fam-
ily. Examples abound. Cicero’s household staff, for instance, has been charted from his 
literary output; it is revealed that most of his living-in staff as well as hired labourers 
were slaves or ex-slaves.2 Part of the newly-found riches of Petronius’ fictional character 
Trimalchio was that he could boast a substantial number of personnel, and plenty of his 
slaves, many of them with highly specialized occupations, feature in the Satyricon.3 The 
consul of AD 43, L. Pedanius Secundus, was said to have owned 400 slaves.4 Sizeable 
elite households are attested epigraphically as well: several large columbarium tombs 
provided collective burial space for the domestic staff of aristocratic families.
1 The insightful term ‘domus economy’ was suggested to me by Rens Tacoma.
2 Park (1918) 55-79. Largely slaves and ex-slaves: concluding remarks on pp. 88-9. See also Treggiari 
(1969b).
3 Cf. Baldwin (1978).
4 Tac. Ann. 14.42-45.
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The reasons for having numerous slaves were not just economic, regardless of the 
fact that many of them were put to work. Noblesse oblige: for the elite, the number of 
slaves owned was a significant status indicator. It could be argued that slaves were more 
important to their aristocratic owners as a visible token of wealth than as labourers. In 
that scenario, slaves did not need to work to perform their primary, ideological function 
as a status symbol.5 Slave-holding for appearance’s sake may be classified as conspicu-
ous consumption. And the Romans were not alone in their traditional value judgments 
of slavery:
[I]n a great many slaveholding societies masters were not interested in what their 
slaves produced. Indeed, in many of the most important slaveholding societies 
(…) slaves produced nothing and were economically dependent on their masters 
or their master’s nonslave dependents.6
This particular form of conspicuous consumption must have been a great stimulus to 
the presence of slaves within cities.
It follows from the above that aristocratic households probably were among the most 
important employers of the slave part of the urban population. If adaptive strategies of 
the nonelite family were mostly implemented by means of the labour participation of 
women and children, for the elite domus they were probably largely concentrated in the 
management of slaves and ex-slaves. Wealthy Romans could easily respond to changes 
in their situation, chiefly through buying, selling, and manumitting slaves. Conversely, 
elite expenditure was crucial to urban production as a whole, which will have provided 
employment for the urban freeborn as well. The freeborn population was engaged both 
directly and indirectly with the elite: as employers, and as market consumers. All of these 
processes to some extent must have contributed to the reality of the urban market for 
labour. Elite households made up a very specific sector of the urban labour market that 
to date has not received proper analysis as such. The aim of this chapter is to illuminate 
5 Mouritsen (2011a) 194–5; Bradley (1994) 15-6; cf Joshel (1992) 150 and passim.
6 Patterson (1982) 11.
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the ways in which the aristocratic household shaped and influenced the workings of the 
urban labour market of Roman Italy.7
Chapter outline
This chapter starts off with an attempt to attach a rough sense of magnitude to the 
concept of a domus economy, trying to determine the share of the labour force that the 
large domus stood for. Once the market share of larger familiae has been established, 
we can take a closer look at their workforce. It is apparent at the outset that marked 
differences in size and make-up between nonelite and elite families are likely to come 
up. In line with this structural divergence, we may also expect to find distinct cultural or 
economic considerations and strategies concerning the labour market participation of 
the (members of ) elite domus.
The larger household was subjected to a family life cycle of its own. The family life 
cycle predicts that labour supply and demand within the family change over time, be-
cause of the dynamics of demography, notably mortality and fertility, but also because 
of fluctuations in economic circumstances. Like the nonelite family, the aristocratic 
household workforce was therefore not a static entity. Quite the opposite is likely to 
be true: because of its considerable size, the elite family can be expected to have been 
even more dynamic than the nonelite family, because there were more variables to 
consider – it concerns more individuals, and even whole families within the familia, or 
even surpassing the boundaries of the household in a wider domus-network.
The slave component of the elite domus stands out. It will become clear that buy-
ing, breeding, selling, and manumitting slaves played a significant part in the adaptive 
labour strategies of the elite household. Another potentially major economically stra-
tegic opportunity for the elite, however, was investment in human capital. Although 
this thesis has argued that the freeborn, artisans and craftsmen in particular, regularly 
invested in some kind of job-training for their family, it has often been assumed that 
much of the available education in the Roman empire actually took place within the 
7 The ultimate elite household, the familia Caesaris, features in this chapter only through the 
personal, domestic households of members of the imperial family. Imperial slaves and freed-
men concerned with matters of state are deliberately left out of the analysis: because of their 
exceptional status, their occupations can be studied more productively in a study focused on the 
familia Caesaris itself, or in an analysis of the administrative machinery of the empire, rather than 
in this account of servants and slave-jobs within the context of larger households. Such aspects 
of the familia Caesaris have received excellent coverage in Chantraine (1967), Weaver (1972), and 
Boulvert (1974). Penner (diss. 2013) 9, correctly points out that especially in the early empire, “the 
boundaries between public civil service and private domestic service were porous and undefined”. 
As a result, much of her dissertation on the imperial households of the Julio-Claudians is also 
relevant here.
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elite household.8 Slave and ex-slave labourers from the aristocratic domus are attested 
in a wide variety of jobs that range from unskilled to highly skilled. With regard to the 
more skilled labourers, this raises the question how and where they learnt their trade. 
The answer reflects economic strategies of investing in human capital. It is commonly 
suggested that slaves in the larger household had exceptionally good opportunities 
to acquire skills, and that (as a result?) skilled work was the prerogative of slaves and 
ex-slaves. This chapter shows that possibilities for the education of slaves were indeed 
extensive, and that investment in human capital was high on the household agenda. 
But the question to what extent this posed limitations to the free population’s labour 
opportunities and, consequently, to what extent we can speak of an integrated labour 
market, demands a more differentiated and intricate answer.
The final section of this chapter is concerned with columbarium tombs. These so-called 
columbaria are large-scale funerary monuments that are exclusive to the city of Rome un-
der the Principate. Their importance for this chapter lies in the fact that the columbarium 
tomb population has generally been equated with elite households, in the sense of the 
elite domus which are the topic of this chapter. Columbaria, moreover, are exceptional in 
that they provide us with a relatively well-defined context for the inscriptions they hold. 
Many of the epitaphs from these tombs also record the profession of the deceased, and 
occasionally that of the commemorator. The sample thus makes for a perfect case-study 
of the labourers from the elite domus. It is readily admitted that the equation of the tomb 
population with an aristocratic household is not one hundred per cent accurate for most 
samples: it will become clear that such direct overlap between columbarium and domus is 
limited to a handful of ‘single-family tombs’. It will be argued that the equation is helpful to 
the current analysis, however, because in most instances the tomb occupants can indeed 
be related to elite families, even if they are not necessarily from the same household unit.
demogRAPhy: the seRVIle PResenCe In elIte households And fRee 
hIRed lAbouR
This section considers the demographic context for the elite households in terms of the 
larger urban population or, more specifically, in the context of the available workforce 
in the cities of Roman Italy. On the reasonable assumption that most of the labourers 
of the domus were slaves and ex-slaves, it deals with the concept of urban slavery first, 
and tries to establish whether there is any correlation between urban slavery and the 
8 This is voiced among others by Mohler (1940), esp. 262-3; Mohler, Forbes (1955), and Booth (1979) 
all focus on slave education because of this presumption. Schooling as a slave prerogative is still 
implicit in the recent work of Saller (2013), for example.
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presence of elite households. The free labourers in the service of elite domus are investi-
gated subsequently. On the basis of the ancient evidence it remains difficult to find out 
just how prominent the elite households were within Roman society; this section on 
demography is a modest attempt to situate the elite household as an employer in the 
labour market, in terms of its market share.
slave labour and the city
The elite tended to cluster together in towns. This is both a contributing factor to, and 
a result of, high urbanization rates.9 A strong elite presence in cities should therefore 
certainly hold for Italy, the heavily urbanized political heart of the Roman empire, which 
attracted the upper classes from all over the empire. The elite invariably employed 
slaves, to underline their status. With the consistent presence of the elite in the cities, 
it can be surmised that there were relatively many slaves in the cities, too. It has indeed 
been estimated that the percentage of slaves in the city was higher than the percentage 
of slaves in the countryside,10 even if many upper class Romans owned a rural estate 
with its own staff in addition to their property in the city.11 With the exception of Rome, 
with its large population of urban freeborn, many urban settlements may have had a 
slave population of no less than 40 per cent.12
A correlation between urban slavery and wealthy households matches the pattern 
that is evident in the occupational inscriptions. No less than 73.8 per cent of slaves with 
job-titles were connected to a wealthy household in Joshel’s calculations for the capital. 
This pattern of employment has prompted Joshel to suggest that many of the occupa-
tional epitaphs of slaves belonged to aristocratic households, even if we cannot now 
trace them confidently to a known household.13 Based on Joshel’s findings, equally 73.8 
per cent of the occupational inscriptions that are connected to an elite domus, concerns 
9 De Ligt (2012) 196-7, based on the work of Jongman (1988) 192–8, sp. 196.
10 See also Jongman (2003); Scheidel (2005a) 66; Scheidel (2011a) 289. Conversely, Bradley (1994) 71 
apparently does not feel a need to substantiate his claim that “most slaves were rustici”.
11 Bradley (1994) 58 for the distinction between the urban and rural staff of a slave-owner, the familia 
urbana as opposed to the familia rustica.
12 Cf De Ligt (2012) 190 table 4.3; De Ligt and Garnsey (2012) for Herculaneum.
13 Joshel (1992) 74, 98 and table 4.2 on page 99 for the percentage, and at 103 she writes: “Further, 
I believe that many of the slaves and possible slaves whose epitaphs lack signs of social context 
did in fact belong to large households. The pattern of their employments resembles that of slaves 
whose epitaphs confirm their membership in upper-class familiae”. Moreover, Borbonus (2014) 
119 notes a strong similarity in general of status distribution in the columbaria-inscriptions, and 
other CIL samples, and remarks: “A factor that probably contributes to this similarity is the pro-
venience of inscriptions that are listed in the CIL without context: many of them may stem from 
now-destroyed columbaria”.
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slave workers.14 Borbonus’ analysis of the combined columbarium tomb population, 
however, results in a significantly smaller estimate of 25.5 per cent slaves.15 There should 
be an explanation for the difference in these two estimates. The criteria to define which 
inscriptions belonged to a larger household, and which did not, are not easy to define. 
Most inscriptions lack context, and with the limited information they record the relation 
to an elite domus often cannot be identified. With that in mind, what do these numbers 
really tell us?
It is clear that slaves and ex-slaves make up a large majority of the occupational in-
scriptions, and it is also clear that for many of them a connection to an elite domus is 
likely: this in itself underlines the hypothesis of a correlation between slavery and elite 
presence. But biases in the material evidence may also partly account for the apparent 
connection between slaves and aristocratic household. For one thing, the well-pre-
served columbarium tombs from the city of Rome are likely to have swelled the relative 
numbers attested for slaves in an aristocratic household. It is particularly noteworthy 
that those in the category ‘slaves in a columbarium’ are the ones most likely to mention 
their profession: 44 per cent of slaves in columbaria does so.16 The discrepancy between 
Borbonus’ lower count of 25.5 per cent slaves in the elite household, and Joshel’s higher 
finding of 73.8 per cent slaves recording an occupational title in a private context, is 
thus explained in part by the difference in a sample of ‘occupational inscriptions from 
columbaria’ on the one hand, and ‘columbaria-inscriptions in general’ on the other.
Slaves and ex-slaves in an aristocratic family were perhaps also more likely to be com-
memorated than others of the same legal status; servile labourers may have received a 
proper burial in a smaller household, in the family tomb even, but it was not always a 
named burial – implicit in the common use of the formula libertis libertabusque poster-
isque eorum. There is no doubt in my mind that servile labourers from elite domus are 
overrepresented in the epigraphic evidence. For all these reasons, an estimate placing 
73.8 per cent of the urban slave workforce in elite households in accordance with Joshel’s 
results, is likely to be too high.
To put the epigraphic evidence into perspective, we may compare another way to 
quantify the slave presence in elite domus. Although few scholars have taken up the 
challenge, Walter Scheidel touches upon the number of slaves in aristocratic domus in 
14 Joshel (1992) table 4.2 on page 99 provides the numbers from which I calculated the slave per-
centage in the elite household (slaves in a private context (346)/ all inscriptions from a private 
context (469), x 100). It appears to be a mere coincidence that the percentage is exactly the same.
15 Borbonus (2014) 121 table 5.
16 Borbonus (2014) 126. Cf the numbers for the monumentum Liviae in Treggiari (1975a) 59 table 
D: only 5 out of 41 slaves do not record a job. It is interesting that in Treggiari’s account of Livia’s 
household, almost 50% of the freedmen also record a job there.
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an attempt to quantify the slave population of Roman Italy.17 His model provides us with 
a very tentative sense of scale. There is no hard evidence for these numbers, but they 
should be read as informed guesses that are good to think with.18
Scheidel’s understanding of elite, for calculating purposes, is the total of all senators, 
knights (equites) and councillors (decuriones). The number of senators is set at 600, knights 
at 5,000, and councillors at 20,000. Scheidel takes every senator to have owned 80 slaves, 
every knight 20 slaves, and every decurion 5 slaves, which makes for a total of 248,000 
elite household slaves. This working definition of the elite is of course substantially less 
inclusive than my definition of the larger household, and Scheidel acknowledges that 
there are more elite domus beyond the three ordines that may have owned quite a number 
of slaves.19 The resulting figures should therefore be read as a minimum estimate.
Scheidel’s numbers can be used to calculate the percentage of elite household slaves. 
In order to do so, we need to know the total of all slaves in the city as well. Smaller 
households may also have owned a slave or two, who should be added to the number of 
urban slaves.20 Scheidel does so by analogy with the census-data from Roman Egypt (1 
slave: 5.8 freeborn). For an urban population of 1.4–1.6 million non-slave and sub-elite 
urban residents, that means adding another 240,000 – 275,000 slaves living in non-elite 
households. The calculation leads to a total of ca 500,000 slaves in the cities of Roman 
Italy. Since most of the numbers fed into the model are likely to be too low, Scheidel 
doubles the minimum estimates in “controlled speculation”. He goes on to say that “[i]f 
we schematically place all senatorial slaves, half of the equestrian slaves and half of all 
sub-élite slaves in the capital, we arrive at approximately 220,000 to 440,000 slaves in 
17 The following paragraphs are based on the model for “non-agricultural slavery” in Scheidel (2005a) 
66-7.
18 Cf Scheidel (2005a) 66 n. 15.
19 Senators, equites and decuriones add up to 25,600 households. Scheidel (2006) argues for 40,000 
elite households. It is reassuring that 40,000 x 6 provides a similar number – 6 being Flory’s edu-
cated guess for the average number of slaves in a household, Flory (1978) 85.
20 See chapter 3 on slaves in smaller households.
table 4.1: Urban slavery and the percentage of slaves in elite households. Numbers derived from Scheidel 
(2005a).
Rome other cities in Roman Italy
slaves in urban elite households 100,000 150,000
All urban slaves 220,000 280,000
slaves in urban elite households (%) 45.4 53.6
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Rome and 280,000 to 560,000 in the other cities”.21 I tabulated the lower range of these 
numbers to calculate the percentage of slaves in elite households in table 4.1 – but 
doubling all estimates leads to the exact same percentages, of course.
What can be gathered from Scheidel’s model, therefore, is that approximately 50 per 
cent of urban slaves should be located in the elite households. This number is likely to be 
too low, because of Scheidel’s limited working definition of the elite.22
If we offset the epigraphic evidence against the model of Scheidel, a plausible range 
can be established for how many urban slaves were employed in elite domus. Scheidel’s 
theoretical 50 per cent for Roman Italy is likely to be too low, whereas the 73.8 per cent 
extracted from Joshel’s sample for the city of Rome is likely to be too high. That leaves 
me with the hypothesis that most urban slaves, between 50 and 74 per cent, were 
employed in large domestic households. This finding seems to endorse the proposed 
correlation between urban slavery and elite presence in the cities. However, Scheidel’s 
model cannot shed light on the question what proportion of the workforce in the elite 
domus was made up of slaves. The widely differing results from Joshel (73.8 per cent 
of occupational inscriptions for slaves originate from a private context) and Borbonus 
(25.5 per cent of the columbarium population were slaves) leave us with something of a 
conundrum – but perhaps balancing these findings with the data for freedmen can shed 
some light on the matter.
freedmen
The connection between elite domus and urban slavery prompts the related question 
how the elite households tied in with freedmanship. If somewhere between 50–74 
per cent of urban slaves were employed in the aristocratic household, it is not too far-
fetched to presume that many freedmen were closely related to those households, too; 
the previous chapter illustrated the fact that ex-slaves often maintained a close relation-
ship with their patrons, and it will become clear that this was no less true for freedmen 
of wealthy patrons. It is generally presumed that proximity to the master increased the 
chances of manumission, and such proximity was perhaps most likely in the personal 
service of a wealthy family – the elite had plenty of employment for slaves in their per-
21 Scheidel (2005a) 67; compare De Ligt (2012) 190 for 700,000 urban slaves in 28 BC, which suggests 
that Scheidel’s doubling of the estimates was perhaps too crude.
22 Scheidel (2005a) 67 himself notes that “a more pronounced (...) concentration of slave-ownership 
in the top ranks of Roman society would help redress the apparent imbalance between centre and 
periphery”. Cf Harper (2011) 38–60, esp. 58–60 with table 1.1 who proffers a similar model for rural 
and urban households combined to conclude that, “the wealthiest 1.365 percent of Roman society 
owned 49 percent of slaves”. Harper’s focus is on the later empire, but the numbers fed into this 
model are equally relevant for the Principate.
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sonal vicinity, which should be understood quite literally in the case of, for example, 
bedchamber servants (cubicularii).23
Most of the freedmen in columbaria are relatively easy to identify as such, since their 
full names – when recorded – reflect their owner’s names.24 Joshel attributes only 25.9 
per cent of the freedmen with occupational title securely to domestic service.25 Her 
numbers suggest that, conversely, around 21.3 per cent of work ‘in a private context’ was 
filled in by freedmen.26 The elite columbaria attest to many freedmen who were buried 
there, 22 per cent in Borbonus’ calculation.27 The fact that these numbers sit much closer 
together than the numbers for slaves, however, should not trick us into believing they 
mean the same. According to Borbonus, only 11 per cent of the freedmen recorded an 
occupation.28 More than half of the individuals with named burial in a columbarium 
belong to the uncertain category of those who carry the tria nomina, but for whom 
there is no other indication of whether they were free or freed: surely some of them were 
freedmen, too.29 On the sole basis of these percentages, we should therefore probably 
attribute more than 21.3 per cent to freedmen labourers.
A brief exercise may confirm a rough order of magnitude for the number of freedmen. 
If the 2:1 ratio for slaves:freedmen in the general urban population is applied, as postu-
lated by Garnsey and De Ligt, the percentages for slaves mentioned above (25.5–73.8 
per cent) would lead to somewhere between 12.7–37 per cent for freedmen.30 Since 
it is impossible to go above 100 per cent, however, the maximum cannot go beyond 
33.3 per cent. Joshel´s finding of 21.3 per cent does sit nicely in the middle, and would 
imply a highly plausible 42.6 per cent for slaves. Since there were few if any freeborn in 
the household (see below), however, to get to 100 per cent we can tentatively place the 
percentage of freedmen at a third, which leaves two thirds of slaves.
Freedmen, however, may have stayed in the domus, but may as well have left after 
manumission to set up their own workshop and family. The nature of the evidence of 
23 Mouritsen (2011a) 196–200.
24 There are exceptions to the rule: some we know were free(d) chose not to sport the tria nomina, 
esp. in ‘homogeneous’ tombs, Borbonus (2014) 123; there were also ‘unrelated freedmen’ with a 
distinct nomen, see below.
25 Joshel (1992) 98.
26 Joshel (1992) table 4.2 on page 99, from which I calculated the freedmen percentage in the elite 
household (freedmen in a private context (109)/ all inscriptions from a private context (469), x 
100).
27 Borbonus (2014) 121 table 5 records 50.9 per cent free/d.
28 Borbonus (2014) 126.
29 Borbonus (2014) 121 with table 5.
30 De Ligt and Garnsey (2012), Garnsey and De Ligt (2016); Incidentally the ratios of slaves to freed-
men in the Statilian household tomb shows something like this, 68: 32 per cent – though not the 
Volusian tomb, which has 54: 46 per cent, see Mouritsen (2013) 46–7.
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columbaria-inscriptions is such that it only accounts for freedmen who were buried in 
the household tomb. The previous chapter expanded in more detail on how economic 
bonds between patrons and freedmen continued either way, with or without the formal 
operae libertorum, because freedmen were considered as a quasi-extended family. In 
other words: freedmen could be linked to the elite household in more than one way, not 
all of which meant that they would be buried in a columbarium. We may therefore esti-
mate the contribution of freed labour to the elite domus to be less than a third, but more 
than Joshel’s 21.3 per cent. Joshel’s tally admittedly does go beyond the columbaria, but 
her text indicates that her definition does not include freedmen “in the public world”, 
bankers, salespeople, and artisans, for example – a group that is likely to have been non-
negligible.31 This finding of somewhere between 21.3 and 33.3 per cent freedmen labour 
in the domus also further specifies the numbers for slaves, to more than 66.7 per cent.
One explanation for the freedmen buried in columbaria could be that manumission 
was a deathbed gift. This is particularly plausible for those who died as freedmen un-
der the legal minimum age of 30: under-age death-bed manumission was tolerated. 
Examples of very young freedmen are not hard to come by.32 This type of freedman was 
never truly free and remained a slave their entire lives. Age is not a common feature to 
record, however. One could therefore plausibly argue that age is recorded particularly 
to underline special circumstances, such as an early death33 and, potentially, deathbed 
manumission. Significantly, of those recorded with age, most under 30 were slaves, 
and “most slaves were not freed until after the age of twenty”.34 To my mind, therefore, 
deathbed manumission accounts for no more than a small proportion of the evidence.
In addition to potential deathbed manumissions, there is also the theoretical possibil-
ity that freedmen maintained the right to be buried in the household columbarium after 
leaving the household – and some ostensibly unrelated freedmen gained their burial 
rights because they were related to one of the tomb’s ‘inhabitants’.35 There is thus always 
a possibility that the freedmen in the columbaria were not, or no longer, working for an 
elite domus. All these arrangements are virtually impossible to trace and come to the 
fore only occasionally.
There is, however, compelling evidence for the fact that at least some of the freedmen 
did remain within the household after manumission – which suggests that they kept 
31 Joshel (1992) 98.
32 The example of the 4-year-old vestiarius tenuarius, L. Anicius Felix (CIL 6. 6852 cited above) springs 
to mind.
33 Hopkins (1966) remains the locus classicus; for other problems with age such as age rounding, 
Scheidel (1996).
34 Mouritsen (2013) 52-53 for both the Volusii and Statilii.
35 See the example of CIL 6. 7290 = CIL 6. 27557 from the columbarium of the Volusii, discussed 
below.
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working there, too.36 Such a pattern was perhaps more common in some households 
than others.37 The reasons for freedmen to stay are not difficult to think of. Especially in 
larger households, it is likely that the newly freed had previously engaged in personal 
relationships with other household members.38 Joshel points out the simple truth that 
service occupations like that of a foot servant (pedisequus, -a) were rather difficult to 
carry out in the absence of someone to escort.39 A good example of a resident freed-
woman is Iulia Elate in CIL 6. 4002, pedisequa to Livia, whose husband M. Iulius Carisius 
(for whom no occupation is recorded) is also from the same household – the bond with 
her husband and her service job would be two compelling reasons for her to stay.40 
Even if their job was more ‘marketable’, however, freedmen may have stayed. Thus, we 
know that Cicero’s gifted and well-educated freedman, Tiro, did not leave Cicero’s side 
until after his patron’s death.41 A passage in the Digest likewise records a case of a slave 
who continued his employment as a banker after manumission.42 Examples like these 
suggest that many of the columbaria-inscriptions do indeed commemorate privileged, 
freed slaves who still lived and worked in the elite domus. Mouritsen recently went even 
further, arguing that the high manumission rates from the columbarium inscriptions of 
the Statilian and the Volusian tombs indicate that, in these two households, slaves were 
freed on the assumption that they remained in the household.43
The evidence can only securely attest to continued burial rights of freedmen, however, 
not continued residence patterns. Whereas Mouritsen may well be correct about the 
Statilii and the Volusii, many occupational inscriptions from outside the columbarium 
tombs, conversely, attest to ex-slaves who set up their own household, regularly conju-
gal couples originating from the same domus. It is known that the bulk of all epitaphs 
was set up by freedmen. This phenomenon is generally attributed to the wish of the 
36 Cf. Edmondson (2011) 343: “manumitted slaves (i.e. freedmen and freedwomen) quite frequently 
remained part of the household even after manumission, as in the household of the Statilii Tauri”.
37 As suggested by Penner (2012) 147 who suggests that the percentages of slave-freed-free of the 
monumentum Marcellae could indicate that this tomb encouraged continued bonds after manu-
mission, in contrast to the Statilian tomb; the latter finding at least sits well with Mouritsen (2013) 
58-61. See below.
38 The classic article is Flory (1978); more recently, see Mouritsen (2013) 55 on the mixed status of 
nuclear families in the households of the Volusii and Statilii; Mouritsen (2011b); and Edmondson 
(2011). And see below.
39 Joshel (1992) 101.
40 Libertination and marriage are not explicitly mentioned in this epitaph, but the context is strongly 
suggestive.
41 Park (1918) 63 for a very brief summary (with references) of Tiro’s services to Cicero, including 
those after manumission; more elaborately, McDermott (1972).
42 Dig. 14.3.19.1 (Papinian). To be precise, the slave was an institor ‘apud mensam pecuniis accipiendis’.
43 Cf Mouritsen (2013) 58, 61.
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freedmen population to display their lifetime achievements in public, more than any 
other social group in the empire.44 Considering this prominence of freedmen in funerary 
epigraphy, combined with the significant percentage of slaves who were working for 
aristocrats, it is highly likely that many of these ‘independent freedmen’ originally came 
from elite families. CIL 10. 3957 from Capua is an unambiguous example of this: the 
inscription clearly refers to a separate family tomb for a cabinet maker and his wife, both 
freedmen by the same principal and therefore probably from the same domus.
ciL 10. 3957
M(arcus) Avidius M(arci) l(ibertus) Aesopus sibi et / Avidiae M(arci) l(ibertae) 
Zosimae coniugi / fab(e)r intestin(arius) / h(oc) m(onumentum) s(ive) s(epulcrum) 
e(st) hh(eredes) n(on) s(equetur)
Marcus Avidius Aesopus, freedman of Marcus, [set up this monument] for himself 
and for Avidia Zosima, freedwoman of Marcus, his wife. He was a cabinet maker. 
This monument or tomb will not go to the heirs.
This is a clear example of independent freedmen who had left the domus, which un-
derlines once more that the attested columbarium tomb population can only provide a 
minimum for the freedmen percentage in the elite domus.
It can be gathered from the above that the elite market share in servile labour was 
very large by any account. Adding Borbonus’ numbers for the slave and freed presence 
in the columbarium tombs adds up to 47.5 per cent of the household, which is a bare 
minimum that could potentially be as high as 98.4 per cent – 100 per cent minus the 1.6 
Borbonus securely identified as freeborn.45 That leaves some room for freeborn labour-
ers in elite employment, but it was not necessarily very much.
free hired labour
In 53 BC Cicero writes to Tiro: “make sure that the doctor is promised whatever wage he 
demands”.46 Apparently, at the time of the letter in 53 BC, Tiro is unwell and a doctor is 
hired. Imported products, perishables, and custom-made luxury items could not all be 
produced within the elite domus. If out shopping for exclusive jewellery or other luxury 
items, the elite might parade the porticoes of the Saepta Iulia; if in need of first-quality 
44 Mouritsen (2011a) 127–8.
45 Borbonus (2014) 121 table 5.
46 Cic. Fam. 6.14.1–2; Medico, mercedis quantum poscet, promitti iubeto.
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meat, the macellum was the place to be.47 The aristocratic houses must have hired labour 
and bought produce from free labourers, in addition to the labour or goods provided or 
produced by their own servile staff and freed labour relations.48 This pool of free labour-
ers significantly includes independent freedmen. I take ‘independent’ freedmen to refer 
to those unrelated to the particular elite domus looking to do business with them. To 
avoid confusion between these independent freedmen and the freedmen labourers 
who were associated with the household, the latter will be excluded from the following 
discussion on free hired labour.
Free hired labourers in ancient Rome were not very likely to become a part of the elite 
family, familia, or household. From a broader historical perspective, this statement is 
not necessarily so obvious as it sounds to our modern western ears: even today, there 
are families with a living-in au pair, for example. In early modern times, certainly, it was 
common for a free servant to move into the house and be considered as family for the 
time of their appointment. Young girls from the countryside regularly moved to the 
city to work as a maid for a few years, and then returned and settled in a marriage. The 
early modern live-in household staff could be substantial, and included maids, butlers, 
doorkeepers, child attendants, cooks, and others.49 In the Roman world, however, most 
of these service professions were practiced by slaves or ex-slaves. Hired free artisans or 
craftsmen, conversely, would not be prone to move in – in either time period.50 Taking 
in freeborn apprentices or the Roman equivalent of journeymen also was much more 
likely to be confined to the nonelite household, because the elite domus included slave 
children and youngsters who took this place.
If there were freeborn workers in the elite household, they are hard to trace. The 
epigraphic record does not include many instances of freeborn domestic workers. For 
the city of Rome, Joshel found that only one individual who is certainly of free birth can 
be related to a wealthy household. If we include those she has identified as uncertain 
freeborn, there are a few more attestations (N=10). These incerti of elite households 
were mostly “architects, doctors, or teachers”.51 This enumeration corresponds exactly 
47 Holleran (2012) 232–57 on elite consumption.
48 Park (1918) 78–9 lists tradesmen “from whom Cicero himself bought”, among whom some ingenui, 
and mostly liberti.
49 Cf, to name but one example, the well-attested household of Joyce Jeffreys in 17th-century Her-
eford: Spicksley (2012).
50 Park (1918) 61 finds that Cicero’s familia “did not supply skilled artisans”, nor “regular artisans”. The 
household of Joyce Jeffreys only supported a jack-of-all-trades.
51 Joshel (1992) 99-100. She suggests that many more incerti may have been connected to an elite 
household, as many incerti from an unknown context (public or private) were engaged in “the 
most typical household jobs”, such as the nurse and child minder cited above, or as a personal 
servant; Joshel (1992) 205 n. 19.
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with the jobs that Cicero holds to be “respectable for those whose status they befit”, and 
this might be one of the reasons why Joshel prefers to see them as freeborn rather than 
freedmen.52 In reality, idenfitication of these incerti as freeborn workers remains entirely 
hypothetical.
Borbonus’ analysis of the columbarium tomb population confirms that the freeborn 
make up only a minority there, 1.6 per cent.53 Because such people are unlikely to 
have lived in the household in the first place, this should not come as a surprise. It is 
rather more noteworthy that ingenui are attested in the columbaria at all. A closer look 
at Borbonus’ results brings out once more the significant group of 50.9 per cent ‘free/d’, 
who carry the tria nomina but who cannot otherwise be identified as either libertus or 
ingenuus.54 An estimate of 1.6 per cent may therefore be considered low. Having said 
that, with Borbonus, I do believe that the majority of this group of ‘free/d’ were in fact 
freed.
Ingenui were less inclined to record their profession than slaves or ex-slaves; indeed 
the freeborn tended to put up fewer inscriptions altogether. It has been suggested that 
freeborn employees were more likely to be commemorated by their family than by the 
collegia that in many cases were responsible for the collective columbarium tombs.55 On 
this basis one would expect to find a modest freeborn presence in the columbaria. Not all 
of the funerary monuments for the freeborn urban population were inscribed, and not 
all of those that were graced with an inscription have survived. The more humble grave 
monuments were probably also the more common, such as amphorae or small markers 
in the ground that are likely to have been lost over the centuries – that is, if a funerary 
monument was erected for the burial at all, because not everyone could afford one.56 
These biases in the ancient evidence are another part of the explanation why so few 
freeborn workers are attested, and why even fewer can be linked to aristocratic domus. 
Still, the pattern is remarkably consistent and suggests that freeborn town-dwellers 
working and living in the elite household were indeed scarce.
52 Quibus autem artibus aut prudentia maior inest aut non mediocris utilitas quaeritur ut medicina, ut 
architectura, ut doctrina rerum honestarum, eae sunt iis, quorum ordini conveniunt, honestae: Cic. Off. 
1. 151, translation Finley (1973)2 41–2.
53 Borbonus (2014) 121.
54 Borbonus (2014) 121 this group was already referred to above, under ‘freedmen’.
55 Hasegawa (2005) 81–8. Patterson (1992) 23 emphasizes the likelihood of the family and collegia 
working together for an individual burial, which would also facilitate the creation of burials out-
side of the columbaria.
56 E.g. Hope (2009) 159–166 on the variation in funerary markers.
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That at least the possibility of working in an elite household existed for the freeborn 
is proven by Lucianus’ satirical piece On salaried posts in great houses.57 It does not be-
come clear exactly what kind of posts are meant, but Lucian talks of educated men in 
a position of what I would describe as a ‘glorified foot servant’; in terms of an actual 
task, the text merely hints at the possibility of teaching the master’s children (19). The 
existence of other, unskilled positions in the household that were filled by the freeborn 
poor, however, are also mentioned in passing. Even if Lucian’s words are hardly a recom-
mendation for the job – which he sees as selling oneself for wages into the service of 
an elite employer – the hundreds of thousands looking for a job in the city must have 
been happy to take up a position in the domestic service of a wealthy master. Lucian 
acknowledges that for unskilled labourers domestic service is no worse than other jobs 
(4, underlining his sentiments against ‘wage slavery’ once more). Apart from the income 
earned, such labourers perhaps hoped to benefit from the master’s patronage. Lucian’s 
second-century satire obviously is not the most factual account, but other literary refer-
ences are in short supply.
A passage from the jurist Marcian has been adduced as evidence for free mercennarii 
living in their employer’s house:58
Dig. 48.19.11.1
Furta domestica si viliora sunt, publice vindicanda non sunt, nec admittenda est 
huiusmodi accusatio, cum servus a domino vel libertus a patrono, in cuius domo 
moratur, vel mercennarius ab eo, cui operas suas locaverat, offeratur questioni: 
nam domestica furta vocantur quae servi dominis vel liberti patronis vel mercen-
narii apud quos degunt subripiunt.
If domestic thefts are relatively minor, they are not to be punished publicly, nor 
is an accusation of this sort to be granted, when a slave shall be brought to ques-
tion by the master, or a freedman by the patron in whose house he is staying, 
or a contract worker by him, to whom he hired his labour: because those thefts 
are called domestic that slaves steal from their masters, or freedmen from their 
patrons, or contract labourers by those with whom they live.
57 De mercede conductis, which in the Loeb edition is characterized by Harmon (1921) 411 as “[a] 
Hogarthian sketch of the life led by educated Greeks who attached themselves to the households 
of great Roman lords – and ladies”.
58 Dig. 48.19.11.1 (Marcian); Brunt (1980) 100; Treggiari (1980) 50: “this does not amount to a declara-
tion that all mercennarii (or all liberti) lived in, nor does it put them on a par with slaves”.
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Although there has been some debate about the term mercennarius, it is now commonly 
accepted that it generally refers to free labourers – it is certain that there were slave 
mercennarii, too, but whenever reference is made to them it says so explicitly in the 
texts.59 This passage from the Digest, therefore, presents the possibility that free hired 
labourers would sometimes (temporarily) move in with their employer. Free mercennarii 
living in the house were not legally part of the family, but that does not mean that they 
were not considered as such by the outside world.60 Marcian explicitly indicates that free 
hired labourers were subject to the ‘justice’ of the employer. Brunt points out that the 
mercenarii from this particular text are likely to have been engaged in occupations other 
than domestic service.61 That suggests that there was at least some opportunity for the 
freeborn to work in the elite domus, outside of the domestic sector.
We might expect to find some additional evidence for living-in freeborn workers in 
sectors such as child care. It seems natural that wet-nurses and pedagogues would have 
lived in with their charges, just like a governess, nanny, or au pair did in later periods. 
Scholars have indeed emphasized the strong and often lifelong ties maintained be-
tween child minders and the family. The bond is evident from the epigraphic record, 
where nurses and others are frequently linked with the family who employed them.62 
The following texts may illustrate this.
ciL 6. 6686
Dis Manibus sacru[m] / Ti(berio) Claudio Neothyrso / qui vix(it) annis XXIIII dies 
XI[3] / Ti(berius) Claudius Stephanus / patrono bene merito de / se et Cacia 
Restituta nutrix / eius et sibi et suis po(s)terisq(ue) / eoru(m) ita uti cippi fine / 
fecit libe(n)s animo / [
59 Brunt (1980) pp 100ff. Bürge (1990) has argued at length that the term mercenarii refers exclusively 
to slaves unless explicitly stated otherwise: mercennarius in his opinion must refer to another 
man’s slave (renting himself out) living in the employer’s domus. His claim is convincingly refuted 
by Möller (1993), however. See also the comments of Scheidel (1994) throughout pages 153–202.
60 To my knowledge it is only when the law states that publicani are liable for wrongful acts commit-
ted by their subordinates that it includes the freeborn in their familiae, and then only “if they were 
similarly employed”, i.e. in tax-farming. This situation would not be very common; Dig. 39.4.1.5 
(Ulpian).
61 Brunt (1980) 100: “It is interesting that some mercennarii might actually live in the employer’s 
house; we might perhaps think of craftsmen employed in a business, which was carried on in the 
employer’s home; it seems unlikely that free mercennarii were used as domestic servants”.
62 Günther (1987) 86, 96 adds that nurses’ own families are notably absent from the epigraphic 
record.
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Sacred to the divine spirits. To Tiberius Claudius Neothyrsus who lived 24 years 
and 11(?) days. Tiberius Claudius Stephanus to his well-deserving patron from his 
own funds and Cacia Restituta, his [i.e. Neothyrsus’] nurse, set this up willingly; 
also to himself, his [family] and their descendants; as far as the boundary stone.63
ciL 6. 10766
D(is) M(anibus) / P(ublius) Aeeius(!) Placentius / nutritori filiorum suorum / 
dignissimo / M(arco) Aurelio Liberali / b(ene) m(erenti) f(ecit)
To the divine spirits. Publius Aelius Placentius set this up to the carer of his sons, 
the most honourable and well-deserving Marcus Aurelius Liberalis.
Restituta the nurse and the child minder Liberalis both probably were freeborn workers, 
considering the fact that they sport the tria nomina, while their praenomen and nomina 
are different from that of the families they worked with. The majority of child minders, 
however, were of servile origins.64 Moreover, even if a nurse were freeborn, we know 
that nurses did not always move in with their charge. In wet-nursing contracts from Ro-
man Egypt it is regularly specified that the infant will reside in the home of the freeborn 
nurse.65 Although that points to labour demand for freeborn women in this sector, it 
does not make them part of the elite domus.
The aristocratic families are more likely to have made extensive use of the labour and 
produce of free hired labourers living elsewhere than of free living-in staff. As stated 
above, the elite presence in the city generated ample demand for the (luxury) products 
and services of free artisans and craftsmen, and so provided a livelihood for many. The 
doctor hired for Tiro is one example, the architect in CIL 10. 8093 is another:66
63 The Latin here is difficult to translate though the meaning of the words is perfectly clear; I have 
taken sibi etc. to refer to Stephanus and his family; ita uti cippi fine is meant to confirm what has 
been said before: the monument is open to them, on this burial plot, as far as (in a rare use of 
fine with genitive, Lewis and Short s.v. finis I.B2) the cippus (which may carry both the meaning of 
boundary stone and grave marker here).
64 Bradley (1991) 19–20 for nurses, all of servile background, but that finding is outdated. Restituta is 
not on the list for example; page 82 for tatae and mammae. Tacitus, Dial. 28.4 writes of an emptae 
nutricis, a “bought nurse”, and therefore a slave. Aulus Gellius, NA 12.1.1-5 however, writes adhiben-
das nutrices, where adhibendas leaves open whether the nurses–to–be–acquired were bought, or 
hired.
65 See, e.g., P. Reinach 2. 103, a wet-nursing contract from Oxyrynchus, 26 CE.
66 CIL 10. 8093 = AE 2006, 356 (Grumentum). Architects were mostly freeborn.
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ciL 10. 8093
T(itus) Vettius Q(uinti) f(ilius) / Ser(gia) architectus / porticus de peq(unia) / 
pagan(ica) faciund(as) / coer(avit) / A(ulo) Hirtio C(aio) Vibio / co(n)s(ulibus)
Titus Vettius Sergia, son of Quintus, architect, arranged for the colonnade to be 
built, paid for by communal funds, in the year that Aulus Hirtius and Caius Vibius 
were consuls [43 BC].
It is widely believed that as a rule, free artisans and craftsmen were independent labour-
ers and many business encounters with the elite will indeed have been of a temporary 
nature, be it a single transaction to buy bread or cater to a dinner, or a contract for the 
construction of a tomb complex that would take a certain period of time to complete. 
Rens Tacoma and I have argued elsewhere that the most important document for prices 
in ancient Rome, Diocletian’s Prices Edict of 301 AD, underlines the importance of hired 
labour in the market: it presents daily wages for all kinds of jobs, including those for 
which we might rather expect priced items, such as a baker, or a gold- or silversmith.67 
What the Edict cannot tell us, however, is who were hired: free, freed, or slave labourers. 
Nor does it tell us whether they lived in with the contractor for the duration of a contract. 
And although this section presented some evidence for free hired labour, like Cicero’s 
doctor, Park demonstrated almost a century ago that Cicero in fact, insofar as he men-
tions it in his writings, hired chiefly (someone else’s) slaves and ex-slaves.68
The evidence taken together suggests that occasionally the freeborn will have worked 
in elite households. The epigraphic evidence implies that when they did, they were un-
likely to be remembered for it. The scarcity of the evidence is thus likely to reflect reality, 
indicating that the freeborn employees living in the elite domus were not numerous. If 
correct, this implies that the freeborn poor could not find long-term employment within 
the elite domus easily. The market for produce they shared with independent freed 
labourers, leaving them only a small niche in the urban economy.
This crude demographic analysis of the living-in workers in elite households confirms 
the suggestion that urban slave labour centred around upper-class familiae. The aristo-
cratic domus was an important employer in the city, particularly for its numerous slaves 
and ex-slaves: the resulting lack of vacancies in the household will have restricted labour 
opportunities in domestic service for the freeborn, and indeed very few free domestic 
workers are attested.
67 Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2017); the Edict includes some prices for piecework, too, but the 
prevalence of hired labour is significant.
68 Park (1918) 71–7.
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the dynAmICs of demogRAPhy wIthIn lARge slAVe-ownIng 
households
The composition of the aristocratic household, like that of a nonelite family, was always 
changing. The marriages and remarriages of the nobility are relatively well documented 
– Bradley aptly refers to their “matrimonial careers”.69 It is certain that many of these 
marriages concerned strategies, meant to form or strengthen political alliances, because 
they often reflect contemporary politics.70 It is not unthinkable that economic aspects 
also played a part in the marriage practices of the elite, as they did for the nonelite fami-
ly.71 In fact, all of the basic demographic ‘strategies’ that were identified for the nonelite 
will also have been practised by the elite to a certain extent. Children, and the number of 
children, mattered to the elite family, too: ideally, the family fortune was split up as little 
as possible.72 Although the discussion in the previous chapter showed that the extent 
to which the Romans acted upon such ideals by means of infanticide or exposure is 
difficult to grasp, the wish for an heir or a son may have induced a form of family plan-
ning. Adoption to preserve the family line and the family fortune is one strategy that 
was perhaps more common among the elite than among the (supposedly) more prolific 
and (certainly) less affluent nonelite; the evidence for elite adoption at least is more 
abundant, though that is partly the result of the fact that the elite is better documented 
overall. Within the aristocratic family, then, the available demographic strategies were 
broadly similar to those for nonelite families.
The main difference between elite domus and nonelite households in terms of de-
mographic changes over the life cycle, is that many of the structural changes to the 
larger family took place in the servile segment of the family, precisely because slaves 
and ex-slaves made up such a large part of the household. On the one hand, slaves 
and ex-slaves were passively subjected to the events in their principal’s life, such as 
death or divorce: because ‘his’ slaves were legally distinct from ‘her’ slaves, they were 
separated into two familiae if the marriage was broken up.73 The life course of individual 
slaves, on the other hand, also contributed to the family life cycle. Slaves were regularly 
replaced upon death, disease, sale and upon manumission; and slaves could procreate. 
69 Bradley (1991) 156.
70 Corbier (1991) 49–63, Bradley (1991) 156–176.
71 Broekaert (2012) and my chapter 3.
72 Champlin (1991) 114–117 illustrates a pattern where sons tended to receive a substantially larger 
share of the inheritance than daughters. They were clearly favoured over their sisters, who held a 
smaller share that was often in the form of their dowry. Champlin says nothing about shares for 
brothers. In my view, such wills were effectively keeping (landed) property together as much as 
possible.
73 Cf. Dig. 29.5.1.15.
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Slaves could buy slaves of their own – these vicarii are not uncommonly attested – again 
increasing the number of slaves in the familia. Structural change of the family was there-
fore based on somewhat different demographic factors than the factors influencing the 
demographic life cycle of smaller families.
An additional slave in the house increases family expenditure through the cost of 
maintenance, but he or she would also add to the family’s collective productivity, or 
maintain it in case of a replacement. If a slave fell in value because he or she was elderly 
or unwell, this might prompt the decision to sell.74 A slave could also be ‘removed’ from 
the household through manumission. The motivations underlying manumission are 
rather more complex than those concerning sale. The question then becomes to what 
extent economic considerations shaped these deliberate changes in the slave labour 
force of the aristocratic household. The process of structural change in the large family 
is impossible to follow, because we simply do not have the data to do so. Following a 
similar approach to that of the previous chapter, however, we can analyse the ways in 
which new slaves were added and other slaves removed from the household.
the sources of slaves
Where did elite families get their slaves from? It is not too difficult to come up with 
various possible sources of slaves in the Roman empire, but it has proven far more com-
plicated to decide on the relative importance of such sources during the Principate.75 It 
has been argued that the slave-market gradually transformed into a system of predomi-
nantly home-born slaves under the high empire.76 During the expansion of the empire, 
numerous captives of war were put up on the stands.77 Initially, this will have been the 
most important source of slaves for sale. In the period under consideration, however, the 
slave-influx from war and conquest dwindled, for lack of war and conquest. To maintain 
74 Cato RR 2.7 encourages the sale of everything that is superfluous: e.g., surplus produce, but also 
old tools or dead-beat oxen – and old or sick slaves.
75 Much has been said in the pioneering work of Jones (1956), and Bradley (1994) 31–56; Finley 
(1980) 128 is still to the point; the ‘grand debate’ took place between Harris (1980)(repr. 2011) 57-
87, (1994), (1999)(repr. 2011) 88-109; and Scheidel (1997), (2005a), (2011a). See now Silver (2011) 
for a strikingly different approach.
76 Jones (1956) 193, and especially Scheidel (1997)(2005a), with critique from Harris (1999) who 
contends that the slave population would have become stable only after the high empire (p. 75): 
“Something like Scheidel’s model (...) must in the end have imposed itself. When?”.
77 Scheidel (2011a) 295: “The scale of enslavement was primarily a function of the geographical 
reach of Roman imperialism”; Welwei (2000) for captive slaves under the Republic; cf Finley (19834) 
174 on the continuity of “the army as a slave-supplying instrument”; similarly, at (1980) 128 he 
notes that although the massive expansion ended, “war did not”.
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slave numbers, other sources, such as natural reproduction among slaves, must have 
played an ever more important part.
The means of acquiring slaves was not just a response to the available supply: it also 
reflects economic considerations, which is why it deserves separate analysis here. We 
can say that new additions to the slave population of the elite domus conform to one of 
three categories: slaves were bought, inherited, or born within the household.78
Buying and selling slaves
Evidence for the slave-trade under the empire is unmistakable, even if the specifics – 
such as the identity of actual slave-traders – are sometimes difficult to identify.79
The (unnamed) mango or venalicius/venalicarius (both mean slave-trader) is a familiar 
stock figure in literature, which suggests he was a familiar figure in the streets of Roman 
Italy, too. Think of Martial’s complaint when a slave boy he wants – excessively priced by 
the mango at a hundred thousand sesterces – is bought instead by the equally exces-
sively wealthy Phoebus, in epigram 1. 58. Although Phoebus’ conduct is mocked by the 
satirist, the passage does suggest that slaves did not come cheap.
This clue from Martial is corroborated by other, scattered indications of slave prices.80 
Slaves are listed as a commodity in Diocletian’s Prices Edict of AD 301.81 In the Edict, the 
maximum price is set at 25,000 denarii for an adult female slave, and 30,000 for a male 
of the same age category. The prices for a skilled slave could add up to double that 
amount.82 To get a sense of real slave prices, we can compare these sums with the aver-
age daily wage in the Edict of 50 denarii a day for skilled labour and 25 for unskilled 
work. It means that the cost of buying an unskilled slave amounted to the equivalent of 
500–600 days of work for a skilled labourer, and twice as long if that slave was paid for 
78 Mouritsen (2013) 67 n. 53 with reference to ps-Quintilian, Decl. Min. 311.7 – aut natus aut relictus 
hereditate aut emptus.
79 Bodel (2005), Bradley (1994) 42–3 offers some compelling evidence for the continued importance 
of the independent slave trade, that was drawing on “a combination of sources”; Finley (19834) on 
continuous trade in enslaved people, especially from the Danubian and Black Sea regions, from 
the late 7th century BC to the 6th century AD; Harris (1980) 129–31 notes on p. 129 “the reticence 
which surrounded an occupation that was naturally despised by the elite”. CIL 10. 8222 (Capua 
– the slave-trade can only be inferred from the accompanying relief ) nevertheless suggests that 
they sometimes took pride in their trade.
80 For slave prices, see Scheidel (1996), (2005b) esp. 2–8, Ruffing and Drexhage (2008); and Harper 
(2010) on late antiquity.
81 Prices Edict chapter 29; with Scheidel (1996), and Salway (2010).
82 29.8: Pro mancipio arte instructo pro genere et aetate et qualitate artium inter emptorem vel vendi-
torem de praetio placere conveniet ita ut duplum praetium statutum in mancipium minime excedere.
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by unskilled work.83 The Edict is a late source, but it is reassuring that scattered price data 
from Roman Italy for the high empire fall in the same order of magnitude.84 It is clear 
that, even for the well to do, buying a slave was costly. It is also clear that slaves were 
being bought and sold regardless.
“Where did the merchandise itself come from when slaveowners were ready to buy?”85 
The attestation of foreign slaves is indicative of a continuous influx of slaves who in all 
probability were not born into slavery. For some of the slaves in aristocratic households, a 
foreign background can be inferred from their nomenclature: some have foreign names, 
and in rare instances their origins have been explicitly recorded.86 Thus, the couple in 
CIL 6. 6343 is referred to as Dardana and Dardanus, which suggests that they both came 
from the province of Moesia (superior, modern Serbia).
ciL 6. 6343
Messia Dardana / quasillaria / fecit Iacinthus / unctor Dardanus
To Dardanian Messia, spinning woman. Dardanian Iacinthus masseur set up [this 
monument].
The epitaph, that was recovered from the Statilian household tomb, clearly stresses 
a common background for this pair, which may be the reason it is included in their 
epitaph. If not in the case of this particular example, the onomastics of slavery are 
generally difficult to interpret. Greek names predominate for slaves and ex-slaves in the 
first two centuries AD. The explanation of this undeniable pattern is rather complex. 
It was demonstrated that Greek names are a likely indication for servile status – that 
is, those with Greek names as a rule were (children of ) slaves and ex-slaves – but that 
83 The daily wage is taken here excluding the food allowance. On prices and wages in the Edict, and 
on the validity of relating these price data to each other and to the world outside the Prices Edict, 
see Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2017).
84 Scheidel (2005b) page 5 on Roman Egypt, page 8 on Roman Italy; slaves remained an expensive 
good into Late Antiquity, Harper (2010) 230.
85 Bradley (1994) 31.
86 Mouritsen (2013) 58; Hasegawa (2005) 75-9.
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such names do not necessarily suggest Greek or even more generally foreign origins.87 
Even so, the popularity of Greek names for slaves may well indicate a continuing and 
significant presence of bought slaves: in a recent study, Christer Bruun analysed the 
names of home-born slaves, for whom he finds demonstrably more Latin cognomina 
than for the slave population at large.88 As Bruun himself points out, the implication is 
that many individuals on the slave market were not home-born slaves, but ended up 
there through different channels: if vernae had been in the majority, we should expect 
to find mostly Latin cognomina among the servile population, rather than the attested 
pattern of mainly Greek names for slaves and freedmen.89
Many of the slaves in Italy came from within the empire, and often they were locals.90 
This suggests that at least some of them were born as vernae. An unknown number may 
have been enslaved only later in life, by various means. Thus, piracy and kidnapping 
were known, but are difficult to quantify. Roman society was also familiar with a form 
of penal slavery, although this was probably a marginal phenomenon, if only because 
of its often temporary nature.91 Self-sale and the enslavement of freeborn children, 
conversely, may not have been quite so marginal.92 Morris Silver deserves the credit for 
restoring a focus on the significance of what he calls ‘voluntary’ or ‘contractual slavery’.93 
Since it was established that many Romans lived at or under subsistence levels, it does 
make sense that for some Romans self-enslavement became a reasonable economic 
strategy to avert chronic poverty and destitution.94 If certain jobs, and job-training, were 
more easily accessible to slaves and freedmen, as I believe to have been the case, this 
87 Solin (1971) demonstrated the earlier supposition that Greek cognomina denote a servile status 
or servile background (p. 121–145), and added the finding that Greek names do not generally 
refer to Greek or foreign origins (p. 146–158). Silver (2011) 87-8 conversely, hypothesizes that 
the name-pattern indicates that foreigners from the Greek East of the empire voluntarily sold 
themselves into slavery to finance migration to the Italian heartland. In his view, their presence in 
turn inspired a taste to give slaves Greek names.
88 Bruun (2013).
89 Bruun (2013) 33. Either that, “...or they were born in conditions where they never encountered 
their master and the names were given by a vilicus or someone else who routinely chose typical 
slave names, which mostly were Greek”.
90 Silver (2011) 84 with references; cf Scheidel (1997) 164; Finley (1980) 128.
91 On penal slavery: Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2015), Millar (1984).
92 Harris (1999), Ramin and Veyne (1981). Both maintain that self-sale was a major source of slaves, or 
at least “commonplace”(Harris (1999) 73).
93 Silver (2011).
94 See chapter 2 for an indication of living standards. Silver (2011) emphasizes the inherent draw of 
contractual slavery, however, whereas I believe slavery will always have been a last resort, cf also 
the comments in Tacoma (2016) 68 with n. 95, and 182–183 with n. 64.
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strategy becomes all the more rational. Particularly so, perhaps, if it can be shown that 
there was also a real chance of early manumission.
Legal evidence acknowledges and accommodates the possibility of becoming a 
slave willingly.95 Seneca comments that “the slave-trader benefits those for sale”, which 
appears to indicate that those for sale actually want to be sold.96 As noted by Silver, 
many texts might be interpreted as referring to voluntary slavery. The fact that he sees 
contractual slaves absolutely everywhere, however, has understandably worked against 
him.97 In addition tot this, I fail to grasp the significance of singling out this group as a 
distinct status category, different from freeborn, freed and slave. Freed status will always 
trump one’s freeborn origins in the eye of the Roman beholder.98 Examples of ‘freeborn 
freedmen’ are limited in number and provide inconclusive evidence: they are extraor-
dinary in that they are from the familia Caesaris, and from the provinces. One T. Flavius 
Helius from Asia who holds the curious job-title of eirenophylax (peacekeeper), set up a 
dedication that records both that he is a freedman of the emperor Vespasian, and that 
he is the son of Glycon, son of Timaos; the text tells us also that Helius is married to a 
freeborn woman.99 Compare the following inscription from Africa:
95 Silver (2011) 75–81.
96 Sen. De ben. 4.13.3, mango venalibus prodest. Harris (1999) records legal references to self-sale in 
his n. 84 on p. 73. I believe both references to Ulpian are flawed: Dig 21.1.17.12 does not refer to 
self-sale but to fugitive-slaves who seek refuge with a statue of Caesar. Dig. 28.3.6.5-6 casually 
refers to penal slavery, not self-sale.
97 Silver (2013) is a good example, where he argues that contractual slavery was the catalyst for the 
slave mode of production in the third century.
98 Silver (2011) 90 especially n. 15 makes a point of the fact that Mouritsen (2004) never considered 
the incerti with a ‘respectable’ Latin name to have been voluntary slaves.
99 For the inscription (in Greek): Drew-Bear and Naour, ANRW II 18.3 (1990) 1967–77, no. 15 and 
Kearsley (2001) 118 ff, no. 144. See Weaver (2004) 200 with n. 28; Silver (2011) 90; Tacoma (2016) 
182 n.63 notes two additional examples: the first is CIL 6. 13328, where an imperial slave (named 
Numida) at Rome has a free (or freed, but not imperial) mother (Aemilia Primitiva), which probably 
implies that he was born free, as does their origin in Africa. If I understand correctly, however, 
Weaver (1972) 177f indicates that a union between imperial freedmen and freeborn women could 
also produce imperial slaves, so an alternative explanation is that the unknown father was an 
imperial freedman. The second is P. Oxy. 46. 3312, which seems to suggest that a certain (freeborn) 
Herminos has become a freedman, pace Weaver (2004). It states ‘γινως οῦ̣[ν] ὅτι Ἑρμῖνος ἀπῆλθεν 
ἰς Ῥώμ ̣[ην] καὶ ἀπελεύθερος ἐγένετ[ο] Καίσαρος ἵνα ὀπίκια [= officia] λάβ[ῃ.]: “You should know 
that Herminos has gone off to Rome and become a freedman of Caesar so he can get official 
posts”, in the translation of Weaver. Though his freedom may plausibly be inferred, technically 
Herminos’ original legal status is not stated.
Family economics: elite domus 181
aE 1979, 656
C(aius) Iulius Aug(usti) l(ibertus) Felix / Accavonis f(ilius) pius / vixit annis LXV h(ic) 
s(itus) e(st) / C(aius) Iulius C(ai) l(ibertus) Felix f(ilius) patri / posterisq(ue) eius d(e) 
s(ua) p(ecunia) f(ecit)
Caius Iulius Felix, freedman of Augustus, the pious son of Accavo, lived 65 years, 
[and] is buried here. Caius Iulius Felix, Jr., freedman of Caius set this up with his 
own funds to his father and his [father’s] descendants.
Weaver and Silver are convinced that these individuals are examples of freeborn men 
who were freeborn, (voluntarily?) enslaved and subsequently freed.100 In my view, that 
is not necessarily what these texts indicate: in the epitaph just cited, Caius Iulius Felix 
junior used exactly the same form of filiation and libertination as his father does, despite 
the fact that the son was surely born a slave – or he would not also have been freed. 
My contention is that the filiation in these examples is a positive appraisal of biological 
family ties among slaves and ex-slaves, more than anything else – similar to the use of 
coniux for conjugal partners in a union that was not actually recognized by the law. In 
defense of Morris Silver, however: there must have been many who opted for slavery.
From the viewpoint of the buyer, there were a number of practical economic concerns, 
which created a continuous demand for slaves. In the words of Mouritsen:
Elite households would have seen a steady influx of newly purchased slaves, who 
supplemented existing staff members who had died. Slave functions were often 
highly specialized and vacancies might occur unpredictably before home-born 
apprentices had been fully trained. Slaves from the market were therefore a 
natural supplement to the self-regeneration of the familia.101
Moreover, owning and training skilled slaves of every type may have been exceedingly 
expensive for all but the wealthiest households. Varro remarks that for the farm, at least, 
to hire the services of doctors, fullers, and builders from a nearby city (if available) could 
100 Weaver (2004) 200 with n. 31; Silver (2011) 90.
101 Mouritsen (2013) 58; Treggiari (1979b) 188-189: “A young Roman considering how to encourage 
the production of children by the slaves he had inherited from his father might not be able to fore-
see that he would marry a woman whose dotal estates would unexpectedly involve him in, say, 
marble-quarrying for which he would need a special staff, or that he would have eight daughters 
who would need an unusually large complement of maids, or that his only son would be a scholar 
who needed research assistants with expertise in Etruscan”.
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be wiser than training its own slaves, “for sometimes the death of one artisan wipes out 
the profit of the farm”.102
Buying slaves at great expense is also a form of conspicuous consumption: because 
domestic slaves were somewhat of a luxury product, buying slaves – particularly male 
slaves – was also a means of showing off. Scheidel contends that the continued existence 
of slavery can only be explained by accepting that ideology and tradition, not economic 
rationality, lay at the heart of ancient slavery.103 The cultural expectation that an elite 
domus should entertain numerous slaves, was real. As noted by Mouritsen, however, 
economic considerations also played a part. The question whether slave-holding was 
economically viable has not been answered decisively.104 Nevertheless, it was definitely 
possible to reap a substantial profit by selling or hiring out slaves. The value of slaves 
and (skilled) slave labour will be explored further in the section on human capital below.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the slave trade continued under the high empire, 
but also that a demonstrable shift in the sources of slaves occurred from mainly war cap-
tives under the Republic, to a variety of sources in the Principate – including contractual 
slaves, foreigners, and home-born slaves.
Home-born slaves
An increasing number of slaves must have been born into slavery. Home-born slaves 
were called vernae or, more matter-of-factly in a legal context, partus ancillarum (liter-
ally the ‘offspring of slave women’).105 They had a firm reputation of trustworthiness, for 
which they were valued highly by their masters.106 The particular status is proudly ad-
vertised in inscriptions by both vernae and masters.107Vernae sometimes record it even 
102 RR 1.16.4, quorum non numquam unius artificis mors tollit fundi fructum tr. Hooper and Ash (1934, 
Loeb Classical Library); the passage was brought to my attention by Silver (2011) 100. It is interest-
ing that in this context Varro speaks of a “yearly contract” (anniversarios) for doctors, fullers and 
builders (medicos, fullones, fabros).
103 Scheidel (2005b), (2008); White (2008) is unhelpful for a purely economic comparison from the 
perspective of the owner’s investment, because his argument focuses on welfare economics and 
allocative efficiency, which is an ethical approach that includes the value of freedom (immeasur-
able).
104 See introductory chapter.
105 Sigismund-Nielsen (2013) 293 writes on vernae: “But it is not under this term that we meet them 
in the Digest. We know them only as the filii of a male, high-status slave and his contubernalis”. The 
Digest also refers to partus ancillarum.
106 Rawson (2013); Bradley (1994) 33 remarks that vernae had “a certain cachet” (his italics). On vernae, 
see especially Hermann-Otto (1994). Sigismund-Nielsen (2013) 293 seems not to have been able 
to substantiate her earlier doubts about the special position of vernae on the basis of the literary 
material, (1991) 226.
107 Sigismund-Nielsen (1991) analyses inscriptions from CIL 6.
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after manumission, like Anicetus for example, an imperial freedman architect and verna 
referred to in CIL 6. 5738, the epitaph for his wife Aurelia Fortunata. More commonly it is 
used as a term of endearment for a slave-child by his or her master, suggesting ties of af-
fection; although presumably the mention of a home-born slave also advertised the fact 
that the master possessed the resources to raise one. CIL 14. 472 is an elaborate example.
ciL 14. 472
D(is) M(anibus) / Melioris calculatoris / vixit ann(os) XIII hic tantae memoriae et 
scientiae / fuit ut ab antiquorum memori[a] usque in diem / finis suae omnium 
titulos superaverit / singula autem quae sciebat volumin[e] potius / quam titulo 
scribi potuerunt nam / commentarios artis suae quos reliq(u)it / primus fecit et 
solus posset imitari si eum / iniq(u)a fata rebus humanis non invidissent / Sex(tus) 
Aufustius Agreus vernae / suo praeceptor [i]nfelicissimus / fecit / in f(ronte) 
p(edes) II in ag(ro) p(edes) VI / excessit anno urbis condita / DCCCXCVII
[Sacred] to the divine spirits. To Melior, calculator, who lived 13 years. He was 
of such wisdom and knowledge that he surpassed the renown of all from the 
memory of the ancients until the day of his passing. The singular things (sin-
gula quae) that he knew were more voluminous than they could inscribe on his 
headstone; for the commentaries that he left behind of his art, he was the first to 
make, and only he could duplicate them, if the hostile fates had not begrudged 
him the human realm. Sextus Aufustius Agreas to his verna, [his] most unhappy 
instructor, set up this monument. Two feet wide, six feet long. He passed away in 
the year 897 from the founding of the city [145 AD].
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A child born to a slave mother was a slave and belonged to the mother’s owner. This was 
of obvious benefit to the master, and it must have been one of the reasons why slave 
unions were allowed. If women were kept in slavery longer than men, as can plausibly 
be argued, this is probably no coincidence and it should be explained in part by the fact 
that the women were still of child-bearing age.108 It is a commonplace that at least some 
slaves were sexually exploited.109 As a result of sexual exploitation of slave women by 
their owner, an unknown number of slave children were in fact the biological offspring 
of the master himself. It is also possible that in some instances the sexual relations of a 
slave with another slave were forced: Bradley suggests that slave offspring was “so con-
venient” to owners, that for slave unions “perhaps more than approval was involved”.110 
To my knowledge there is no hard evidence for this.
There are certainly clues that the ability to beget children was valued in a slave 
woman. A female slave was priced highest at the time when her reproductive capacity 
was highest, between 16–40 years of age.111 It should be noted, however, that this is 
also the age when male slaves are most expensive. The Digest offers more compelling 
evidence that slave-owners took an interest in their slave women’s offspring. Women 
who had given birth to several children could apparently be rewarded by manumission, 
which indicates that there was some encouragement, or at least appreciation, of the 
fact.112 Moreover, one could go back on the purchase of a slave woman who was sold 
“with her offspring added”, if she turned out to be infertile or over fifty – which was really 
the same thing in Roman law.113 Conversely, it is spelled out that the sale of a woman 
was considered valid also when she was pregnant – Ulpian continues: “after all, the first 
and foremost task of women is to conceive and to take care of the child”.114 Elsewhere, 
however, the same Ulpian notes that “slave women were not simply purchased for that 
108 Drawing on the data for Roman Egypt: Scheidel (1997) 160–2, Bagnall and Frier (1994) 94 with n.10 
and the age-table (D) on page 342–3.
109 Both male and female slaves, though for obvious reasons the emphasis is on slave women here; 
Scheidel (2009b) 284–99; repeated in (2011b) 113–4; cf Treggiari (1979b) 192-194, who in addition 
references the possibility that owners fell in love with slaves, or protected their female slaves from 
prostitution by contract.
110 Bradley (1994) 50-51, see also Bradley (1987b) on ‘slave-breeding’.
111 Cf Bradley (1987a) 55 on thirty Egyptian contracts of sale that demonstrate a correlation “between 
the age of adult female slaves at the time of sale and the period of expected reproductivity”.
112 Dig. 1.5.15 (Ulpian); Dig. 34.5.10.1 (Ulpian); cf also Colum. RR 1.8, 19.
113 Dig 19.1.21 pr: Si sterilis ancilla sit, cuius partus venit, vel maior annis quinquaginta, cum id emptor 
ignoraverit, ex empto tenetur venditor.
114 Dig. 21.1.14.1 (Ulpian): maximum enim ac praecipuum munus feminarum est accipere ac tueri con-
ceptum.
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reason that they bear children”.115 That is to say, women’s childbearing potential was 
definitely a consideration, but it was not the sole reason for purchase.116
Relationships between male and female slaves, ideally, could of course also be vol-
untary. Many epitaphs of slave partners suggest that their unions not uncommonly 
developed out of affection. Slaves were regularly allowed to engage in contubernium, a 
de facto marriage-bond that was recognised by all but the law, since slaves did not have 
the legal capacity to marry.117 Whereas it cannot be excluded that slave owners allowed 
such unions out of the sheer goodness of their hearts, there is some evidence to suggest 
that consent to contubernia was part of a reward system to increase labour productiv-
ity – and that would make it a strategic move on the part of the master(s).118 Moreover, 
we should consider the fact that the dynamics of the slave population simply came with 
the phenomenon of slave family formation and slave infants – and that process may not 
necessarily have been easy to control within a large household, even if the owners had 
wanted to.
More often than not, a slave found his or her partner within the same familia.119 The fol-
lowing examples are of such contubernia between (ex-)slaves from the same household.
115 Dig. 5.3.27 pr. (Ulpian). In context: “slave women’s children and their children’s children should not 
be considered proceeds (fructus), since slave women were not simply purchased for that reason 
that they bear children, though their offspring does add to an inheritance.”– ancillarum etiam 
partus et partum partus quamquam fructus non existimantur, quia non temere ancillae eius rei causa 
comparantur ut pariant, augent tamen hereditatem.
116 Cf Treggiari (1979b) 186-188.
117 On the legalities and practicalities of contubernium, see Treggiari (1991) 52-4, 410-1 and more 
through her index s.v. contubernium and contubernales; see also Flory (1978) “Family within fa-
milia”.
118 Bradley (1987a) 50, 51: “permitting marital and familial associations among their slaves could 
contribute positively to the preservation of social and economic order”. Varro RR 1.17.5 mentions 
marriage as a reward for the vilicus: “The foremen are to be made more zealous by rewards, and 
care must be taken that they have a bit of property of their own, and mates from among their 
fellow-slaves (coniunctas conservas, e quibus habeant filios) to bear them children; for by this 
means they are made more steady and more attached to the place”. Tr. Hooper and Ash (1934, 
Loeb Classical Library).
119 Mouritsen (2013) 54 table 8, for marriages within the Statilian (and Volusian) households; 
Edmondson (2011) 347; Flory (1978) 82; Treggiari (1973) on the household of the Volusii (and, 
in passing, on that of the Statilii). With the approval of both masters, however, a relation could 
also be maintained over two households – presumably the owner of the male partner would be 
compensated for the benefit of children resulting from the union, who would automatically be 
assigned to the familia and possessions of the woman’s owner, for examples see Rawson (1966).
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ciL 6. 33794
Maritimi / Antoniae Drusi l(iberti) / rogatoris // Quintiae / Antoniae Drusi 
l(ibertae) / cantricis
[Grave] of Maritimus, freedman of Antonia wife of Drusus, questioner.
[Grave] of Quintia, freedwoman of Antonia wife of Drusus, singer.
Maritimus and Quintia both served Antonia Minor, one of the women of the Julio-
Claudian family. The juxtaposition of both epitaphs on one memorial plaque suggests 
that Maritimus and Quintia were partners in a contubernium, even if the stone does 
not record it explicitly. Even if the questioner and singer were not contubernales, the 
existence of other, similar marble plaques juxtaposing husband and wife suggest that 
they might have been. Leaving no doubts about the nature of the recorded relationship, 
for example, is CIL 6. 6342 from the tomb of the Statilii.
ciL 6. 6342
Italia quasillaria / vixit ann(os) XX / Scaeva tabellarius Tauri / coniugi suae fecit
Italia, spinning woman. She lived 20 years. Scaeva, tabellarius of Taurus set this 
up to his wife.
Scaeva refers to his deceased partner with the word for a lawful wife, coniux, which can 
only be a reflection of sentiment, not of the status of their relationship.120 The union of 
the Dardanians in CIL 6. 6343 cited earlier is a contubernium, too; in their case it is one 
that may even have predated their enslavement, since they were both from the same 
region. If so, it is an interesting detail that the continuity of their union was allowed for 
by their masters, again the Statilii.
Accommodating family formation among slaves led to valuable slave offspring and 
slave families also were a contributing factor tying the freed to their former master’s 
household.121 There are thus very few reasons why aristocratic masters would be op-
posed to their slaves and ex-slaves forming families of their own. Especially where it 
concerns domestic urban slavery rather than chattel slavery, the sources indicate that 
there was no lack of opportunity for slaves to form a family. This, therefore, cannot 
120 CIL 10. 3957 quoted above is another example. Treggiari (1979b) 195 (with refs.) points out that 
even the jurists sometimes use uxor rather than the correct contubernalis.
121 This chapter, above; Mouritsen (2013) 55 also suggested as much.
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have been a limiting factor on slave fertility.122 Contubernia effectually brought an extra 
demographic factor into play for the household, and could lead to families branching 
out widely among the servile population of the domus.123 Slave families and vernae were 
therefore a common phenomenon, certainly within elite domus of the city. However, 
this does not mean that slave reproduction alone was enough to fulfil the demand for 
slaves – the previous section already underlined the evidence for other sources of slaves.
Those inclined to tone down the importance of home-born slaves as a source of 
slaves, have adduced skewed sex ratios as a major limiting factor on slave reproduction: 
there were too few slave women.124 More male than female slave labourers are attested, 
it is not unlikely that the slaves who were bought in the slave market were chiefly young 
adult males, and it has been argued that although foundlings perhaps were more likely 
to be girls, the boys were more likely to be brought up.125 It becomes difficult to discard 
entirely the suggestion that men were in the majority among the slave population. 
Scheidel forcefully advocates that there were as many slave women as there were men, 
however, and that the sex ratios will have balanced out by the time of the early empire.126
I would argue that the solution to maintaining slave fertility, despite a slight misbal-
ance in sex ratio, lies predominantly in the distinctive life course of men and women. By 
analogy with the general marriage pattern, female slaves undoubtedly ‘married’ earlier 
than men, and were more likely to remarry and balance out the marriage market; ‘mar-
riage’ here always meaning the quasi-marital form of contubernium.127 Add to that the 
fact that women probably were manumitted later than men (see below) and that as a re-
sult, most of their children were in effect born as slaves, and the sex ratio becomes less of 
a ‘problem’. And there were other solutions that would support fertility rates. Mouritsen’s 
analysis of the households of the Statilii and the Volusii demonstrates a skewed sex ratio 
for both domus. Importantly, it also shows that the ‘surplus’ of males, slave, freed, and 
free, was not necessarily celibate – not infrequently they were married to women from 
122 Harris (1980) proffers this as one of the main arguments that would lower slave fertility (according 
to the addenda to the (2011) reprint, p. 108, he still agrees with his earlier argument).
123 Edmondson (2011) 347 notes that “house-bred slaves (vernae) might well have had a number of 
aunts, uncles and cousins”, with examples on page 348: a maternal uncle (avunculus, commemo-
rated in CIL 6. 6469), and a paternal uncle (patruus, commemorator in CIL 6. 6619) whose niece 
resp. nephew were with them in the household of the Statilii.
124 Especially Harris (1980) pp; (1999) 69–72.
125 Male slaves predominating in the market, e.g. Mouritsen (2013) 58; De Ligt and Garnsey (2012) 86; 
Helpfully contextualising the gender of expositi with references: Evans Grubbs (2013) 90–2.
126 Scheidel (2005a) 71–3; Scheidel (2011a) 307–8.
127 The general marriage pattern is discussed in chapter 3.
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outside the household.128 The incidence of inscriptions that attest to unions between 
freed slaves with distinct gentilicia also supports the suggestion that there were slaves 
who maintained their ‘marriage-bond’ over two different households.129 It will also be-
come clear (below) that a large number of individuals was employed in child care, which 
underlines a significant presence of infants and older children in the household. In sum, 
there is no evidence for systematic slave breeding, but procreation was accommodated 
and perhaps encouraged, because slave children were a welcome side-effect of a larger 
slave familia.
The slave members of the family faced considerable insecurity regarding their own 
biological families; slave parents, spouses, or children could be sold off. The owner need 
not take the personal lives of his or her slaves into account, dislocating familial bonds. 
But the slaves’ story may not always have been as grim as some scholars would have 
it.130 Edmondson notes that there is evidence that now and then the choice was made to 
sell a nuclear slave family, or a mother and child, together rather than to separate them; 
presumably this was better for morale than selling off slave children separately.131 The 
latter scenario is nevertheless more commonly attested. Upon the death of the master, 
too, it is likely that the slaves of the household were scattered among heirs, again not 
necessarily taking into consideration the slave family. Yet there is evidence that slave 
parents were allowed to keep in touch with their children over two or sometimes more 
households.132 Moreover, there are clues that slave-owners who expected their slaves 
to be sold off or split up upon their death or, like Cicero for example, upon their exile, 
were inclined to free more of their slaves in advance.133 Apparently slave-owners did 
not always let their personal economic gain preside over more humane considerations. 
And the slaves of the elite domus may well have been the more privileged group in this 
respect, because of the proximity to their masters.
128 Mouritsen (2013) 53–5, the pattern is especially clear for the Volusii, where marriages are better 
documented: 21 % (N=54) of males married an outsider.
129 Rawson (1966) offers some examples.
130 Harper (2011) 77 and especially Bradley (1987a) 47–80 emphasize implicit insecurity; cf Flory 
(1978) 87.
131 Edmondson (2011) 349-50 with n. 44 for references to contracts of sale on papyri; cf. Treggiari 
(1979b) 196-201, considers “the legal attitude to slave families [which] became gradually more 
humane under the empire” (at 196), respecting slave’s family bonds.
132 Rawson (1966) 78-81 for examples of such ‘broken’ slave families, since, paradoxically, the evidence 
for broken families itself is proof for a continued bond. Sigismund-Nielsen (2013) 292–3 adds 
some useful primary references.
133 Mouritsen (2011a) 184-5 with references.
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Foundlings or the purchase of infants
Child slaves were not always born in the household: foundlings and bought infant 
slaves should also be considered in this context. Most foundlings that were taken up, 
were raised as a slave.134 Harris suggested that provincial foundlings – born where life 
was cheap – were regularly raised to be sold on the slave market in the city of Rome.135 
Children could be bought at reduced prices: slaves age 0-8 were available at half the 
price of an adult slave or less.136 These children were not always born into slavery. Parallel 
to self-enslavement, there must also have been parents who sold their free children into 
slavery, out of practicality perhaps, out of necessity, or for hope of a better future for 
their newborn than they had to offer.137 The legal sources are ambiguous towards the 
practice, as freedom was absolute in Roman law – but every legal obstacle to child (or 
self-) sale seems to have had a way around it, including a fictional ‘exposure’ of the infant 
so that the buyer could claim not to be aware of its free status.138 It presumably was a 
profitable arrangement for both seller, and buyer.
Raising a foundling or buying a slave infant may well have been an attractive invest-
ment, not just for slave traders but also for an individual household. An infant was much 
less costly than an adult slave, both in price of purchase and in cost of maintenance. 
As with home-born slaves, the cost of raising an infant is more gradual than buying an 
older slave for a substantial sum to be covered all at once. The possibility that some 
preferred such gradual payment should not be underestimated. The total cost of rais-
ing a foundling seems to have been roughly similar to the price of a young adult slave; 
moreover, these very young individuals would be raised in the household, and they 
could perhaps reach the same informal status that was awarded to the vernae who were 
so popular for their alleged loyalty.139
134 Corbier (2001) 66-7; Harris, especially Harris (1980), argues for the importance of abandoned 
children as a source of slaves.
135 Harris (2011) 87.
136 E.g. Diocletian’s Prices Edict of AD 301 chapter 29, 1-7 lists 15,000 for a male or 10,000 denarii for a 
female slave age 0-8, compared to 30,000 (m) or 25,000 (f ) for slaves age 16–40; cf Scheidel (1996), 
(2005b).
137 Scheidel’s (1997) model for the slave population on pages 164–5 predicts that one in five (in 
one scenario even one in three) mothers bore a child that would become a slave, a number he 
then dismisses as unrealistic; Silver (2011) 107 thinks it may not be so unrealistic in view of his 
argument for the predominance of contractual slavery – at the same time he suggests on page 
109 that few if any exposed children will have died, because they were in fact sold into slavery. 
With that he mitigates the numbers in Scheidel’s model, who works with an attrition rate among 
expositi of 33%.
138 Silver (2011) 80–1, 83, 107–8 with references to many legal sources.
139 Saller (2013) 73 n.5 offers a very rough calculation of investment in a female foundling in Roman 
Egypt, compared to buying an older female slave.
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There was a risk to the investment, as infant mortality in particular was notoriously 
high in ancient Rome.140 A one-year-old had already lived through the most hazardous 
times, however, and at the age of five, the original life expectancy of around twenty-five 
years at birth may have been raised to forty. Perhaps, then, it was smarter to buy a slightly 
older slave child. Apparently, however, the life of a child slave and his or her prospective 
earnings were worth the gamble to many. Although it would be a while before labour 
output would reach its maximum potential, children did put in their labour from a very 
early age onwards.141 Raising children as slaves was economically rational.
Inheritance
Relocating slaves or acquiring slaves through an inheritance, finally, should probably not 
be considered as a conscious policy, even if we allow for the possibility that a few master-
minds or inheritance hunters did make plans for when their rich aunt, or they themselves, 
passed away.142 Although not technically the result of economic strategizing, this way of 
acquiring slaves may well have been quite common in a high mortality regime.143 With 
the passing of an aristocrat, the number of slaves to be relocated could be substantial. It 
is unlikely that this posed much of a problem: a son or daughter already made use of that 
very slave familia living in the same domus, and if that did not work out slaves could be 
freed or sold if they were unwelcome in the household – with all due considerations of the 
factors already discussed under the heading of buying and selling above.
Alternatively, testamentary manumission could provide the heir with a freedman, 
rather than a slave. From the perspective of the deceased master, this had the benefit 
of not missing out on the slave’s services during his lifetime. Making up a will required a 
delicate balance between benefiting the heir on the one hand and the (ex-)slave on the 
other, which is why testamentary manumission often specified certain obligations of the 
freedman to the heir, sometimes including economic contributions such as operae.144 
The lex Fufia Caninia of 2 BC specified a maximum for the number or percentage of 
slaves that could be manumitted by will, which could conceivably also be understood 
as a contribution to help maintain the balance. It should be recalled also that the patron 
often was heir to a substantial part of a freedman’s property, particularly when the 
140 Parkin (2013) 46–50 is a recent, sophisticated account of the available models and numbers, and 
forms the reference for the numbers in this paragraph.
141 Dig. 7.7.6.1 (Ulpian) notes that slaves counted as productive from age 5 onwards; cf Laes (2011a) 
165 for this and other references to the value of slave child labour.
142 Or those wanting to win imperial favour, Penner (2012) 128.
143 Penner (2012) 125-130 offers a very interesting analysis tracing the origins/circulation of inherited 
slaves in the Julio-Claudian domus through agnomina; cf Mouritsen (2013) 60 with n. 53.
144 Because of this delicate balancing-act, Mouritsen (2011a) 180-5, esp. 182 argues that testamentary 
manumission was probably fairly limited.
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freedman had no (freeborn) children.145 Moreover, since there is sufficient evidence for 
the continued bonds between patrons and freedmen – in nonelite and elite families 
alike – it can safely be said that inheriting a freedmen was in many ways as desirable as 
inheriting a slave.
That on occasion an inheritance of slaves and freedmen did result in economic strat-
egizing, and that there were economic advantages involved, is suggested by Appian. 
One of the strategizing masterminds who was not certain of his inheritance of freed-
men, because he was not a biological son of the deceased he was to inherit from, was 
Octavian Augustus. In an interesting passage Appian suggests why Octavian would have 
wanted the people confirm his adoption by Caesar in accordance with the lex curiata:146
Appian. bc. 3.13 (94)
Γαΐῳ δ’ ἦν τά τε ἄλλα λαμπρὰ καὶ ἐξελεύθεροι πολλοί τε καὶ πλούσιοι, καὶ διὰ τόδ’ 
ἴσως μάλιστα ὁ Καῖσαρ ἐπὶ τῇ προτέρᾳ θέσει, κατὰ διαθήκας οἱ γενομένῃ, καὶ 
τῆσδε ἐδεήθη.
Among the other splendid accessories of Caesar was a large number of freed-
men, many of them rich, and this was perhaps the principal reason why Octavian 
wanted the adoption by a vote of the people in addition to the former adoption 
which came to him by Caesar’s will.
Octavian wanted to be absolutely certain that his (testamentary) adoption by Caesar was 
publicly accepted, because – so Appian – he wanted to profit from the large and, so it is 
poignantly added, wealthy freed entourage of Caesar. Even though political legitimacy 
was obviously the most important factor in the reconfirmation of Octavian’s adoption, it 
is striking that Appian singles out this very point.
In sum, it is clear that the decision to acquire new slaves or to sell them was based on 
economic as well as cultural considerations. The same is true for manumission, which 
has been the subject of incessant debate among historians and which because of the 
complexity of the matter deserves to be dealt with in a separate section.
145 Mouritsen (2011a) 238: “Freedmen were expected to consider their patrons in their wills, and if 
they failed to do so and died without direct natural heirs, the patron could claim half the estate 
(from Augustus onwards)”. The converse – freedmen as heirs to their patron – was not uncommon 
either, see idem 240-2 and chapter 3 above.
146 Appian. BC 3. 13 (94); transl. H. White (1913 Loeb Classical Library).
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Changing slaves to freedmen: manumission
Why did Roman masters free so many slaves? At first sight, it seems amazing. 
Slaves cost money. Skilled or talented slaves apparently stood the best chance of 
securing their freedom, and they cost a lot of money.147
Hopkins sought to explain the economic rationality behind manumission and came up 
with an answer that was as elegant as it was plausible: slaves generally bought their own 
freedom, which allowed the owner to buy a replacement.148 This view has only limited 
support in the evidence, however. Mouritsen in a recent discussion of the topic has to 
conclude that in the end, there is no simple economic explanation.149 This sums up the 
difficulty in understanding the economics of manumission in twenty-first century terms: 
manumission does not appear to adhere to any economic rule. Even if the motivations 
for freeing slaves were not, or not entirely, economically rational, however, freedman-
ship certainly was an important factor in the way the labour market functioned.
Freedom is considered to be the ultimate reward for slaves. In terms of economics, 
manumission becomes a positive incentive for slaves, particularly, or so it was argued, 
for those in “care-intensive” jobs: occupations that required initiative and responsibil-
ity from the slave, and that were difficult to supervise.150 A reward system built around 
the prospect of freedom can only have functioned if manumission was not granted 
indiscriminately, which means that slaves working in these positions either stood a 
better chance to be freed than others, and/or that they were freed at an earlier age. 
The evidence, however, is not systematic enough to be able to support either of these 
scenarios. There are a few attestations of very young freedmen: Lucius Anicius Felix for 
example, a fine tailor (vestiarius tenuarius) of only four years old, was freed – though this 
was probably a case of death-bed manumission. There is also evidence to the contrary. 
Seventy-year old Oriens, a tailor (sarcinator) from Tarentum, judging from his single 
name, was probably still a slave.151
The fragmentary nature of the ancient evidence, and the biases that it entails, do not 
allow modern scholars to establish the frequency of manumission with any certainty. With 
147 Hopkins (1978) 117.
148 Hopkins (1978) 126–131.
149 Mouritsen (2011a) 202: “The Roman system of manumission gave owners considerable scope for 
rewarding slaves irrespective of their age, gender, and occupation. The result is a picture that does 
not conform to any narrow economic logic”.
150 Scheidel (2008) with reference to the work of Fenoaltea (1984); Hawkins (forthcoming). Frequent 
manumission is also crucial to Temin’s understanding of an integrated labour market, Temin 
(2004a) 522.
151 CIL 6. 6852 (Felix) and AE 1972, 111 (Oriens).
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Mouritsen I hold that manumission was probably “both very common and very selective”.152 
Manumission was not for everyone.153 It remains to be seen whether manumission was 
frequent enough to be a strong incentive for self-sale.154 There does not appear to be a 
clear pattern as to which slaves were freed and which were not.155 One of the more con-
vincing selection-criteria, however, appears to have been the opportunity to stand out in 
the eyes of the master – which provided an advantage for slaves in the domestic context of 
large urban families in comparison with those working on a rural estate.156 That particular 
criterion leveled the chances of manumission, which could potentially have functioned 
as an added labour incentive: “all had a chance and no one was formally beyond hope”.157
Mouritsen recently postulated that manumission of the domestic staff of the Volusii 
and Statilii was granted on the assumption that the new freedman did not leave the 
household. By implication, as the author points out, manumission became a nominal 
gesture of very little practical consequence to the slaves, which would take away much 
of its economic function as a positive labour incentive.158 The household columbaria 
of the Volusii and the Statilii show a freed population of 32 per cent and 46 per cent 
respectively, suggesting that “between a quarter and a third of the household may have 
been freed at any time”. This matches with an overall manucmission rate of more than 50 
per cent for slaves over the age of 30. Considering the limited practical effect of manu-
mission if freed slaves did indeed maintain their own jobs in the household, Mouritsen 
suggests that the chances of manumission for the Volusian and Statilian slave staff may 
well have been better than for others.159
From an elite owner’s perspective, manumission as a strategy to battle the risks of a 
fluctuating market or to create a flexible work-force is unlikely to have played a part (see 
152 Mouritsen (2011a) 140. Mouritsen provides a useful survey of past scholarship on the frequency of 
manumission on pp. 120-141. On p. 131 he complains that: “Given the state of our evidence, most 
scholars have remained cautious about the rate of manumission, merely suggesting that many 
slaves had a ‘good chance’, vel sim.”.
153 Interestingly, manumission in Roman Egypt was virtually universal, Tacoma (2006) 257 with refer-
ence to the data in Bagnall and Frier (1994).
154 As Silver (2011) 92–3 would have it.
155 Mouritsen (2011a) chapter 5 on manumission, 120–205.
156 E.g. Mouritsen (2013) 59-60.
157 Mouritsen (2011a) 200.
158 Mouritsen (2013) 58-61, at 58: “The high rate of manumission, the commemoration of freedmen 
alongside other family servants, and the extensive use of vicarii all point in that direction”, and 
at 61: “Manumission was ‘rational’ in the sense that it involved limited losses for the owner, but 
that does not entail it was therefore part of a logical system of rewards and incentives for slaves 
performing particularly responsible economic roles”.
159 Mouritsen (2013) 46–7, quote at 53; but see Garnsey and De Ligt (2016) 80 with n. 29 for the 
implications of Mouritsens numbers on general manumission rates.
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chapter 3).160 The manumission tax of 5 per cent is not very likely to have posed an obstacle 
to a wealthy master, either. In the context of the elite domus cultural considerations were 
equally, if not more, important than strictly monetary concerns. There was social capital 
in having freedmen. Freedmen brought name recognition, for example, and throngs 
of dependent freedmen at one’s door for the morning salutatio can only have been an 
impressive sight.161 Even the manumission of a slave on his or her deathbed was perhaps 
not merely a humanitarian and emotional act, but potentially also an opportunity for 
“social ostentation”.162 Ancient authors also make a number of (disapproving) references 
to the idea that slaves sometimes were freed by will, only to ensure a good following in 
the funerary procession.163 Whereas we should be careful not to caricaturize this solely as 
spendthrift of the elite, we may safely concur that “[t]he notion of ‘profitable’ manumission 
would have been out of tune with the ideology of the Roman elite”.164
Finally, there were also slaves who purchased their own freedom, which perhaps 
modifies any ‘pattern’ that is visible to modern eyes to some extent, and which was con-
ceivably also the way in which many voluntary slaves may have expected to exit slavery.
humAn CAPItAl
The high degree of specialisation and job differentiation in Roman Italy suggest sig-
nificant investment in human capital.165 Scholars have argued that opportunities for 
job-training were particularly good for slaves, especially so for the slaves in elite house-
holds. Indeed, skilled professions are attested chiefly for slaves and for ex-slaves. Skilled 
slaves and ex-slaves are a logical result of slave education: because human capital is not 
transferable, skills remain with the slave upon manumission. This is why the supposedly 
widespread access to education during slavery is considered to be one of the economic 
advantages of being a freedman.166 It is also suggested to be one of the reasons that a 
freeborn pauper should want to sell himself/herself into slavery in the hope of a better 
160 With reference to the work of Hawkins (forthcoming), and (2006) in particular.
161 The possibility of Veturius as a brand name was explored above p. 136.
162 Suggested by Mouritsen (2011a) 187, with references to some literary sources of deathbed manu-
mission. Cf the 4 year old tailor L. Anicius Felix, referenced above, and see also below.
163 Mouritsen (2011a) 184 with references n. 295.
164 Mouritsen (2011a) 196. On testamentary manumission: Gai. Inst. 1.42-3 specifies that no more 
than 100 slaves may be freed in one will.
165 See also chapter 3.
166 Treggiari (1969a) 87; Mouritsen (2011a) 219; Verboven (2012a) 94.
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life.167 Peter Temin takes these notions one step further and states that self-sale was “like 
the process of apprenticeship in early modern Europe”.168 To my mind, however, that is 
pushing the argument too far.
The interpretation of job-training as a slave prerogative has given rise to the idea that 
skilled labour can be equated with slave labour.
The demand for skilled workers was met by the importation of slaves from abroad or 
the training of slaves bred in the household (vernae). Ingenui who were not born into 
a craft had little prospect of acquiring the skills necessary to compete with slaves.169
Although Garnsey explicitly mentions the possibility of free artisans who were “born 
into a craft”, in this quotation he emphasizes the point that skilled labourers were often 
captives who were already experienced in a trade, or home-born slaves who were taught 
in the household.170
To what extent were schooling and job-training really the prerogative of slaves? Did 
the freeborn have “little prospect of acquiring skills necessary to compete” with them? 
Surely the evidence for freeborn artisans, and the representation of freeborn children in 
apprenticeships in the previous chapter counts for something. Nevertheless, investment 
in the human capital of slaves deserves close examination in its own right.171
Investing in slaves’ education seems to have made economic sense, since skilled slaves 
apparently were a precious commodity. The produce they were responsible for was worth 
more, and they would typically command higher prices in the market.172 Paul refers to a 
case in which a skilled workman was commissioned by a friend to buy a slave apprentice, 
who was afterwards sold for double the original price.173 Likewise, the slave chapter in 
Diocletian’s Prices Edict includes a clause that a skilled slave could be sold for up to twice 
the standard price for a slave of the same age and gender.174 According to Plutarch, the 
167 cf. Silver (2011); Ramin and Veyne (1981), who believe it to be one of the main sources of slaves. 
See above.
168 Temin (2004a) 526.
169 Garnsey (1980) 44; cf Mouritsen (2011a) 219 especially n. 63: “There is little evidence that more 
responsible or specialist functions were filled with hired labour”.
170 Burford (1972); Cf Park (1918) 49, 88-9, who seems to adhere to this scenario also for unskilled 
labourers.
171 For which the articles by Booth (1979), Forbes (1955), and Mohler (1940) are still relevant.
172 Saller (2013) 78; Mouritsen (2011a) 219: “The slaves’ status as property meant their value could be 
improved”.
173 Dig. 17.1.26.8.
174 Edict 29.8, see above; cf Col. RR. 3.3.8 (1st c. AD), estimating the price of a skilled vine dresser at 
6,000–8,000 sesterces, roughly three or four times the price of an adult slave.
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elder Cato allowed his slaves to buy slaves and train them for a year, with the specific 
goal of selling them at a profit.175 Conversely, Crassus personally invested heavily in the 
education of his slaves and benefited from their labour himself, again going by Plutarch’s 
account.176 Moreover, it is unlikely that elite domus were capable of replacing all of their 
skilled personnel with a home-taught individual. Death, illness and various other factors 
that necessitated replacement could not always have been planned for so there was no 
way to ensure that a replacement was at the ready.177 Hence, there must have been quite 
a market for skilled labour – which, in many instances, meant a market for skilled slaves.
household schools and household schooling
The argument for the training of slaves in larger domus comes mainly from various refer-
ences to the so-called paedagogium.178 A paedagogium seems to have been an in-house 
school for slave boys that was part of some larger households. It is best described as 
a ‘page-school’, something Columella refers to as “training-schools for the most con-
temptible vices – the seasoning of food to promote gluttony and the more extravagant 
serving of courses”.179 These boys were pretty and well-dressed ‘pet’ slaves, home-born 
vernae in particular.
The evidence on these page-schools is not so straightforward, however. A reference to 
the paedagogium in the Letters of Pliny the Younger is exemplary in the lack of informa-
tion it provides:
Plin. Ep. 7.27.13
Puer in paedagogio mixtus pluribus dormiebat: venerunt per fenestras (ita nar-
rat) in tunicis albis duo cubantemque detonderunt, et qua venerunt recesserunt. 
Hunc quoque tonsum sparsosque circa capillos dies ostendit.
A boy slept in the paedagogium, in among many others: two figures in white tunics 
came through the windows (so he says) and shaved the sleeping boy, and went back 
the way they came. The day shows this boy bald and amidst scattered locks of hair.180
175 Plut. Cato 21,7.
176 Plut. Crass. 2.4-6; cf Saller (2013) 78: “Plutarch’s phrase organa empsucha might be translated, with 
some license, as ‘human capital’”.
177 Mouritsen (2013) 58, 60, quoted above.
178 Mohler (1940); Forbes (1955); Keegan (2013) 73-5.
179 Forbes (1955) 335; Columella 1 praef. 5; contemptissimorum vitiorum officinae, gulosius condiendi 
cibos et luxuriosius fericula struendi, translation Ash, Loeb Classical Library.
180 Plin. Ep. 7.27.13; I translated ostendit as a praesens historicum, in accordance with the analysis of 
the narrative modes in Pliny 7.27 by Kroon (2002). See her p. 196 for the probability of reading 
ostendit as historical present rather than perfect.
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We are informed that many boys slept over in the paedagogium, which is why Mohler 
takes it to be a kind of boarding school.181 Unfortunately Pliny offers no further details as 
to what goes on in the paedagogia.
The remains of two archaeological structures in Rome have been nominated as a pos-
sible locus for the imperial paedagogium, one on the Caelian, one on the Palatine hill. In an 
analysis of graffiti from the Palatine paedagogium, Peter Keegan attempts to demonstrate 
that slave boys were educated in reading and writing.182 It is the only evidence that sug-
gests that the paedagogium is “where urban slave children were taught the elements 
of letters and numbers, as well as the finer arts of elegant domestic service”.183 Keegan’s 
tentative suggestion is that the paedagogiani may even have had the opportunity to 
learn a job,184 because a custos, ianitor (both doorkeepers), opifer (helper),185 and a perfusor 
(bath-servant)186 are identified in the scribbles. Whereas I am willing to accept that some 
or even most boys obtained a very basic literacy, I do not think that this necessarily hap-
pened in the paedagogium (see below). Moreover, the occupations mentioned are few 
and unskilled, and so I remain unconvinced that any systematic job-training took place in 
the paedagogium. Having said that, Keegan is of course right in his more general observa-
tion that the boys were prepared for “personal service at close quarters to the emperor, his 
family, and the imperial retinue of aristocratic and equestrian retainers.”187 In my opinion, 
the remainder of Keegan’s article reads mostly like a strong confirmation of Columella’s 
prejudices towards the paedagogium as a “training school for the most contemptible vices”.
The foregoing discussion raises the question of how widespread and how influential 
the paedagogium as an educational institution really was. If this was indeed “antiquity’s 
most systematic and durable plan for educating slave children”,188 Roman plans for slave 
education in general do not appear to have been systematic or durable. Students from 
181 Mohler (1940) 270.
182 Keegan (2013) 75-8. Keegan brings out the “educational heterogeneity” of the graffiti – about 
10 per cent exhibits “a certain grade of instruction corresponding suggestively to the use of the 
building as a paedagogium”(76). This educational heterogeneity is then interpreted as a reflection 
of “the process of learning to write”.
183 Saller (2013) 78; The assumption that language and arithmetic were also taught in the paedago-
gium is widespread: Mohler (1940) and Forbes (1955).
184 Keegan (2013) 79-81.
185 Keegan (2013) 81 thinks this is a slave who provided medical aid, which would make it a highly 
skilled job. In n. 40 he admits that literally the word means aid-bringer. I should like to add it also 
means ‘helper’, which may be no more than a generic term for a trusted slave. I know of no other 
attestation of opifer as a job-title.
186 A slave who pours water over bathers.
187 Keegan (2013) 81.
188 Forbes (1955) 336.
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the paedagogium are attested almost exclusively for the imperial household.189 The 
archaeological evidence is for the imperial paedagogia, and it should be underlined that 
the identification of these structures as a paedagogium is less than secure.
Many of the elite households included a so-called paedagogus (male or female), and 
it is of course tempting to connect paedagogi as teachers to a paedogogium – in the 
sense of school. There is, however, no indication for paedagogi in a paedagogium, or 
for a paedagogium in the households where a paedagogus/-a is attested. Moreover, the 
occupation of paedagogus is not so easy to define.
Apuleius records a paedagogus “in the classic role of escorting a boy to and from 
school”.190 Lucius the Ass recalls the story of the wife of a town-councillor – a mother of 
two, an older stepson, and her own boy (of whom it is said that he is over 12 years old). 
She tries to seduce her stepson and – when the young man does not give in – plans to 
poison him with the help of her slave.
Apul. met. 10.5.1–4
Ac dum de oblationis opportunitate secum noxii deliberant homines, forte 
fortuna puer ille iunior, proprius pessimae feminae filius, post matutinum la-
borem studiorum domum se recipiens, prandio iam capto sitiens repertum vini 
poculum, in quo venenum latebat inclusum, nescius fraudis occultae continuo 
perduxit haustu. Atque ubi fratri suo paratam mortem ebibit, examinis terrae 
procumbit, ilicoque repentina pueri pernicie paedagogus commotus ululabili 
clamore matrem totamque ciet familiam.
But while those two were conferring as to when to offer him the wine, fate 
chanced to intervene. The younger boy, the stepmother’s own son, came home 
from morning school for his lunch, and feeling thirsty found the wine, already 
imbued with poison. Ignorant of the danger lurking there, he drank it in one 
great gulp, and swallowing the venom destined for his brother fell lifeless to the 
ground. His servant, terrified at this sudden collapse, raised a cry of horror that 
brought the mother running along with the whole household.191
The story ends well: the boy survives and the stepmother and her slave are punished 
(Met. 10.11-12). For our purposes we may focus on the fact that the younger son, not ac-
189 Keegan (2013) 73-5.
190 Bradley (2012) 85, talking about Ap. Met. 10.5.1-4. The reference in Bradley is erroneous (he writes 
10.4.5).
191 Translation A.S. Kline, poetryintranslation.com.
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tually that young anymore, apparently was accompanied to school by his paedagogus,192 
which surely means that the paedagogus was not the boy’s teacher. Indeed the frequent 
occurrence of paedagogi in the epigraphs suggests that they were the more common 
child minders. The same story does contain an earlier mention of the elder brother’s ‘old 
teacher’ (educator senex, Met. 10.5.4), however, which indicates that this family had ac-
cess to a teacher, who may or may not have lived in with them. The linguistic connection 
between paedagogium and paedagogi is thus misleading.
Attending to children is, in fact, one of the most common professions attested overall 
for men and, particularly, for women. The household of the Statilii included five paeda-
gogi, the household of the Volusii employed three – plus an additional four nurses, and 
two grammatici.193 Thamyris, slave footservant of Livia, “gives an urn” (dat ollam) to his 
magister Cnismus.194 Although the exact functions of the various child-minders are not 
always clear, their considerable presence in the aristocratic domus demonstrates that 
the resources for in-house schooling were present. Child-minders themselves proudly 
advertise that they looked after the elite children – although the epigraphic evidence 
suggests that both the children of their elite owners and home-born slave boys and girls 
were left in their care.195 A single name for pedagogue and charge, for example, suggests 
servile status for both, as in CIL 6.9748 and CIL 6. 33894.
ciL 6. 9748
Hilario / paed(agogo) / Celeris
To Hilarius, pedagogue of Celer.
192 A reference to escorting a slave girl is, e.g., in Terence’s Phormio: a young man called Phaedria falls 
in love with a slave girl he cannot have and can therefore only follow her around, v. 86: in ludum 
ducere et redducere; later one of the characters jokingly refers back to this when asking about 
Phaedria: “What of the pedagogue of that lute-girl?” (quid paedagogus ille qui citharistriam…?, v. 
144).
193 Hasegawa (2005) 36 table 3.4 lists child minders for the households of the Statilii, Volusii, Livia, and 
Iunii. In this context it is perhaps interesting to note that Mouritsen (2013) considers the Volusian 
tomb to be the most complete, and therefore the most representative, columbarium.
194 CIL 6. 4006.
195 Bradley (1991) 37–75 on (male) child attendants of slave children as well as aristocratic children, 
with appendix of inscriptions from Rome.
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ciL 6. 33894
D(is) M(anibus) / Rufi qui / vixit an(nos) XIIX / m(enses) VII d(ies) X / Nicepiorus / 
paedag(ogus) b(ene) m(erenti) f(ecit)
To the divine spirits. (Grave of ) Rufus. He lived 18 years, 7 months and 10 days. 
Nicepiorus his pedagogue set this up for him. He deserved it.
This scattered evidence appears to support the assumption that young urban slaves – 
both male and female – may have been taught the basics of reading, writing, and perhaps 
arithmetic.196 Their primary education need not have taken place within a paedagogium 
or even within the household: Booth adduces literary evidence that makes it plausible 
that slaves also attended the ordinary street schools of the ludi magister alongside free-
born boys and girls.197 Schooling could be expensive, but it was probably well within the 
means of the elite: Diocletian’s Price Edict lists a price of 75 denarii per pupil per month 
for a grammaticus. At a daily wage of 25 denarii a day for unskilled and 50 for skilled 
work, the investment would soon pay itself back.
A basic education therefore appears to have been regularly available to slaves; but 
even though it is clear that there were virtually no practical obstacles, it is impossible to 
say how many actually received such an education.
Arts and crafts
It is clear from the evidence that some slaves were skilled beyond a basic education, and 
were trained in the arts or crafts. From the perspective of the wealthy owner, one option 
was of course simply to buy skilled slaves on the market – this has already been discussed. 
All specialised slave artisans nevertheless must have learnt their trade in one of two ways: 
through learning by doing in the household itself, or through an apprenticeship. The fol-
lowing sections deal with both options for investing in the education of artisans.
Learning by doing
Although there is no direct evidence for learning by doing within the aristocratic house-
hold, it can be made plausible.198 From Cicero’s correspondence we know of his friend 
Atticus’ sophisticated copy shop. Nepos addresses what was exceptional in Atticus’ busi-
ness, however, and that had everything to do with his slaves.
196 Most extensively: Mohler (1940).
197 Booth (1979) refers specifically to Martial and Petronius, of which Martial Epig. 10. 62 is most 
convincing; on the ludi magister see e.g., Laes and Strubbe (2008) 75.
198 Mouritsen (2011a) 212.
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nep. att. 13.3–4
Usus est familia, si utilitate iudicandum est, optima; si forma, vix mediocri. Namque 
in ea erant pueri litteratissimi, anagnostae optimi et plurimi librarii, ut ne pedis-
sequus quidem quisquam esset, qui non utrumque horum pulchre facere posset, 
pari modo artifices ceteri, quos cultus domesticus desiderat, apprime boni. (4) 
Neque tamen horum quemquam nisi domi natum domique factum habuit; quod 
est signum non solum continentiae, sed etiam diligentiae.
He kept an establishment of slaves (familia) of the best kind, if we were to judge 
of it by its utility, but if by its external show, scarcely coming up to mediocrity; for 
there were in it well-taught youths, excellent readers, and numerous transcribers 
of books, insomuch that there was not even a footman (pedisequus) that could 
not act in either of those capacities extremely well. Other kinds of artificers 
(artifices caeteri), also, such as domestic necessities require, were very good there 
(4) yet he had no one among them that was not born and instructed (factum) in 
his house; all which particulars are proofs, not only of his self-restraint, but of his 
attention to his affairs.199
The slave familia of Atticus is praised in all but its beauty (forma). Their excellence is 
explained as a direct result of the fact that they were born, raised and trained in the 
household – a token of Atticus’ continentia and diligentia, presented by Nepos as the 
qualities that set Atticus apart in a positive way. The passage thus underlines the exis-
tence of learning by doing in the household, but it also points to the fact that this was 
not necessarily the standard.
While Nepos’ account of Atticus raising and educating his own slaves in his household 
might be viewed as recording a laudable exception, the epigraphic evidence supports 
the practice of home-schooling artisans as well. The family of the Statilii, for example, 
clearly focused on textile production.200 Their household included, among others, no 
less than eight wool spinners (all female), five seamstresses, four fullers, and three weav-
ers (m/f ).201 This can plausibly be read as relatively direct evidence of learning by doing 
within the elite household. Epigraphic evidence from the columbaria is scanty, but the 
following inscription from the monumentum Liviae is suggestive:
199 Translation Rev. J.S. Watson (1853).
200 On the Statilii and cloth production, Hasegawa (2005) 39-44.
201 Most likely to be contemporaneous: the inscriptions are all dated between 20–97 AD, Buonocore 
(1984) 44.
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ciL 6. 6376 = iLs 7416a
Antiocho / magistro / unctores
The masseurs (set up this monument) for their instructor Antiochus
It is not difficult to come up with reasons why a family of aristocrats, or a family of en-
trepreneurs, should have wanted to train their slaves within the domus. The students 
would soon be able to contribute substantially to the working process, even during the 
learning process when they had not fully mastered the trade. Their continuous labour 
contribution would therefore limit the cost of forgone earnings during the time of 
education, making this type of on the job training a more profitable – or at least less 
costly – way to invest in human capital.
Occupational inscriptions offer additional evidence for learning by doing, or at least 
evidence for the education of slaves in the household and of the wide-ranging effects 
of the domus economy. Every job-title for a freedman is an indication of his or her 
job-training as a slave. The ties between patrons and freedmen were never completely 
severed. The overwhelming numbers adduced in this chapter above indicate that many 
freedmen used to be part of a larger aristocratic household when enslaved.
The continued economic bonds between patron and freedman are unambiguously 
recorded in an inscription as often as they can be postulated. When fellow freedmen are 
explicitly ascribed the same occupation, surely the assumption that it reflects learning 
on the job in the household of one’s master is not too far-fetched.202 Small groups of 
three or more colliberti commemorated together are a recurrent phenomenon in the 
occupational inscriptions.203 The freedmen of the Veturii who worked in the business 
of purple-dying together were already mentioned in the previous chapter.204 Similarly, 
fellow freedmen who were also co-workers, are attested for the profession of thurarius 
(incense dealer, CIL 6. 9934), gemmarius (jeweller, CIL 6. 9435), ferrarius (ironsmith, CIL 6. 
9398), aerarius vascularius (tableware bronze maker, CIL 6. 9138), and that of vestiarius 
tenuarius (fine tailor, CIL 6. 37826) – and these are just attestations from CIL volume 6. 
The additional example of the tailors in CIL 6. 33920 deserves a closer look.205
202 The example of CIL 6. 9215 discussed in chapter 3 is unique in that it designates both freedman 
and patron (himself a freedman) as axle-makers.
203 Joshel (1992) 128-45 has much to offer on the occupational inscriptions of freedmen artisans and 
their relations with patron and colliberti.
204 N. 299 with reference to Dixon (2001b).
205 Also singled out by Joshel (1992) 131–3.
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ciL 6. 33920
P(ublio) Avillio P(ubli) l(iberto) Menandro patrono / post mortem liberti fecerunt 
et / sibi {i}<et> qui infra scripti sunt / Avillia P(ubli) l(iberta) Philusa / P(ublius) 
Avillius P(ubli) l(ibertus) Hilarus / P(ublius) Avillius P(ubli) l(ibertus) Anteros / 
P(ublius) Avillius P(ubli) l(ibertus) Felix / vest{e}<i>[a]ri(i) de Cermalo minusculo 
a [3] / sobe[
To Publius Avilius Menander, freedman of Publius, patron. His freedmen set this 
up after his death, also for themselves, [c.q.] those who are recorded below.
Avilia Philusa, freedwoman of Publius; Publius Avilius Hilarus, freedman of Pub-
lius; Publius Avilius Anteros, freedman of Publius; Publius Avilius Felix, freedman 
of Publius. Tailors from the smaller Germalus …
It should be noted that the patron mentioned in this inscription, Menander, was a freed-
man himself. The other four – three men and a woman – commemorate him in death, 
while referring to their current workplace on the Germalus.206 This epitaph is evidence 
for the continued bonds between patron and freedmen on a somewhat larger scale than 
the examples in chapter 3. There can be no doubt that all of these freedmen gained their 
skills in slavery; we may infer that P. Avilius Menander set up his own independent work-
shop sometime after manumission, or that he became independent upon the death of 
his master. He continued the business with his own slaves, whom he subsequently freed. 
Even if Menander’s master were still alive, there was no law to prevent competition be-
tween freedmen and their former masters: indeed, in this context the law protects freed-
men’s interests.207 Alternatively, Menander could have continued to work for, or with, his 
former master after manumission, in which case this example would reflect  cooperation 
and continuation of the family business rather than competition.
A different category of inscriptions records liberti – a husband and wife – with distinct 
job-titles. Identical nomina suggests they came from the same familia; some carry dif-
ferent nomina, which illustrates a shared servile history but not in the same household. 
In most instances couples remained within the shared elite household of origin, as the 
example of Maritimus and Quintia shows – CIL 6. 33794 quoted above. Others set up 
their own household, or at least their own epitaph. The fact that husband and wife had 
distinct occupations was explained in chapter 3 by the fact that both had already learnt 
206 The Germalus refers to a part of the Palatine hill.
207 Verboven (2012a) 96; Mouritsen (2011a) 212 n 28.
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a trade as slaves in their master’s household.208 This type of epitaph therefore also pres-
ents indirect evidence of the domus economy.
Apprenticeships
Members of the slave familia in a wealthy household could also be apprenticed out 
rather than home-schooled, just like the slaves from a nonelite family. 12 out of 50 
apprenticeship contracts from Roman Egypt were concluded for slave children.209 The 
numbers are too small to base strong arguments on, and it should be noted that slavery 
in Roman Egypt may have been of a different nature than slavery in the cities of Roman 
Italy: in Egypt slaves only made up 5–10 per cent of the urbanized population, and they 
are likely to have been mostly household slaves.210 Seen in that light, 12 slaves out of 50 
artisan apprentices is perhaps more than expected.
Within these 10 documents for slave children, there is no apparent discrimination re-
garding the gender of the child. Their equal representation in apprenticeship contracts 
notably sets slave girls apart from their freeborn counterparts. It is also remarkable that 
the documents for slave children are more consistent in terms of the investment than 
those for freeborn children: slave apprentices generally are paid for their work, save for 
those in the luxury trades. As a result, the direct and indirect costs of investment in 
human capital through apprenticeship were mitigated somewhat.
The cost of apprenticing out many slaves could add up, but even so monetary con-
siderations were, or so it must be presumed, less of a problem from the perspective of 
a wealthy owner than it was for the nonelite. Therefore, the decision must have rested 
on more practical considerations. If a household essentially was a textile production 
unit in itself, it would make no sense to apprentice out another weaver when it was 
so easily taught at home. More importantly, the point of having a slave entourage in 
the city for the elite was that the slaves would be conspicuously present in the domus, 
in large numbers and at all times. It was also the most pragmatic way to have slaves 
multi-tasking and/or working after hours, both of which appears to have been normal 
procedure. Whatever the reasons, most lines of reasoning suggest that learning on the 
job within the aristocratic household production unit apparently took precedence over 
apprenticeships. I would go so far as to tentatively suggest that the slave apprentices 
we know of conceivably originated from nonelite households – though this cannot be 
more than a suggestion.
Despite the limited quantity of the surviving sources, it seems possible to conclude 
that elite slave-owners were prone to invest in slaves who showed potential. In-house 
208 The category is also discussed under the heading of ‘independent women’ in chapter 3.
209 See appendix 2.
210 Scheidel (2011a) 289–90.
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schools, on-the-job training and even apprenticeships were all very real options. The 
direct cost of investing in schooling appear to have been relatively modest, tempered by 
in-house schooling or job-training, so all it took was time and effort; a slave apprentice 
was regularly – if not always – paid for his or her efforts. Both constructions helped to 
mitigate the indirect cost of forgone earnings.
In the long run, an educated slave brought many advantages. Education or job-training 
will have exponentially increased the slave’s lifetime earnings. Contrary to the freeborn, 
slaves could not run away with their human capital.211 Even the human capital of those 
slaves who were freed, remained available to their former owners through various forms 
of dependence. Saller argues that the elite households were in need of trustworthy 
managers and overseers in particular: “The large domus (households) were the largest 
private productive units in the early empire, requiring coordination, monitoring and 
record-keeping”.212 This, according to Saller, will have encouraged them to educate their 
own future administrators, to make sure that these key positions were filled by individu-
als that could be trusted because of their strong link with the household.213 If it were 
merely a matter of training sufficient numbers of managers and overseers, however, as 
Saller seems to imply, the education of slaves in the elite domus arguably would not have 
left such a clear record. Quite apart from such considerations of reliability, economic 
opportunism was probably also an important incentive: this chapter pointed out that in 
the market a skilled slave brought in twice the wages, or twice the price, of an unskilled 
slave. And there certainly was a market for skilled slaves because, as we have seen, the 
need for a replacement often arose unexpectedly.
To sum up, household slaves were in a good position to receive a basic education 
and/or some form of job-training. That means that in terms of skilled work, the freeborn 
workforce faced some serious competition from the servile population.
the eVIdenCe fRom ColumbARIum tombs
In terms of the occupational inscriptions that form the main dataset used in this study, 
the larger household is reflected specifically in the epigraphic material from elite colum-
baria. “[C]olumbaria are closed, collective funerary monuments that deposit cremation 
211 Saller (2013) 78.
212 Saller (2013) 78.
213 Silver suggests that it was also an incentive for the freeborn to sell themselves into slavery, in 
order to be eligible for the job, Silver (2011) 89-92, 95. Saller seems to think of home-born slaves 
in this context, however, which negates that correlation.
206 Chapter 4
ashes in urns and niches on their interior walls”.214 ‘Elite columbaria’ more specifically 
refers to subterranean columbaria only. Columbarium tombs built aboveground form 
a more diverse tomb type of a later date. Aboveground columbarium tombs were 
geographically more widespread than the subterranean ones, but the aboveground 
monuments that I happen to know of as a rule were considerably smaller, raising the 
suspicion that they were perhaps also rather less likely to concern elite households.215
The construction of subterranean columbaria was a relatively short-lived phenomenon 
of the first century AD. Many of the tomb-chambers were used for only a generation 
or two, which adds to a coherent picture of the tomb population; some tomb popula-
tions are more difficult to analyse in their entirety, however, because the columbarium 
remained in use until the second and third centuries. It is also significant that the exis-
tence of columbarium tombs was restricted mainly to the capital and its environs.216 This 
points to urban elite households as part of the specific nature of the labour market in the 
city of Rome, which should not come as a surprise: the elite may have clustered in towns 
more generally, but for the wealthiest senators, there was no place like Rome – so that is 
where their slave familiae resided, and were buried.217
It is a fortunate characteristic of the columbarium tomb type that many of the de-
ceased who found their final resting place in them received individual commemoration 
in an epitaph.218 The inscriptions reveal that these monuments contained the remains 
chiefly of slaves and ex-slaves from elite households.219 That is why this material offers an 
excellent opportunity to study the composition of aristocratic domus.
epigraphic evidence for elite domus from the columbaria
Columbarium tomb inscriptions in Joshel’s sample make up 21.4 per cent of the occupa-
tional inscriptions from the city of Rome (including slave, freed, and free).220 Because the 
214 Borbonus (2014) 20. Borbonus provides the most recent and extensive study of subterranean 
columbaria to date. Much of the general information that follows was taken from (or corroborated 
by) his work. Borbonus on p. 18 points out that strictly speaking, columbarium refers to one niche 
only. Technically the tomb should therefore be called ‘columbarium tomb’ or ‘columbarium monu-
ment’, and this I will do. However, columbarium has become accepted usage and will be applied 
here as well. Cf Bodel (2008) 195-6.
215 To my knowledge there is no comprehensive study of this type of tomb, let alone its epigraphic 
heritage.
216 Borbonus (2014) 146 ff for scarce attestations of columbaria outside of Rome; they do not quite 
match the definition provided.
217 Rens Tacoma pointed out that there is also the practical matter of tufa, that allowed the building 
of columbaria in the vicinity of Rome.
218 Cf. Borbonus (2014) 106–9.
219 Borbonus (2014) 1.
220 Joshel (1992) 73.
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columbaria are exclusive to Rome, that percentage is lower for Roman Italy as a whole. It 
is likely that the columbaria we know of do not encompass all (occupational) inscriptions 
that originate from an elite household. Ex-slaves in particular, but also slaves may have 
been buried outside the household columbarium, as the following epitaph seems to 
illustrate.221
ciL 6. 9775
Doris Statiliae Mino[ris] / pediseq(ua) / Erotis ad i{m}[n]pediment[a] / vixit an(nos) 
XXIIII
For Doris, foot servant of Statilia the Younger, (companion) of Eros, caretaker of 
baggage. She lived 24 years.
Even if it was not actually found in the Statilian tomb, there is no doubt in my mind 
about the affiliations of Doris and Eros. And if the text itself were not clear enough, the 
editors of CIL add that the inscription also appears to have been found near the monu-
ment of the Statilii. But not all of the epitaphs for household members buried outside of 
the columbarium can be identified as such as easily as this.
There must also have been several other domus of a considerable size that were some-
what less extravagant than the ones we know of. The unique text of CIL 14. 5306 from 
Ostia is interesting in this respect.
ciL 14. 5306
Agathemeris Manliae ser(va) / [Ac]hulea Fabiae ser(va) ornatrix / [C]aletuche 
Vergiliae ser(va) ornatrix / Hilara Liciniae [ser(va) orn]atrix / Crheste(!) Corn[eliae] 
ser(va) ornatrix / Hilara Seiae ser(va) ornatrix / Moscis ornatrix / Rufa Apeiliae 
ser(va) ornatrix / Chila ornatrix
This is a lead tablet with a list of nine hairdressers, whose single, Greek names indicate 
slave status. Although the document is obscure in many other respects, the list suggests 
221 Penner (2013) 27 notes that “of all Livia’s slaves and freed slaves attested in the inscriptional 
evidence, slightly more than half come from the Monumentum Liviae, while the remainder were 
found elsewhere…”.
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to me that all of these women served aristocratic women.222 For seven of nine ornatrices 
an aristocratic owner is mentioned; only for Moscis and Rufa no mistress is recorded.
It is clear that many inscriptions of slaves connected to elite households were also 
found outside the columbaria. Therefore, inscriptions connected to elite households are 
likely to have made up a larger percentage of the occupational inscriptions from the 
city of Rome than the 21.4 per cent mentioned above. Indeed, Joshel connects 31.6 per 
cent of all occupational inscriptions from Rome to a private context.223 Although Joshel’s 
definition of ‘a private context’ is nowhere made explicit, the pattern in the occupational 
inscriptions is clear and can be supported even if we just take into account the more 
secure evidence of the columbaria-inscriptions. It must be concluded that many Romans 
were employed in the service of wealthy elite domus – particularly, but not exclusively, 
slaves. These findings match up well with the more general pattern outlined above con-
necting urban slavery with elite households.
A word of caution is in order, however. The epitaphs from elite household colum-
barium tombs from the city of Rome represent a change in epigraphic habit, a localized 
“early peak of epigraphic output”, that was established because the particular form of a 
columbarium tomb meant that virtually every tomb occupant received an inscription.224 
That peak of epigraphic output and the additional fact that the columbaria have been 
relatively well preserved, is reflected in the data. In other words: columbarium tombs, 
and therefore elite households, are overrepresented in the epigraphic data. Moreover, 
it was apparently more common to record professions in columbaria inscriptions 
than in other epitaphs, increasing the prominence of elite staff labourers among the 
222 The lead indicates that it is a curse tablet, also noted by Meiggs (1960) 226 n. 1; in my view this 
makes Treggiari’s suggestion that the inscription is evidence of a school for hairdressers highly 
unlikely, Treggiari (1979) n. 47. The inclusion of Agathemeris in this list indicates to me that she 
was a hairdresser, too, even if this is not stated explicitly.
223 Joshel (1992) 74.
224 Borbonus (2014) 108. Borbonus mentions one columbarium near the Sepulcrum Scipionum (his 
cat.nr. 1) where this niche-by-niche identification was planned (there are painted tabula ansata 
under the niches) but this was not executed (they are not filled in); similarly, I noticed that in 
the smaller columbarium ‘of Pomponius Hylas’ (nearby) the burials are more numerous than the 
individuals identified in inscriptions, with coffins under the floor, loose urns added, and so on. The 
general ‘early peak in epigraphic habit’ is nevertheless not in doubt.
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occupational inscriptions.225 In the monument of the Statilii, for example, no less than 
28 per cent of all individuals recorded an occupation. For all columbaria combined the 
percentage is much lower, but still significant at 15.9 per cent.226 In contrast, it may be 
recalled that profession was generally recorded in less than 5 per cent of inscriptions. 
The question of how representative the numbers are, is ultimately insoluble.
Single family tombs
If the columbaria reflect elite households, the assumption that they were set up by 
aristocratic heads of family follows naturally: they were viewed as monuments libertis 
libertabusque, so to speak. Contrary to earlier and still influential interpretations along 
these lines, it has now convincingly been argued that the tombs were most likely set up, 
or at least organized, by household associations (collegia).227 Emphasis on the agency of 
collegia does not preclude the possibility of (financial) support from an elite patron, just 
like the earlier interpretations left room for the practical responsibilities of the associa-
tions, but I embrace the shift in perspective.228 That the initiative rested with a burial 
association rather than with the wealthy patrons would explain why the aristocratic 
family itself was not included in the tombs, why the monuments were of a relatively 
modest nature and, most significantly, why the tombs cannot always be connected to a 
single elite family, but regularly include slaves and freedmen of several elite masters in 
one chamber.229
The best means of identifying the household(s) represented in a columbarium is the 
nomenclature of the deceased. Dorian Borbonus devised a cluster index (“C”) of nomina 
for all columbaria to analyse this aspect: in the columbarium ‘of the Statilii’ for example, 
one would expect to find a clustering of the nomen ‘Statilius’. By measuring the cluster-
225 The various households have been said to demonstrate different preferences for what was re-
corded on the epitaphs, and so occupation may not be as prominent in every tomb: Treggiari’s 
observation that “fashions vary from columbarium to columbarium: job data are prominent in the 
Statilian tomb and family data in the Volusian. There was little room for both on the standard 
plaque”, (1976) 98, is corroborated by Penner (2012). Whereas there may well have been such a 
thing as columbarium-fashions, the mention of occupation was relatively prominent in most of 
them; Borbonus (2014) 128 table 9, Penner (2012) 157 figure 10.10, Hasegawa (2005) 32.
226 Hasegawa (2005) 4, 32 table 3.1 for 28 per cent of the individuals in the columbarium of the Statilii; 
cf Borbonus (2014) 128 table 9: 28.8 per cent for the Statilii, 15.9 per cent on average.
227 See now Borbonus (2014) 136 ff; contra Hasegawa (2005), Patterson (1992) 18, and Purcell (1987) 
all stress the importance of patronage; Note that a (household) association may provide for burial, 
but that does not necessarily imply the existence of collegia funeraticia, see chapter 5.
228 Cf. Treggiari (1975a) 63 with n. 148, who points to the apparent permission of Lucius Noster in 
some of the Statilian inscriptions, such as CIL 6. 7370.
229 Patterson (1992) 18 seems to think that the patron’s natural family was buried in the columbarium 
tomb, too, but I know of no evidence for this.
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ing of nomina in each tomb, Borbonus ascertains four ‘single household columbaria’ 
(with C > 40): the columbarium of the Statilii does indeed qualify, and in addition so do 
the columbarium of the Volusii, that of the Iunii Silani, and that of the Arruntii.230 The 
case of the Volusii is exceptional because no columbarium structure was ever found, but 
the collection of epitaphs suggests a similar collective household burial arrangement.231
Clustering of nomina is somewhat less strong in the columbarium known as that of 
Livia (C = 20/21), yet Treggiari feels that “[t]he individual slave-owner whose household 
staff can be most fully reconstructed is Augustus’ widow Livia”.232 In my view it is highly 
likely that the monument does represent the household of the empress. In this case, 
however, the cluster index presumably signals the monument’s continued use into the 
third century, which is why it contains imperial slaves and freedmen of later emperors, 
for example, in addition to members of Livia’s domestic staff – thereby lowering the 
cluster index.233 Moreover, the larger the monument, the more likely it was to contain 
‘outsiders’, since slaves and freedmen did not always marry within the household. Even 
so their families were regularly included.234 The following example from the Volusian 
tomb shows that the family connections could branch out far.
ciL 6. 7290 = ciL 6. 27557
[Dis] / Manibus [sacru]m / Primigenius L(uci) Volusi / Saturnini ser(vus) ab hospiti(i)
s et / paedagog(us) pueror(um) Charidi cont(ubernali) s(uae) b(ene) m(erenti) / 
T(itus) Iulius Antigonus gener eius / Spurinniae Niceni Torquatianae / nutrici suae 
bene merenti / sanctae piae amantissimae / fecerunt sibi et suis posterisq(ue) 
eor(um)
230 Borbonus (2014) 122: “the values exceeding a ‘c’ of forty (...) are ‘single family columbaria’ that ac-
commodated, wholly or predominantly, slaves and freedmen of a single aristocratic household”. 
The monument ‘of the Carvilii’ has C=53, but the ten inscriptions also mention others from various 
families, which is presumably why it is not classified as a single family tomb. The formula for the 
cluster index is on page 248 n. 53.
231 The same is true for the ‘monument’ “of the gens Abuccia”: Borbonus (2014) 28, cat. nr 17; 
Hasegawa (2005) 4.
232 Treggiari (1975a) 48; See for an analysis of Livia’s domestic staff especially Treggiari (1975a), but 
also Treggiari (1973), (1975b), (1976); Hasegawa (2005).
233 Borbonus (2014) 175-6. Conversely, there are also servants of Livia in tombs with other imperial 
servants, Treggiari (1975a) 65 n.4; Hasegawa (2005) 22.
234 See above for contubernia and marriages crossing household boundaries; Mouritsen (2013) 54 
table 8 includes his count of outsider marriages for the columbaria of the Volusii and Statilii for 
example; It would not be unusual if some of the husband’s slaves had relations with some of the 
wife’s slaves and thereby ended up in ‘her’ columbarium, a practice Treggiari (1975a) 48 identifies 
for Livia’s monument.
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Sacred to the divine spirits. Primigenius, slave of Lucius Volusius Saturninus, 
in charge of guests and teacher of the (slave?) children, for Charis, his well-
deserving contubernalis. Titus Iulius Antigonus his brother-in-law, for Spurinnia 
Nice Torquatiana, his nurse, a well-deserving, loyal, most amiable woman. They 
set this up for themselves, their [family] and their descendants.
Apart from two slaves of the household, Primigenius and Charis, the text also includes 
Antigonus and Torquatiana, who carry the tria nomina but who were not freedmen of 
the Volusii. Apparently, Primigenius’ right to use the household tomb extended to his 
wider family, if it could accommodate for his brother-in-law Antigonus, and Antigonus’ 
(freeborn?) nurse.
There are thus only five single family columbaria that could potentially give us an indi-
cation of the occupational structure of a single household staff.235 Even single household 
tombs do not reflect the occupational structure of a household accurately, however, 
because the boundaries of who were buried in it and who were not are so blurry. More-
over, it is not certain at all that the epigraphic collection from any one tomb is complete, 
nor is it always easy to distinguish whether the inscriptions – and therefore the recorded 
jobs – were contemporaneous or not.
The nomenclature of those buried in single family columbaria indicates that the large 
majority was part of the dominant household. There are many other plausible single 
family households, however;236 even in multi-family tombs, a large group of individuals 
can often be connected to a larger household.237 In her study of the familia urbana, for 
example, Kinuko Hasegawa distinguishes 15 groups of columbaria-inscriptions that can 
be connected with a known aristocratic family or individual owner.238 In all likelihood, all 
columbarium-inscriptions are representative of the domestic staff of elite households, 
regardless of whether the ‘inhabitants’ originate from one or from several households. 
In order to maintain a clear sense of context, however, it is important to keep in mind 
that there is a difference between single family tombs, multi-family tombs and uncon-
nected attestations of household servants, when discussing the particulars of the large 
domestic household. Having said that, unrelated individuals were probably a minority.
235 It is no coincidence that Sandra Joshel singles out precisely these five single family columbaria in 
her sample, Joshel (1992) 194 n. 47: “Only columbaria that include individuals predominantly from 
one familia are considered”. The five single family columbaria are only mentioned as an example, 
however, so she probably includes more of the columbaria-inscriptions.
236 Penner (2012) analyses epigraphic data from the five largest columbaria, including not only the 
Statilii, Volusii, and Livia, but also the monumentum Marcellae and the monumentum filiorum Drusi.
237 E.g. the columbarium ‘of the Carvilii’, or that of the Stertinii, Borbonus (2014) cat. nrs 10 and 27.
238 Hasegawa (2005) 5 table 2.1 lists 16 households, but that of Iunius Silanus is a duplicate entry.
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occupational differentiation
Many of the occupations recorded for slaves in the columbaria are so specific that they 
make us wonder whether they would have taken up all of the slave’s time: Bradley cites 
the examples of the ostiarius (doorkeeper) and scoparius (sweeper), but one might also 
speculate what is the purpose of the nine foot servants in the household of Livia.239 It is 
unlikely that they were left idle when their work was done, so they will have been en-
gaged in other activities now and then.240 Other household slaves who are not recorded 
with a specific job-title, were probably employed in all tasks imaginable like jacks-of-all-
trades. There are two interesting parallel inscriptions of ‘multi-tasking’ slaves, but they 
are the only such occupational epitaphs I know of:241 The first inscription is written on 
an altar from the columbarium of the Volusii, and records a freed capsarius (carrier of 
scroll-holders) who apparently served also (idem) as an a cubiculo (bedchamber servant) 
to “our Lucius”. The second is for a freed a cubiculo et procurator (bedchamber servant 
and manager), again to “our Lucius”.242Lucius noster freed both of them.
The fact remains that a great variety of jobs is attested for the slaves of elite house-
holds.243 Harper correctly notes that household “scale and specialization were cor-
related”: certainly, elite households were more wealthy and populous, which enabled 
specialization.244 One could also imagine that it would be helpful to distinguish between 
individuals with the same name, such as Hilarus the doorkeeper, Hilarus the surgeon 
and Hilarus the cashier, who were all part of Livia’s household.245 There could be various 
other reasons for the fact that job-titles are prominent in the columbaria, however.
239 Bradley (1994) 60; for pedisequi (male and female) in the household of Livia, see Hasegawa (2005) 
33 and Treggiari (1973) 75-6 who only lists seven.
240 Bodel (2011) 326 with n. 25 for references. Harper (2011) 103–5 at 103 sees domestic service as “a 
way of utilizing the extra time and labor of otherwise productive slaves”.
241 But compare also P. Wisc. 1.5 (Oxyrynchus, AD 185), which is the contract of lease for a slave 
woman, who is leased out to help a weaver with his craft, but who can contractually be called 
back by her owner to bake bread during the night. There is some evidence of moving from one 
job to another, for which see elsewhere in this thesis.
242 CIL 6. 7368: Di{i}s Manibus / sacrum / L(ucio) Volusio Heraclae / capsario idem / a cubiculo L(uci) 
n(ostri) / Volusia Prima patron(o) / suo piissimo idem / coniugi bene merent(i) fecit / et sibi p(ermissu) 
L(uci) n(ostri) / Thyrso a cel(l)a / v(ixit) a(nnos) XXXV; and CIL 6. 7370: Dis Manibus / L(ucio) Volusio 
/ Paridi a cubiculo / et procuratori L(uci) n(ostri) / Claudia Helpis cum / Volusia Hamilla et / Volusio 
Paride / fili(i)s suis coniugi suo / bene merenti / permissu L(uci) n(ostri) / s(ua) p(ecunia) f(ecerunt). It 
is difficult to establish to which Lucius Volusius Saturninus the inscriptions refer, see Hasegawa 
(2005) 20-1.
243 Emphasized by e.g. Treggiari (1975a) and Bradley (1994) for the household of Livia.
244 Harper (2011) 102.
245 The ostiarius urbanus (doorkeeper) of CIL 6. 8964; the medicus chirurgus (surgeon) of CIL 6. 3986; 
and Hilarus Gugetianus ad argentum (cashier) of CIL 6. 3941. There was at least one other Hilarus, 
a freedman of Livia, commemorated without profession in CIL 6. 8722.
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Bradley quotes the following passage from Columella to argue that there was a practi-
cal side to job specialization, encouraging a slave’s pride in the assignment as well as 
conferring the responsibility for it onto him or her.246
Col. rr 1.9.5–6
… ne confundantur opera familiae, sic ut omnes omnia exsequantur. (6) Nam id 
minime conducit agricolae, seu quia cum enisus est, non suo sed communi of-
ficio proficit, ideoque labori multum se subtrahit; nec tamen viritim malefactum 
deprehenditur, quod fit a multis.
…the duties of the slaves should not be confused to the point where all take a 
hand in every task. (6) For this is by no means to the advantage of the husband-
man, either because no one regards any particular task as his own or because, 
when he does make an effort, he is performing a service that is not his own but 
common to all, and therefore shirks his work to a great extent; and yet the fault 
cannot be fastened upon any one man because many have a hand in it.
Presumably the motivations of a dependent freedman or even of hired labourers would 
be similar.
Occupational titles of slaves could be considered also as a means of cataloguing mate-
rial goods. In the words of Bodel:
[O]ne may reasonably question whether studies of the phenomenon are not 
more revealing of the Roman mania for classifying property than of the varieties 
of tasks that Roman slaves actually performed.247
The jurists, for one, were indeed much concerned with the job specification of slaves 
– when they were part of a bequest.248 The following excerpt from Marcian, however, is 
illuminating in various ways. The passage is placed in the context of bequests concern-
ing slaves.
246 Bradley (1994) 73; Col. RR 1.9.5–6, transl. Ash (1941, Loeb Classical Library).
247 Bodel (2011) 321. Similarly, Bradley (1994) 57: “It was a habit reflecting the Roman’s fixation with 
categorization and hierarchy”.
248 Bodel (2011) 326-7 with n. 26.
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Dig. 32.65.1-2
1. Si ex officio quis ad artificium transierit, quidam recte putant legatum exstin-
gui, quia officium artificio mutatur: non idem e contrario cum lecticarius cocus 
postea factus est.
1. If someone proceeds from a job to a craft, one would rightly think to exclude 
him from the bequest, because the job changed into a craft: that does not hold, 
conversely, if a litter-bearer is later made a cook.
2. Si unus servus plura artificia sciat et alii coci legati fuerunt, alii textores, alii lec-
ticarii, ei cedere servum dicendum est, cui legati sunt in quo artificio plerumque 
versabatur.
2. If one slave knows multiple arts and the cooks were bequeathed to one, the 
weavers to another, the litter-bearers to another, the slave should be ceded to 
him, to whom are bequeathed those in the craft in which he [the slave] is most 
often engaged.
The text illustrates not only that it was possible for slaves to proceed in a career, but also 
that a slave potentially did exercise more than one occupation: the latter theoretical ex-
ample works with three different engagements for one slave, of which two are perhaps 
semi-skilled. At the same time it highlights the use of highly specialized slaves as a form 
of conspicuous consumption.
A brief reference in Tacitus’ Germania indicates that household specialisation was 
deemed a sign of civilisation, one that the Germans did not exhibit.
tac. Germ. 25.1
Ceteris servis non in nostrum morem, descriptis per familiam ministeriis, utuntur: 
suam quisque sedem, suos penates regit.
The other slaves they do not use as we do, with designated duties throughout the 
household; each one controls his own holding and home.249
249 Tac. Germ. 25.1, translation Rives (1999).
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Tacitus is not without implied criticism of the Roman sumptuousness as opposed to 
Germanic simplicity;250 nevertheless there are other indications that in Roman thought 
ideally it was not advisable for an aristocrat to have one slave perform more than one 
job – regardless of how realistic that scenario may have been.251
The care with which the manifold occupations are specified in the often brief and 
modest epitaphs from the columbarium tombs, however, suggests to me that such 
household specialisation was deemed important beyond mere legalities in the early Ro-
man empire. While job differentiation on columbaria inscriptions partly results from the 
owners’ interest in it, the fact that the resulting plethora of job titles was subsequently 
recorded in such high numbers reflects that to the workers of the servile staff their job-
title was a distinctive source of pride.252
occupational structure
For reasons set out above, no single one columbarium tomb can be expected to provide 
the material to allow an accurate outline of the occupational structure of the associated 
aristocratic house. Even if the full collection of inscriptions from one tomb would have 
survived – and it most certainly has not – there were individuals who were excluded 
or buried outside the tomb for various reasons; there were also jobs that were not 
recorded or under-represented; in addition, an epitaph generated around the moment 
of death generally does not inform the twenty-first century reader about possible 
previous careers of the deceased in more humble lines of work. That said, the body of 
columbaria-inscriptions offers what is arguably the best opportunity to reconstruct the 
basic outlines of occupational structure in an important segment of the urban labour 
market of early imperial Rome.
The organization of labour in an urban elite domus, if anything, does not appear to 
follow any ideal of self-sufficiency. But a single household should not merely be looked 
at in isolation: spouses had their own separate slave familiae and his and her household 
were – and were expected to – be used in a complementary way.253 Labour interdepen-
dence between aristocratic households even extended to marginally wider family bonds, 
between siblings, or in-laws.254 An argument about the self-sufficiency of the household 
250 Rives (1999) 61-2 on Tacitus’ portrait of the Germani as “moral exemplars” reflecting an idealized 
past, devoid of the vices that civilization brings.
251 Cic. Pis. 67; Ael. Arist. Rom Or. 71b; Treggiari (1975a) 61.
252 Joshel (1992) esp. chapter 5.
253 Penner (2012); Cf Treggiari (1975a) 54, who also suggests that Livia “relied on the vaster resources 
of the ruling Caesar”.
254 The interdependence of the elite domus, illustrated by means of the Julio-Claudian households, 
is to my mind the most interesting finding of Penner (2013). Rawson (2005) offers an epigraphic 
case-study of a wet-nurse who can be traced ‘circulating households’.
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should therefore be made on the basis of an analysis of the overarching network of two 
or more elite familiae rather than a single household; even then it appears that autarchy 
was probably never achieved.
The complementary nature of these ‘domus-networks’ has implications for an under-
standing of the occupational structure of the elite household. All individual households 
appear to follow the same blueprint, however. Every single household had a nucleus of 
domestic servants and personal attendants serving the master or mistress. In line with 
the legal independence of familiae perhaps, each domus also seems to have had some 
form of administrative section. Both categories include chiefly the staff members neces-
sary to run a domus. The remainder of the employees were employed in a multitude of 
professions that, as we shall see, occasionally seem to suggest a kind of specialization 
for the market.255
In terms of the organization of work, the attested job specialization within the domus 
also reflected an internal occupational hierarchy.256 The household was generally led by 
a steward (dispensator). After that, the situation could become rather more complex. 
A division into decuriae of workers with the accompanying supervisors (decuriones) 
is attested with any credibility only in the enormous household of an emperor or the 
imperial family.257Praepositi, too, – superintendents of one group or other – were an im-
perial exclusive.258 But where the emperor Claudius had a decurio cubiculariorum, other 
elite households nevertheless sported a supra cubicularios to supervise the bedchamber 
servants – which surely still points to a staff of significant size.259 There are few if any 
other supervisory roles that come to the fore: the supra cocos was master chef, one may 
presume, but the supra iumenta (person in charge of pack and draft animals) did not 
necessarily have something to say about the iumentarii (drivers of those animals).260 Ex-
amples that are similar in wording, like the supra/ad valetudinarium ‘in charge of’ health 
(presumably the sickbay vel sim), and the a speculum, ‘in charge of’ the mirror, abound, 
but they were really not overseers of staff.
255 Cf Penner (2012) 148.
256 In very general terms: Bradley (1994) 70.
257 Not so credible by contrast: the decuriae in Petr. Sat. 47.12; Treggiari (1975a) 60 with references in 
n. 131. Compare, however, the dedication of the mon. Marcellae, CIL 6. 4421, which also mentions 
decuriae: C(aius) Claudius Marcellae / Minoris l(ibertus) Phasis decurio / monumentum dedicavit et / 
decuriae epulum dedit d(e) s(ua) p(ecunia) huic / decuria ex aere conlato imaginem / decreverunt.
258 E.g. Praepositus cellariorum, CIL 6. 8746; praepositus cocorum, 8752; praepositus velariorum, 9086. A 
few late, Christian inscriptions for praepositi commemorate clergy.
259 Scriba cubiculariorum item decurio: AE 1946, 99; similarly CIL 6. 8773 (also imperial); supra cu-
bicularios: CIL 6. 4439 (mon. Marcellae), 6645 and 9287 (col. Statilii), 8766 (mon. Livia), and 33842 
(unknown origin).
260 Supra cocos: CIL 6. 9261.
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The phenomenon of slaves or ex-slaves owning – and presumably supervising – slaves 
(vicarii) is a much more prominent feature in the epigraphic data.261 The following epi-
taph is a particularly beautiful illustration:
ciL 6. 6275
Hic est ille situs / qui qualis amicus / amico quaque fide / fuerit mors euit (= fuit) 
indicio / f(unus) f(ecit) / Faustus Erotis / dispensatoris vicarius
Here he is buried, he who was such a great friend and who died through such loy-
alty to his friend as an indicator of which this burial was set up. Faustus, vicarius 
of Eros the steward.
This epitaph, written on an altar found in the Statilian tomb, is exceptional in form, 
length and wording: the amicitia, friendship, between Faustus, and Eros the dispensator 
is stressed. Vicarii in general, however, were not so exceptional. Eros owned another 
slave (Suavis, CIL 6. 6276), yet he himself may in fact have been the slave of one T. Sta-
tilius Posidippus: CIL 6. 6274 mentions an Eros T(iti) Statili / Posidippi ser(vi) / disp(ensator). 
T. Statilius Posidippus, freedmen to the Statilii and himself apparently not buried in the 
tomb, had a familia of 19 (!) that can be reconstructed from the columbarium.262
One text on vicarii stands out from the rest and deserves quoting in full.
ciL 6. 5197
Musico Ti(beri) Caesaris Augusti / Scurrano disp(ensatori) ad fiscum Gallicum 
/ provinciae Lugudunensis / ex vicariis eius qui cum eo Romae cum / decessit 
{e}<f>uerunt bene merito / Venustus negot(iator) / Decimianus sump(tuarius) / 
Dicaeus a manu / Mutatus a manu / Creticus a manu // Agathopus medic(us) 
/ Epaphra ab argent(o) / Primio ab veste / Communis a cubic(ularius) / Pothus 
pediseq(uus) / Tiasus cocus // Facilis pediseq(uus) / Anthus ab arg(ento) / Hedylus 
cubicu(larius) / Firmus cocus / Secunda
To the deserving Musicus Scurranus, slave of Tiberius Caesar Augustus, accoun-
tant of the Gallic treasury in the province of Gallia Lugdunensis, from those of his 
261 It is well-known for the imperial family, Weaver (1972), or in columbaria, Penner (2013); Baba (1990) 
also notes a number of opus doliare stamps that indicate the presence of some slave-owning 
slaves in the familia rustica, too.
262 Mouritsen (2013) 57 discusses both Eros and T. Statilius Posidippus.
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slaves (vicarii) who were with him when he died at Rome: Venustus, tradesman; 
Decimianus, cashier; Dicaeus, secretary; Mutatus, secretary; Creticus, secretary; 
Agathopus, medic; Epaphra, in charge of silver; Primio, in charge of clothes; 
Communis, bedchamber servant; Pothus, footservant; Tiasus, cook; Facilis, foot-
servant; Anthus, in charge of silver; Hedylus, bedchamber servant; Firmus, cook; 
Secunda.
This is the epitaph of Musicus Scurranus, slave to the emperor Tiberius. It was set up by 
his 16 vicarii – that in itself makes the text unique. In addition the vicarii are virtually all 
mentioned with their occupational title, and that makes it the only inscription known to 
me in which vicarii specify their job.263
The complexity of these familiae in familiae has not yet received proper treatment 
in itself.264 The slaves of a slave were legally the property of that slave’s owner (thus, 
Musicus and his vicarii were all the property of the emperor Tiberius); but that was not 
true for the slaves of a freedman. The case of Musicus Scurranus suggests that there may 
have been individuals who did have a distinct household-within-household catering to 
their needs – but they were exceptional, universally high-placed and, most likely, impe-
rial slaves and freedmen. The common inclusion of vicarii (especially those of freedmen) 
in the household columbaria strongly suggests that these sub-slaves or under-slaves 
should be considered a part of the household. But the fact that these hierarchies are so 
meticulously inscribed, suggests that analysis should go beyond “a strong possibility 
that such servants actually worked for their owner’s domina or patrona.”265
Domestic service and personal attendance
All elite domus had a core staff of domestic servants and personal attendants.266 Joshel 
has plausibly explained the predominance of the service sector among the columbari-
um-inscriptions by the elite’s need to be surrounded by servants to demonstrate their 
wealth and social standing:267 it is perhaps predominantly in the large number of service 
jobs that we see reflected the concept of conspicuous consumption. The elite domus 
263 Could it be significant that the woman, Secunda, is both mentioned last and has no job-title? 
Günther (1987) 131, 135 suggests that vicariae like Secunda were only owned by men, with the 
regular aim of ‘marrying’ them. Sometimes they were married, e.g. ILS 7981a and 7981b.
264 With the exception perhaps of Di Porto (1984) who sees the vicarius as a kind of servus communis 
and a go-between in economic partnerships/ joint enterprises, but see the critique of Andreau 
(1999) 68–70.
265 Treggiari (1975a) 51.
266 Joshel (1992) 75 table 3.2 (“Service occupations in the large domestic household”). Pages 145-161 
discuss the domestic servant in the context of the large domestic household.
267 Joshel (1992) 73-6.
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formed the locus of domestic service in the cities: virtually all employment in this sector 
can be traced to an aristocratic home.
Personal attendance
Personal care was all-pervasive for example in the case of Cn. Domitius Tullus, who ac-
cording to Pliny had become so infirm that to his own despair, he had to have his teeth 
brushed by servants.268 Nothing similar to the home care that Tullus required is attested 
in the inscriptions, though it is plausible that servants were employed for such personal 
care when necessary. The epitaphs highlight instead that the elite certainly liked to have 
around a large throng of what could be termed ‘luxury’ carers, personal servants with 
a certain skill-set. Masseurs and masseuses (unctores), hairdressers (ornatrices), barbers 
(tonsores), and perfumers (unguentarii) are ubiquitous. The job of hairdresser is for 
women only: in fact it is the most common single occupation attested for women in the 
city of Rome save one – for which see below –, and virtually all hairdressers come from 
elite households.269 The willingness to record this type of employment illustrates that 
these personal attendants took pride in their proximity to the masters, as well as in their 
own skills. Unskilled personal attendance is not recorded. One cannot perhaps get much 
closer to a master than washing him or her, but the servants of Tullus and others who 
performed such daily care remain anonymous when we hear of them – as in Pliny – or 
entirely obscured, since their job-titles do not appear in the columbaria.
The cubicularii or bedchamber servants referred to earlier deserve separate mention 
in this context. Despite the fact that cubicularii are well-attested, it is unclear what it 
was exactly that they did, in or regarding the bedchamber (cubicularium). However, the 
frequent recordings of cubicularii and their regular manumission suggests to me that 
their position was highly valued; therefore their tasks probably had less to do with secur-
ing clean sheets, than with personal attendance in a wider sense, as informal advisor or 
confidant. Cubicularii of high-placed persons could become men of significant power 
and wealth.270 Cleander, a notorious freedman of the emperor Commodus, is an extreme 
268 Plin. Ep. 8.18.9.
269 Günther (1987) 45-53 on ornatrices confirms this pattern, though Günther’s sample is limited to 
freedwomen. On page 50-1 she has a few examples of freedwomen who apparently continued 
their business outside the household – regardless, I should like to emphasize that these women, 
too, originally came from an elite domus, see also ch. 3.
270 Men of wealth, since they were overwhelmingly male, though there are a few cubiculariae: CIL 6. 
5748, 5942 and 33750, and potentially 9315 (fragm).
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example who according to Cassius Dio could profitably control general access to consul-
ships and senatorial status – among other things.271
The rather large group of pedisequi were personal attendants or foot servants to their 
individual elite masters. It is interesting that they regularly include in their epitaph 
whose servant they were, like Doris Statiliae Mino[ris] / pediseq(ua) of CIL 6. 9775 quoted 
above.272 Other examples of foot servants have already been referred to in various con-
texts. There are both male and female foot servants, and from Livia’s monument we also 
know of a boy (puer a pedibus).273 It is generally assumed that this group is the entourage 
that accompanied a nobleman or -woman wherever they went. The concentration of 
pedisequi in the city of Rome may perhaps underline the significant presence of elite 
households there.274 The relative frequency with which such a ‘low’ position is inscribed, 
underlines Joshel’s important point that occupation within elite households often 
designates a feeling of community and one’s place within the household – not so much 
through pride in a job but through collegiality.275 Collegiality and belonging certainly 
speak from the following example.
ciL 6. 4355
Philusa Andraei / liberti uxor / ollam et titulum / datum ab conservas / pedisequas
Philusa wife of Andraeus the freedman (lies here). The urn and plaque were given 
by her fellow slaves-and-foot servants.
Child care
A very large part of domestic service and caring for other people within the elite domus 
was devoted to child care.276 It is unlikely that these child carers were all engaged only 
with the master’s child(ren); their presence thus supports the earlier supposition that 
271 On Cleander’s influence see esp. Cass. Dio 73.12. Under Diocletian the imperial ‘cubicularius’ of-
ficially became one of the four major ministers, overseer of the “palace staff”, see e.g. Potter (2009) 
184.
272 Or Iulia Elate of CIL 6. 4002.
273 CIL 6. 4001.
274 Outside of Rome there is only a concentration of pedisequi in imperial service from Africa procon-
sularis (CIL 8).
275 Joshel (1992) 97-91.
276 Cf Laes (2016) for the interesting finding that in Late Antiquity these educators were no longer 
predominantly servile ‘professionals’ like these, but rather freeborn and family members.
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the elite household included a significant number of home-born slaves.277 Penner identi-
fies no less than 11% of the Volusian staff as engaged in child care, which has led her to 
tentatively suggest that the Volusii actually specialized in this domain.278 But it seems to 
me that child care was integral to the domus rather than aimed at the outside world as a 
business. The high percentage is unsurprising, however, considering the likelihood that 
children were ubiquitous, and taking into account the real possibility that the Volusian 
tomb represents one of the two best documented domus.279
Caring for children starts within the womb, up to and including birth. The Romans 
must have felt the same way, as a number of elite households attest to an in-house 
obstetrix (midwife) – Livia’s substantial monument includes two.280 Again, if babies were 
not a common phenomenon of the familia, having an in-house midwife would not make 
sense.281
The newborn infant then required breastfeeding, which in ancient Rome was not nec-
essarily done by the birth mother, for various reasons that do not need to be repeated 
here.282 Many children were therefore suckled by a nutrix, a wet-nurse, who generally 
was meant to breastfeed the child for a much longer period than the current western 
average of 3-6 months. It is thus to be expected that the elite domus also included one 
or more nutrices at any one time, and indeed Livia has one, the Statilii have two, the 
Volusii four.283 It is not unlikely that often the nutrix’ care for the child continued after 
the weaning period, certainly within the context of the familia.284 Naturally, the actual 
277 Hasegawa (2005) 36 does seem to assume that the child minders took care of the master’s children 
only. Admittedly, it is not impossible.
278 Penner (2012) 148; also in entertainers, who make up an equal 11%.
279 Mouritsen (2013) 44.
280 Among others, the Volusii CIL 6. 9725 = 27558; Statilii CIL 6. 6325; Antonia Augusta CIL 6.8947; 
Marcella CIL 6. 4458; Livia CIL 6. 8948, 8949. Unsurprisingly, these slave and freedwomen are all 
connected with female mistresses. See also Laes (2010) esp. 271-273 with appendix for the full 
Roman epigraphical dossier on midwives, with at 272 the remark that ‘large families could employ 
their own midwives’, because 13 out of 31 attestations he finds come from elite families in Rome.
281 It also contradicts the interesting suggestion that women were regularly sent to the rural familia 
to give birth, Treggiari (1979b) 189-190.
282 E.g. Harper (2011) 110-12 at 111-12 notes a “correlation between the practices of child exposure 
and wet-nursing”; and Bradley (1991) 26.
283 According to Hasegawa (2005) 36. It is obvious that the male equivalent, the nutritor, also known 
epigraphically albeit in far smaller numbers, did not perform the same job. Or did he? Infants 
in Rome very occasionally were raised by animal milk – despite the considerable risks of giving 
them non-pasteurized animal milk. So did nutrix and nutritor perform the same job after all? It is 
unlikely. The frequent epigraphic connection of nutritor with their alumnus, and esp. the text of CIL 
6. 9967 (Mem(o)riam ex origine vestiariorum in quo [sunt(?)] / nutritores mei …), suggests to me that 
the nutritor could be any kind of mentor, also in crafts.
284 Continued service of nurses, e.g. Bradley (1991) 20, 25-8; Günther (1987) 100.
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wet-nursing can only be done by women: this is, in fact, the most commonly attested 
occupation for Roman women, counting slave, freed and free women, in and outside 
of the elite domus.285 It is the overwhelming number one of the list of jobs for women.
As they grew up, the children were cared for by various other child minders. In the 
context of the elite domus, noteworthy are the paedagogi, educatores and grammatici 
also encountered earlier in this chapter. Paedagogi, as we have seen, provided a more 
general sort of child care than the specific educational tasks of the educator or gram-
maticus. This is probably one of the reasons that the paedagogi are by far the largest 
group of child minders. Though female paedagogae are not uncommon, it is noteworthy 
that men outnumber them by a wide margin.286
Domestic service in larger households is where most women are attested, the majority 
of them in child care, but also as hairdressers and so on.287 The nine foot servants of 
Livia are supplemented by various hairdressers, masseuses, but also female doctors and 
midwives.288 Domestic service matches well with the Roman ideal of women’s domestic 
nature and their ‘natural’ place in the house. The incidence of women commemorated 
with occupation is higher in the columbaria than in any other category of inscriptions, 
and female jobs are usually service jobs.289 Female owners were more likely to own female 
staff,290 but whereas a female pedisequa, cubicularia and so on was almost certain to work 
for a woman, a noblewoman could very well have a male pedisequus/cubicularius/etc.291 
It is significant to highlight that there were more male than female child minders.292 In 
sum, even here, the inscriptions still confirm the relatively poor position of women in the 
285 Günther (1987) 98, 100 for her Roman sample. It was already stated above that most nurses were 
of a servile background, with reference to Bradley (1991) 19-20; see also Harper (2011) 109–12 on 
the continuance of this practice into Late Antiquity.
286 Günther (1987) 76 records 70 men and 4 women.
287 Cf above; and Joshel (1992) 98 in her wider discussion of Roman labour indeed notes that large 
households provide “the setting in which women were most likely to name their work, usually 
as domestic servants of various kinds (especially nurses) and skilled service workers (especially 
ornatrices, hairdressers and maids).” That said, note that the large proportion of freedwomen in 
childcare (42.6%, or 20 out of 47 women) are left out of Joshel’s discussion, “Because gender and 
status differentiate those in child care from domestic servants as such”, p. 145.
288 “Nearly all these women work for women or for or with the children of the house”, Treggiari (1979b) 
190.
289 41.3 per cent of women is engaged in domestic service; Joshel (1992) 69 table 3.1.
290 Penner (2012), (2013); Treggiari (1975a) 58: “A domina employed more women than did a bach-
elor”. On the same page she notes a “low proportion” of women in the monumentum Liviae, while 
actually the 20% is relatively high.
291 Günther (1987) 60.
292 Cf Bradley (1991) 37-75, ‘Child care at Rome: the role of men’, at 38: “The appearance of female 
nurses in the service of aristocratic families is not really surprising, but the use of men is rather less 
predictable at first blush”.
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labour market. The question remains whether the skewed sex ratios this suggests were 
a reality, because the demographic analysis above suggested that the gender balance is 
likely to have been more even in most households, when compared to the exceptional 
domus that provide our epigraphic evidence.
Other service occupations
The elite domus would often include a small medical staff, such as medics, midwives, or 
the ad valetudinarium (in charge of health), the latter of whom was probably more of a 
healer or nurse in case of less serious illnesses.
In addition to staff looking after people, there was a great variety of servants look-
ing after (an equally wide variety of ) possessions, such as an ab argento (silver), the a 
speculum ([sic] mirror), ad imagines (paintings, statues, (ancestor) portraits?), or the ad 
margarita (pearls). Those working with clothing are somewhat more common, as the a 
veste/ad vestem, or vestispicae/vestiplica (folders of clothes).
There are those service workers who are responsible for the running of the household 
in a practical sense, such as the atriensis (majordomo), rogator (questioner), ab admis-
sione (usher), nomenclator (name teller), ab hospitis (host).
Strikingly less visible in the epigraphic sources are those domestic servants who 
kept the household operational in a much more practical sense, by doing the cooking, 
cleaning, or by supplying water. In the pre-modern world it is very well possible that 
this category was in fact the largest.293 A few job-titles can be linked to acquiring and 
preparing food, though I wonder if the particular functions of the opsonator (caterer), 
ministrator (waiter), praegustator (taster), and a cyatho (cupbearer) for example, were 
not more closely involved with elite dinner parties than with the household’s food. 
There were few cooks – but cooks could be hired.294 Interestingly, there appears to be no 
household that is truly fully staffed (or fully attested, of course); nor can this be solved 
by a domus-network we can trace.
ConClusIon
The urban phenomenon of elite domus was restricted to the larger cities of Roman 
Italy where the elite tended to cluster together. Aristocratic households are particularly 
well-attested for the city of Rome. It has become clear from the above that wherever 
293 Harper (2011) 107.
294 Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2017); Hasegawa (2005) 45 has five coci for the four largest house-
holds, four of whom worked for the Statilii. Interestingly Harper (2011) 108 notes that “It is notable 
how often the job of ‘the cook’ was a specialized occupation in late antique households”.
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the elite resided, this significantly changed the make-up of the population, and of the 
labour force. A large majority of all slaves lived in towns, and more than half of these 
urban slaves worked in aristocratic houses. Independent freedmen can also often be 
traced back to a servile history in elite households. The epigraphic sources exacerbate 
this focus on larger cities and Rome in particular – which is precisely why it is so helpful 
to look at the uncharted territory of the domus economy as a whole.
It has long been known that slaves and ex-slaves predominate in pre-Christian inscrip-
tions from the Roman empire. This is even more prominent in occupational inscriptions, 
and – as was illustrated in this chapter – the pattern is most explicit for the elite house-
hold epitaphs recording job-title, originating from columbaria. On the one hand, the co-
lumbaria themselves make up such a large part of the material that it is difficult to draw 
firm conclusions about the servile labour population in relation to the free population. 
On the other hand, it has become clear that elite presence and aristocratic houses did 
provide substantial employment in the cities, which suggests that the predominance 
of household labourers in epigraphic data is at least partly a reflection of reality. The 
overrepresentation of columbaria and elite households more generally, combined with 
a predilection for specialization of job-titles among their staff largely explains the strong 
occupational differentiation.
One of the main questions that lay at the heart of this chapter, is whether the presence 
of elite domus restricted labour opportunities for the freeborn urban population. The 
study of occupational inscriptions, and of columbarium tombs in particular, confirms 
the predominance of slaves and ex-slaves within the labour force of elite domus, ef-
fectively closing off the domestic service sector for the freeborn (but not the freed). 
Then again, we should perhaps not expect to find freeborn labourers in elite domus, 
since other references indicate that the free working in elite households were prob-
ably the exception, whereas the free working for the aristocrats must have been quite 
common. The employment generated by the domus for the free, and particularly for 
the freeborn, remains difficult to grasp. The ways in which freedmen maintained and 
benefited from economic bonds with their families of origin (i.e. the domus) sometimes 
can be recovered from the evidence, whereas the singular bonds of locatio conductio 
with the freeborn remain largely unknown. But free hired labour did include both the 
freeborn and the freed, thereby increasing competition for the freeborn seeking to gain 
an income. The ostentatious presence of the often sizeable and certainly numerous elite 
households must have been an important employer for the free artisans and craftsmen 
represented within the material – many of whom worked in the more luxury trades and 
whose work might not be affordable by the masses.
The significant servile presence in occupational inscriptions and in elite households 
has also given rise to the assumption that education in the Roman world was a slave 
prerogative. My analysis of human capital suggests that slaves, at least in the context 
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of labour in the cities of Roman Italy, were indeed in a good position to acquire some 
skills, varying from a basic education to becoming a fully trained craftsman. Investment 
in human capital of slaves was economically rational. Education at least doubled the 
value of a slave on the market, a market for skilled slaves in particular – and this market 
remained in operation long after the influx of captives had dwindled. A slave could not 
run off with accumulated knowledge and skills, thus ensuring that the income would go 
to the owner. Interestingly, the basic slave education did not take the form that scholars 
have long suggested, that is, through paedagogia. Instead, most elite domus included 
various levels of teachers, or alternatively sent their slaves to regular ‘schools’ with the 
ludimagister. Conversely, the arts and crafts were generally taught on the job, in the 
household, although occasionally both male and female slaves were apprenticed out 
just like the freeborn. Competition between the servile population and the freeborn 
population therefore centred especially on skilled work, and in domestic service, which 
by analogy with early modern patterns is most likely to have impacted women’s job 
opportunities.
Teachers and child carers in the home also form indirect evidence for the ubiquity of 
children in the elite home. The majority of these young individuals presumably were 
slaves, often but certainly not always the offspring of slave-unions. It is clear that slave 
families within households, and crossing household boundaries (within domus-networks 
perhaps?) were a regular occurrence. The children of the household were not only ver-
nae, however, but may have included foundlings, or individuals who were bought on the 
market. The slave market and the self-replacement hypothesis for the slave population 
therefore are not mutually exclusive. Servile families included biological ties, as well as 
the more complex and under-researched hierarchic bonds of (ex-)slaves owning under-
slaves (vicarii), complicating the demographics of the aristocratic household.
The occupational structure of the upper-class household, large and not-so-large alike, 
nevertheless appears to follow a standard blueprint: a basis in domestic service, an 
administrative section, and a part that could specialize for the market. The concept of 
domus networks, derived from the interconnectedness of the Julio-Claudian households 
as indicated by Lindsey Penner, fundamentally alters our understanding of the occu-
pational structure of individual domus. A domus network could create more autarchy 
than might be expected. If aristocratic households could rely on domus networks to 
fulfil most of their labour demands, the need (and thus the opportunities) for free hired 
labour would be less, and the demand for slave labourers on the market would be deter-
mined rather differently. Certainly not all aristocrats entertained a staff as sizeable as the 
manifest ones that dominate the evidence and the discussion (here as elsewhere), and 
because of this the influence of domus networks on the urban labour market may have 
been limited. It is difficult to extrapolate the findings for the top aristocratic households 
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IntRoduCtIon
The Roman family was only one, informal, structuring factor shaping the Roman labour 
market. The influence of the family needs to be offset against other, non-familial, labour 
collectives.1 The social structure outside of the household is made up of associations, 
more generally referred to as collegia. Collegia were not the only form of non-familial 
labour relations, but they were the most important ones. This chapter deals with Roman 
labour associations or, to be more precise, with the economic features of associations 
in general. It can only do so by taking into account the more general social and cultural 
integration of associations within Roman society. My aim here is to outline the way in 
which the so-called ‘professional’ associations acted as a labour collective and influenced 
the labour market, and to indicate how the relationship between collegiati tied in with 
family bonds.
The integration of collegia into the debate on the Roman economy raises the question 
whether they were more economic than social, or whether they were more social than 
economic collectives (or whether they were chiefly funerary clubs, or religious, and so 
on).2 Scholarly consensus is now shifting towards the point of view that the question 
whether the collegia were a predominantly social, or mostly economic phenomenon is 
irrelevant. It is clear that the collegia did function as an economic institution, and they 
should therefore be taken into account in a New Institutional Economics account of the 
Roman economy.3 Even social gatherings may well be used for economic benefit, and 
any kind of network is likely to be economically useful, at least potentially so. Collegia 
were part of the urban social structure that helped define individual labour opportuni-
ties.
The balance between the social function of collegia on the one hand, and family on 
the other, was a decisive structural influence on individual participation in the economy. 
Economic associations are a distinctly urban phenomenon, whereas family ties tend to 
lose some of their influence in the city as was pointed out in chapter 3.4 Family and 
association function as both complementary and overlapping informal networks, within 
“precisely that space between the individual and society which voluntary associations 
are commonly thought to inhabit”.5
1 Cf Garnsey and Saller (1987) 148, “The place of a Roman in society was a function of his position in 
the social hierarchy, membership of a family, and involvement in a web of personal relationships 
extending out from the household”.
2 The collection of papers in Ancient society 41, 2011 for example, poses the question explicitly: 
“guilds or social clubs?”.
3 Verboven (2011).
4 Lucassen, De Moor, Van Zanden (2008) 15.
5 Wilson (1996) 5.
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Chapter outline
The first section of this chapter deals with the place of associations in the urban com-
munity more generally. Collegia as a collective were a distinct part of the civic order. 
Paradoxically they also provided a separate, symbolic order for those excluded from the 
civic order. Although the essential goals of forming an association appear to remain 
the same everywhere in Roman Italy, it will become clear that there was a difference 
in structure of the associative network of Rome and that of smaller urban centres. Who 
were part of the collegia, and what can the distribution pattern of the collegia tell us 
about their nature? Membership was open to virtually any Roman of some means, 
although options for women were severely limited. This theoretical openness of collegia 
then leads me to question the common presumption that associations were mostly 
populated by freedmen.
The functional analysis of the collegia sets out with their perceived social meaning and 
the way they structured the lives of individual Romans. Just as in the case of the Roman 
family and the elite household, the form and function of the social networks that asso-
ciations helped to create and maintain had a bearing on the shape of the labour market. 
It will be considered to what extent they can usefully be seen as substitute families, as 
many scholars have hinted at in the past, when familial and collegial networks overlap 
and interact.
The next section looks into the economics of association: the choice to associate with 
others in itself quickly becomes an economic act. But is there any direct evidence to 
show the involvement of the Roman collegia with economic life? The occupational colle-
gia have often been likened to medieval and early modern guilds. It will be argued here 
that the comparison remains a promising one. Roman collegia were not monopolists of 
the arts and crafts sector, but as it turns out the medieval guilds did not have such a mo-
nopoly either. The significant comparandum is that both guilds and collegia functioned 
as trust networks with so-called multiplex relationships, not merely social, but religious, 
familial, and economic.
In the last part of this chapter, the lines will be drawn together to form a coherent 
story of the part collegia may have played in structuring the Roman urban labour mar-
ket. Collegia and the family form two intersecting axes of reference.
foRmAl oRgAnIzAtIon And VARIAtIon
The impact of the expanding empire, notably a growing population and increasing 
urbanization rates, led to a proliferation of collegia and an improvement in their social 
standing over the second and third centuries AD. This development was outlined most 
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extensively by John Patterson, and his views may be briefly summarized here.6 Public 
benefactions and euergetism from the resident elite must have formed a substantial 
part of the city budget in the early Roman empire.7 With the coming of the empire, local 
autonomy and political lost much of their significance. The traditional elite of senators 
and knights tended to move away from their home towns towards the seats of power, 
Rome in particular, where they hoped to find political advancement. Although instances 
are known of those who, when in Rome, still maintained a level of euergetism in their 
native towns (such as Pliny the Younger and his native Comum), it is likely that most 
would take their resources with them, to the detriment of that town.8 Small settlements 
would have been particularly vulnerable to this drain of resources and only those with 
a benevolent and sufficiently wealthy patron could survive. In larger cities, however, 
it is likely that enough people remained to step in. The gap was filled by members of 
associations (collegiati), local council members (decuriones), or wealthy freedmen. They 
were able to do so because on the one hand, patterns of benefaction changed towards a 
preference for more affordable forms (banquets rather than buildings) and, on the other 
hand, the members of a collegium taken together were wealthy beyond their individual 
capacity. Their contribution to the civic community in turn led to a rise in social status 
and prestige. This, in a nutshell, is the background to the growing cachet and numbers 
of associations in the first centuries AD. By the second century, the associations are so 
well-attested in public inscriptions that “their presence in a town can reasonably be as-
sumed even if it happens not to be directly proven”.9 The collegia had become a set and 
valued element of the civic order.10
The prior history of the collegia during the republic and the early empire, however, is 
one of unrest and political interference. It is telling that the collegia are included amongst 
MacMullen’s Enemies of the Roman order.11 His narrative of the tensions between the col-
legia and the ruling powers emphasizes a history of politics, riots and upheaval, versus 
anxious senators and emperors: a history that is well known from ancient literary ac-
6 Patterson (2006), especially chapter three. Cf Patterson (1994).
7 Cf Brown (2012) 58 ff: “an empire of gifts”.
8 Pliny: CIL 5. 5262 lists many of his benefactions in Comum. Pliny also mentions his gifts in his 
letters, e.g. Plin. Ep. 1.8 (donation of the library). Cf. Eck (2017).
9 MacMullen (1974) 73; Cf Liu (2013) 364; this chronological development is largely confirmed by 
the archaeological evidence for collegium buildings in Bollmann (1998) who on page 169 notes a 
change not only in number (more) but also in nature (more elaborate) of the scholae in the second 
century. The second century also saw mostly professional collegia compared to the first century, 
that had more evidence for Augustales.
10 Patterson (2006) 257–8.
11 MacMullen (1966) especially 173–9.
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counts.12 In response to the political involvement of the collegia, the Senate repeatedly 
took action against the associations.13 Julius Caesar appears to have issued a lex Iulia de 
collegiis that prohibited virtually all associations.14 A senatus consultum now commonly 
referred to as the senatus consultum de collegiis tenuiorum (“regarding associations of 
people of lesser means”) that was issued in the first or early second century, specified 
what categories of collegia were to be allowed, thereby restricting the possibility of 
starting new associations.15 The unease of the authorities towards private associations 
may also be illustrated by the emperor Trajan, voicing his concerns in a letter to Pliny 
the Younger:
Plin. Ep. 10.34
Tibi quidem secundum exempla complurium in mentem venit posse collegium 
fabrorum apud Nicomedenses constitui. Sed meminerimus provinciam istam 
et praecipue eas civitates eius modi factionibus esse vexatas. Quodcumque no-
men ex quacumque causa dederimus iis, qui in idem contracti fuerint, hetaeriae 
eaeque brevi fient.
You are of the opinion it would be proper to constitute a guild of fabri in Nicome-
dia, as has been done in several places. But it is to be remembered that societies 
of this sort have greatly disturbed the peace of the province [Bithynia] in general, 
and of those cities [Nicomedia] in particular. Whatever name we give them, and 
for whatever purposes them may be founded, they will not fail to form them-
selves into factions, assemblies, however short their meetings may be.16
What was the effect of all this on the nature and prevalence of associations up to the 
first century AD? There is relatively little epigraphic evidence of formal collegia before 
the second century.17 But there certainly was a form of socio-economic association. In 
Pompeii, the goldsmiths united (aurifices universi) supported C. Cuspius Pansa’s run for 
12 A more detailed overview can be found in Cotter (1996) or De Ligt (2000).
13 Cotter (1996) 75–6.
14 Cotter (1996) 76–7; Suet. Div. Iul. 42.3.
15 Dig. 47.22.1 pr. (Marcian, 3rd c.), discussed by De Ligt (2000) 247–9.
16 Plin. Ep. 10.34, translation Melmoth (1927, Loeb Classical Library), with minor modifications.
17 Liu (2008b) 66 concludes that “in general, collegia were a sporadic phenomenon in the West before 
the late first century AD”. Bollmann (1998) 163-9, at 169 finds evidence of Vereinshäuser in the first 
century mainly for the Augustales. She finds little to no evidence for the Republic.
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aedile in electoral graffiti.18 Tacitus writes that after a fight between Pompeians and Nu-
cerians at the amphitheatre in Pompeii got out of hand in 59 AD, the illegitimate collegia 
of Pompeii were dissolved (among other things): the phrasing suggests that there were 
illegitimate collegia as well as legitimate ones at the time.19 Moreover, the continuous 
apparent enmity between authorities and associations could be interpreted as evidence 
for the fact that the collegia had always remained extant, and influential.20 Indeed, the 
stumbling block that was the lex Iulia appears not to have been very long-lived, and De 
Ligt has convincingly argued that the implications of the senatus consultum de collegiis 
tenuiorum were not nearly as restrictive as some scholars have believed.21 In my view, 
such rules and regulations are a reflection of a government attempting to impose a 
formal structure onto the already widespread habit of forming informal associations.
Collegia increasingly sought, and were granted, government recognition. With an 
imperial or senatorial grant of the ius coeundi (right to assemble) they became legal 
associations (collegia legitima), which underlines once more that the authorities were 
not entirely hostile towards private associations. Liu concludes that “the proliferation 
of all kinds of collegia in imperial Rome suggests that the official regulations may in 
fact have had a positive impact on the development of associations”.22 She points out 
that predictably the state was particularly prone to support collegia that were useful to 
the public good.23 Governmental recognition was justified since associations were more 
than a potentially disruptive factor. They were also an important structuring principle in 
society that reaffirmed the civic order. From the perspective of the association, the grant 
of the right to assemble was not only important in itself, but it was also the prerequisite 
for other rights and privileges.24 The right of corpus habere, for example, that is the right 
18 CIL 4. 710. On the form of association in electoral graffiti, Liu (2008b) 57-60. She concludes cor-
rectly they are not formal collegia – but they are a form of professional associations, even if they 
sometimes refer to only “the workmen in a workshop” (p. 57). Universi in this example points to a 
larger group, though.
19 Tac. Ann. 14.17: et rursus re ad patres relata, prohibiti publice in decem annos eius modi coetu Pom-
peiani collegiaque, quae contra leges instituerant, dissoluta (“And, the case brought again before the 
magistrates, the Pompeians were prohibited another public assembly of this type for ten years, 
and the associations that existed against the rule of law, were dissolved”). Liu (2008b) 60-62 does 
not see any evidence for legitimate collegia in this.
20 So Patterson (1992) 23.
21 De Ligt (2000) and (2001).
22 Liu (2013) 357. The duality in the connections between government and collegium is emphasized 
by Liu (2009) 97-111 and (2013) 355ff (“double-edged effect”).
23 Liu (2009) 123.
24 Liu (2013) 355 “at least from the second century on”.
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to act as a legal collective, would significantly facilitate the owning and receiving of 
property.25 Legitimate collegia were in it to win it.
To sum up, the first century saw the development from informal to formally recognized 
and increasingly widespread associations. During the second and third centuries AD the 
collegia flourished as independent organizations, and this is reflected in their epigraphic 
output. Much of what follows, therefore, is based on evidence that stems mostly from 
the late first to late third centuries. From the late third century onwards, the role of 
the collegia changed significantly in nature, as private associations were increasingly 
employed for the public good in service to the state and the city of Rome, notably for 
the food supply.26 But that development lies outside the scope of the current analysis.
hierarchies and civic life
It has long been recognised that the Roman population below the elite was just as 
hierarchically organized as the elite – a hierarchy that was structured by voluntary as-
sociations.27 The question is how the hierarchy of the non-elite was formed and how it 
interacted with the elite hierarchy. The Roman elite as reflected in our ancient sources 
does not seem to have taken much notice of the rest. Or did they, and is their anxiety 
towards associations a consequence of the existence of an alternative road to power?
Forming associations can be perceived as a quest to personal achievement, a way 
to create opportunities for advancement.28 The collegia had a strong internal hierarchy 
with a wide range of magistracies that their members could aspire to.29 This hierarchy 
extended to a ranking of the associations themselves: first came the three principal col-
legia, next those related to the imperial annona, and then interregional associations.30 
‘First-class’ collegia seem to have been favoured by benefactors as well, so their dona-
tions made the wealthy associations wealthier.31 An exception to the rule are the collegia 
domestica, that were somewhere on the lower end of the scale in terms of status, but 
that could generally count on the support of their aristocratic masters. 
25 Solely prestige, Van Nijf (1997); legal advantages, De Ligt (2001), Liu (2009) 103–11. The right of 
corpus habere was not handed out indiscriminately, cf Dig. 3.4.1 pr (Gaius ad ed.). It was granted to 
all legitimate collegia only under Marcus Aurelius.
26 Gibbs (2013), ‘Artisans, trades, and guilds. Late Antiquity’ in the Encyclopedia of Ancient History 
with references; Cf Liu (2013) 367, Liu (2009) 112–5; Ausbüttel (1982) 99–108.
27 Verboven (2007) 870, “institutionalized through the numerous voluntary associations across the 
empire”.
28 Venticinque (2009) 25–6: “an obvious reaction to and result of the economic, and therefore politi-
cal insignificance of craftsmen and non-land holding members of any given municipality”.
29 Royden (1988) collects the material on collegia magistrates.
30 Verboven (2007) 875–80.
31 Liu (2008a) 239 although she cautions not to push the stratification of associations too far.
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The cursus honorum within a collegium was as a rule completely separate from that in 
the civic hierarchy. That was no reason for the officials not to be proud of their title, even 
in a collegium domesticum. Collegium magistrates noted their position within the asso-
ciation rather than their freeborn citizenship.32 It is interesting to see that membership 
alone apparently was not often deemed worth mentioning in epitaphs. It was magistra-
cies rather than occupations that people were proud of. Since office-holding within a 
collegium regularly required a summa honoraria, recording the title on a tombstone is 
also a reflection of wealth.33
The collegia offered their members a chance to social status and rank that was as a rule 
not open to them in the civic hierarchy.34 Within the ranks of the collegium, slaves could 
rise to become magistrates.35 It was “an avenue for the ambitious without subverting 
the basic organization of society”.36 MacMullen observed that collegia both “resembled 
the whole social context they found themselves in and imitated it as best they could”, 
calling them “miniature cities”.37 The terminology of their magistracies mirrored those 
of the city: there was a board of councillors (decuriones), for example, and a quaestor.38 
It was a literal alternative to the civic order. Verboven dubbed this phenomenon “the 
associative order”.39 In his view, however, the associative order provided a means for suc-
cessful collegiati to gain the social and symbolic capital that was valued within the civic 
order – and it gave them, or at least their children, the chance to actually enter into that 
civic order.40 In his view, collegiati were mainly successful businessmen whose wealth 
was looked down upon because of how they earned it. The argument works equally 
well reading ‘wealthy freedmen’ in place of ‘successful businessmen’, depending on one’s 
interpretation of who were accepted members.
32 Joshel (1992) 113–9, specifically 118.
33 Joshel (1992) 115: “In general therefore, most of the men with this form of occupational title would 
have been among the wealthier practitioners of their trades”.
34 E.g. Patterson (2006) 260; Kloppenborg (1996) 18; Ausbüttel (1982) 48.
35 Liu (2009) 177 n. 56 points out the unambiguous examples of CIL 11. 4771 (fullones) and CIL 14. 
2874 (cisiarii); Royden (1988) lists no slave magistrates, but does not include these two inscriptions 
in his book.
36 Patterson (2006) 262.
37 MacMullen (1974) 77, 76.
38 Patterson (2006) 255.
39 Verboven (2007).
40 Cf Venticinque (2009) 128 on Roman Egypt, who suggests that the boundaries between elite and 
non-elite (i.e. collegiati) became blurrier when further away from the centre of power.
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The collegia themselves were an integral part of the community.41 As a reflection of 
the close connection with the town, their names would sometimes include the town 
name, as in the case of the collegium fabrum tignuariorum Ostiensum.42 The collegiati par-
ticipated in civic life as benefactors as well as recipients of benefactions; they were con-
spicuously present during religious festivals and processions, they could have separate 
seating areas in the theatres and set up buildings, statues and inscriptions in the public 
space.43 Interaction with elite patrons was mutually beneficial and confirmed as well 
as shaped the community: “the collegia could be expected to reciprocate meaningfully 
through the grant of honorific titles and so on in a way impossible for the individual.”44
membership composition
It is as if no principle of either inclusion or exclusion could meet all demands – as 
if clusters of every conceivable private sympathy required expression. Where two 
neighbors at a corner pub today will raise their glasses and at most exchange a 
friendly “Cheers!” the two in antiquity seem to have said, “Be it resolved, to call 
ourselves the society of.…”.45
There was significant variation in Roman associations. There were associations from a 
minimum of three to over a hundred members;46 there were private, semi-public, and 
state associations. Membership of an association was not open to everyone, but still 
the collegia were open to many: it was available to slave, freed, free, male, and female. 
This was a matter of matching the right individual with the right collegium, because 
many associations catered for a specific group of people. Candidates for membership of 
a collegium therefore had to fulfil certain requirements of occupation, religion, wealth, 
gender, or other. If qualified, they had to be voted in, generally by the guild magistrates 
or by the democratic vote of all members. A kind of background check of prospective 
41 Verboven (2007) 881; cf Van Nijf (1997) and (2002); The ambivalence of the people of Tarsus 
towards the linen-weavers (an association?), as sketched out by Dio Chrysostom 34.21-3 in detail 
(they were “as it were, outside the constitution”, ὣσπερ ἒξοθεν τῆς πολιτεἰας; sometimes consid-
ered on the inside and sometimes on the out), is revealing and deserves more attention in this 
respect. Dio argues that they should be accepted as citizens.
42 Cf Patterson (2006) 256.
43 Patterson (2006) 262-4 (benefactors); Patterson (1994) 232, 235: Augustales, decuriones, and col-
legia were the three groups important in civic life in the second and third century.
44 Patterson (1992) 22, his emphasis.
45 MacMullen (1974) 82.
46 For the legal minimum, Dig. 50. 16. 85 (Marcellus, attributed to Neratius Priscus): Neratius Priscus 
tres facere existimat ‘collegium’, et hoc magis sequendum est.
Non-familial labour collectives 237
candidates could be part of the procedure.47 For trained artisans or craftsmen, however, 
membership of the corresponding association does not appear to have been obligatory, 
hereditary, or self-evident in any other way.48 There is thus every reason to assume that 
membership of (professional) associations was not universal.49
MacMullen once guesstimated that in the first century AD, one-third of the (male) 
urban population were members of an association.50 This view has recently been chal-
lenged by Liu, who carefully calculates a maximum of only 13 per cent of the male 
population of the city of Rome, using the combined data for the first four centuries AD.51 
Her problem with the earlier guesstimate is that it did not use a strict definition of formal 
collegia for the calculation: it was based on the numbers from Pompeii as representative 
for other cities, counting as associations all (occupational and other) identifiable ‘groups’ 
that were found in Pompeian inscriptions, including the electoral graffiti. The current 
inclusive analysis of the associative phenomenon would argue for the inclusion of such 
informal (or rather, ‘less formal’) associations, however.52 An inscription like that of “the 
fullers for Eumachia, daughter of Lucius, civic priestess”, surely suggests that there was a 
collective of the fullers, even if no mention is made of a collegium per se.53 In the broader 
picture, the distinction between formal and informal collegia in epigraphic evidence 
generally is not a problem: to my knowledge there are few instances of ‘unspecified’ 
associations whose status as such is ambivalent outside the Pompeian graffiti.
Even with a clear dataset for the associative phenomenon, no certain numbers will 
come up; it is also likely that the percentage will lie somewhere between 10–30 per cent 
for the first century AD.54 The epigraphic evidence shows unequivocally that collegia then 
became both more numerous and more prosperous in the second and third centuries 
47 Broekaert (2011) 27–9 with reference to the lex of the citrarii et eborarii, CIL 6. 33885, debebunt 
utique curatores de eo / [que]m adlecturi fuerint ante ad quinq(uennales) re[fe]rre.
48 Compulsion and inheritance of guild membership may have played a part from the fourth century 
onwards, see Gibbs (2013) with references.
49 Verboven (2007) 883–4 on the proliferation of guild membership; see also Van Minnen (1987) 
68–9, who illustrates for Roman Egypt that it could be difficult not to be part of a guild.
50 MacMullen (1966) 174. Cf Ausbüttel (1982) 36-7.
51 Liu presented these calculations in her paper for the conference ‘Work, labor and professions’, 
Ghent 31 May 2013, but they were left out of the published version, Liu (2017). According to her 
calculations the real percentage was probably lower; extensive refutation of interpreting occupa-
tional or religious groups as formal collegia in Liu (2008b).
52 Liu (2017), and elsewhere, herself is all in favour of this new approach, and goes on to consider as 
collegia some debatable evidence that I would not necessarily include as such: for instance, the 
networks surrounding Tryphon and Pausiris, for which see also chapter 3.
53 CIL 10. 813: Eumachiae L(uci) f(iliae) / sacerd(oti) publ(icae) / fullones.
54 A promising long-term project has now started: The Ghent Database of Roman Guilds(+), where 
the plus refers to the fact that it includes associations more generally.
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AD though here, too, their numbers remain elusive. But collegiati probably remained a 
minority throughout, and it needs to be kept in mind that there always was a significant 
group of outsiders. Qualitative data can considerably further our understanding of who 
could join the collegia and who was excluded.
Wealth
The senatus consultum de collegiis tenuiorum could tentatively be read to suggest that col-
legia were particularly common among the ‘poorer’, depending on one’s interpretation 
of tenuiores.55 The collegia have been referred to as a form of social security, “designed 
for lower class self-help”.56 This suggests they were ‘mutual aid societies’ that catered 
to the needs of the poor, and of those who had no family to fall back on – interpreting 
tenuiores as the poor and destitute. In this view, they also provided the financial means 
by which a bereaved widow might take care of her children and could secure the funds 
for a decent burial, for her deceased husband and for herself and her children in the 
future.57 But membership was probably out of the reach of that widow if she were truly 
poor and destitute.
The collegium-charters that have come down to us suggest that membership was 
not free. Aspiring members were probably required to pay an entrance fee, as well as a 
regular monthly contribution.58 The best known charter of a Roman association reports 
that the worshippers (cultores) of Diana and Antinoos from Lanuvium owed the colle-
gium 100 HS plus an amphora of good wine upon admission; their monthly contribution 
amounted to 5 asses.59 This entrance fee was not negligible, and together with the 
continuous monthly contributions effectively makes money a selection-criterion for 
membership.60Collegia also required their members’ presence at meetings, banquets, 
and so on, and the time investment, too, was one that presumably not everyone could 
55 See above; Dig. 47.22.1 pr (Marcian).
56 The words are Van Nijf ’s (2002) 307 who then goes on to refute this interpretation; social security: 
MacMullen (1966) 174.
57 “Mutual aid societies”, Garnsey and Saller (1987) 156; the hypothetical widow was introduced by 
Hopkins (1983) 213.
58 Hawkins (2006) 106–7; Cf Liu (2009) who writes that it is plausible, but not very widely attested 
that collegia commonly demanded an entrance fee, p. 163 with n. 10 listing the evidence.
59 CIL 14. 2112, now in the Museo Nazionale delle Terme Diocleziani in Rome; Cf Bendlin (2011), with 
updated text and translation.
60 Patterson (1992) 21; Cf Venticinque (2009) 41–2 and (2010) 274 with n.4 for Roman Egypt.
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afford.61 Burial arrangements through a collegium were costly by implication.62 The idea 
that the associations functioned mainly as a burial insurance for the poor has long been 
refuted.63 These considerations make clear that collegia did not provide social security 
to the poor in our sense of the word. One might say that they did so in the Roman 
sense of the word. Tenuis was a relative concept, that distinguished a very wealthy elite 
from all the rest: when Augustine referred to himself and his father as tenuis or pauper, 
for example, we know that he certainly was not referring to any financial problems the 
family might have had.64 In all likelihood the use of the word ‘tenuiores’ in the senatus 
consultum de collegiis tenuiorum, therefore, did not so much refer to the poor, but to the 
nonelite or the ‘not-wealthy’.65
It is certain that the professional collegia attracted a number of wealthier members, 
some of whom belonged to the senatorial or equestrian elite. A collegium with such 
upper-class membership did not conform to the general rule of the sc de collegiis 
tenuiorum. That would have made the collegium illegal, so it is likely that it would have 
had to apply to the authorities to gain the official status of association.66 This practical 
drawback may not have been so severe in reality – it was argued above that many as-
sociations were granted the right of assembly – and one can imagine that the presence 
of elite members had its advantages. That there was such a wealthier group of members 
and associates, is evident from the amount of money circulating in substantial benefac-
tions bestowed upon associations, as well as in the significant expenses incurred by the 
associations’ involvement in burials and collective deeds of euergetism.67 Their place in 
the urban community depended on it. Most of the occupational inscriptions relating to 
61 Liu (2017) 209. On p. 210 she cites a very interesting case of someone resigning from his associa-
tion because he could not bring up the investment anymore: ἀσθενῶς ἔχων (P. Mich. 9. 575, l. 4–5, 
Karanis 184 AD).
62 Verboven (2007) 875: “Membership of an association was in itself relatively expensive. Indirectly 
burial by or with assistance of a collegium, was an expensive option. Rather, the collegia contrib-
uted to adding lustre to the funeral of their members, affirming for the last time their social status, 
reflecting favourably on their family and heirs”.
63 Contra Mommsen (1843) whose views have long been influential, e.g. Hopkins (1983) 214. But see 
now Perry (2006) chapter 1, spec. 29–32.
64 Brown (2012) 148-154; Aug. Conf. 2.3.5 for Patricius as a tenuis municeps; Aug. Sermo 356.13 refer-
ring to himself as hominem pauperem, de pauperibus natum, “a poor man, born from poor parents”; 
Cf Woolf (2006); Shaw (1987b) 8–10 seems to have changed Peter Brown’s mind, who still took 
Augustine’s word (tenuis) at face value in his biography, Brown (1967) 21.
65 Ausbüttel (1982) 25: “Mit dem Wort tenuiores wird die einfache, aber (…) keineswegs besitzlose 
Bevölkerung im Gegensatz zu den honestiores oder divites bezeichnet”.
66 Cf De Ligt (2000).
67 This is evident for example from Liu’s discussion of membership in the collegia centonariorum, Liu 
(2009) 164–9 and Liu (2008a); more generally, see also Ausbüttel (1982) 43–8.
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the collegia record collegium magistrates or benefactors, who cannot have been entirely 
without means.68CIL 6. 1872 is found on an altar dedicated to Tiberius Claudius Severus, 
by the association of fishermen and divers at Rome.
ciL 6. 1872
Ti(berio) Claudio Esquil(ina) Severo / decuriali lictori patrono / corporis 
piscatorum et / urinator(um) q(uin)q(uennali) III eiusdem corporis / ob merita 
eius / quod hic primus statuas duas una / Antonini Aug(usti) domini n(ostri) 
aliam Iul(iae) / Augustae dominae nostr(ae) s(ua) p(ecunia) p(osuerit) / una cum 
Claudio Pontiano filio / suo eq(uite) Rom(ano) et hoc amplius eidem / corpori 
donaverit HS X mil(ia) n(ummum) / ut ex usuris eorum quodannis / natali suo XVII 
K(alendas) Febr(uarias) / sportulae viritim dividantur / praesertim cum navigatio 
sca/pharum diligentia eius adquisita / et confirmata sit ex decreto / ordinis 
corporis piscatorum / et urinatorum totius alv(ei) Tiber(is) / quibus ex s(enatus) 
c(onsulto) coire licet s(ua) p(ecunia) p(osuerunt)
To Tiberius Claudius Severus of the Esquiline tribe, decurialis, lictor, patron of 
the associated fishermen and divers, threefold president (quinquennalis) of the 
same association, because of his benefactions, first among which two statues 
he placed out of his one funds, one of Antoninus Augustus our emperor [= 
Caracalla], the other of Julia Augusta our emperor-mother; one [statue] with 
Claudius Pontianus his son, a Roman knight; and on top of that he gave to the 
same association 10,000 sesterces so that out of the dividend of these on his 
birthday, the 17 Kalends of February, gifts can be handed out man by man; above 
all for the navigational rights (navigatio scapharum) gained through his diligence 
and confirmed by decree of the board (ordo) of the association of fishermen and 
divers of the entire Tiber-shore to whom it was allowed by senatorial decree to 
assemble (i.e. they had the ius coeundi).
This text gives a good overview of what such a man might be capable of in terms of 
money (and influence).69
The wealthier segment of the population thus took part in larger associations as well, 
and some associations, like the Iobacchoi, were even characterized by a largely upper-
68 For Rome, Joshel (1992) 113.
69 CIL 6. 1872 = ILS 7266, 206 AD. An different side of the altar adds consular dating and the corporate 
magistrates responsible for setting up the dedication.
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class membership.70 There were real benefits to be gained from collegium membership, 
so the presence of the elite is unsurprising: It appears that by the third century some of 
the more affluent Romans joined a collegium to gain immunities from munera publica 
(public benefactions for which only the wealthy were eligible), or to get other privileg-
es.71
Collegia were therefore not for the poor, and they did include some rich people. In line 
with this finding, the possibility that the professional collegia included only employers, 
not employees, has been stressed repeatedly.72 In this view, the association of bakers 
would consist of wholesalers or large property-owners in charge of those actually 
kneading the dough and baking the bread, which interestingly sounds rather like what 
we think we know of that famous pistor, M. Vergilius Eurysaces. Membership would have 
concerned master craftsmen and shop owners, rather than wage-labourers, apprentices 
or salesmen. Indeed we have seen that the truly poor were not among the collegiati. 
However, it is highly likely that a skilled labourer could afford to join an association.73 
And since not every skilled artisan was an entrepreneur, this means that the collegiati 
would – at least potentially – include employees as well as employers.74 In some cases 
the collegia effectively were so large that it is quite unlikely that they only included the 
top echelon of master artisans and shop owners, to the exclusion of others.75 Moreover, 
the inclusion of employers and employees matches the hierarchical nature of the col-
legia, reflecting the relationships outside of them. I suspect that one of the reasons that 
the idea of associations of employers still is cited, is that guild membership is one of 
the criteria scholars have used to try and distinguish between a manual labourer and 
a wholesaler – when an inconclusive job-title was the only thing certain. It is true that 
there is nothing in the ancient evidence to suggest that affiliation with a collegium was 
70 Remus (1996).
71 Liu (2009) 109–11; Verboven (2007) 881. This led to legal measures to exclude from these privileges 
those who were too wealthy or who were not actually of the nominal occupation, Dig. 50.6.6.12 
(Callistratus). Cf also Liu (2009) 57–62.
72 Recently voiced by Verboven (2007) 882, Patterson (2006) 255, and Van Nijf (2002) 308. See also 
the influential work of Ausbüttel (1982); This possibility was also emphasized by Brunt (1980) 87, 
91, including the collegia-inscriptions explicitly among “those [inscriptions] which might be held 
to mention manual workers at Rome, but in fact often relate to employers”.
73 See, for example, the section on ‘economic differentiation’ in Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2017) 
118-22; cf Ausbüttel (1982) 46.
74 Skilled slaves in collegia are especially unlikely to have been entrepreneurs; for slave members in 
collegia see below.
75 Cf Liu (2009) 169-171.
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close to universal, so there were restrictive factors at work.76 However, I do not believe 
that the selection criterion for collegium membership was ‘entrepreneurship’. They must 
have been restrictions of a different kind.
Legal status
Slaves, freed, and freeborn were equally welcome to join associations as long as they 
complied with the association’s conditions for entry. It is difficult to say anything more 
about the respective proportion of the freeborn, freed, and slaves among the collegiati, 
however. Virtually everything we know about individual collegiati outside of Roman 
Egypt, comes from inscriptions and, like all epigraphic material, the collegia-inscriptions 
are not without biases. Private associations in Rome had the fortunate habit to keep 
lists with the names of their members (and beneficiaries) and, more importantly, to 
inscribe them on stone. Some of these documents survived, and are now known as 
the alba collegiorum. Unfortunately, however, for most members these alba do not 
explicitly record filiation, libertination, or servile status. Perhaps they explicitly omitted 
legal status to emphasize the general equality of their members to the outside world. 
To make matters worse, explicit mention of libertination was omitted in the epigraphic 
record more generally from the second half of the first century onwards. It is interest-
ing that in accordance with the lack of status indication in the alba, Joshel’s study of 
the occupational inscriptions for individuals from CIL 6 finds that professional collegiati 
were particularly likely to leave out proper status indication in favour of stating their 
ties with a collegium.77 This would also indicate a tendency among collegium members 
to emphasize collective identity and equality rather than individual status distinctions, 
although the significant proportion of collegium magistrates among them underlines 
that the associations in themselves were actually strongly hierarchical in nature.
Scholars who took up the challenge of studying the membership composition of 
associations including status structures, resorted to onomastics. Onomastic analysis 
indicates that most members were free, but it cannot always say whether they were 
freed or freeborn.78
76 Unless the Pompeian graffito CIL 4. 960 can be read as “all of the woodworkers”: Cuspium Pansam/ 
aedil(em) lignari(i) universi rog(ant). There is no evidence that the Pompeian woodworkers formed 
a collegium, however. Compare also the universi dendrofori in CIL 8. 23400 (quoted below, n. 90).
77 Joshel (1992) 117–9.
78 For the onomastic approach see Huttunen (1974). These incerti were not necessarily ingenui, as 
Ausbüttel (1982) 39–40 concludes on the basis of some very questionable onomastics: he works 
with the assumption that freedmen are (all and only) those with a non-Latin cognomen. See Liu 
(2009) chapter 5 for a systematic analysis of membership composition of the collegia centonari-
orum, the value of which is not limited to the collegia centonariorum.
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The majority of those known collegium-members whose legal status we can identify 
with any certainty, appear to have been freedmen.79 A noticeable majority of office hold-
ers in the collegia were also of freed status.80 These observations led some scholars to 
believe that associations were chiefly or exclusively made up of freedmen.81 However, 
since the evidence for collegium-membership is largely epigraphic, and freedmen are 
relatively prominent in the epigraphic evidence from the Roman empire, it is to be 
expected that freedmen are relatively well-represented among collegiati as well. But the 
predominance of freedmen in associations ostensibly was not always so pronounced: 
it is lacking in the numerically significant collegia centonariorum.82 The conclusion that 
members of associations were mostly freedmen is not so straightforward.
I would suggest that the argument that collegia (and professional associations in 
particular) were a freedmen prerogative builds on a number of other presumptions 
regarding Roman freedmen. Freedmen were an elusive group of individuals who are 
highly visible in the ancient evidence, and therefore speak to the scholarly imagina-
tion. Freedmen have at various times been equated with successful businessmen, the 
nouveaux riches, or a version of the bourgeoisie, middle class/plebs media – and so have 
the collegiati.
Conspicuous funerary monuments, and literary references to wealthy freedmen like 
Petronius’ famous satirical character Trimalchio, all contributed to a picture of freedmen 
as rich upstarts: the nouveaux riches or, from an old-fashioned Marxist perspective, the 
Roman counterpart of the ‘bourgeoisie’. Their obvious wealth could not have run in the 
family because of their servile background. The money had to be earned through their 
economic enterprises. There were many sectors of the economy that the elite tradition-
ally kept away from. The evidence at first seems to support the idea that (successful) 
businessmen invariably were freedmen. The occupational inscriptions taken at face 
value also suggest that manual labour was generally executed by freedmen, and the 
artisans and craftsmen historically make up the ‘middle class’ in society. The associative 
order outlined by Verboven was the way through which Roman upstarts could convert 
economic capital into social and symbolic capital, and although Verboven to his credit 
does not explicitly talk about a middle class, this is how one presumably moved up from 
the plebs media to the upper-class.83
A real middle class cannot be isolated in Roman society, let alone be equated with 
freedmen. It is also clear that the group of freedmen in itself was decidedly heteroge-
79 Cf Joshel (1992) 117–119.
80 Royden (1988) 230.
81 E.g. Van Nijf (2002) 308.
82 Liu (2009) 171–2.
83 Verboven (2007).
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neous. These observations are not new. Some of the old notions, however, still resonate 
in attempts to explain the function and membership composition of collegia through 
the freedman presence – a view not fully supported the evidence. Associations were not 
a freedman prerogative.
The participation of slaves and ingenui in Roman associations has not been studied 
with quite the same intensity as freedman participation. It is tacitly assumed that the 
freeborn were allowed to congregate into professional and other voluntary associations; 
Ausbüttel even assumed that most of the collegiati were freeborn.84 The latter assump-
tion cannot be supported by the evidence, but it is securely attested that the freeborn 
were part of the collegia. Publius Aufidius Fortus, son of Publius, for example, was prefect 
of the fabri tignuarii in Ostia, and patron as well as an honoured official (quinquennalis 
perpetuus) of the associated fruit sellers and divers in the same city.85 Another example 
is Lucius Cincius Martialis, son of Lucius, who was affiliated with the collegium of fabri 
tignuarii at Rome.86
We know that at least in theory slaves, too, were eligible to join a collegium, even 
if not all associations were open to them. The inscription of the cultores of Diana and 
Antinoos in Lanuvium specifically records prescriptions for the eventuality that a master 
should refuse to hand over the remains of a deceased slave to the collegium.87 Slaves 
who were manumitted were expected to donate an amphora of wine to the associa-
tion. The text therefore clearly reckons with slave membership among the cultores. The 
jurist Marcian also underlines that there was no reason why slaves could not join an 
association, provided they had their owner’s permission.88 Slaves were even among the 
guild magistrates sometimes.89 This is a vivid illustration of how the collegial hierarchy 
would sometimes overturn the hierarchy of society (see below). Looking at the attested 
members, however, few collegiati can be securely identified as slaves.
Gender
What has been said so far about membership in associations largely applies to the 
male population. The collegia may have been less inclusive when it comes to gender, 
however. Women are seldom recorded formally among the members listed in the alba 
84 Ausbüttel (1982) 39–40, cf n. 78 above.
85 CIL 14. 4620, corpus mercatorum frumentariorum et urinatorum.
86 CIL 6. 9405.
87 Implying that it was common practice (or at least desirable) that the collegium arrange a proper 
funeral for their slave members, CIL 14. 2112, 2, 3–5.
88 Dig. 47.22.3.2 (Marcianus), translation Cotter (1996): Servos quoque licet in collegio tenuiorum recipi 
volentibus dominis, “It is also lawful for slaves to be admitted into associations of indigent persons, 
with the consent of their masters”.
89 See n. 35 above.
Non-familial labour collectives 245
collegii: they are not attested as members of the professional collegia at all, though their 
membership is sometimes confirmed for religious associations.90 Yet as we have just 
seen, the distinction between professional and religious collegia may have been little 
more than an indication of two different sides of the same coin.91 In addition to female 
membership of predominantly male associations, there are one or two references to 
all-female associations: the collective of female mimes (sociae mimae) from Rome is the 
best example.92 Exclusively female collectives seem to have existed in Roman Italy on 
a limited scale but, parallel to the idea of a secondary labour market, we might call it a 
‘secondary associative phenomenon’.93
There is a difference between legal membership of associations on the one hand, and 
women’s actual engagement with the collegia on the other.94 A famous example that 
always comes up in this context is Eumachia, commemorated for her benefactions by 
the fullers of Pompeii.95 The recent work of Emily Hemelrijk illuminates the position of 
women who come up as benefactress, patroness, or so-called ‘mother’ of a collegium. 
Hemelrijk argues that contrary to patronesses of associations, the title of ‘mother’ of 
the collegium (mater collegii) was bestowed upon women who in all likelihood were 
‘insiders’, chosen from among the same social strata. She tentatively suggests that these 
women may have been associated members themselves.96 It is tempting to read into this 
that the women may have been recognized artisans, as members of the occupational 
associations. As Hemelrijk shows, however, few ‘mothers’ were recorded within profes-
sional associations. Moreover, there is no way of knowing whether their engagement 
90 Hemelrijk (2015) 200 for occupational collegia, 199-204 for membership of associations in general. 
It is interesting to note that virtually all come from Italy, Hemelrijk p. 200, 224; Cf Waltzing I (1895) 
348; Ausbüttel (1982) 42 “Allerdings besassen einige, vor allem religiöse Kollegien, einen hohen 
Prozentsatz weiblicher Mitglieder” – he mentions an association from Mactar, Africa, with the tell-
ing title universi dendrofori et sacrati utriusque sexus (of both sexes), the reference must be CIL 8. 
23400; cf North (2013) on variations in the relation between the gender of the worshippers and 
admission to religious cults; Dixon (2001b) 14.
91 An interesting background to the observation of Waltzing I (1895) 348-9, that “[e]n ce point, les 
collèges d’artisans différaient donc des collèges funéraires qui admettaient les femmes et leur 
confaient même des fonctions collégiales”. If the distinction is not valid, what is the significance of 
the observed difference?
92 CIL 6. 10109 quoted in full below; noted by Hemelrijk (2015) 205; Ausbüttel (1982) 42; Waltzing 
(1895) 348.
93 Hemelrijk (2015) 205–221.
94 Hemelrijk (2015) chapter 4 and 5; Hirschmann (2004) 403–4, 412.
95 CIL 10. 813 quoted in the text above; Hirschmann (2004) 409; Hemelrijk (2015) 198 and (2008) 119 
n. 12 notes that Eumachia is not explicitly indicated as a patroness of the fullers.
96 Hemelrijk (2015) especially chapter 4 and 5; earlier publication of findings in Hemelrijk (2012) on 
fictive motherhood, (2010) and (2008) on female patronesses and ‘mothers’ of collegia; see also the 
discussion of Liu (2009) 178–180.
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with an association did not originate chiefly from their relationship with another (male) 
member.97 Because there is very little evidence for female membership of professional 
collegia, the latter option seems to be the most likely explanation. This outcome is en-
tirely in line with the engendered patterns of labour in Roman society. “[F]ictive mother-
hood allowed women a position of authority within a city or collegium, a role which was 
cast in socially acceptable terms”.98 It seems that women could be, but were not usually 
among the members of an association. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, this 
does not mean that they were not involved in a trade.
Ethnicity
The existence of a corpus splendissimum mercatorum Cisalpinorum et Transalpinorum at 
Mediolanum and Novara, or the epitaph of the president of the corpus negotiantium 
Malacitorum found in Rome – to name but a few examples – indicates that common 
ethnic background could be the organizing principle behind an association, for those 
who moved to or within Roman Italy.99
The port cities of Ostia and Puteoli were also home to many migrants, often merchants 
from abroad, and here they organized themselves into collectives that sporadically 
come up in the epigraphic sources.100
Clustering of migrants in larger cities more generally, however, is chiefly attested 
through trading stations (stationes) such as the Piazzale delle Corporazioni in Ostia and 
the famous Tyrians of Puteoli; but stationes were perhaps more like embassies (with a 
commercial function) than associations.101 When Verboven writes that “collegia group-
ing foreigners are widely, but not abundantly, attested throughout the empire”, it is 
significant that this includes stationes – and it is even more noteworthy that, with the 
exception of Ostia and Puteoli, much of the more substantial evidence comes from 
outside of Roman Italy.102 Likewise, there are no inscriptions for resident aliens in Roman 
97 Hemelrijk (2015) e.g. 184-5; family was important in the choice for patronesses, too, 231–35; also 
Hemelrijk (2012), and (2008) 140: “as a rule, a ‘mother’ of a collegium was a female official who was 
probably recruited from among the female members of the association, or from the relatives of 
male officials.”
98 Hemelrijk (2012) 212.
99 The corpus splendissimum is also attested at Aventicum, Lugdunum and Trier, Verboven (2011b) 
n.31 for references; this particular epitaph is CIL 6. 9677.
100 Verboven (2011) 337 lists Berytenses, Heliopolitanenses, Germellenses, Nabataenses and individ-
ual foreigners. He writes: “Puteoli was an exceptional place. Like Ostia, the city was a commercial 
stronghold, where the number of outsiders rival[l]ed the number of citizens. Both towns shared 
many features, but differed substantially from ‘ordinary’ cities”.
101 Tacoma (2016) 236-7; For the Piazzale see CIL 14. 4549 and Terpstra (2013) 100-12. The Tyrians at 
Puteoli: CIG 3. 5835 = IG 14. 830, 174 AD with Terpstra (2013) 70-84.
102 Verboven (2011) 337.
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Italy united in collegii consistentes or peregrinorum, as there are in other provinces. In 
Lugdunum there was a collegium of the fabri tignuarii consistentes as well as a collegium 
fabrum tignuariorum (of locals, we may presume). This leads Liu to signal exclusion of 
resident aliens from associations “in large port cities or commercial centres”.103 Whereas 
there are sporadic examples that seem to reflect this duality elsewhere in the empire,104 
a similar ban is not apparent in Italy. Foreigners may have been prevented from joining 
existing collegia sometimes, but if they were it is not traceable.
In sum, migrant associations in Roman Italy do not appear to have been common, 
even in the city of Rome. It must be assumed that migrants who wished to join a collec-
tive were quickly assimilated into the existing pluriform associative structure.105
Occupation
Gender appears to be the best general indicator for in- or exclusion in associations. 
Legal status or wealth does not seem to be a specific requirement for membership in 
the professional associations. More interestingly, however, occupation was not always 
a knock-out criterion either.106 Perhaps that curious fact should not come as a surprise, 
considering the functional overlap between associations that was emphasized earlier 
in this chapter. Nevertheless, surely the titular profession of an association must have 
meant something. After all, Roman history would have it that the associations first cre-
ated in the time of the Kings were occupational in nature.107
In professional associations, occupation took pride of place. The lex of the dealers in 
ivory and citrus-wood (negotiatores eborarii et citrarii) is clear on the matter.
ciL 6. 33885, 4–6
[item] placere ut si alius quam negotiator eborarius aut citrarius [p]er / [fr]audem 
curatorum in hoc collegium adlectus esset uti curatores eius / [cau]sa ex albo 
raderentur ab ordine…
103 Liu (2017) 214 with 214-16. She notes that the consistentes demonstrably accepted local members 
into their ranks, which mitigates a strict duality.
104 Cf Koestner (2017) on the linen-weavers of Alexandria in P. Giss. 40 II.
105 Tacoma (2016) 232-237, excluding the stationes, and see 237-40 for the volatile nature and weak 
ties of many migrant networks.
106 Ausbüttel (1982) 36, 74; Liu (2013) 360: “The link to a particular occupation, however, did not mean 
that all the practitioners of a trade had to become members of the corresponding association, 
or that each and every professional association admitted artisans and/or tradesmen of its titular 
trade only”.
107 The first collegia are said to have been created by Servius Tullius or Numa Pompilius, Flor. 1.6.3; 
Plin. HN 34.1.1; 35.46.159; Plut. Num. 17.1-2; cf Dig. 47.22.4 for collegia in the Twelve Tables.
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if by a mistake of the curators someone other than an ivory dealer or a citrus-
wood dealer should have been admitted into this collegium, then the curators 
will be erased from the membership list by the ordo because of it...108
Note that the curators are removed, but the text does not explicate what was done 
about the erroneously appointed collegiatus.109
It is probably significant that the negotiatores eborarii et citrarii were based in the city 
of Rome: larger cities like Rome and Ostia had a greater variation of associations, often 
connected with highly specialized trades such as the faber soliarius baxiarius (women’s 
sandal maker).110 With such a wide choice in associations it is difficult to see why, say, 
a faber soliarius baxiarius would even consider to join the eborarii et citrarii rather than 
the collegium of his own trade. There were obvious economic and social benefits to as-
sociating with those in the same trade. As a rule, therefore, professional collegia could 
indeed be defined by shared occupation. However, it appears to have been a recognized 
fact that various professions could also sometimes be assembled under the heading of 
one occupational collegium: the law acknowledged that this occurred, although it is dif-
ficult to find actual attestations of it.111 It has been suggested that occupational plurality 
within a professional association was characteristic particularly of smaller settlements, 
in which case this scenario may have been the more common one throughout Italy.112 
This geographical differentiation is where I shall turn now.
108 CIL 6. 33885, 4–6. The ordo here probably refers to the guild or guild magistrates, cf Tran (2007a) 
124.
109 Expulsion was a possibility, cf Tran (2007a).
110 CIL 6. 9404.
111 E.g. Dig. 50.6.6.6; 50.6.6.12; for an example see AE 1981, 387; cf Liu (2009) 203–8 on ‘outsiders’ 
in the collegium centonariorum; Verboven (2007) 883-4 with other examples. The converse was 
also possible: there are those with multiple affiliations, despite the fact that it is forbidden by law 
(Dig 47.22.1.2, Marcian), see Liu (2009) 206–8. Cf Hawkins (2006) 109 who suggests that individu-
als with multiple affiliations were in fact exceptional, and that they were generally recruited as 
benefactors.
112 Liu (2009) 22.
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urbanism and association
There is a correlation between urbanism and association: generally speaking, collegia are 
attested in urban centres.113 In part this is due to the nature of the evidence: associations 
are chiefly attested epigraphically, and inscriptions on stone are an urban occurrence. 
Moreover, associations generally tend to form where people cluster together in large 
numbers, and that is in the cities. The more people, the more associations. The perceived 
distribution pattern of collegia inscriptions is therefore not surprising. The precise nature 
of the correlation between urbanism and the associative phenomenon is, however, not 
immediately apparent. In order to get to the nature of this connection, the distribution 
of inscriptions recording collegia deserves somewhat closer scrutiny.
There was a wide variation in number, size, and prestige of associations, all of which 
was largely related to their location.114 It will become clear that some basic distinctions 
between collegia in large and small towns have already been noted in the scholarly 
literature. But there is a third category, both the largest and most obvious one: the as-
sociations of Rome. Rome cannot be equated with the other large cities, and conversely 
the material from the eternal city has a tendency to become an unwarranted model 
for all (large) cities. The tripartite distinction between the capital, large cities, and small 
settlements is not often explicitly recognized.115
Rome
Almost two thirds of the epigraphic attestations of collegia come from Italy.116 The 
majority of collegia inscriptions originate from the capital.117 This pattern appears to be 
broadly consistent with the general pattern of epigraphic output. More significant is that 
the city of Rome also exhibits a greater differentiation in the ‘occupational’ associations 
113 Liu (2008b) 65 notes “the case of Pompeii implies that a high degree of urbanization, such as that 
found at Pompeii, or craft-related specialization does not automatically lead to the formation of 
collegia. It is my understanding that the relationship between urbanization and the formation 
of collegia is not always straightforward.” This viewpoint is based on a strict definition of formal 
collegia which I have discussed under the heading of ‘formal organization and variation’ above, 
where I outlined the development of private associations into collegia, and of collegia into active 
organizations in the civic community. What follows is valid, too, if in the first century there were 
private associations (as I have argued above for Pompeii) rather than formal collegia.
114 Ausbüttel (1982) 33 pointed out that there probably were regional differences, but does not go 
into this.
115 Liu, especially (2013) and (2008b), is the positive exception. For a working definition of large, 
medium, or small settlements, see De Ligt (2012) 201.
116 Ausbüttel (1982) 32.
117 Ca 700 according to Liu (2013) 352.
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attested than any other city:118 The difference is not just in number, but also in nature of 
the inscriptions. In Rome, there appear to have been three centuriae of women’s sandal 
makers alone.119 In Rome, too, there are collegia for highly specialized professions like 
caudicarii (lightermen) and specularii (mirror makers?), or the lenuncularii traiectus Luculli 
(ferrymen working at the crossing of Lucullus), “and many, many other specialists quite 
untranslatably named according to what they did for a living”.120
Rome stood at the apex of the urban network. Migration to Rome was substantial 
and included many young males, who migrated without any family or pre-existing 
networks.121 The city may have had a million inhabitants, locals as well as immigrants. 
Because of the large number of people involved, all of whom were looking for a place to 
belong, as often as not without a family to fall back on, the structuring principle offered 
by collegia was more important in Rome than anywhere else in Roman Italy. As a result, 
there were many identifiable associations in the capital but, significantly, most of them 
did not enjoy the same social prestige as their counterparts in other settlements. Per-
haps more than anywhere else, in Rome the ‘associative order’ presented an alternative 
for those who had no part in the civic order.122
In most cities collegia became part of the civic order, and as part of the civic order, 
collegiati gained certain privileges. The development was outlined in more detail above. 
Associations were included in public banquets and ceremonies, and together with the 
decuriones and Augustales, they were the core group of recipients of distributions and 
benefactions from wealthy patrons.123 Taking over civic benefactions and duties in the 
absence of the traditional elite, collegium magistrates and collegiati enjoyed a certain 
prestige. By implication, so did their patrons and benefactors, as indicated by the fact 
that they proudly advertised their relationships of patronage and euergetism with the 
associations. This mutually beneficial system facilitated attracting high-ranking indi-
118 Liu (2013) 352 notes a total of c. 500 different collegia at Rome. Cf Royden (1988) 238; cf Liu (2009) 
22–3. Compare Harper (2011) 102 who finds that also household “scale and specialization were 
correlated”.
119 CIL 6. 9404.
120 CIL 6. 1795, CIL 6. 2206 and CIL 14. 5320 respectively, all also attested in other inscriptions; quote 
MacMullen (1974) 73.
121 Tacoma (2016) chapter 4, esp. 107–123.
122 The associative order: Verboven (2007) and below; this symbolic order especially in Rome: Liu 
(2013) 362.
123 Cf Liu (2013) 362; Patterson (2006), (1994), Patterson (1992) 21-2; Van Nijf (1997) for the Roman 
East.
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viduals as patrons and benefactors for the collegia. All of that was, however, not the case 
at Rome.124
The capital represented a unique civic landscape. The emperor resided at Rome, and so 
did the Senate – and many senators in addition. This was the seat of power that attracted 
the elite from all over the empire. With the emperor in the lead, all of these wealthy 
men were in constant competition for political power. The emperor took pains to affirm 
his position in relation to the plebs. Euergetism to the people and to the city of Rome, 
in the form of a building program, games, and distributions of money or bread, was a 
prime method to do so. The virtual monopoly to euergetism claimed by the emperor 
left little space for the collegia to step in as civic benefactors. There was also no need to 
fulfil a desire for political influence among those who had very little, as in smaller cities. 
It was difficult for associations in Rome to secure wealthy patrons, both because of the 
associations’ limited role in the community and in high-end politics, and because of the 
limited social capital that came with their position.125
This general account leaves out the considerable variation in types of association, 
however. In Rome they ranged from the collegia domestica of the elite domus to the 
official collegia apparitorum.126Collegia domestica and others of a more private nature 
presumably did not compete for a more substantial role in the community, as their mod-
est aims may have been fulfilled by their elite patron. Most of the professional collectives 
seem to have fallen somewhere in between these two, not merely presenting social but 
also economic networks, that were of great value to their members but less so to elite 
patrons and the civic community.
There certainly were very large, influential and prestigious associations in the city. An 
association like that of the pistores (bakers) or the navicularii (skippers) gained impe-
rial recognition and the right of corpus habere, presumably because of their important 
role in the annona.127 The collegia tria or principalia, the ‘three’, or ‘principal associations’ 
were among the ancient and respected guilds everywhere, including Rome. These three 
principal associations commonly concern the fabri (often fabri tignuarii or tignarii), 
124 Noted by Liu (2013) 362. Ausbüttel predicts quite the opposite, (1982) 48: “So werden in Rom und 
Ostia reichere Leute einem Verein angehört haben als z.B. in Britannien“.
125 Presumably one of the reasons why so many collegia are seen to have engaged in emperor wor-
ship in the hope to gain this powerful patron’s favour, cf Liu (2013) 364.
126 Liu (2013) 356; The collegia domestica are more relevant to chapter 4 on the elite domus than here. 
The specific nature of the collegia domestica shows also, e.g., from the prominence of women, 
Hemelrijk (2015) 186–189.
127 Dig. 3.4.1.pr (Gaius ad ed.); see also Verboven (2007) 875-878.
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centonarii, and dendrophoroi.128 Tentatively these translate into the builders, textile deal-
ers, and worshippers of Magna Mater (literally ‘tree-carriers’). The fabri tignuarii of Rome 
were one of the most long-lived and largest collegia in the capital that we know of.129 
There were fabri, dendrophori and centonarii here, too.130 Many other associations were 
also prominently present in the capital through their buildings, scholae or temples, the 
majority of them of an occupational signature.131Collegia set up inscriptions and statues 
in public places, and dedicated them to deities and the imperial house.
Larger cities
The port city of Ostia is the one settlement that would conceivably resemble Rome best, 
because of the close connection between the two. Walking around what is left of the city 
today, commercial spaces catch the eye. Ostia as we know it was largely constructed or 
transformed in the second century AD, when collegia flourished.132 The elaborate build-
ings or scholae of associations undeniably shape the urban landscape, and the Piazzale 
delle Corporazioni is unparalleled, with its rows of market stalls or offices for various 
collectives.133 Like Rome, Ostia is known for its great variety of occupational collegia 
and, as in Rome, they are omnipresent both in the epigraphic record and in the material 
remains of the townscape. In both respects, however, it appears that Rome and Ostia 
128 Sometimes the utriclarii are also included. Liu (2009) 50–5 questions the value of studying these 
three collegia as a coherent group, stressing differences in origins and development. See also 
ibidem pp. 393-4 on the epigraphic record of the tria collegia/collegia III, urging caution in the 
equation of the collegia tria with these collegia when the sources do not specify which ones are 
meant. In what follows I use collegia tria principalia to refer to these particular three associations 
as is common in scholarly literature; The prominence of these collegia has sometimes been linked 
to public utility as a fire brigade vel sim. That the collegia centonariorum and fabrum in particular 
were so widespread because they might have served as a fire brigade or were involved with 
maintaining public safety, as suggested by earlier scholars on the basis of Pliny, Ep. 10.33 and 34 
(quoted above), has rightly been questioned, see Van Nijf (1997) 177–81, Perry (2006) 7–18 and 
Liu (2009) chapter 4, pp 125–160 with additional references. Contra Verboven (2007) 880, who still 
speaks of the “fire brigade associations”. Callistratus, Dig. 50.6.6.12 does speak of the public utility 
of the fabri (passage quoted elsewhere). If we compare the finding that in 1791 AD a third of all 
the wage-workers in Paris were employed in the building trade (Brunt (1974) 87), the prominence 
and public utility of an actual builders’ association is perhaps not so unlikely.
129 Largest: CIL 6. 1060 points to at least 59 decuriae, of around 22 men each. Long-lived: CIL 6. 9034 
(lustrum XIIX) and CIL 6. 9406 (lustrum XXVII). There are attestations from the 1st to the 4th century.
130 Liu (2009) appendix B, p. 384-390 .
131 Bollmann (1998) 169.
132 Meiggs (1960) 133 (133-145 ‘the architectural revolution’).
133 Commercial space: Meiggs (1960) 272-4; DeLaine (2005); Piazzale delle corporazioni: many corpo-
rations are named in the mosaics on the floor of the offices, documented as CIL 14. 4549; Scholae: 
Bollmann (1998).
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were exceptional within Roman Italy.134 This makes it all the more vexing that there were 
significant differences between the position of the collegia in the capital, and Ostia.
Ostia was a city of commerce, not a political hub. The Isola Sacra necropolis holds the 
remains of traders and craftsmen, with few or no reported magistrates.135 Professional 
associations at Ostia are disproportionately well-attested epigraphically compared to 
other occupational inscriptions from the town (roughly 2:1). Incidentally and unsurpris-
ingly, the most prominent guild is that of the fabri tignuariorum Ostiensum. There are also 
fabri (without addition to the name), as well as dendrophori, but no known centonarii. 
Many of the associations here concern collectives of sailors and traders, which is to be 
expected in a port city. The visibility of associations both in the epigraphic record and in 
archaeological remains of the town plan seems to reflect their importance in the com-
munity. As a result of their position, the collegia at Ostia do not seem to have had any 
problem to engage high-ranking and wealthy patrons, though many admittedly were of 
the new elite of wealthy freedmen.136 A town like Pompeii also accounts for twenty-five 
known different professional associations.137
Besides these two examples, the epigraphic record for collegia in the larger towns of 
the Italian peninsula is limited. Half of these cities have no record of any associations, the 
other half have one, maybe two. Puteoli does not appear to have had many associations 
despite its obvious importance in commerce, though there are dendrophori here.138 The 
city of Capua, that seems to have ranked second in size after Rome, has centonarii and 
two interesting references to unspecified ‘collegia’, where “the collegia have set up” (colle-
gia posuerunt) a dedication to influential individuals. Similarly, CIL 11. 5416 from Asisium 
134 Bollmann (1998) 169-70 notes that the rich evidence for Vereinshäuser in the second century is 
largely restricted to Rome and Ostia. Her discussion of the ‘Vereinshäuser in städtischen context’ is 
structured accordingly: in Rome, Ostia, and the rest.
135 Meiggs (1960) 455; Kampen (1981) 23.
136 E.g. L. Calpurnius Chius, CIL 14. 309, mid-late 2nd c. AD. His name suggests family ties (libertina-
tion) with one of the known consuls of the name L. Calpurnius Piso, perhaps (closest in time) the 
consul of 175 AD whose light might have shined down on Chius. Chius became a central person in 
Ostia’s civic community: his epitaph lists that he once was sevir and president of the Augustales, 
president and twice treasurer (curator) of the corpus mensorum frumentariorum at Ostia, treasurer 
of the Ostian codicarii, three times and honorary president of the collegium of Silvanus Augustus 
maior; and magister to Mars Ficanus Augustus in the collegium dendroforum.
137 Verboven (2007) 874, in 41 inscriptions including the famous election notices; Liu (2008b) on the 
question whether these groups should be understood as collegia or not, to which her answer is 
negative, page 62: “the phenomenon of collegia had not developed in Pompeii by the time the city 
was destroyed”.
138 Other than these, there is a collegium scabillariorum (some sort of ritual musicians?); Baulanorum 
(ethnic); Heliopolitanorum (ethnic), see above.
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commemorates a patron of the city and three associations (municipii et collegiorum III).139 
The scarce references to collegia III, like this one, have been taken to mean ‘the three 
principal collegia’, in casu the fabri, centonarii and dendrophori.140 Though one should 
be careful in the assumption, it is easy to see where it comes from and it may not be 
far beside the truth: with the exceptions of Ostia and Pompeii, an investigation into the 
associations of larger cities largely coincides with mapping the principal associations.
The question becomes why Ostia and Pompeii show such a different picture, com-
pared to other large cities. That said, Ostia and Pompeii are both relatively large within 
a rather broad category of settlements. Ostia could perhaps also be explained through 
its proximity to Rome, though important differences between Ostia and Rome were 
pointed out above. More importantly, the state of the evidence in Ostia and Pompeii is 
better than in many other cities, which accounts for some of the discrepancy. If that is 
the case, however, should the circumstances in Ostia and Pompeii be seen as represen-
tative of other commercial centres? Comparison with the situation in other provinces 
would suggest as much, but comparison with the other settlements of Roman Italy 
would indicate that perhaps Italy was exceptional.
Small towns
The range of (professional) collegia predictably was small in minor urban centres: in these 
settlements, too, many of the (professional) associations belong to one of the collegia 
principalia.141 The fabri are everywhere, but there appear to be some regional differences 
within this pattern: the centonarii are predominantly located in north and central Italy, 
and almost absent from the south where the dendrophori are most common.142 Recent 
analysis of the occupational inscriptions of Picenum by Cristofori offers an interesting 
case in point, as it has virtually no evidence for collegia other than the three principal 
ones.143 But there are exceptions. The modest settlement of Falerio is relatively well 
documented in the region, and it is evident that collegia played an important part in 
its community. An elaborate inscription offers evidence for the existence for the three 
collegia principalia in the town, but there is also an epitaph set up for a magistrate of the 
139 Centonarii in Capua: AE 2010, 325; collegia posuerunt, AE 1985, 273 and AE 1972, 75; cf also the 
reparator collegiorum of CIL 9. 1596 (Beneventum).
140 Liu (2009) 393. In my view, AE 1985, 273 and AE 1972, 75 from Capua cited in the previous note 
very likely also relate to the III collegia – in both instances there is illegible space on the stone 
before the word collegia that would accommodate ‘III’.
141 The Augustales remain the most common collegium throughout; Collegia were certainly not 
limited to the fabri tignuarii outside of Rome and Ostia, which is what Royden (1988) 238 writes.
142 Liu (2009) 29-36 with appendix B, table on p. 384-390 listing fabri, fabri tignuarii, centonarii, den-
drophori, utriclarii.
143 Cristofori (2004).
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collective of the fullers, who was also a magistrate of the fabri; his wife was a ‘mother’ to 
the fullones as well.144 Another inscription mentions unspecified but presumably com-
mercial associations taking part in the construction of a road: these collegia are said to 
be ‘contiguous to the forum pecuarium (cattle market)’.145
There may be a rationale behind this more limited array of associations. Hawkins sug-
gested that associations may bring together artisans of broadly related trades, to enable 
“extensive vertical subdivisions of labour”.146 He cites a passage from the Digest where 
the jurist Gaius writes that the designation faber tignuarius refers “not only to those of 
hew timber, but to all who work as builders”.147 Theoretically the collegium fabrum could 
accommodate a broad range of people working in construction. It has been argued that 
Hawkins’ idea is particularly useful for understanding associations in the smaller urban 
centres, because of the attestation of these more general collegia in smaller centres, 
versus the highly specific occupations in the names of associations attested for larger 
cities.148 As we have seen, however, the more complex differentiation of collegia was 
limited to Rome, Ostia and, to a lesser extent, Pompeii.
Many of the prerequisites and stimuli for the proliferation of collegia in Rome and Os-
tia were not equally present, or not pressing enough, in smaller settlements. There were 
simply fewer artisans to unite into associations, which would have made the (enduring) 
existence of more than one or a few associations untenable. It also seems reasonable to 
suppose that many of the social advantages of the collegiate network were less urgent 
in a neighbourhood where everybody already knew one another. To anticipate the 
socio-economic function of the associations to be discussed below, therefore, Liu may 
be correct hypothesizing that the very existence of collegia as well as “the potential of 
associations in further reducing transaction costs among members may be in reverse 
proportion to the size of the city”.149 Hawkins’ vertical subdivision of labour therefore 
may well be part of the explanation for the existence of associations in larger cities. 
The active presence of collegia in even some of the smallest towns, however, cannot be 
144 Collegia principalia CIL 9. 5439; fullones/fabri CIL 9. 5450, quoted in full below. Hemelrijk (2015) 
251–69 and (2008) for ‘mothers’ of collegia.
145 Collegia principalia, CIL 9. 5439; Collegia quae attingunt … foro, CIL 9. 5438.
146 Hawkins (2006) 111–5, quote 115.
147 Dig. 50.16.235.1 (Gaius): “Fabros tignarios” dicimus non eos dumtaxat, qui tigna dolarent, sed omnes 
qui aedificarent, transl. Hawkins (2006) 111.
148 Cf. Liu (2009) 22: “Hawkins is certainly correct in noting that the Roman occupational collegium 
often included a wide range of artisans that were related to a broadly defined trade. But that 
seems to be a phenomenon typical of smaller centers. Larger commercial centers such as Rome, 
Ostia and Lugdunum featured many collegia whose titles suggested highly specialized trades”. Cf 
Verboven (2007) 880.
149 Liu (2009) 22.
256 Chapter 5
explained merely by their function as a trust network or private enforcement network, 
but rather by their importance in the civic community. Small towns in particular needed 
the support of a broader group of benefactors if they were going to remain extant, and 
an active collegium could play a part in this.150
the soCIAl Phenomenon of substItute fAmIlIes
Since the final decades of the twentieth century, scholars have ‘discovered’ collegia as 
a social phenomenon: it was a natural reaction to the formal and juristic treatment 
that went before.151 Joining a collegium was a voluntary choice that broadened an 
individual’s social network beyond the family and other networks he or she may have 
been associated with. Like the family, the collegium became a part of the Romans’ self-
identification.152
The plethora of associations in the early Roman empire has sometimes been ex-
plained by a need for a surrogate family. The association was expected to take care 
of various issues when the natural family could not, such as financial intermediation, 
religious dedications and, above all, burial arrangements.153 Consequently, the collegia 
have been referred to as grandi familie by De Robertis, Schultz-Falkenthal similarly writes 
that they were “so etwas wie eine grosse Familie“. Associative life has been termed la vie 
familiale.154 There are some indications that the collegiati themselves also appreciated 
each other this way, as they occasionally refer to the others as brothers (fratres). Surely, 
the ‘brother builders’ (fabri fratres) must refer to an association: the Romans were no 
strangers to the use of terms of fictive kinship as terms of endearment.155 
In the absence of family, specifically in the absence of children, the Romans worried 
over a proper burial.156 Anonymous graves marked by tiles or amphorae in the Isola 
Sacra necropolis were not necessarily appealing, and what is more: Martial’s Epigram 
8.75, 9-10 suggests that many of the poor were simply cremated, their ashes scattered 
(into the Tiber perhaps), their memories forever erased.157
150 Patterson (2006), 271f for his model of the small town, earlier in (1994) 236.
151 Perry (2006) chapter 6; see especially the work of Nicolas Tran (2006), (2011).
152 Joshel (1992) 113–22; Van Nijf (1997) 111.
153 For fictive or substitute families, see e.g. Wilson (1996) 13; various issues, cf Garnsey and Saller 
(1987) 157.
154 De Robertis (1946) 77; Schultz-Falkenthal (1968) 163; Waltzing.
155 CIL 5. 7487; Cf Hemelrijk (2015) ch. 5 on ‘mothers’ (and ‘sisters’) of collegia; Compare Harland (2005) 
and (2007) for a similar phenomenon in the Greek East.
156 Hopkins (1983) 213; Patterson (1992); cf Hübner (2013) 87 ff.
157 Bodel (2000); cf Patterson (1992) 16 with ref. to Martial; Hopkins (1983) 205–11.
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mart. Ep. 8.75, 9–10
Quattuor inscripti portabant uile cadauer,
accipit infelix qualia mille rogus
Four branded slaves were carrying a common corpse, of the kind that an unhappy 
pyre receives a thousand.
Collegia habitually concerned themselves with funerary matters for their members. It 
follows from the nature of the ancient evidence on collegia – which consists of many 
epitaphs – that funerary activities are their best attested pursuit.158 The charter of the 
collegium of the cultores of Antinoos and Diana at Lanuvium stipulates that the associa-
tion will pay out 300 HS for the purpose of burial.159 Fellow collegiati mourned for the 
deceased with all due ritual, participating in the funerary procession. The members of 
the cultores from Lanuvium received monetary compensation to attend the funeral; 
members of an unidentified association in Roman Egypt, conversely, were fined 4 drach-
mas if they did not go, and another 4 drachmas if they did not shave their heads in 
mourning.160
Collegia in their own right seem to have had access to burial space for their members. 
The monument of the sociae mimae in Rome measured 15 x 12 Roman feet; the sodalici 
lanariorum carminatorum (wool-merchants and -carders) from Brixellum sported a much 
larger plot of 100 x 55 feet.161 In the city it would often be a columbarium, or a number 
of niches in a columbarium tomb, where members could be buried.162 Also in the case of 
a single family columbarium related to an elite domus, an overarching collegium is regu-
158 Patterson (1992) 20; Ausbüttel (1982) 70, 71: the funerary activities of collegia are only sporadically 
attested from the 4th century onwards and so they seem to have waned in favour of Christian rites.
159 CIL 14. 2112.
160 P. Mich. 5. 243, 1–12; cf Venticinque (2009) 39–40.
161 CIL 6. 10109: Sociarum / mimarum / in fr(onte) p(edes) XV / in agr(o) p(edes) XII; CIL 11. 1031: D(is) 
M(anibus) / haec loca sunt / lanariorum / carminator(um) / sodalici / quae faciunt / in agro p(edes) C / 
ad viam p(edes) LV.
162 Patterson (1992) 20-1, including an interesting reference to CIL 6. 9405 where a number of niches 
appears to be given to specified members (and 10 unassigned places) of a collegium. There is no 
clear evidence for collegia setting up or owning a columbarium tomb, see chapter 4; cf Patterson 
(1992) 21 who points to the cultores of Hercules Victor of CIL 10. 5386 who certainly owned a large 
burial plot (loca sepulturae); Liu (2013) 365-6 also notes CIL 6. 9405, plus other examples.
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larly attested that ostensibly took care of the funerary arrangements.163 Testamentary 
endowments to collegia often stipulated the continuation of commemorative rites.164
It is not unlikely that there were collegiati who did not have a family to provide their 
burial and therefore relied on a collegium. Many labour migrants to the city of Rome 
will have been unmarried young men who had left their birth families behind.165 The 
same principle may have operated to a lesser extent in other urban centres. A number 
of migrant and local young men had some time before marriage when, because of the 
high mortality rates that were even higher in the city, there may not have been surviving 
parents to commemorate them. CIL 10. 7039 from the Sicilian city of Catina could be an 
example of this:
ciL 10. 7039
D(is) M(anibus) s(acrum) / L(ucius) Arrius / Secundus / vix(it) ann(os) XVII / 
marmorari(i) / convive fecer(unt)
Sacred to the divine spirits. Lucius Arrius Secundus. He lived 17 years. The marble-
workers sharing his life set up [this monument].
The marble-workers appear to have financed the burial of the deceased, Lucius Arrius 
Secundus, and actively contributed to the arrangements (fecerunt).166 Only seventeen 
years of age, Secundus could fit the profile of a young man without family. Sigismund-
Nielsen has shown that many ‘anonymous’ burials, meaning epitaphs without record of 
their dedicator, were set up for this demographic group, arguing on the basis of this and 
other criteria that they too were buried by a collegium for lack of family.167 
But there were certainly members of associations who did have biological families. 
Not every member was necessarily buried in a collective burial place like a columbarium. 
The collegium did not take over primary responsibility from the family. Rather, in mat-
ters of death as in life, there seems to have been a delicate cooperation between the 
163 Hasegawa (2005) 81-8 presents most of the direct and indirect evidence; E.g. CIL 6. 6215 (Statilii), 
CIL 6. 7282 (Volusii), CIL 6. 9148–9 and 10260–4 (Sergia Paullina). See also ch. 4.
164 Liu (2008a) 240.
165 Tacoma (2016) chapter 4, esp. 107–123.
166 From Catina. This particular example was chosen because I did not want to leave unmentioned 
Perry’s telling reconstructions of the possible story behind it, Perry (2006) 1–5.
167 Sigismund-Nielsen (2006) 204 “younger males of the working classes”, ibidem 206 specifies them 
as unmarried men ages 15-30. I do not believe that all of these anonymous burials were set up by 
collegia.
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association and the relatives of the deceased.168 Depending on the circumstances, the 
collegium could arrange everything, from retrieving the body of the deceased to a place 
in a communal tomb; but in other instances it would simply pay out to the next of kin.169 
Many members were buried by a collegium.170 Associations would sometimes arrange 
a funeral for the biological family of their members, too.171 When the family rather than 
the association set up the epitaph, or when family takes pride of place, the inscription 
often concerns collegium magistrates.172
The following is a clear example of how family and collegium may have operated 
together.
aE 2001, 879b
D(is) M(anibus) sacrum / L(ucio) Gavellio Felici Su/ellia Prisca coniu/gi b(ene) 
m(erenti) f(ecit) et collegi/um dendrofo/rorum
Sacred to the divine spirits. To Lucius Gavellius Felix. Suellia Prisca set this up for 
her well-deserving husband, and the association of the tree-carriers (set this up).
The associations could also be burdened with the protection of the family tomb of one 
of their members.173 In some instances, the collegium gained access to the tomb when 
the family line died out, as in the following example.174
168 Patterson (1992) 23, Van Nijf (1997) 32–3, and Venticinque (2010) 293: “Including provisions for 
burial in guild regulations or offering legal assistance does not need to imply a lack of reliance on 
one’s kin or community as has often been suggested”.
169 Cf. the Lanuvium inscription, CIL 14. 2112, col. I.26-32: when a member has died more than 20 
miles away and his death has been reported, three men will be sent to conduct the burial; when it 
has not been reported, the expenses of his burial will be compensated after the fact.
170 Joshel (1992) 113.
171 Cf Hemelrijk (2015) 183–86.
172 Joshel (1992) 113-4. But she herself notes (208, n.45) that the evidence is skewed because these 
individuals are largely concentrated in two tombs – Joshel counts individuals, not inscriptions or 
monuments.
173 Ausbüttel (1982) 69–70. The collegium received money for this, as in AE 1951, 94 (1,000 HS to the 
centonarii of Comum).
174 Cf also AE 2004, 210 (Ostia).
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ciL 6. 8750
Diis(!) Manibus / T(itus) Aelius Aug(usti) lib(ertus) Primitivus / archimagirus / fecit 
Aelia(e) Tyche et sibi et Aeliae / Tyrannidi coniugi et libertis li/bertabusq(ue) meis 
vel Aeliae Tyran/nydis / posterisque eorum /
custodia mon{i}<u>menti inhabitandi ne quis inter/dicere velit quotsi nemo de 
n(ostra) memoria / exstiterit pertinebit ad collegium cocorum / Caesaris n(ostri) 
quot veniri donarive vetamus si ad/versus ea quis fecerit poenae nomine feret 
/ arcae cocorum HS L m(ilia) n(ummum) / ate ex usuris eorum / celebretur suo 
quoq(ue) anno/ h(oc) m(onumentum) h(eredem) n(on) s(equetur)
To the divine spirits. Titus Aelius Primitivus, freedman of the emperor, head cook, 
set this up to Aelia Tyche and himself and to Aelia Tyrannis his wife and my freed-
men and – women or those of Aelia Tyrannis, and to their descendants.
The care of the monument to be dwelt in (inhabitandi), so that no one may 
interfere, [we stipulate] that if no one of our memory [i.e. family] should exist, 
[the care] will fall to the association of the cooks of our Caesar. We forbid it [the 
monument] to be given or sold. If anyone should do these things in opposition 
[to these stipulations], he shall hand a nominal fine to the treasury of the cooks 
of 50,000 nummi, a yearly sacrifice from the revenues of this should be celebrated 
in his year. This monument does not go to the heirs.175
This is the inscription of the family tomb of T. Aelius Primitivus and his wife (both his 
first (Tyche) and second partner (Tyrannis)). His family including freedmen clearly takes 
precedence here. Primitivus apparently fulfilled a magistracy as archimagirus in the 
imperial association of cooks, which will take care that the tomb is not violated on the 
penalty of 50,000 nummi – to benefit the collegium.
The collaboration of family and association in matters of death and burial is illustra-
tive of the way in which family and associative life overlapped. The collegium mourned 
the death of collegiati and their relatives, but there are indications that it was equally 
175 The translation of this text is more difficult than its meaning. Cf Weaver, Repertorium familiae 
Caesarum, 276–7 for Aeliae Tyche (= dative) instead of Aelia, and for the meaning of ate [= ἂτη], as 
a penalty in the form of a yearly sacrifice. CIL 6. 7458 has a remarkably similar text to this one; its 
contents are virtually identical to CIL 6. 8750, but it does not mention Aelia Tyrannis, only Tyche as 
Primitivus’ wife, and adds that the collegium cocorum, “exists on the Palatine” and was “located in 
this place”: quod consistit in Palatio and corpori qui sunt in hac stationem. See for that text and the 
protection of tombs by a durable institution, Crook (1967) 136–7.
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involved with the happier family life events of marriage and birth: the members of an 
unidentified association in Roman Egypt were required to pay 2 drachmas to the as-
sociation on the occasion of their marriage or the birth of a son, and one drachma for 
the birth of a daughter. That same collective has it written in their charter that “If anyone 
neglects another in trouble and does not give aid to release him from his trouble, let him 
pay eight drachmas”.176 Eating, celebrating, and grieving together, collegiati can in many 
ways be usefully seen as extended family.
Collegia and family were not just intersecting and complementary networks, however: 
collegium and family could literally coincide. There is evidence for collegiati who were 
also related as family. This phenomenon is difficult to quantify, among other things 
because of the absence of explicit filiation and libertination in the membership lists 
that was already noted above. Occupation and guild membership were not hereditary 
in the period under scrutiny, although it must be assumed that many did follow in their 
parents’ footsteps.177 It is therefore hard to say if we can speak of a “significant percent-
age” of kinship bonds among collegiati.178 The membership lists occasionally contain 
identifications such as sen(ior), iun(ior), or fil(ius), the son, in cases of homonymy.179 Liu 
illustrates that in the case of the collegium centonariorum, there were family clusters 
within collegia, sometimes over two generations as in the case of the Octavii in the col-
legium at Rome.180 Pearse reconstructs three generations among the fabri tignuarii, also 
at Rome.181 Venticinque adds convincing material that shows blood relations between 
collegiati; his examples are largely from Roman Egypt, however, and the material is not 
abundant.182
Looking beyond the membership lists, it is clear that many collegia do indeed demon-
strate kinship relations. In the following epitaph, interestingly, two sons chose to give 
precedence to official titles (including that of their mother) over kinship bonds and piety.
176 P. Mich. 5. 243 (BL 9. 160); Venticinque (2010) 280–5 including the full text and translation of the 
charter.
177 Chapter 3 on intergenerational dependence.
178 Venticinque (2010) 279: “Persons united by at least one bond of kinship with a brother, father, or 
son account for a significant percentage of the overall membership.”
179 Ausbüttel (1982) 39. Unlike him I feel that the distinction senior/junior in case of homonymy prob-
ably is an indication of kinship as well as age.
180 Liu (2009) 180–203, including patron-freedmen or colliberti.
181 Pearse (1976) 173; Liu (2009) 181–3.
182 Venticinque (2009) 44–7 and (2010) 278–9.
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ciL 9. 5450
D(is) M(anibus) / T(ito) Sillio T(iti) lib(erto) / Prisco / mag(istro) colleg(ii) / fabr(um) 
II et q(uaestori) II / mag(istro) et q(uaestori) sodal(icii) / fullonum / Claudiae 
Ti(beri) lib(ertae) / uxori eius matri / sodalic(ii) fullon(um) / T(itus) Sillius Karus et / 
Ti(berius) Claudius Phi/lippus mag(istri) et q(uaestores) / colleg(ii) fabr(um) / fili(i) 
parentib(us) / piissimis
To the divine spirits. To Titus Sillius Priscus, freedman of Titus, twice magister of the 
collegium fabrum and twice quaestor, magister and quaestor of the sodalicium ful-
lonum. To Claudia, freedwoman of Tiberius, his wife, ‘mother’ of the sodalicium of 
fullers, Titus Sillius Karus and Tiberius Claudius Philippus magistri and quaestores 
of the collegium fabrum, sons to their most revered parents.
Family clustering within collegia is also attested for forged family ties between freedmen 
and patron, though not much research has been done on this.183 Inscriptions of colliberti 
commemorating a patron already illustrated the continued bond with their patron, and 
their trade.184 It is only natural that freedmen should proceed to join the collegia – it 
is known that associations accommodated many freedmen. Theoretically familia-ties 
within the collegium could occur for slaves, too, though their membership is difficult to 
trace or further explain. Collegia domestica of elite households largely seem to coincide 
with the familia, which means that for slaves and freedmen here the collegium may actu-
ally be equated with their ‘family’.
In sum, the relationship between families and guilds seems to have been comple-
mentary.185 And so there is some truth in the idea of collegia as a substitute family. The 
historical pattern predicts that the absence of family ties influenced the emergence 
of associations.186 Family ties were perhaps not less important, but they were not 
omnipresent in the city where the dominant family form was the nuclear family,187 and 
where people often migrated to without taking their family with them, because they 
had the intention to return one day. Many young men will also have migrated before 
they had formed a family of their own. To the numerous immigrants to Rome and other 
183 Liu (2009) 180-203.
184 See chapter 3 and 4.
185 This is the thrust of the argument of Venticinque (2010) 277: “I argue that guilds, and in particular 
the ethical regulations dealing with relationships between members and their families, sought 
to create and maintain bonds of trust between members, rather than to compensate for any 
deficiency”.
186 Lucassen, De Moor, and Van Zanden (2008) 15.
187 Compare chapter 3 on family forms.
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large Italian cities, therefore, the association must have been an important substitute 
to their native family. To the locals, associative family might sometimes have been more 
durable than bloodlines in a high mortality regime, and it could even have incorporated 
biological family anyway. To slaves (and ex-slaves), finally, the collegium may have been 
the family they could not have.
the eConomICs of AssoCIAtIon: PRofessIonAl coLLEGia As tRAde 
guIlds, unIons, oR unIque to Rome?
Collegia were not constituted for economic purposes … and this is reflected 
in the names they gave to their societies –‘Mates and marble workers’, ‘Brother 
builders’, ‘the comrade smiths’, ‘the late drinkers’.188
There is an obvious social aspect to associating with others. Rather than proving that 
“collegia were not constituted for economic purposes”, the titles for associations suggest 
that they were not constituted solely for economic purposes – the fact that they often 
include a profession surely indicates some economic engagement. In his important 
historiography of the Roman collegia, Jonathan Scott Perry wrote that “the dominant 
trend of contemporary collegial studies has been to explore the ‘social’ features of these 
organizations, to the exclusion of the other ‘interests’ that association may also have 
served”.189 Perry’s work was published in 2006. The tide has now turned. Scholars empha-
size the interaction between the various roles of the associations, and particularly the 
general involvement of collegia in the economy has again become the topic of research 
interest.190
Many of the collegia are professional in name. Accordingly they could be seen as 
economic associations. The comparison of occupational collegia with Medieval and 
Early Modern trade guilds virtually imposes itself. But because of the absence of trade 
monopolies or universal membership in Roman society, the comparison invariably led 
to the conclusion that the collegia were no guilds, and collegiati were nothing like the 
“economic masterminds of a medieval commercial revolution”.191 This view of collegia as 
188 Walker-Ramisch (1996) 133; the names of the collegia she cites clearly were taken from MacMullen 
(1974) 77. On the brother builders (CIL 5. 7487) and the relation between associations and (fictive) 
family members, see below.
189 Perry (2006) 207.
190 See, e.g. Liu (2017), Verboven (2017b).
191 Van Nijf (1997) 11–17, quote from page 12.
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‘not guilds’ had a powerful protagonist in Moses Finley, who forcefully argued for their 
economic insignificance. In his Ancient Economy he writes on collegia:
In no sense were they guilds trying to foster or protect the economic interests of 
their members, nor did they reveal a trace of the hierarchical pattern of appren-
tice, journeyman and master that characterized the mediaeval and early modern 
guilds.192
According to Finley, craftsmen, and craftsmen associations, were marginal factors in 
what he perceived as a largely agricultural economy. The comparison with trade guilds, 
and the ‘mistranslation’ of collegia as trade guilds, has nevertheless remained.193 It is now 
known that the later trade guilds were not merely economic collectives, but that they 
fulfilled a score of other social functions too, not unlike the Roman associations.194 Even 
the medieval guild monopolies probably were not as strict as has been thought. There is 
thus no reason not to refer to occupational associations as ‘guilds’, which I will occasion-
ally do from here on.
A perceived lack of evidence is another reason why the economics of association 
have been underexposed. Many studies into associations have focused on the funerary 
and dedicatory inscriptions that were set up by the collegia, as well as on membership 
lists, and on legal evidence for state intervention in line with the story of rebellion and 
conflict that was understood from ancient literary evidence. The ancient evidence has 
not provided much incentive to emphasize the economic importance of associations.195 
Taking absence of evidence as evidence of absence underestimates the fact that the 
act of association in itself can be economically significant. Changing the questions may 
provide answers. Are there any traces of economic zoning? How did the associative 
networks contribute to the economy? Quite apart from inscribed monuments, there is 
documentary evidence for the economic involvement of collegia even though most of it 
192 Finley (19993) 81, cf 138: “…there were no guilds, no matter how often the Roman collegia and their 
differently named Greek and Hellenistic counterparts are thus mistranslated”. See also MacMullen 
(1974) 19: “Any analogy with a medieval guild or modern labor union is wholly mistaken”.
193 See Verboven (2017b); and e.g. Gibbs (2012) and (2011), Broekaert (2011), Van Nijf (1997), Van 
Minnen (1987).
194 Cf Liu (2009) 16–7; Van Nijf (1997) 11–18; Van Nijf (2002) usefully compares the collegia to yet 
another collective, the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Dutch civic guards.
195 Perhaps that is only to be expected, says Perry (2006) 207: “If, for example, a collegium were agitat-
ing for better working conditions, would it be likely to have inscribed a document demanding a 
resolution of their grievances by the power elite? And even more importantly, would they have 
chosen to share their most secretive deliberations with the larger society in an inscribed monu-
ment?”
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comes from Roman Egypt.196 And then there is the fact that collegiati were a privileged 
group, in society, but also by law. With the hypothesis of economic significance rather 
than insignificance in mind, suddenly much of the existing sources from the Western 
provinces, too, can be read as hinting at economic activity of the collegia, even if the 
evidence is not primarily economic in nature.
occupational clustering
Professional associations generally were a local phenomenon. It has been argued that 
dealers and craftsmen working in related businesses were inclined to settle together 
in specific parts of the city.197 This clustering or economic zoning could have then led 
to the formation of the occupational collegia.198 For the city of Rome in particular, top-
onyms regularly suggest a connection with trades, such as the Forum Boarium (‘cattle 
market’), and several districts and streets of Rome attest to a particular trade: the Via 
Sacra for example was the home of dealers in a number of luxury trades. Prostitutes were 
apparently found in the Subura.199 Clustering of trades is historically well attested for 
preindustrial cities, like London. Clustering creates the clear economic advantage that 
buyer and seller can easily find each other. The idea is that if you needed a scythe, you 
went ‘among the scythe makers’, ‘inter falcarios’. Holleran suggests that clustering also 
made the sharing of information among workers in the same branch easier, and may 
have accommodated specialization because it makes for an easy network of subcon-
tracting.200 In theory, there could also be practical advantages in sharing access to raw 
materials and clustering noisy and smelly trades. There is a marble district in Emporion, 
to facilitate transport over water, and bricks were produced outside Rome where there 
were clay beds.201
The problem with the Roman evidence is that it is inconclusive. The presence of a Vicus 
Lorarius (harness-maker), for example, is attested in an inscription that records a pigmen-
tarius (dealer in paints) and not a lorarius; similarly there is an argentarius (silversmith) 
attested inter aerarios (copper smith); there is also an argentarius from the blacksmiths’ 
alley (Vicus […]ionum ferrariarum). By the second century the Vicus Sandalarius (sandal 
makers) was more famous for its booksellers than its sandal makers.202 Conversely, it is 
196 See, e.g., Gibbs (2011), Venticinque (2009) and (2010), Van Minnen (1987).
197 For occupational clustering in Rome, Tacoma (2013) 139–42; Holleran (2012) 53-60; MacMullen 
(1974) 70–9 with appendix on page 129–135.
198 MacMullen (1974) 73.
199 Cf Mart. Ep. 6.66.
200 Holleran (2012) 57.
201 Tacoma (2013) 140.
202 Holleran (2012) 54–5 with reference to CIL 6. 9796 (pigmentarius), 9186 (inter aerarios), and 9185 
(Vicus […]ionum Ferrariarum).
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quite likely that not all sandal makers were located in the Vicus Sandalarius. Most vici 
were not named after an occupation. And even what is potentially the most smelly of 
trades, fulling, was not clustered in one part of the city.203 The list could be expanded. 
“The dominant pattern is one of random scatter, with a modest degree of clusters of 
specific shops and industries”.204 Economic zoning was simply not the way in which the 
Romans battled an inadequate information supply.
trust networks
Accurate, up to date information probably was a scarce good in the Roman world.205 
Transport of information and goods was slow and precarious, and mortality rates were 
high.206 Market demand was volatile; finding dependable workers was not always easy.207 
All of these factors led to a high degree of market insecurity and economic uncertainty: 
transaction costs were high.208
A labour market only works if there is an institutional framework to enforce labour 
relations and to secure the rights of both parties. Roman law supplies some of the neces-
sary provisions, including contracts and the possibility for a law-suit.209 It remains to be 
seen whether they were adequate. The legal framework was certainly biased towards 
“connections and money”, which diminishes the chances of success for the nonelite.210 
Status distinctions could distort the outcome of a legal action against a well-connected 
opponent of high status; an opponent of lesser means may not have been able to com-
pensate for a monetary loss, even when the case was won.211 That is, if the defendant 
had appeared in court at all, for which the plaintiff perhaps needed the help of powerful 
patrons; in case of a no-show they needed to pay an auctioneer to be able to procure 
justice, seizing and selling the defendant’s property.212 Costly and protracted legal ac-
tions like these must have provided only a last resort. One can imagine that artisans who 
mostly conducted smaller transactions would try and avoid the hassle if at all possible, 
203 Flohr (2013).
204 Tacoma (2013) 142.
205 Broekaert (2011) 242–5.
206 Broekaert (2011) 221; Terpstra (2008), especially 352-4.
207 Holleran (2017); Hawkins (2006).
208 Cf also Temin (2013a) 97-99 with the example of grain merchants.
209 Terpstra (2008) 351.
210 Terpstra (2008) 365.
211 Hawkins (2006) 94–95.
212 Terpstra (2008) 365; more extensively in Kelly (1966).
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and that they were in need of a simpler, less expensive and time-consuming way to gain 
some economic security and lower transaction costs.213
Against this background, the economic importance of a network of people you knew 
and trusted and who worked in related positions was even higher than it is today, in a 
world where information travels faster than we can manage it. Clearly it was important 
to find out as much as possible about the trustworthiness and creditworthiness of a 
potential business partner or employee. Within a collegium, there was plenty of oppor-
tunity to share information or to contract out work among fellow associates, reducing 
transaction costs. Moreover, the formal, hierarchic nature of the collegia made them 
suitable for enforcement and control.
The collegia therefore were an important addition to the Romans’ institutional frame-
work.214 Hawkins contends that associations functioned as reputation-based private 
order enforcement networks, and his view begins to be accepted more widely.215 The 
argument may briefly be summarized as follows. The network of collegiati provided a 
basis of trust. There was a strong distinction between insiders and outsiders, making 
possible long-term cooperation. Not just anyone could join.216 The formal organization 
of collegia was well-suited to maintain the bonds of trust between their members on 
the one hand, and to protect the reputation of the collegium in the outside world on 
the other. Surviving guild charters and regulations regularly include a set of communal 
sanctions that the collegium could resort to should a member harm another collegiatus 
in any way: their interference was not limited to economic wrongdoing.217 Penalties 
ranged from a warning or a monetary fine to expulsion; the wrongdoer would lose face 
and become an untrustworthy economic partner, thereby losing valuable connections 
and opportunities.218
The efficiency of associations as private enforcement networks can of course be 
questioned.219 It should be noted that with guild by-laws, too, the relation between 
what was written and what was practiced is not always clear. Decrease in membership, 
insufficient finances and defaulters could all be a problem. Because of their hierarchical 
213 Terpstra (2008) 353: “Most business will have taken place in networks and between known associ-
ates”; For some objections to these ideas, see Moatti (2017).
214 Cf Temin (2013a) 100 on the extent of this framework for merchants (= adapted from Kessler and 
Temin (2007)); Hawkins (2006).
215 Hawkins (2016); Hawkins (2006) chapter 2; see also Hawkins (2012); Broekaert (2011) for a similar 
argument on ‘the potential advantages of being a collegiatus’.
216 Cf Broekaert (2011) 227–8.
217 Cf Venticinque (2010) 285–8.
218 Cf Broekaert (2011) 221: “Commercial networks created by the collegiati hence offered protection 
against various risks and uncertainties in a volatile trading world.”
219 This paragraph deals with the critique written up in Liu (2017).
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nature, there is a chance of internal rivalry among members that could slowly erode the 
association.220 Enforcement becomes difficult when the durability and stability of the 
collegium was not secure.221 If membership became non-committal like this, and if (as 
Liu suggests) so many alternatives existed, the collegium as private order enforcement 
network would disintegrate.222
It seems that the network provided by an active collegium as an institution must have 
been a powerful tool. Not only does membership appear to have been highly valued, 
the specific nature of collegia in Rome and Ostia and the scarce number of associations 
in the other cities suggest that there were not, in fact, many alternatives. Within the 
collegia that were sustainable enough for us to know of them, networks of trust were 
strong. The social and religious aspects of collegial life add to so-called multiplex re-
lationships: “The more ties, the closer the connection between the members and the 
more likely they are to help and protect each other”.223 The integration within collegia 
would be even stronger if there was some overlap with biological or forged family ties, 
as sometimes was the case; moreover, it is not impossible that family ties were expanded 
by marriage bonds that were formed through the guild.224 Apprentices may have been 
contracted out among fellow collegiati.225 In my view, even the existence of clusters of 
trust and competition between them within a large collegium could strengthen ties, 
albeit within a subgroup of the association.
Apart from building trust and ensuing business networks among the members 
themselves, membership of a collegium can tentatively be said to have increased the 
trustworthiness of each individual member in the eyes of potential customers, clients, 
220 Liu (2009) 23 points to the strong hierarchy within the collegia, so that a member may still find 
himself in a dispute with an opponent of higher status which could potentially influence the 
outcome.
221 E.g. Liu (2013) on durability.
222 Liu (2017) 206-12; on p. 216 she argues that because of the lack of alternatives, “collegia as 
reputation based, private order enforcement mechanism may have been best applicable to the 
organizations of the resident aliens”.
223 Broekaert (2011) 227 on multiplex relationships, see also 229–30. Similarly, Venticinque (2010) 
288: “What began in the guild hall continued and extended beyond it in the form of closer busi-
ness partnerships and social and economic connections”. Hawkins’ explanation of collegia as 
private order enforcement networks also fits Charles Tilly’s concept of ‘trust networks’, as briefly 
mentioned by Venticinque (2009) 47 and (2010) 276–7.
224 cf Broekaert (2012); Liu (2017) 216.
225 This is actually the main body of Liu (2017) 217-24. Whereas I think that collegiati certainly may 
have used this method to find a master artisan to teach, I do not believe that her examples of 
family networks of masters and apprentices (Tryphon and Pausiris, discussed at length in chapter 
3) provide enough evidence to indicate the existence of an association of weavers; Venticinque 
(2010) 289-91 likewise sees apprenticeship as a tie between households – via guilds.
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or business partners from outside the association. And it is no wonder if collegiati were a 
preferred choice, because there are some indications that the collegium may even have 
accepted liability in case of debts or adverse business outcomes for their members.226 
Moreover, it appears that the collegium as a collective, too, was viewed as a trustworthy 
business partner by external principals, and that the authorities preferred to hand out 
the contract for public works and distributions to a recognized association.227
In sum, whereas the membership of a professional collegium was not compulsory for 
Roman artisans and craftsmen, it seems that not joining an association may have made 
professional life rather difficult. The happy few on the inside may have made economic 
life more difficult for those on the out.228
financial benefits
Collegia were recognized legal actors: associations with the right to corpus habere could 
own property and could engage in contracts with ‘outsiders’, they could sue, and be 
sued, collectively.229 There is strength in financial partnership.
If collectives could own property, it follows that they could own slaves and freedmen – 
even if these were also among their ranks. Collective slaves of collegia are not widely 
known or studied, because there is very little evidence: Ulpian writes that Marcus Aure-
lius explicitly gave collegia with the ius coeundi the right to manumit. As a consequence, 
he goes on, associations could also claim the inheritance of their freedmen.230 In other 
words: collegia had slaves to manumit. If there was common property, such slaves would 
be useful to manage it.
Other forms of collective ownership are also attested. An association of merchants set 
up an altar to the genius of the horrea Agrippiana in Rome.231
226 Broekaert (2011) 237-8 with reference to evidence from Roman Egypt: P. Mich. Inv. 1277 (“If any 
one of the undersigned men is held for debt up to the amount of one hundred drachmai in silver, 
security will be given for him for a period of sixty days by the association”) and the very similar P. 
Mich. Inv. 720 (thirty days). Venticinque (2010) 282-3 also has these examples and adds P. Ryl. 2. 94 
= Sel. Pap. 2. 255, 1st c. where an actual dispute has arisen and the weavers’ guild steps in.
227 For Roman Egypt, Venticinque (2009) specifically 61 ff; Liu (2009) 23 notes the difficulty in investi-
gating the ‘radius of trust’ for collegia.
228 ‘The dark side of particularized social capital’, Ogilvie (2011); Cf Van Minnen (1987) 68–9 for Roman 
Egypt.
229 Dig. 3.4.1. pr.-1 (Gaius).
230 Dig. 40. 3.1 (Ulpian, Sabinus book 5) and Dig. 40.3.2 (Ulpian, Sabinus book 14).
231 An altar, or a statue base? The photograph available in the Clauss-Slaby database allows both. 
AE 1915, 97 = AE 1923, 57 = AE 1927, 97; the other sides of the altar are also inscribed: Posit(um) 
dedic(atum) V Idus Iun(ias) / Cn(aeo) Cossutio Eustropho / L(ucio) Manlio Philadelpho // Cur(atores) 
ann(i) III. Example from Broekaert (2011) 236.
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aE 1927, 97
pro] salut(e) geni{um}<i> horreor(um) / [A]grippianorum negotiantib(us) / 
L(ucius) Arrius Hermes / C(aius) Varius Polycarpus / C(aius) Paconius Chrysanthus 
/ immunes s(ua) p(ecunia) d(onum) d(ederunt)
To the well-being of the genius of the horrea Agrippiana by the merchants. L. Ar-
rius Hermes, Caius Varius Polycarpus and Gaius Paconius Chrysanthus, immunes, 
donated this votive from their own funds.
The mention of immunes (honorary members with exemption from fees) and, on an-
other side of the monument, curatores, indicates that this text concerns merchants in 
the formal structure of a collegium. Here it would seem that they shared storage space in 
the horrea, which could for obvious reasons be useful for merchants. In a similar vein, the 
corpus Heliopolitanorum in Puteoli owned seven iugera of land with a cistern and shops 
(tabernae), for the use of members present and future (eorum possessorum / iuris est qui 
in cultu corporis Heliopolita/norum sunt eruntve).232 Incidentally, this inscription indicates 
economic cooperation (and zoning) for an otherwise ‘ethnically’ identified association.
The most important common property may have been the treasury.233 The collegium 
received admission money and monthly fees, as well as the summa honoraria of their 
magistrates. Endowments to collegia are relatively well-attested and could concern 
substantial sums.234 Add to this that many guilds also had properties that generated rev-
enue: there probably was money. The common treasury could potentially be a valuable 
tool in an insecure market, if only because many professional undertakings required a 
capital investment at the outset. The problem is that we do not know what associations 
did with their funds. It is possible that they extended loans to members and associates 
from the common treasury against a favourable rate of interest, or that they encour-
232 CIL 10. 1579, with Verboven (2011b) 343. In Roman Egypt there is additional evidence for a sixth-
century collegium of linen-weavers renting out workshops to its associated members, Broekaert 
(2011) 233 with reference to SB 14. 12282.
233 Liu (2008a) 242 for the unique arca Titiana, that belonged to the centonarii and fabri in Milan 
jointly, CIL 5. 5578; 5738; 5612; 5869.
234 Liu (2008a). CIL 6. 1872 = ILS 7266, 206 AD quoted above is an example of an endowment, of 
10,000 HS in this case.
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aged loans between members in which case the formal framework of the association 
functioned as a guarantee that the money would eventually be paid off.235
There were other economic advantages to being a collegiatus that have already come 
to the fore in a different context, but they may be briefly recalled here. Collegia were 
regularly included in distributions of food or money, in which case members invariably 
received a larger share than the plebs. Often this was a specific collegium which, we 
may safely conclude in line with what has been said above, was probably the single 
or most important local collegium. CIL 11. 6053 is exemplary, in its generosity first and 
foremost towards the councillors (20 HS), then the Augustales (12 HS), the collegium of 
mercuriales  (10 HS), and finally the people (7 HS).236 This pattern recurs throughout Italy 
and the Empire.237
Finally, membership of a legitimate collegium could come with governmental grants 
of immunity from public benefactions (munera) or other privilegia.238 This is an advan-
tage of collegium membership that probably was not widespread in the period under 
scrutiny. It appears to be connected to the increasing reliance of the state on collegia 
for public services connected to the grain and other supplies over the third and fourth 
centuries.239
trade unions?
Thus far the focus has been on ‘internal’ economic benefits, and I have dealt chiefly 
with relations of trust and enforcement mechanisms for dealings between collegiati. It 
is perhaps to be expected that the collegia also pursued external economic benefits 
by promoting their common interests, regulating a trade like the medieval guilds or 
demanding more pay or fiscal privileges like a modern trade union.240 There were no 
legal formalities to stop them from taking economic action. Still, Tacoma felt that he 
could write that
[p]rofessional associations are best known for what they did not do: they did not 
interfere in the urban economy, at least not before late antiquity. No price-setting 
235 Broekaert (2011) 237; Liu (2008a) 245 who suggest in addition that the collegia may also have 
extended credit to outsiders. The only document referred to by both scholars is P. Strasb. 4. 287 
(6th c. Hermopolis) recording a loan between members of the same association of tow-workers. 
Interestingly, it is a loan without interest and without surety or penalty.
236 Verboven (2007) 882 with this and other examples; Patterson (2006) 256.
237 But probably not in the city of Rome, Liu (2013) 362.
238 Liu (2009) 109-11; Verboven (2007) 881; Dig. 50.6.6.12; and see above.
239 Liu (2009) 113-4.
240 Ausbüttel (1982) 100 argues that the collegia did not act as an economic collective, because to his 
mind collegia were not a collective of a single professional group as I believe they were.
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occurred, they had no intermediary role in assigning apprenticeships, they of-
fered no control of the quality of products, they did not monopolize labour.241
The evidence for economic action by collegia in Roman Italy has really not been re-
searched thoroughly. The reason is simple: much of the evidence we have is from Roman 
Egypt, it all concerns highly specific cases and it is difficult to draw a general picture form 
it. Matthew Gibbs in his recent article on collegia in the Encyclopedia of Ancient History 
is highly optimistic about the abilities of the guilds to take collective action.242 But the 
evidence deserves a closer look.
There is one unique document that shows a form of price regulation and parcelling 
out the areas of work among the members of an association of salt-dealers, basically 
doing exactly what we would expect a professional collegium to do. It is a first-century 
papyrus from Tebtunis that has no parallel.243 Price-fixing by guilds to my knowledge 
is not otherwise attested, until its prohibition in late Roman law.244 Likewise guild mo-
nopolies were a phenomenon of the later empire only, such as a fourth-century deal for 
the saccarii (porters) unloading goods at the gates of Rome.245
There are sporadic attestations of collective action, though most of them late and 
outside of Roman Italy: there was a riot concerning the bakers at Ephesus in the late 
second century AD, which we know from a state decree urging the bakers to comply; 
five corpora of sea-going navicularii in third-century Arles put a complaint before the 
praefectus annonae Claudius Iulianus about the supply of grain, and got assistance from 
him as documented in a beautiful bronze plate found in Beirut.246 The nautae Rhodanici 
may have succeeded in gaining fiscal privileges from the emperor Hadrian in return 
for which they put up an honorary inscription, found in Valencia.247 The one example 
from the city of Rome would be the rebellion of monetarii working in the imperial mint 
against the emperor Aurelianus. They allegedly went to war out of fear of punishment, 
presumably for fraud.248 The rebels were defeated cruelly – Aurelian’s cruelty is empha-
241 Tacoma (2016) 233.
242 Gibbs (2013) s.v. collegia.
243 P. Mich. 5. 245; Hawkins (2016) 73; Van Nijf (1997) 13-14.
244 CJ 4.59.2; with Venticinque (2009) 70 and n. 89; Van Nijf (1997) 14-15 refers to what was apparently 
a price war in Smyrna, 1st/2nd c. AD.
245 Liu (2009) 110, with reference to CTh 14.22.1 (364 AD); Cf De Robertis (1971) II 192; Sirks (1991) 258.
246 Bakers IEph. 215 = SEG 4, 512 – the nature of the disturbance is unclear but it may have 
been a strike, Buckler (1923), caveat Harland, http://www.philipharland.com/greco-roman-
associations/?p=6299 (accessed 28-7-2016); navicularii CIL 3. 14165,08 = ILS 6987, for a brief 
account of what happened Broekaert (2011) 248.
247 Tran (2011) with reference to CIL 12. 1797.
248 Aur. Vict. Caes. 35.6 poenae metu; he also refers to fraud, cf Eutropius Brev. 14.1.
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sized by various antique writers.249 The mint was dissolved for several years. This was not 
an association arguing for better terms. The possible involvement of several senators 
and the amount of attention for the revolt in the antique literature suggest that perhaps 
this was more than a conflict between the emperor and the monetarii trying to save 
their own skin, and that it had developed into a general uprising against the emperor.250 
Nevertheless it is clear that guilds could and did work together in the event of problems 
with the state or city council – or in case of public assignments from that city council.251 
Conflicts and contracts could also occur with a less lofty employer, of course.252
Patrons of the association were likely to intervene on behalf of the collegium or an 
individual members.253 The political network of high-placed patron was presumably the 
most efficient way for the collegium to achieve their goals. The inscription for Tiberius 
Claudius Severus cited above is actually not only an example of a wealthy benefactor 
and his gift to the association, but it is also an example of an individual’s negotiation for 
navigational rights for the corpus piscatorum et urinatorum.254
The associations as institutions were steadily incorporated into the imperial bureau-
cracy, which appears to have made clever use of all available organizational structures. 
In Roman Egypt, many associations paid their taxes collectively and thereby had become 
part of the imperial bureaucracy.255 It remains to be seen what the actual benefits to the 
state were, and to the collegiati – paying taxes collectively was not at all universal, nor 
was membership of an association. Moreover, there does not appear to be any evidence 
for this outside of Roman Egypt.256 It was only in the later empire that the state began to 
go through collegia for specific public services on a larger scale.
For Roman Italy during the first three centuries AD, then, it is in my view impossible to 
go beyond the conclusion that it is highly likely that collegia could defend their interests 
more easily than individual craftsmen or traders. But as a collective, too, they were at the 
mercy of the governing bodies in the empire.
249 Aur. Vict. Caes. 35.6; HA Aur. 38.2; ibid. 21. 5-6; Epit. De Caes. 35.4; Eutropius Brev. 9.14.
250 Cf Dey (2011) 112-13, with n. 7 for extra literature.
251 P.Tebt. 2. 287 = W.Chr. 251; P.Oxy. 12.1414 with Venticinque (2009) 61-7.
252 P. Oxy 1668 = Sel. Pap. 1.150 – in my opinion, this does not concern a guild, but cf Broekaert (2011) 
248.
253 Broekaert (2011) 249–51 discusses this at various levels.
254 CIL 6. 1872 = ILS 7266. cf Liu (2013) 364.
255 Venticinque (2009) 48–9; Van Minnen (1987) 49. The aforementioned salt-dealers of P. Mich. 5. 245 
did the same.
256 Gibbs (2013) s.v. ‘collegia’ in the EAH tentatively suggests on the basis of CTh. 13.1.17 that paying 
taxes collectively possibly became obligatory in the 5th century.
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ConClusIon: InteRseCtIng Axes of RefeRenCe
The first three centuries AD witnessed rapid change in the position of voluntary associa-
tions: their numbers and prestige grew to reach a peak in the second and third century, 
after which they became increasingly absorbed into the structure of empire. The in-
crease of collegia was paired with an increase of governmental rules and recognition 
of legitimate associations: both developments seem to have reinforced one another. 
Despite their growing numbers in this period, however, collegiati always remained a 
minority.
Members of associations can be characterized perhaps as a subelite. They filled a niche 
in the urban community that came with a certain prestige. Collegia were a highly visible 
sub-section of the population that engaged in benefactions to the community and in 
turn received them from powerful patrons. The collective was prominent and influential 
in urban society and its esteem and combined power rubbed off on individual members. 
The internal hierarchy of collegia created the associative order, a cursus honorum similar 
but opposed to the civic order, which presented an alternative road to power, as well 
as a road to alternative power, for those who were for reasons of (mainly) legal status, 
origin and/or gender not part of the traditional competition for civic influence.
Collegiate membership had the appearance of openness: slave, freed and free could 
join, and so could men and women. The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that 
membership was actually highly selective, because each association had its own de-
mands and restrictions: not just anyone could join. Exclusive membership was perhaps 
also a prerequisite for the way associations seem to have meddled in all areas of life as 
dense trust networks. It is no wonder that those on the inside were always a minority.
Members of associations cannot have been the truly poor, who would not have been 
able to fulfil the financial minimum requirements of many collegia. The associations’ 
place in the civic order and the continuation of the collegia demanded a substantial 
income. It is also clear, however, that membership was not restricted to employers and 
wholesalers. The assumption that membership of associations was a prerogative of 
(wealthy) freedmen turns out to be equally problematic. Although there is little concrete 
evidence for slaves and freeborn in the associations, it is evident that membership was 
decidedly heterogeneous, even within the group of freedmen. Women were the group 
less likely to join; yet, female members of the collegia are attested which suggests that 
even for them, associations presented a road to alternative power and influence.
Looking at the distribution of various professional collegia, it is unsurprising that Rome 
and Ostia stand out: this is where a plethora of associations can be found. This finding is 
a reflection of the difference in the position of collegia in the civic community. Rome was, 
of course, one of a kind. Ostia was tightly linked to the capital, though it is interesting to 
see that here the collegia were of a slightly different nature, reflecting the commercial 
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nature of the port city, and in Ostia associations were apparently more prestigious 
overall. In Roman Italy as a whole, conversely, the types of associations are limited. The 
so-called three principal collegia are respected and well-reputed everywhere. In larger 
towns their existence as an umbrella-association (that is including various sub-types of 
occupation) may be explained in part by the need for vertical subdivision of labour. In 
smaller towns, however, this need was not as pressing, and their presence is perhaps 
more defined by their role in the community.
The limited range of associations has consequences for an understanding of their pos-
sible role as surrogate families. The argument largely rested on the need for burial provi-
sion for the poor. It can be safely said that this was incorrect. As it turns out, however, 
funerary evidence is a good reflection of the range of overlap between family bonds and 
collegia, ranging from burial solely by the collegium, to only the family and everything in 
between. Some Romans will have been without family at the time of their death, which 
is predicted by high mortality, urban family forms, and the problems of family formation 
of migrants in the city. In some cases, family and association were literally the same 
thing, including biological relations or extended family of (fellow) slaves and freedmen. 
Both collegial and familial relationships lay at the heart of most business partnerships. It 
should not come as a surprise that sometimes they were one and the same.
The recognition of combined social and economic functions in collegia reintroduces 
the comparison with medieval and early modern guilds. The multiplex ties of social, 
religious, familial and economic nature provided an valuable and efficient means of bat-
tling economic insecurity and transaction costs in a world where information was scarce. 
The formal organizational structure of the associations aided enforcement of business 
partnerships and other labour agreements, provided of course that the collegia were 
stable and durable. There is, therefore, quite enough common ground to incorporate 
the Roman collegia in a global history of the guilds in pre-industrial times.257 The collec-
tive was a business partner to the outside world, its importance was reflected in legal 
state benefits, collective property aided in battling economic risks, and the association 
could take collective action to defend the rights of individuals of the group.
257 Lucassen, De Moor, and Van Zanden (2008) 10. The article is entitled ‘The return of the guilds: 
towards a global history of the guilds in pre-industrial times’.
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IntRoduCtIon
Occupation has long been viewed as the key to the daily life of ‘ordinary Romans’. Taber-
nae, bakeries or brothels in Pompeii, Herculaneum, or Ostia Antica are discussed as such 
in both tourist guides to the archaeological sites or museum guides, and in popularizing 
analyses of ‘invisible Romans: prostitutes, outlaws, slaves, gladiators, ordinary men and 
women... the Romans that history forgot’.1 In scholarly literature, occupational inscrip-
tions in particular have received a vast amount of attention. Earlier research on Roman 
labour has done an excellent job unlocking the ancient evidence on the Roman world of 
work; it incorporates a wealth of occupational inscriptions and juridical texts, as well as 
literary references. The material remains of artifacts, tools, or workplaces are becoming 
increasingly well-documented, even if they have not yet been fully incorporated into the 
narrative of work and labour.2
Because of the abundance of the evidence, it is easy to lose track of the fact that 
the majority of Romans were engaged in agriculture, which is actually not at all well 
represented in the sources. In agriculture, much of the produce was destined for per-
sonal consumption, not for the market. Urbanisation and agriculture are nevertheless 
intrinsically linked. The nature of the urban labour market is different from labour in 
agriculture, however. The particular nature of labour in the city versus agriculture is one 
of the reasons why this study has focused on the cities of Roman Italy; the chiefly urban 
origin of the sources is another.
The ancient sources are biased towards the group of urban free male skilled labour-
ers: the urban poor are significantly underrepresented, and so are women. In other 
words, the ‘ordinary Roman’ of earlier accounts was a male artisan or craftsman of freed 
of freeborn legal status who lived in the city. But the working population contained 
many others, too, who have largely remained invisible. My aim has been to present an 
integrated analysis of the economic activities of the urban working population, includ-
ing freeborn wage-labourers and entrepreneurs as well as the unremunerated domestic 
work of mainly women and children and the dependent labour of slaves and ex-slaves – 
in accordance with a definition of ‘work’ which includes “any human effort adding use 
value to goods and services”.3
In the foregoing chapters I have tried to strike a balance between social and economic 
factors to outline a new coherent picture. This composite view impinges heavily on the 
larger debates on the Roman economy, and Roman society. It is worth drawing up at 
1 This is the title of Knapp (2011).
2 My research is no exception, because that would demand another book; but see a number of 
contributions to Wilson and Flohr eds (2016); Laes and Verboven eds (2017).
3 Following Tilly and Tilly (1998) 22–3, see introduction.
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some length the broader implications of my findings for those fields. In what ways has 
the current investigation of the urban labour in Roman Italy furthered an understanding 
of labour and labourers in Roman society under the early empire? How can the ideas 
that have been developed here be incorporated in forthcoming scholarship? Every sug-
gested answer raises new questions, and I should also like to take the opportunity to 
make some suggestions for future research that go beyond the scope of this work.
The main reason why the debate on Roman labour is steadily moving forward in my 
view is an increasing incorporation of modern theories of (labour) economics among an-
cient historians. It is no longer warranted to look at Roman labour in a historical vacuum. 
My approach is shaped by this trend and owes much to pioneering work particularly 
in the field of Neo-Institutional (Ancient) Economics. Conversely, I want to stress the 
significant contribution that ancient history can make to the larger historical debate – 
notwithstanding, or precisely because of, the particularities of Rome.
Early modern historians for their part have started to turn their attention to pre-in-
dustrial societies, including the Roman empire, as a result perhaps of the new economic 
approaches to the Roman economy.4 Converging trends of global history on the one 
hand, and opening up the Roman economy to general economic approaches on the 
other, have made possible the development of an inclusive global labour history. Against 
this background, the final section of this chapter aims to place my findings on Roman 
labour explicitly in the broader context of global labour history. It is worth exploring 
the intersection between ancient and modern explicitly from the side of the Roman 
historian, because the case-study of Roman society can be a valuable addition to global 
labour history, and because the dialogue between ancient historians and historians of 
other periods is important. Larger patterns that may shed light on the past sometimes 
can only be perceived from the present, and conversely there are valuable lessons for an 
understanding of the present to be learnt from the past.
the geneRAl ARgument
the urban labour market
The prevailing consensus among ancient historians would seem to be that although 
market forces and local markets may be identified in the evidence, the sources cannot 
support the hypothesis of an empire-wide integrated market, and to speak of ‘the Ro-
man market economy’ therefore is overstating the matter.5
4 E.g. Lucassen (2013) 11.
5 Contra Temin (2013a).
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The production factor labour was more readily available in Roman antiquity than 
either land or capital. Investment in human capital preceded (investment in) technologi-
cal development and was therefore of paramount importance to sustained economic 
growth.6 That is why the existence of a functioning labour market was vital to the Ro-
man economy. The explicit question whether market forces were present in a market 
for labour, to the extent that we can speak of a Roman labour market, was not posed 
explicitly until recently.7 The answer is not straightforward. Labour is an elusive good. 
Recent socio-economic approaches have shown that a labour market generally does 
not function according to any straightforward application of economic price theory. This 
finding was implemented in the development of labour market segmentation theory, 
which acknowledges that historical labour markets are rarely perfectly integrated, but 
are segmented along various lines. Such a multidimensional approach fits the evidence 
for urban labour in Roman Italy well. The Roman market for labour stands out because it 
did not just deal in labour, but also in labourers, that is, slaves.
The Roman empire has been identified as one of five historical slave societies, and as 
such it was included in analyses of the phenomenon of historical slavery.8 The history 
of Roman slavery is an established sub-discipline of labour history with a remarkably 
‘global’ historiography, but it has not often been considered within the broader context 
of labour.9 My approach of the urban working population has tried to fill that lacuna. 
Slaves and ex-slaves predominate in the occupational inscriptions, yet the majority of 
the working population must have been free. Moreover, slave and free labourers were 
largely eligible for the same vacancies. For these reasons I have adopted an integrated 
approach of forced and voluntary labour in my analysis. It was argued that there was a 
functioning labour market in the cities of Roman Italy. The question that was dealt with 
next, is in what ways it functioned.
Labourers in Rome had the opportunity to respond to market incentives, in accor-
dance with the principles of a labour market. Geographical mobility was possible, and 
migration to the city is likely to have occurred in substantial numbers. Movement be-
tween jobs was also an option for some, even for slaves. Migration, however, was most 
likely to occur over shorter distances. This is true for the mobility of people, but it also 
applies to the movement of information on prices, supply and demand. Imperfections 
in information flows are an important reason why there was no single integrated market 
economy in Roman society: there were rather regional or local markets. The Roman 
6 Saller (2002) 261 (reprinted 2005).
7 Temin (2001); (2004a).
8 E.g. the influential book of Patterson (1982).
9 Cf Van der Linden (2006) 27–8 who points to the relevant “historical sub-disciplines” of global 
labour history: slavery, family history, gender history, and migration history.
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urban labour market was similarly made up of a variety of more or less interconnected 
local markets, each of them probably centred geographically on one city. Within these 
local urban labour markets, other restrictions to labour market integration played a part. 
Skill levels and the availability of job-training, legal status, and gender can be identified 
as the most influential ones, that led to segmentation into restricted groups with limited 
movement or competition between them. Fluctuations (both unpredictable and cycli-
cal) in demand for goods and its derived labour demand are likely to have determined 
economic strategies for everyone, whereas seasonal patterns of high labour demand in 
the agricultural calendar, the building trade and the sailing season, probably were of 
great consequence especially for unskilled wage labourers.10
The importance of social and cultural determinants to the economy of Rome have 
correctly been emphasized in the past. The Romans could be said to have had a socially 
and culturally embedded or moral economy: they highly valued the insurance provided 
by family ties, bonds of friendship and dependency, reciprocity and trust, and relied 
on them for personal economic security.11 More strictly economic approaches of the 
Roman economy left social structures largely out of consideration. However, the deep-
seated economic functions of social networks like family and associations should not 
be underestimated: they were integral to what I believe to have been a sophisticated 
Roman economy. The lines of segmentation in the labour market were both reinforced 
and overturned by these institutions. In practice, then, the participation and the po-
sition of an individual in the labour market was not determined solely by his or her 
individual characteristics. He or she was embedded in the social structures of family 
and associations. ‘Human resources’ like these were even more important than today, 
where we have institutionalized employment agencies and other methods for creating 
weak ties, all to find the right person for the job. The importance of social structures of 
course did not preclude the existence of economic rationality and market forces, or of 
economic growth.
family
The Roman family has been high on the research agenda of the last five decades or so, 
and there are no signs that scholarly attention will be decreasing anytime soon. It is not 
just the scholarship on the Roman family in particular that has experienced a steady 
increase in the past half century or so, the popularity of family history is a much wider 
phenomenon. The Roman family as an economic unit, however, has hardly received any 
10 Hawkins (2016), (2013); Erdkamp (2016), (2008).
11 Finley (19732); Verboven (2002) uses the term ‘moral economy’, borrowed from J.C. Scott (1976). 
Verboven’s book sets out from a similar premise as this thesis, on the subject of amicitia among 
(mainly) the upper classes.
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attention at all, even though in economics, the economics of the family is an established 
field, and in labour history the family and household are becoming increasingly central 
to the analysis.12
The preindustrial family has often been explained by the model of the ‘family econ-
omy’. The family economy explains the family as the unit of production and consump-
tion; in my view, this is reflected in ancient Rome in the predominance of small-scale 
urban workshops. Small-scale workshops clearly were an important part of the urban 
landscape. The model of the family economy does not match completely with what 
we know about ancient Rome, however. Families were crucial to the functioning of the 
Roman labour market, but not necessarily, and not only, as the unit of production and 
consumption. The evidence illustrates that there were also numerous wage-earning 
families, and families that included some wage-labourers, for example. In order to 
accommodate this diversity this thesis worked with the more inclusive model of the 
‘adaptive family economy’, which has more explaining power for the Roman empire than 
the family economy model.13 The adaptive family economy in the context of Roman 
family ideals explains why women were found in domestic and subservient roles, but 
it can also explain their presence as artisans and entrepreneurs. Families consciously 
and unconsciously allocated an individual’s labour activities, and differentiation was as 
much a strategy as engagement with the family business.
The demography of the family defined the amount of labour that was needed to sup-
port everyone, but also who was available to work. More than a demographic given, the 
demographic make-up of the family was subject to socio-cultural conventions, such as 
contemporary ideals about family form and marriage ages. A neo-local marriage pattern 
in Roman Italy guided the decision to get married when resources were sufficient to 
set up a new separate household, which probably pushed the median marriage age 
towards the late teens for women and late twenties for men. In the urban context of 
Roman Italy, it is likely that the simple (nuclear) family was the dominant family form, 
although this regularly included slaves and freedmen. City-dwellers appear to have lived 
in relatively small families – a relatively later marriage age will have curbed fertility to 
some extent. Several other ways to practice family planning were available, but none of 
them were really reliable. Raising fewer children, or having fewer children that survived 
into adulthood, however, meant that there was more money to invest in the upbringing 
and education of remaining children. The economic opportunities and the resources of 
a family therefore will have influenced family formation and composition, just as much 
as the disease-ridden environment of the larger cities did.
12 Cigno (1991); Van der Linden (2013) 222 with references; Cf Van der Linden (2006) 27–8; Lucassen 
(2013) 7.
13 Introduced by Wall (1985).
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The slave presence in the nonelite household is likely to have been limited to one 
or two. Slaves needed to be maintained, and it was expensive to keep a slave under-
employed when demand fell. A small permanent slave workforce meant optimal flex-
ibility in volatile market.14 A restricted number of slaves and ex-slaves ensured access to 
(skilled) labour, while it did not drain the household resources too much when business 
was slow. Such economic considerations are less likely to have played a part in wealthy 
elite households, where slaves could be found in large numbers: more than half of all 
urban slaves were probably linked to one of these large domus. Slaves were an indicator 
of wealth. Slaves were also economically active within the household, however, leaving 
few vacancies in the domestic sector open to freeborn labourers. What was virtually a 
slave monopoly of the domestic sector therefore may have limited job opportunities for 
freeborn women in particular, who we might expect to have worked mostly in this type 
of jobs, in line with gender ideals – which is what happened in early modern Europe. In-
deed, women are found chiefly in the role of nutrix (wet-nurse), or ornatrix (hairdresser), 
and even here slave- and freedwomen outnumber freeborn women by a large margin.
The work of slaves was integral to the economics of the family, both in small house-
holds and in elite domus. The economic bond between the family and their slaves gener-
ally continued after manumission, and many ex-slaves maintained close connections 
with their former masters. The freedmen became ‘extended family’; this extended family 
could be important for securing labour power whenever skilled labour or trustworthy 
labourers were in short supply; patrons and freedmen forged significant and potentially 
vast networks of trust of the kind that were so vital to the Roman economy.15 
The Roman family was demonstrably significant as an economic entity. Economics 
therefore provides an additional criterion to define who should be included in the elu-
sive Roman ‘family’, and a way to understand its structure and some of the organizing 
principles behind it. Economic considerations and strategies must have played a part 
even in the constitution of the nuclear family, through marriage alliances and measures 
for curbing or encouraging fertility, or its slave component. Conversely, family structure 
opens a valuable window onto the Roman labour market. Family form – the demography 
of the family – was not a stable factor, however. The family moved through a so-called 
family life cycle, driven forward by the standard life-events of birth, marriage and death 
that shape the structure of the family over time. With the addition or subtraction of 
family members, labour demand and labour supply change. At the birth of a child, for 
example, the family’s needs go up (there is an extra mouth to feed), and the labour sup-
ply goes down (because the mother devotes time to childcare and the infant obviously 
14 Hawkins (2017).
15 Verboven (2012a); Mouritsen (2011a).
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cannot work) – if, as in this example, the calculation leads to a net loss, we speak of a life 
cycle squeeze, a situation that calls for a change of the family’s economic strategy.
The principle of the family life cycle also operated in elite households, only with a 
large slave population the demographic effects are potentially multiplied. Slaves, too, 
engaged in recognized though illicit ‘marriages’ (contubernia) and had families with a life 
cycle of their own. They had children, they sometimes also had slaves that – once they 
were freed themselves – they could manumit, and they passed away. The slave family life 
cycle of a household had an obvious effect on the need for additional slaves, or on the 
form of slave education. The slave vernae who were born, raised, and educated within 
the household, were a preferred choice, but it is likely that home-born slaves were not 
enough to fulfil demand for slave labour. It was impossible to predict when a (skilled) 
slave would need a replacement, and it took time to raise and educate a verna. As a 
result, the market for forced labour probably remained substantial.
human capital
The family determined an individual’s part in the labour market to a large extent. Invest-
ment in human capital was also a family decision. Skill paid off: skilled labour paid about 
twice as much as unskilled labour. There is enough evidence to suggest that in theory 
at least, job-training in the form of a basic education or apprenticeship was open to 
everyone, to slave and free, boy or girl. Contrary to the influential view that job-training 
was not an option for freeborn girls, the apprenticeship contracts show that some of 
them did receive job-training. Moreover, it was argued in chapter 3 that the dominant 
marriage pattern left freeborn girls enough time to undertake an apprenticeship or learn 
from their birth families before they got married. There were, however, factors other than 
gender that curbed investment in human capital. The high rate of mortality predicts 
lower investment, because it implied a risk that the returns to that investment might be 
short-lived. Education did not come cheap, and financial constraints are therefore also 
likely to have played a part. Not everyone could afford to miss out on the income a child 
could generate. In this respect it is interesting to note that since skilled labourers were 
better off than unskilled workers, they could more easily afford an education for their 
children: this phenomenon is called intergenerational persistence. Intergenerational 
persistence in Rome did not imply that children always followed in their parents’ foot-
steps, however. Job differentiation between the generations is well-attested. The most 
significant implication here is that intergenerational persistence predicts a continuous 
presence of freeborn skilled labourers in Roman society.
Elite households invested heavily in basic education and higher skill levels for slaves. 
There were (in-house and street-) schools where many slaves learnt the basics of reading 
and arithmetic, and some received additional training by learning on the job or through 
more formal apprenticeships. The master could cash in on his or her investment by em-
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ploying the skills of slaves, or by selling them or their labour power. Under circumstances 
of highly fluctuating demand, freeborn skilled wage-workers thus faced severe competi-
tion from the servile population. An education may have been viable especially if there 
was a reasonable chance of becoming an independent entrepreneur, and that was not 
for everyone. This may have further limited freeborn investment in human capital and 
reinforced slaves’ position in the market.
In sum, in both small and large households, the family, or the head of family, decided 
on collective labour participation and labour allocation, and the amount of investment 
in human capital for each family member. The Roman ‘family business’ could thus take 
various shapes and forms, from a household production unit to the cooperation be-
tween patron and freedmen.
non-familial labour collectives
Labour opportunities were also decided by other, non-familial social structures. In the 
early modern world, craft unions or guilds are the prime example. In Rome, the most ob-
vious equivalent of such labour collectives were voluntary associations or collegia. They 
exemplify the economic functioning of all kinds of social networks, however. Whenever 
people get together there are economic benefits to be gained, a phenomenon which 
may be described as the economics of association. In the absence of a watertight legal 
framework for the enforcement of labour relations, the importance of mutual trust or 
personal security should not be underestimated. Market information, as we have seen, 
was hard to come by. Information travelled with people, but people are only as good 
as their word, and it takes a certain amount of trust to act on that information. A col-
legium provided a trust network, a safety net that helped decide who to rely on. The 
ties among collegiati therefore were extended social ties, with clear economic conse-
quences. The formal organisation of collegia made them particularly useful for economic 
purposes. This is true even if outright collective economic action by the associations is 
rarely attested. It would thus be anachronistic to see them as Roman trade unions. The 
comparison with early modern guilds is helpful up to a point, because early modern 
guilds were not actually the monopolists they were once thought to have been. But 
collegium membership will have lessened transaction costs of finding business partners 
and employees, and perhaps the collective reputation of an association also made these 
collegiati the go-to place for consumers.
A Roman labourer was therefore not entirely free in his or her choices on the labour 
market, but had to deal with family and sometimes also with an association. This tension 
between social institutions is significant: it is what decided a labourer’s market position. 
To a certain extent family and collegium were complementary: family encouraged or 
precluded labour participation and paid for an education, whereas a collegium provided 
the business contacts for an active participant in the labour market. Yet there were some 
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functional overlaps between the two. Job-training was sometimes facilitated not by 
family, but by fellow collegiati who may have lent the money, or helped out in a more 
hands-on manner by taking in apprentices. Conversely, business contacts for example 
were also maintained through family, or a business partner became family by marriage. 
Sometimes family members were also members of the same collegium. Both institutions 
built one’s reputation and social capital.
In an urban context perhaps the associations were more central than family: there are 
reasons to think that family ties were weaker in the city than in the countryside, thereby 
creating the need for associations as a replacement for the social network and the safety 
net that the family provided. This is a phenomenon that is historically well-attested, and 
the evidence seems to indicate a similar pattern in ancient Rome. A predominance of 
young males among the migrants, who could and did not always bring their families 
with them, is suggestive. Insofar as can be ascertained, families in Roman cities were 
generally small and the dominant family form there was nuclear. Under these circum-
stances, the advantage of joining a ‘substitute family’ in the form of a collegium must 
have been considerable.
Roman associations were relatively open institutions. This means that their social 
network was available to most: there are slave members attested as well as freedmen 
and freeborn, but membership was probably out of reach for the destitute, and we see 
few or no female collegiati. The collegia were selective in who they admitted, in order 
to protect their credibility and creditworthiness. It is perhaps their exclusivist character 
that explains why only a minority seems to have joined. However, for an honest worker 
with few prior connections in the city an association may well have provided a relatively 
easy point of entry into the urban labour network.
the ContRIbutIon of the RomAn CAse to globAl lAbouR hIstoRy
Global labour history is not conceived as a ‘school’, but rather as an ‘area of in-
terest’; it is not a vertical organization, but a network continuously assembling 
and breaking up in relation to specific research projects; it does not aim for a 
new ‘grand narrative’, but rather to partial syntheses based on multiple empirical 
research and various intellectual interpretations.16
16 De Vito (2013) 12.
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The broader context for my research project is global labour history. During the ‘Golden 
Age of Labour History’, Antiquity fell through the cracks.17 Pioneering studies of labour 
published before WW II provided important insights on labour history, including labour 
in ancient Rome, but they lacked theoretical and methodological sophistication. After 
the second World War, particularly in the 1960’s, 70’s and ‘80’s, labour history was taken 
up anew. A rapidly expanding body of research was devoted mainly to labour in Western 
Europe and North America, from the Industrial Revolution until present times. The wish 
to explain the so-called ‘rise of the West’ led to a limited field of research focusing on 
wage labour in the context of early capitalism. The pre-industrial Roman empire did not 
fit that enterprise. Moreover, as a result of Finley’s influential views, the Roman economy 
was long considered to be fundamentally different in nature, as a non-capitalist society, 
and Rome was therefore generally left out of labour history accounts.
In the final decades of the twentieth century, globalization gave rise to the academic 
field of ‘Global history’.18 The globalizing trend soon extended itself to the (by that time) 
struggling field of labour history,19 leading scholars to express the desire for a radically 
different approach to labour history.20 Van der Linden and Lucassen promulgated global 
labour history, a kind of “universal history of work” that expanded the field geographi-
cally, notably to incorporate the eastern world, and thematically, but also chronological-
ly.21 The first step was to include the run-up to the Industrial Revolution from ca 1500 
onwards. This led to a vast project called the ‘Global Collaboratory on the History of 
Labour Relations 1500-2000’.22
Global labour history acknowledges that not every labour effort since the Industrial 
Revolution concerned wage labour; various forms of commodified labour can coexist, 
even for one historical individual.23 This understanding opened up the way to recognize 
that wage labour might be present in pre-industrial societies too, alongside other labour 
relations – including forced labour. Although this is not the place to present an extensive 
17 For the historiography of labour history and the development of global labour history, see e.g. De 
Vito (2013); Van der Linden and Lucassen (1999); Lucassen (2006); Lucassen (2013).
18 ‘Global history’ currently seems to be the favoured term. The first issue of the Journal of Global 
History was published in 2006; the ‘Oxford Centre for Global History’ was established in 2011.
19 Struggling field: e.g., Burgmann (1991); Frances and Scates (1993); Van der Linden ed. (1993).
20 Global labour history was brought into existence with Van der Linden and Lucassen (1999).
21 Van der Linden (2006) 21; cf Van der Linden (2012) 62-3 including both ‘a universal history of work’ 
and ‘a history of globalized work’; expressing clear limits to its (current) reach, Winn (2012).
22 https://collab.iisg.nl/web/labourrelations, accessed 23-8-2016.
23 Van der Linden (2012) 63-66.
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global labour history approach to the Roman urban labour market, some preliminary 
observations on the Roman case may be made.24
Rome was not exactly a capitalist society. However, this thesis illustrated that next to 
a very large agricultural population living by self-subsistence, the evidence for more 
urbanized regions shows that market forces in labour were also present and influential. 
The Roman empire clearly was familiar with wage labour. Lucassen argued that the 
volume of small coins that circulated in any given society is a sound indicator for the 
extent of wage labour and ‘small independent producers working for the market’.25 The 
widespread use of coins and, closely related, prices, may also point to market forces 
and/or a market economy more generally.26 The coin finds from the Roman empire are 
well-known. The degree of monetization and its implications, perhaps, less so.27
The findings of the foregoing chapters suggest that the history of market economics 
runs deeper than previously thought and that the Roman economy had many ‘modern’ 
traits. At the same time, market imperfections in the Roman empire, conversely, call into 
question the strictly economic views of price theory and reinforce the sociological and 
neo-institutional approaches to the historical economy. In the case of the urban labour 
market of early imperial Italy, a focus on social structures of the family and non-familial 
labour collectives has proven to be particularly helpful.
Roman labour relations
Urban labour in Roman Italy gave rise to a wide spectrum of labour relations including, 
but not restricted to, self-subsistence, wage labour, and small independent producers 
for the market. The existence of slavery in Rome is of course particularly distinctive. 
Global labour historians of the ‘Global Collaboratory on the History of Labour Relations 
1500-2000’ (see above) have developed a universal classification system for labour 
relations, “intended to cover the whole world, from 1500 and in principle also for ear-
lier periods”.28 In what follows I will examine how Roman labour relations fit into their 
24 De Vito (2013) has recently made a strong case for the inclusion of pre-industrial societies in global 
labour history. De Vito and Lichtenstein eds (2015) on global convict labour includes a chapter on 
ancient Rome: Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2015); so does a special issue of Workers of the world 
on global labour history: Zuiderhoek (2013). Earlier, tentative attemps to include preindustrial 
societies in what is largely a history of ideas on work and labour, may be found in Ehmer and Lis 
(2009); Lis and Soly (2012).
25 Lucassen (2007); (2013) 22.
26 Lucassen (2013) 22: “deeply monetized societies must have had market economies”. See also 
Temin (2013), Kessler and Temin (2008), Temin (2001).
27 Cf Hopkins (1980); De Ligt (1990); De Ligt (2003).
28 Hofmeester e.a. (2016) 6.
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Taxonomy of labour relations.29 The purpose of this exercise is twofold: first, it provides 
a schematic overview of the Roman labour market through its labour relations and 
second, it is a first attempt to apply the taxonomy to the Roman situation, testing its 
applicability in an ancient economy. Table 6.1 presents a schematic overview of Roman 
labour relations, divided by household type. I have included the rural household, and I 
have distinguished between two categories of nonelite households on the basis of their 
main income: self-employed, or wages.
Most rural families are likely to have been largely self-sufficient, allowing for small-
scale market transactions (4a and 4b).30 I have included their contribution to the urban 
labour market as employers and employees in the seasonal labour cycle in table 6.1. 
The full range of labour relations brings out the importance of labour for the market in 
an urban context (= all classifications within the range 12-17). Its frequent recurrence 
shows that the category of wage labourers (14) is likely to have been substantial, and the 
flexibility necessary to deal with market insecurity predicts that many Romans will have 
turned to one form of wage labour or other at some point in their life.
One of the noteworthy findings from the Global Colloboratory on the History of La-
bour Relations is that combinations of different labour relations for one individual are 
the rule rather than an exception.31 The exercise brings out the vagueness of the distinc-
tions between various groups of Roman labourers: slavery recurs in all households, and 
in various forms (6; 17.1-2). In Rome, seasonality and the labour cycle predict that very 
many labourers will also have conformed to this pattern of multiple labour relations or 
occupational pluralism. Conversely, the overview indicates that the same assignment 
in a nonelite household might be executed by any one of no less than twelve types of 
labourers.
An attempt to place slaves and freedmen within the taxonomy immediately reveals 
that there is no overlap between legal status and economic position as identified 
through a labour relation. Slave, freed and free were all part of one integrated labour 
market, even though they functioned as imperfect substitutes. It is significant that paral-
lel developments of ‘reconceptualizing the working class’ can be found in global labour 
history, identifying a similar heterogeneous nature within the category of slave labour 
as well as a feeble dividing line with free wage labour in other historical societies.32 
29 Stapel (2016), http://hdl.handle.net/10622/OJYQOR, IISH Dataverse V1. For ease of reference the 
Taxonomy is included in the appendix to this chapter. Explanation of the various categories in 
Hofmeester e.a. (2016), http://hdl.handle.net/10622/4OGRAD, IISH Dataverse V1; a caveat: the 
Taxonomy was meant to codify actual data on historical individuals, not for this kind of theoretical 
use.
30 Hofmeester e.a. (2016) 8 with n. 22; Cf De Ligt (2003).
31 Hofmeester e.a. (2016) 9.
32 Van der Linden (2012) 63-6 and on 67-8 (‘reconceptualizing the working class’).
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table 6.1 Schematic view of Roman labour relations from the perspective of the family by means of the 
classification system of the Global Collaboratory on the History of Labour Relations (appendix 3).
Taxonomy category
Agricultural family
Housework 5 Kin non-producers
Slave labour 17.1 working for proprietor
17.2 for hire
Hiring additional seasonal labour 13.1 employer of free wage earners
14.2 Piece rate wage-labourers
14.3 Time rate wage-labourers
17.2 slaves for hire
Seasonal rural-urban migration 14.2 Piece rate wage-labourers
14.3 Time rate wage-labourers
nonelite family a) entrepreneur
The entrepreneur (m/f ) 12a self-employed leading producers
13.1 employer of free wage earners
13.2 employer of indentured labourers (freedmen operae)
13.4 employer of slaves
Kin 12b self-employed kin producers
Housework 5 kin non-producers
Slaves 17.1 working for proprietor
17.2 for hire
Freedmen 12b self-employed kin producers
(freedmen viewed as extended family)
15 indentured labourers (operae)








17.2 slaves for hire
nonelite family b) wage-earning family
Housework 5 Kin non-producers




Ruling family 13.1 employer of free wage earners
13.2 employer of indentured labourers (freedmen operae)
Slaves housework 6 household servants
Free hired labour 14.2 piece rate wage-labourers
14.3 time rate wage-labourers
Freedmen 12b self-employed kin producers (viewed as extended family)
15 indentured labour (freedmen operae)
Slaves 17.1 working for proprietor
17.2 for hire
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Instead of slavery, the dichotomy between free and unfree labour and the spectrum 
of dependency that lies in between takes precedence in the new labour history.33 In 
Roman society, moreover, the boundaries between legal categories were not fixed: free-
born people could become slaves, slaves became freedmen, freedmen’s children were 
freeborn. The life and labour cycle of an individual is therefore likely to have seen him/
her progress through various labour relations. Slaves could go from dependent slave 
labour (6, 17.1 and/or 17.2) to a shop of their own with a family or colliberti (12a and 12b) 
and with their own employees (13).
One of the testable hypotheses that the taxonomy set out to answer is that “the com-
bination of different sorts of labour relations within the same household promotes the 
resilience of all its members to downward social mobility.”34 This hypothesis is highly 
relevant to the labour market of Roman Italy in the early empire. Table 6.1 shows a re-
markable variety of possible labour relations within the nonelite family, particularly the 
entrepreneurial nonelite family. A small slave workforce, the option of manumission and 
the continued economic bonds between patrons and freedmen, ensured that nonelite 
households in the city had a variety of economic strategies available to them. This flex-
ibility is probably one of the reasons why slavery remained so popular for so long.
The taxonomy includes a category of tributary labour (8-11), that does not occur in 
table 6.1. The category concerns various types of labour left out of the current analysis, 
such as convict labour, and conscripts (both category 8), though soldiers from Roman 
Italy in the early empire were mainly a very particular group of wage-earners (14.3), 
debt-bondage, or the servus quasi colonus.35 The collective slaves and freedmen of asso-
ciations are a very particular group of labourers that strain the limits of the taxonomy.36 
Similarly, public slaves are difficult to classify.
Despite the exclusion of a few groups that could be incorporated with minor adapta-
tions, I think that the taxonomy of labour relations is useful for mapping the Roman 
labour market, at least as far as vertical labour relations are concerned, that is relation-
33 Brass and Van der Linden (1997); Palmer (1998); Engerman (1999); Brown and Van der Linden 
(2010).
34 Hofmeester e.a. (2016) 11.
35 Groen-Vallinga and Tacoma (2015).
36 Slaves of collegia perhaps could be added under (11) and freedmen under (9), if working for col-
legia can be classified as tributary labour.
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ships of dependence.37 For a project aiming “to draw up a worldwide inventory of all 
types of labour relations, in all their facets and combinations, in different parts of the 
world…”, horizontal labour relations are notably lacking.38 By horizontal labour relations 
I mean a societas between colliberti, or a business partnership on equal terms between 
collegiati for example. Whereas the taxonomy gives due credit to the family (‘the first 
shell’), the household (‘the second shell’), or communities of several households, and 
a polity (‘third shell’), the market is the fourth category. Associations and non-familial 
labour collectives, which clearly played an important part in labour relations of early 
imperial Italy, cannot be accommodated in this scheme.
Much is to be gained from the cooperation between ancient historians and global 
historians. Initiatives like the taxonomy for labour relations indicate to the ancient 
historian where to look for the invisible Romans, and may assist in the search for useful 
comparisons. Conversely, it is hoped that labour historians of other periods will take 
sufficient note of the fact that the Roman labour market was just as complex as that of 
any other historical society.
This thesis has argued that the urban labour market of Roman Italy in the early empire 
was shaped and structured through the social relations of the family and other, non-
familial associations. While the crucial role of the family has been widely recognized by 
global labour historians, non-familial associations merit more attention than they have 
received so far.
37 Thus, 14.4 refers to the possibility of hiring groups, with group-wise remuneration, usually piece 
rate, for example brickworkers. Cf. Hofmeester et al. (2016) 15 with n. 39 for references. This is 
probably what Diocletian’s Prices Edict 7.15-16 indicates when the brickworkers receive daily 
pastus as well as a piece rate. The point here is that groups of slaves were also hired out in the 
building industry, calling perhaps for an extra category employer, ‘of a group of slaves’ (*13.5), and 
slaves (*17.3 working for proprietor in group/ for group hire).





APPendIx 1: CAtAlogue of job tItles
This list started from the combined catalogues of Joshel, Treggiari and Von Petrikovits.1 
The resulting list was then expanded with many job-titles from epigraphy, literature and 
legal sources that were not previously included. The translations provided are a combi-
nation of those by the three authors mentioned, the Lewis and Short Latin dictionary, 
and my own interpretations.
a manu, amanuensis secretary
abietarius, abetarius timber merchant
accomodator unknown
actarius scribe, record keeper
actor agent, administrator
acuarius maker of needles (or variant of aquarius?)
acuclarius needle-maker





aedificia, ad/ supra superintendent of urban property
aedituus keeper of a temple
aequator monetae coinage tester(?)
aerarius statuarius maker of copper statues
aerarius vascularius maker of copper vessels
aerarius coppersmith
agrimensor land surveyor
albarius worker in stucco
alicarius maker/dealer of things in halica (spelt)
alipilus plucker of armpit hair
aluminarius dealer in alum
ampullarius maker of miniature amphorae (ampullae)
anaglyptarius maker of reliefs
anagnostes reader
anatiarius dealer in ducks
antiquaries teacher of paleography
1 Joshel (1992) 176–82; Von Petrikovits (1981) 83–119; Treggiari (1980) 61–4.
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anularius, anellarius ring-makers
aquarius workman for a household’s water supply?
aquilegus water-diviner
arcarius, arcuarius treasurer, cashier
archimagirus chef-cook
architectus, arcitectus architect
arcularius chest- or cupboard-maker
argentarius artifex silversmith
argentarius vascularius maker of silver vessels
argentarius banker, money changer
argento, ab person in charge of silver, or the treasury?
armamentarius, armamintarius one engaged with armamenta, weaponry






asturconarius breader and/or driver of asturcones (horses from 
Asturia in Spain)
atriensis majordomo and servants who cleaned and main-
tained the house
aurarius goldsmith
aurator, ad statuas aurandas gilder (of statues)
auri acceptor goldsmith/dealer in gold?/pawnbroker?
auri netrix gold spinner
auri vestrix gold embroiderer
auricaesor gold cutter
auricoctor gold smelter?
auriductor in lamina gold embosser in sheets of gold
aurifex brattiarius gold-leaf beater
aurifex, aurufex goldsmith
aviarius altiliarius dealer in fattened birds (bird fattener?)
aviarius dealer in birds
axearius axle maker
ballistarius, ballistrarius maker of ballistae (catapults)
balneator, balneator privatarius bath attendant
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baltearius belt-maker (?)
barbaricarius, barbaricas brocade maker, embroiderer




brattiarius inaurator goldbeater, gilder
brattiarius, -a goldbeater, maker of gold leaf
bucaeda, bucida butcher
buccularius maker of cheek-flaps for helms
burdonarius hinny driver
bybliopola bookseller
cabator (cavator) engraver, gem cutter, excavator
caelator, gelator engraver













capsarius servant who carried a child’s bookcase, scroll-holder 
carrier
capulator, caplator one who carries oil from the presses
carbonarius coal-dealer





cellarius, cellariarius provisioner, storeskeeper
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circi nuntius announcer of the circus
circitor, circu(m)itor overseer of water-way management (repair man?)
cisiarius, gisiarius, cisianus(?) cab-driver/-owner
cistarius guardian of a chest or wardrobe
citharoedus lyre player and singer
citrarius workers in citrus-wood
clavarius nail smith







cocus, coquus, coctor; supra 
cocos
cook; supervisor of cooks
colorator painter of houses?
columnarius pillar maker
comoedus comic actor
conditarius, -a chef de cuisine?
conditor seasoner
coriarius subactarius preparer of hides for tanning
coriarius, corarianus tanner
corinthiarius worker in Corinthian bronze
corinthis, a caretaker of Corinthian ware
cornicularius assistant, aid, secretary (in civil offices)
coronarius garland maker
crepidarius maker of sandals, slippers




cubiculo, a servant in charge of bedroom
culinari kitchen servant










diabathrarius shoemaker for light shoes (diabathra)
diatretarius cage cup maker






eborarius, eburarius worker in ivory
embaenitarius unknown, but regularly attested
ep(h)ippiarius maker of horsecloths, saddler?
equiso groom, stableman
essedarius maker of esseda (war chariots)?
exactor collector or overseer
exemptor quarryman




faber automatarius maker of automata (machines)
faber balneator provider of services in the baths?
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faber dolabrarius cooper
faber eborarius worker in ivory
faber ferrarius ironsmith
faber ferrius ironworker
faber intestinarius joiner, inlayer (carved fine interior woodwork)
faber intestinus wood-worker
faber lecticarius, lectarius maker of beds
faber oculariarius, ocularius maker of eyes for statues
faber soliarius baxiarius maker of woven footwear
faber subaedianus builder working on interiors
faber tignuarius carpenter






ferramentarius worker with iron equipment





figularius, figulator, figulus, 
figelus
potter
flammarius, flammearius dyer in very red colour




fontanus someone who has to do with a water source (fons)
fossor, fosor grave digger?
frumentarius grain dealer




fusor (olearius) moulder, in metal or oil
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gallicarius maker of Gallic shoes
gallinarius, -a poulterer
gaunacarius furrier






gladiarius, gladiator sword maker
glutinarius maker of glue or paste
glutinator papyrus-gluer
grammaticus grammar teacher, teacher of language
gypsarius, gupsarius maker of plaster casts
hariolus, hariola prophet, prophetess
harundinarius seller of reeds (for hunting or fishing, or roofs) or 
writing pens?
haruspex, haruspica soothsayer






hospitiis et paedagogus 
puerorum, ab
servant in charge of guests and attendant/teacher 
of slave children
hymnologus singer of hymns
iatralipte, iatraliptes doctor who cured by ointments and massage, 
masseuse
iatromea midwife
imagines, ad in charge of paintings/statues
inaurator gilder
indusiarius maker/dealer of over-tunics
infector dyer
inpaestator metal embosser
inpedimenta, ad caretaker of baggage
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inpiliarius maker of felt footwear
insignarius, insignitor gem-cutter
institor unguentarius perfume seller
insularius rent collector or supervisor of an insula
inundator flooders?
iumenta, supra person in charge of pack and draft animals
iumentarius driver or supplier of coacher and carts, dealer in 
baggage animals
lactarius, lactearius dealer in milk/ milk cakes?
lagonarius, -a; lagunarius, -a bottle-seller, potter
lanarius carminator wool carder
lanarius coactilarius, –coactili-
arius
maker of felt, felter
lanarius maker of woolen cloth
lanifricarius cloth cleaner
lanipendus, -a wool weigher, spinning supervisor
lanista trainer/owner of gladiators
lanius, lanio, laniarius butcher
lanternarius lighterman
lapicida, lapicidinarius stonecutter
lapidaries, lapidaries structor stoneworker








librarius a manu scribe, secretary
librarius, -a scribe, copyist, secretary
librator land-measurer, equaliser
libripens weigher?
lignarius dealer in wood
limarius, faber limarius file hewer
limbularius maker of girdles, ribbons and so on
linarius linen weaver/dealer
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lintearius, linteo linen weaver
linyfarius, linyfio linen weaver/dealer
loc(u)larius maker of loculi (niches)?, box-maker









malleator, malliator beater (minting)
manceps dealer, usually in slaves
manicarius worker with manicae (bandages for the sword-arm 
of a gladiator)
manticularius  maker of handbags and so on
manulearius maker of clothing with long sleeves
manupretiarius burrarius one who creates burrae for an hour-wage
margarita, ad caretaker of pearls
margaritarius, -a pearl setter
marmorarius, marmarius marble mason, marble cutter
materiarius timber merchant
mediastinus servant, medical assistant
medicamentarius apothecary
medicus chirurgus surgeon
medicus equarius et venator horse doctor and huntsman
medicus iumentarius doctor of draft animals
medicus ocularius eye doctor
medicus, -a doctor
mellarius dealer in honey
membranarius parchment-maker
mensor aedificiorum surveyor/measurer of buildings
mensor machinarius grain measurer
mensor, (metator) surveyor
mercator bovarius dealer in cattle
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mercator olei hispani ex 
provincia Baetica
dealer in Spanish oil from the province of Baetica
mercator sagarius dealer in cloaks
mercator venalicius slave dealer
mercator dealer, trader, merchant
metallarius, metallicus mine-worker
mima mime (f )









multicarius maker of multicia (thin cloth)




musicarius person in charge of music?
musicus musician
myrrepsius maker of salves and oils
naupegus aupiciarius maker of auspicious signs on ships?
naupegus, naupegiarius shipbuilder
navicularius shipowner
negotia(n)s coriariorum dealer in tanned hides
negotians lagonaris dealer in wine bottles
negotians perticaruis dealer in poles or rods
negotians pigmentarius dealer in paints and cosmetics
negotians salsamentarius et 
vinariarius maurarius
dealer in salted fish and Moroccan wine
negotians salsarius et malaci-
tanus
dealer in salted fish and fish sauce from Malaga
negotians siricarius dealer in silk
negotians vinarius, navicularius dealer in wines, shipper
negotians, negotiator tradesman, dealer
negotiator aerarius et ferrarius dealer in copper and iron
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negotiator fabarius dealer in beans
negotiator frumentarius dealer in grain
negotiator lanarius dealer in woolens
negotiator lintiarius dealer in linens
negotiator marmorarius dealer in marble
negotiator olearius ex Baetica dealer in oil from Baetica
negotiator penoris et vinorum dealer in food and wine
negotiator sagarius dealer in cloaks
negotiator suariae et pecuariae dealer in pigs and cattle
negotiator vestiarius dealer in clothing
negotiator slave manager of master’s business
negotiator, negotians ferrarius dealer in iron
negotiator, negotians vinarius dealer in wines
negotiatrix frumentaria et 
legumenaria
dealer in grain and pulse
nomenclator name teller
notarius, -a shorthand writer, stenographer





officinator, -trix manager/owner of a workshop





ostiarius, -a porter, doorkeeper












wool comber or comb-maker
pedisequus, -a attendant, foot servant
pellio, pellionarius furrier
pernarus, pernarius seller of ham
philosophus Epicureus Epicurean philosopher
philosophus Stoicus Stoic philosopher
philosophus philosopher
phrygio, frygio gold embroiderer
picarius (coll) tar-burner
pictor imaginarius figure painter
pictor parietarius wall painter?
pictor painter
pigmentarius dealer in paints and cosmetics
pilicrepus ballplayer
pincerna mixer (of drinks)





plastis, plastes, plasta pottery, statuary, model-sculptor
plicatrix clothes-folder (f )
plostrarius (plaustrarius) foreman, cart-maker
plumarius embroiderer, brocader with feathers
plumbarius, plombarius maker of (lead) pipes, plumber
plutiarius maker of balustrades
poeta poet
politor eborarius ivory polisher
politor polisher
pollinctor washer and anointer of corpses
pollio polisher
pomarius, -a fruit seller
popa (popinaria?) popinarius, 
popinator
keeper of a cookshop
praebitor vinarius supplier of wine
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praeceptor teacher, instructor




promus distributor of provisions
psecas girl servant who oils hair
pugillariarius maker of writing tablets
pullarius poulterer, chicken-keeper




raedarius, rhedarius coachman, coach builder
redemptor contractor
refector pectinarius comb-repairman?




rhyparographus painter of offensive material
rogator questioner
rosarius garland maker with roses, cf violarii and coronarii
saccarius, sacarius porter of sacks
sacomarius weighter/weight-dealer
sagarius maker of cloaks
sagittarius arrow maker
salarius (salinator?) dealer in salted fish
salgamarius dealer/maker of salted produce
salinator dealer in cooking salt



























segmentarius maker of segmenta (decorative strips for clothes)
sellularius, artifex - maker of litters, chairs
seminaria seller of seeds
seplasiarius salve maker
sericarius, -a; siricarius silkworker, seller of silk
sigillarius, sigillariarius maker of sigilla (statuettes)






sindoniacus, sintoniacus weaver of sindon
sofista teacher of public speaking
solatarius, solatarus maker of women’s shoes
solearius, soliarius shoemaker
spadicarius brown-dyer




worker in mica or isinglass, mirror maker?, glazier
speculum, a caretaker of mirrors
staminaria weaver
statuarius maker of statues
strator groom
strophiarius bra-maker
structor lapidarius stone worker
structor parietarius (varietarius) builder of walls
structor carver, builder



















tabernarius, -a shopkeeper, tavern keeper
tabularius accountant, bookkeeper
tector lignarius carpenter
tector plasterer, stucco worker, carpenter




maker of tesselae or dice




thurarius, -a incense dealer
tibiarius maker of reed pipes, flute-maker




tonsor peccorum sheep shearer
tonsor, -trix; tosor, tostrix, 
tussor, tosillaria





tractator, -trix masseur, masseuse
tricliniarcha caterer?
tritor argentarius chaser of silver
tubarius dealer in tubes
tubularius = tubarius?
tudiator = χαλκοτὀπος bronze beater




valetudinarium, ad/supra infirmary staff/supervisor
valvarius maker of double doors?
vascularius, vasarius maker of metal vessels
velarius curtain closer, curtain or awning maintenance man
venalicius slave-dealer
vespillo, vispillo corpse-bearer
veste, a/ ad vestem caretaker of clothing






vestiplicus, -a clothes folder, presser
vestispica caretaker of clothing
vestitor tailor
veterinarius veterinarian
vexillarius maker of vexilla
victimarius assistants at sacrifice








zonarius, sonarius girdle maker
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APPendIx 2: APPRentICeshIP ContRACts
This collection includes all documents securely attesting to an apprenticeship, including 
contracts, apprenticeship registrations and one letter.
Reference date origin Profession free/slave m/f
1 P. Heid. 226 215/213 BC unknown medicine Free M
2 BGU 4. 1124 18 BC Alexandria ? Free M
3 BGU 4. 1125 = SB 22. 15538 13 BC Alexandria flute player Slave M
4 SB 6. 9445 5/6 AD Oxyrhynchus stone-mason Free? M
5 P Tebt 2. 384 10 AD Tebtunis weaver Free M
6 P. Mich. 5. 346a 13 AD Tebtynis weaver Slave F
7 P. Mich. 5. 346b 16 AD Tebtynis builder Free M
8 P. Oxy. 2. 322 = SB 10. 10236 36 AD Oxyrhynchus weaver Free M
9 P. Mich. 2. 121, recto II, 8 42 AD Tebtynis weaver Free M
10 P. Fouad. 1. 37 48 AD Oxyrhynchus linen weaver? Free M
11 P. Mich. 3. 170 49 AD Oxyrhynchus weaver Free M
12 P. Osl. 3. 141 50 AD Karanis weaver Free M
13 P. Wisc. 1. 4 = Papyrologica 
Lugduno Batava XVI
53 AD Oxyrhynchus weaver Free M
14 P. Oxy. Hels. 29 54 AD Oxyrhynchus weaver Free M
15 P. Mich. 3. 171 58 AD Oxyrhynchus weaver Free M
16 PSI 10. 1132 61 AD Talei ? Free M
17 P. Mich. 3. 172 62 AD Oxyrhynchus weaver Free M
18 PSI 8. 871 66 AD Oxyrhynchus ? Free M
19 P. Oxy. 2. 275 66 AD Oxyrhynchus weaver Free M
20 P. Oxy. 41. 2971 66 AD Oxyrhynchus weaver Free M
21 P. Osl. Inv. 1470 = SB 24. 16186 70 AD Oxyrhynchus weaver Free M
22 P. Heid. 4. 326 98 AD Ankyron ? Free F
23 P. Heid. 4. 327 99 AD Ankyron dancer? Free M
24 SB 24. 16253 = SB 12. 10946 98-117 AD Oxyrhynchus ? Free M
25 P. Tebt. 2. 442 = SB 12. 10984 113 AD Tebtynis weaver Free M
26 P. Tebt. 2. 385 117 AD Tebtynis weaver Free M
27 P. Col. Inv 164 118-138 AD Oxyrhynchus e.o. Free M
28 P. Mich. Inv. 4238 128 AD Theadelpheia carpentry Free M
29 P. Ross. Georg. 2. 18. 450 140 AD Arsinoite Free F
30 St. Pal. 22. 40 150 AD Soknopaiou Nesos weaver Slave M
31 P. Oxy. 4. 724 155 AD Oxyrhynchus shorthand-
writer
Slave M
32 P. Vars. S.n. 7 = SB 6. 9374 170 AD (169?) Ptolemais Drymou weaver Free M
33 P.Oxy. 4. 725 183 AD Oxyrhynchus weaver Free M
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Reference date origin Profession free/slave m/f
34 P. Grenf. 2. 59 189 AD Soknopaiou Nesos weaver Slave M





36 PSI 10. 1110, verso I 150-200 AD Theogonis ? Free M
37 P. Oxy. 14. 1647 150-200 AD Oxyrhynchus weaver Slave F
38 BGU 11. 2041 201 AD Arsinoite weaver Free M
39 P. Oxy. 38. 2875 200-250 AD Oxyrhynchus builder? Free M





41 P. Oxy. 31. 2586 264 AD Oxyrhynchus linen weaver? Free M
42 P. Oxy. 67. 4596 264 AD Oxyrhynchus weaver Free F
43 P. Mich. Inv. 5191a = SB 8. 13305 
was P. Mich. Inv. 5191b
271 AD Karanis weaver slave? F
44 P. Kell. G. 19a appendix = SB 24. 
16320
293–304 AD Kellis weaver Slave F
45 BGU 4. 1021 200-300 AD Oxyrhynchus wool-carder/
hairdresser?
Slave M
46 PSI 3. 241 200-300 AD Antinoopolis weaving? Slave F
47 P. Mich. Inv. 337 = SB 14. 11588 late 4th c? Unknown linen weaver? Free M
48 P. Aberd. 59 300-500 AD Panopolis (?) ? Free F
49 PSI inv. 195 = SB 14. 11982 554 AD Oxyrhynchus ? Free M














































































































































Adams, B. 1964. Paramone und verwandte Texte. Berlin.
Aldrete, G.S., and D.J. Mattingly. 1999. “Feeding the City: the Organization, Operation and Scale of the 
Supply System for Rome.” In Life, Death and Entertainment in the Roman Empire, edited by D.S. Potter 
and D.J. Mattingly, 171–204. Ann Arbor.
Alföldy, G. 1986. “Die Freilassung von Sklaven und die Struktur der Sklaverei in der Römischen Kaiserzeit.” 
In Die Römische Gesellschaft. Ausgewählte Beiträge, 286–331. Stuttgart. First Published in Rivista Storica 
dell‘Antichità 2 (1972) 97-129.
Allen, R.C. 2009. “How Prosperous were the Romans? Evidence from Diocletian’s Price Edict (AD 301).” 
In Quantifying the Roman Economy: Methods and Problems, edited by A.K. Bowman, 327–45. Oxford.
Andreau, J. 2002. “Twenty Years after Moses I. Finley’s The Ancient Economy.” In The Ancient Economy, 
edited by W. Scheidel and S. von Reden, 33–49. New York.
Applebaum, H. 1992. The Concept of Work: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern. Albany, NY.
Aubert, J-J. 1994. Business Managers in Ancient Rome: a Social and Economic Study of Institores, 200 BC–AD 
250. Leiden and New York.
Ausbüttel, F.M. 1982. Untersuchungen zu den Vereinen im Westen des Römischen Reiches. Kalmünz.
Baba, M. 1990. “Slave-Owning Slaves and the Structure of Slavery in the Early Roman Empire.” Kodai 1: 
24–35.
Bagnall, R.S. 1996. Egypt in Late Antiquity. 4th ed. Princeton, N.J.
Bagnall, R.S. 2002. “The Effects of Plague: Model and Evidence.” Journal of Roman Archaeology 15: 114–20.
Bagnall, R.S., and B.W. Frier. 1994. The Demography of Roman Egypt. Cambridge etc, reprinted 2006.
Baldwin, B. 1978. “Trimalchio’s Domestic Staff.” Acta Classica 21: 87–97.
Bang, P.F. 2008. The Roman Bazaar: A Comparative Study of Trade and Markets in a Tributary Empire. Cam-
bridge etc.
Bang, P.F. 2009. “The Ancient Economy and New Institutional Economics.” Journal of Roman Studies 99: 
194–206.
Barber, E.J.W. 1994. Women’s Work: The First 20.000 Years: Women, Cloth, and Society in Early Times. New 
York etc.
Bavel, B.J.P. van. 2008. “Markt, mensen, groei en duurzaam welzijn? Economie en samenleving van de 
Middeleeuwen als laboratorium”, inaugural lecture, Utrecht University.
Béal, J-C. 2000. “La Dignité Des Artisans: Les Images D’artisans sur les Monuments Funéraires de Gaule 
Romaine.” Dialogues d’Histoire Ancienne 26: 149–82.
Becker, G.S. 1964. Human Capital. A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education. 
New York.
Becker, G.S. 1985. “Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor.” Journal of Labor Economics 3 
(1): S33–S58.
Bellemore, J., and B. Rawson. 1990. “Alumni: The Italian Evidence.” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigrafik 
83: 1–19.
Bendlin, A. 2011. “Associations, Funerals, Sociality, and Roman Law: The Collegium of Diana and Antinous 
in Lanuvium (CIL 14. 2112) Reconsidered.” In Aposteldekret und Antikes Vereinswesen: Gemeinschaft 
und ihre Ordnung. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 1, edited by M. Öhler, 
207–96. Tübingen.
Beresford, J. 2012. The Ancient Sailing Season. Mnemosyne Supplements, History and Archaeology of 
Classical Antiquity. Leiden.
Berg, C. 2014. “Capitalism in Ancient Rome.” IPA Reviews 65 (4): 34–37.
Bergamasco, M. 1995. “Le Didaskalikai Nella Ricerca Attuale.” Aegyptus 75: 95–167.
320 Bibliography
Bergamasco, M. 1997. “Una Petizione per Violazione di un Contratto di Tirocinio: P.Kell.G 19a.” Aegyptus 
77: 7–26.
Bergamasco, M. 2004. “Tre Note a Tre Didaskalikai.” Studi di Egittologia e di Papirologia 1: 31–41.
Bergamasco, M. 2006a. “Orfani e Didaskalikai: Il Caso di SB XIV 11588.” Studi di Egittologia e di Papirologia 
3: 55–59.
Bergamasco, M. 2006b. “La Didaskalika di P. Col. Inv. 164.” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigrafik 158: 
207–12.
Berger, A. 1911. Die Strafklauseln in den Papyrusurkunden: ein Beitrag zum Gräko-ägyptischen Obliga-
tionenrecht. Leipzig etc.
Bernard, S.G. 2017. “Workers in the Roman Imperial Building Industry.” In Work, Labour and Professions in 
the Roman World, edited by K. Verboven and C. Laes, 62–86. Leiden.
Biscottini, M.V. 1966. “l’Archivio di Tryphon, Tessitore di Oxyrynchos.” Aegyptus 46: 186–292.
Bisel, S.C., and J.F. Bisel. 2002. “Health and Nutrition at Herculaneum: An Examination of Human Skeletal 
Remains.” In The Natural History of Pompeii, edited by W.F. Jashemski and F.G. Meyer, 451–75. Cam-
bridge.
Bodel, J. 2000. “Dealing with the Dead. Untertakers, Executioners and Potter’s Fields in Ancient Rome.” In 
Death and Disease in the Ancient City, edited by V.M. Hope and E. Marshall, 128–51. London and New 
York.
Bodel, J. 2005. “Caveat Emptor: Towards a Study of Roman Slave-Traders.” Journal of Roman Archaeology 
18: 181–95.
Bodel, J. 2008. “From Columbaria to Catacombs: Collective Burial in Pagan and Christian Rome.” In Com-
memorating the Dead. Texts and Artifacts in Context: Studies of Roman, Jewish and Christian Burials, 
edited by L. Brink and D. Green, 177–242. Berlin etc.
Bodel, J. 2011. “Slave Labour and Roman Society.” In The Cambridge World History of Slavery volume I, 
edited by K.R. Bradley and P. Cartledge, 311–36. Cambridge.
Bollmann, B. 1998. Römische Vereinshäuser: Untersuchungen zu den Scholae der römischen Berufs-, Kult- 
und Augustalen-Kollegien in Italien. Mainz.
Bond, S. 2017. “Currency and Control: Mint Workers in the Later Roman Empire.” In Work, Labour and 
Professions in the Roman World, edited by K. Verboven and C. Laes, 227–45. Leiden.
Booth, A.D. 1979. “The Schooling of Slaves in First-Century Rome.” Transactions and Proceedings of the 
American Philological Association 109: 11–19.
Borbonus, D. 2008. “Review of The Familia Urbana during the Early Empire: A Study of Columbaria Inscrip-
tions by K. Hasegawa.” Klio 90 (2): 505–6.
Borbonus, D. 2014. Columbarium Tombs and Collective Identity in Augustan Rome. Cambridge.
Bosworth, D., P. Dawkins, and T. Stromback. 1996. The Economics of the Labour Market. Harlow.
Boulvert, G. 1974. Domestique et Fonctionnaire sous le Haut-Empire Romain: La Condition de L’affranchi et 
de L’esclave du Prince. Paris.
Bowman, A.K., ed. 2009. Quantifying the Roman Economy: Methods and Problems. Oxford.
Bracher, M. 1992. “Breastfeeding, Lactational Infecundity, Contraception and the Spacing of Birth: Impli-
cations of the Bellagio Consensus Statement.” Health Transition Review 2: 19–47.
Bradley, K.R. 1987a. Slaves and Masters in the Roman Empire: A Study in Social Control. New York and Oxford.
Bradley, K.R. 1987b. “On the Roman Slave Supply and Slavebreeding.” Slavery and Abolition 8: 42–64.
Bradley, K.R. 1991. Discovering the Roman Family: Studies in Roman Social History. New York and London.
Bradley, K.R. 1994. Slavery and Society at Rome. Key Themes in Ancient History. Cambridge.
Bradley, K.R. 2012. Apuleius and Antonine Rome: Historical Essays. Phoenix Supplementary Volume 50. 
Toronto.
Bibliography 321
Bradley, K.R., and P. Cartledge, eds. 2011. The Cambridge World History of Slavery. Vol. 1. Cambridge.
Bransbourg, G. 2012. “Rome and the Economic Integration of Empire.” Instute for the Study of the Ancient 
World Papers 3. http://dlib.nyu.edu/awdl/isaw/isaw-papers/3/#endnote-asterix.
Brass, T., and M. van der Linden, eds. 1997. Free and Unfree Labour. The Debate Continues. Bern.
Braudel, F. 1981. Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century. I. The Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits 
of the Possible. 2nd ed.
Brewster, E.H. 1927. “A Weaver of Oxyrhynchus: Sketch of a Humble Life in Roman Egypt.” Transactions and 
Proceedings of the American Philological Association 58: 132–54.
Brodsky, V. 1986. “Widows in Late Elizabethan London: Remarriage, Economic Opportunity and Family 
Orientations.” In The World We Have Gained. Histories of Population and Social Structures, edited by R. 
Smith and K. Wrightson, 122–54. Oxford.
Broekaert, W. 2011. “Partners in Business. Roman Merchants and the Potential Advantages of being a 
Collegiatus.” Ancient Society 41: 221–56.
Broekaert, W. 2012. “Welcome to the Family! Marriage as Business Strategy in the Roman Economy.” 
Marburger Beiträge Zur Antiken Handels-, Wirtschafts- Und Sozialgeschichte 30: 41–65.
Brown, C., and M. van der Linden. 2010. “Shifting Boundaries between Free and Unfree Labor: Introduc-
tion.” International Labor and Working-Class History 78 (1): 4–11.
Brown, P. 1967. Augustine of Hippo. A Biography. London and Boston.
Brown, P. 2012. Through the Eye of a Needle: Wealth, the Fall of Rome, and the Making of Christianity in the 
West, 350-550 AD. Princeton and Oxford.
Brunt, P.A. 1974. “The Roman Mob.” In Studies in Ancient Society, edited by M.I. Finley, 74–102. London 
and Boston.
Brunt, P.A. 1980. “Free Labor and Public Works at Rome.” Journal of Roman Studies 70: 81–100.
Bruun, C. 2011. “Water, Oxygen Isotopes, and Immigration to Ostia-Portus.” Journal of Roman Archaeology, 
109–32.
Bruun, C. 2013. “Greek or Latin? The Owner’s Choice of Names for Vernae in Rome.” In Roman Slavery and 
Roman Material Culture, edited by M. George, 19–42. Toronto.
Buonocore, M. 1984. Schiavi e Liberti dei Volusii Saturnini. Le Iscrizioni del Colombario sulla via Appia Antica. 
Roma.
Burford, A. 1972. Craftsmen in Greek and Roman Society. London.
Bürge, A. 1990. “Der Mercennarius und die Lohnarbeit.” Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte 107: 80–135.
Burgmann, V. 1991. “The Strange Death of Labour History.” In Bede Nairn and Labour History, edited by B. 
Carr et al, 69–82. Sydney.
Burton-Jones, A. and J.C. Spender, eds. 2011. The Oxford Handbook of Human Capital. Oxford.
Calabi Limentani, I. 1958. Studi sulla Società Romana: Il Lavoro Artistico. Milano.
Caldelli, M.L., and C. Ricci. 1999. Monumentum Familiae Statiliorum: Un Riesame. Roma.
Callataÿ, F. de, ed. 2014. Quantifying the Greco-Roman Economy and beyond. Bari.
Cantarella, E. 2005. “Roman Marriage. Social, Economic and Legal Aspects.” In Hoping for Continuity. Child-
hood, Education and Death in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, edited by K. Mustakallio, J. Hanska, H.-L. 
Sainio, and V. Vuolanto, 25–32. Roma.
Casson, L. 1978. “Unemployment, the Building Trade and Suet. Vesp. 18.” Bulletin of the American Society 
of Papyrologists 15: 43–51.
Chantraine, H. 1967. Freigelassene und Sklaven im Dienst der römischen Kaiser: Studien zu ihrer Nomenkla-
tur. Wiesbaden.
Checchi, D. 2006. The Economics of Education: Human Capital, Family Background and Inequality. Cam-
bridge etc.
322 Bibliography
Chevallier, R. 1997. “Perspectives de Recherche sur le Scènes de Métiers (Gaule Cisalpine et Transalpine).” 
Archeologia Classica 49: 47–63.
Cigno, A. 1991. Economics of the Family. Oxford.
Clauss, M. 1994. Review of F.P. Rizzo, La Menzione del Lavoro nelle Epigrafi della Sicilia Antica (Per Una Storia 
della Mentalità), Klio 76: 525.
Cohn-Haft, P. 1957. “A Note on the ‘didaskalikai’[GR] and a Correction in the Reading of P. Vars. Ser Nov 7.” 
Aegyptus 37 (2): 266–70.
Corbier, M. 1980. “Salaires et Salariat sous le Haut-Empire.” In Les Dévaluations à Rome, Époque Républic-
aine et Impériale, 2: 61–101. Paris and Roma.
Corbier, M. 1999. Adoption et Fosterage. Paris.
Corbier, M. 2001. “Child Exposure and Abandonment.” In Childhood, Class and Kin in the Roman World, 
edited by S. Dixon, 64–98. London.
Cotter, W. 1996. “The Collegia and Roman Law. State Restrictions on Voluntary Associations, 64 BCE–200 
CE.” In Voluntary Associations in the Graeco-Roman World, edited by J.S. Kloppenborg and S.G. Wilson, 
74–89. London.
Cristofori, A. 2004. Non Arma Virumque: Le Occupazioni nell’epigrafia del Piceno. 2a Ed. Riv. et Ampliata. 
Bologna.
Cuvigny, H. 1996. “The Amount of Wages paid to the Quarry-Workers at Mons Claudianus.” The Journal of 
Roman Studies 86: 139–45.
D’Ambra, E. 1988. “A Myth for a Smith: a Meleager Sarcophagus from a Tomb in Ostia”. American Journal 
of Archaeology 92 (1): 85–100.
D’Arms, J.H. 1981. Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome. Cambridge, Mass. etc.
De Robertis, F.M. 1946. I Rapporti di Lavoro nel Diritto Romano. Milano.
De Robertis, F.M. 1963. Lavoro e Lavoratori nel Mondo Romano. Bari.
De Robertis, F.M. 1971. Storia delle Corporazioni e del Regime Associativo nel Mondo Romano. Bari.
De Vito, C. 2013. “New Perspectives on Global Labour History. Introduction.” Workers of the World. Interna-
tional Journal on Strikes and Social Conflicts 1 (3): 7–31.
De Vito, C., and A. Lichtenstein, eds. 2015. Global Convict Labour. Leiden.
Deary, T., and M. Brown. 2003. Horrible Histories: Ruthless Romans. London.
DeLaine, J. 1997. The Baths of Caracalla: A Study in the Design, Construction, and Economics of Large-Scale 
Building Projects in Imperial Rome. Portsmouth, RI.
DeLaine, J. 2005. “The Commercial Landscape of Ostia.” In Roman Working Lives and Urban Living, edited 
by A. Mac Mahon and J. Price, 29–47. Oxford.
DeMause, L. (1974). “The Evolution of Childhood.” In L. deMause ed., The History of Childhood. New York: 
1–73.
Dey, H.W. 2011. The Aurelian Wall and the Refashioning of Imperial Rome, AD 271–855. Cambridge.
Di Giacomo, G. 2010. “Les Aurifices de Rome. Relectures et Nouvelles Interprétations.” Epigraphica 72: 
395–405.
Di Porto, A. 1984. Impresa Collettiva e Schiavo ‘manager’ in Roma Antica (II Sec. a.C.-II Sec. d.C). Istituto di 
Diritto Romano e dei Diritti dell’Oriente Mediterraneo 64. Milano.
Dillon, M., and L. Garland. 2015. Ancient Rome: Social and Historical Documents from the Early Republic to 
the Death of Augustus. 2nd ed.
Dixon, S. 1984. “Infirmitas Sexus: Womanly Weakness in Roman Law.” The Legal History Review 52 (4): 
343–71.
Dixon, S. 1988. The Roman Mother. London etc.
Bibliography 323
Dixon, S. 1991. “The Sentimental Ideal of the Roman Family.” In Marriage, Divorce, and Children in Ancient 
Rome, edited by B. Rawson, 99–113. Oxford.
Dixon, S. 1992. The Roman Family. London.
Dixon, S. 2001a. “Familia Veturia. Towards a Lower-Class Economic Prosopography.” In Childhood, Class 
and Kin in the Roman World, edited by S. Dixon, 115–27. London and New York.
Dixon, S. 2001b. “How do you count them if they’re not there? New Perspectives on Roman Cloth Produc-
tion.” Opuscula Romana 25–26: 7–17.
Dixon, S. 2001c. Reading Roman Women. London.
Drew-Bear, T., and C. Naour. 1990. “Divinités de Phrygie.” In Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt. 
Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der Neueren Forschung. Teil II: Principat, Band 18. Religion. 3. 
Teilband, edited by W. Haase and H. Temporini, 1907–2044. Berlin and New York.
Drexhage, H-J. 1991. Preise, Mieten/Pachten, Kosten und Löhne im römischen Ägypten, bis zum Regier-
ungsantritt Diokletians. Skt. Katharinen.
Drexhage, H-J. 2004. “Vorläufige Liste der Bislang Ausschliesslich Literarisch Belegten Berufs- Bzw. Tätig-
keitsbezeichnungen.” Münstersche Beiträge zur Antiken Handelsgeschichte 23 (1): 41–65.
Duncan-Jones, R.P. 1978. “Two Possible Indices of the Purchasing Power of Money in Greek and Roman 
Antiquity.” Publications de l’École Française de Rome 37 (1): 159–68.
Duncan-Jones, R.P. 1996. “The Impact of the Antonine Plague.” Journal of Roman Archaeology 9: 108–36.
Dyson, S. 2011. “The Family and the Roman Countryside.” In A Companion to Families in the Greek and 
Roman Worlds, edited by B. Rawson, 431–44. Malden, MA etc.
Eck, W. 1998. “Grabmonumente und sozialer Status in Rom und Umgebung.” In Bestattungssitte und 
Kulturelle Identität, edited by P. Fasold, T. Fischer, H. von Hesberg, and M. Witteyer, 29–40. Xanthener 
Berichte 7. Köln.
Eck, W. 2017. “Ordo Senatorius und Mobilität: Auswirkungen und Konsequenzen im Imperium Roma-
num.” In The Impact of Mobility and Migration in the Roman Empire. Proceedings of the Twelfth Workshop 
of the International Network Impact of Empire (Rome, June 17-19, 2015), edited by E. Lo Cascio and L.E. 
Tacoma, with the assistance of M.J. Groen-Vallinga, 100–15. Leiden.
Eckerman, C. 2011. “P. Mich. inv. 4238”. Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists 48: 47–49.
Edmondson, J. 2011. “Slavery and the Roman Family.” In The Cambridge World History of Slavery volume I, 
edited by K.R. Bradley and P. Cartledge:337–61. Cambridge.
Edwards, C. 1997. “Unspeakable Professions: Public Performance and Prostitution in Ancient Rome.” In 
Roman Sexualities, edited by J.P. Hallett and M.B. Skinner, 66–95. Princeton, NJ.
Ehmer, J. 2014. “Attitudes to Work, Class Structures, and Social Change: A Review of Recent Historical 
Studies.” International Review of Social History 59 (1): 99–117.
Ehmer, J., and C. Lis, eds. 2009. The Idea of Work in Europe from Antiquity to Early Modern Times. Surrey.
Eichenauer, M. 1988. Untersuchungen zur Arbeitswelt der Frau in der Römischen Antike. Frankfurt am Main 
etc.
Eide, E.R., and M.H. Showalter. 2010. “Human Capital.” In International Encyclopedia of Education (Third Edi-
tion), edited by P. Peterson, E. and B. McGaw, 282–87. Oxford. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/B9780080448947012136.
Engelen, Th. 2002. “Labour Strategies of Families: A Critical Assessment of an Appealing Concept.” Inter-
national Review of Social History 47 (3): 453–64.
Engelen, Th., A. Knotter, J. Kok, and R. Paping. 2004a. “Labor Strategies of Families: An Introduction.” The 
History of the Family 9 (2): 123–35.
Engelen, Th., J. Kok, and R. Paping. 2004b. “The Family Strategies Concept: An Evaluation of Four Empirical 
Case Studies.” The History of the Family 9 (2): 239–51.
324 Bibliography
Engerman, Stanley L. 1999. “Introduction.” In Terms of Labor: Slavery, Serfdom, and Free Labor, 1–23. 
Stanford CA.
Erdkamp, P.M. 1999. “Agriculture, Underemployment, and the Cost of Rural Labour in the Roman World”. 
Classical Quarterly 49 (2): 556–72.
Erdkamp, P.M. 2005. The Grain Market in the Roman Empire: A Social, Political and Economic Study. Cam-
bridge and New York.
Erdkamp, P.M. 2008. “Mobility and Migration in Italy in the Second Century B.C.” In People, Land, and 
Politics. Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy 300 BC–AD14, edited by L. 
de Ligt and S. Northwood, 417–49. Leiden.
Erdkamp, P.M. 2012. “Urbanism.” In The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy, edited by W. 
Scheidel, 241–65. Cambridge.
Erdkamp, P.M. 2014. “How Modern was the Market Economy of the Roman World?” Oeconomia. History, 
Methodology, Philosophy 4 (2): 225–35.
Erdkamp, P.M. 2016. “Seasonal Labour and Rural-Urban Migration in Roman Italy.” In Migration and Mobil-
ity in the Early Roman Empire, edited by L. de Ligt and L.E. Tacoma, 33–49. Leiden.
Erickson, A.L. 2008. “Married Women’s Occupations in Eighteenth-Century London.” Continuity and 
Change 23 (2): 267–307.
Evans Grubbs, J. 2002. Women and the Law in the Roman Empire: A Sourcebook on Marriage, Divorce and 
Widowhood. London etc.
Evans Grubbs, J. 2013. “Infant Exposure and Infanticide.” In Oxford Handbook of Childhood and Education 
in the Roman World, edited by J. Evans Grubbs, T.G. Parkin, and R. Bell, 83–107.
Fantham, E. 1995. “Aemilia Pudentilla: Or the Wealthy Widow’s Choice.” In Women in Antiquity, edited by R. 
Hawley and B.M. Levick, 221–32. London.
Finley, M.I. 1973. The Ancient Economy. 2nd ed. Berkeley etc.
Finley, M.I. 1985. Ancient History: Evidence and Models. London.
Finley, M.I. 1998. Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology. Edited by B. D. Shaw. 2nd ed. Princeton.
Finley, M.I. 1999. The Ancient Economy. 3rd ed with a foreword by I. Morris. Berkeley etc.
Flemming, R. 2000. Medicine and the Making of Roman Women. Gender, Nature, and Authority from Celsus 
to Galen. Oxford.
Flohr, M. 2007. “Nec Quicquam Ingenuum Habere Potest Officina? Spatial Contexts of Urban Production 
at Pompeii, AD 79.” Bulletin Antieke Beschaving = Annual Papers on Classical Archaeology 82 (1): 129–48.
Flohr, M. 2012. “Working and Living under One Roof: Workshops in Pompeian Atrium Houses.” In Privata 
Luxuria: Towards an Archaeology of Intimacy, edited by A. Anguissola, 51–72.
Flohr, M. 2013. The World of the Fullo. Work, Economy, and Society in Roman Italy. Oxford.
Flohr, M. 2017. “Constructing Occupational Identities in the Roman World.” In Work, Labour and Profes-
sions in the Roman World, edited by K. Verboven and C. Laes, 147–72. Leiden.
Flory, M.B. 1978. “Family in Familia. Kinship and Community in Slavery.” American Journal of Ancient His-
tory 3: 78–95.
Forbes, C.A. 1955. “The Education and Training of Slaves in Antiquity.” Transactions and Proceedings of the 
American Philological Association 86: 321–60.
Foubert, L. 2013. “Female Travellers in Roman Britain: Vibia Pacata and Julia Lucilla.” In Women and the 
Roman City in the Latin West, edited by E. A. Hemelrijk and G. Woolf, 391–403. Leiden.
Frances, R., and B. Scates. 1993. “Is Labour History Dead?” Australian Historical Studies 100: 470–81.
Frézouls, E. 1991. “Les Noms de Métier dans L’épigraphie de la Gaule et de la Germanie Romaines.” Ktema 
16: 33–72.
Bibliography 325
Friesen, S.J., and W. Scheidel. 2009. “The Size of the Economy and the Distribution of Income in the Ro-
man Empire.” Journal of Roman Studies 99: 61–91.
Gagos, T., L. Koenen, and B.E. McNellen. 1992. “A First Century Archive from Oxyrynchos or Oxyrynchite 
Loan Contracts and Egyptian Marriage”. In Life in a Multi-Cultural Society: Egypt from Cambyses to 
Constantine and Beyond, edited by J.H. Johnson, 181–205. Chicago, Ill.
Gallivan, P., and P. Wilkins. 1997. “Familial Structures in Roman Italy: A Regional Approach.” In The Roman 
Family in Italy: Status, Sentiment, Space, edited by B. Rawson and P.R.C. Weaver, 239–79. Oxford.
Gambash, G. 2017. “Between Mobility and Connectivity in the Ancient Mediterranean: Coast-Skirting 
Travellers in the Southern Levant.” In The Impact of Mobility and Migration in the Roman Empire. 
Proceedings of the Twelfth Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire (Rome, June 17-19, 
2015), edited by E. Lo Cascio and L.E. Tacoma, with the assistance of M.J. Groen-Vallinga, 155–172. 
Leiden.
Gardner, J.F. 1995. “Gender-Role Assumptions in Roman Law.” Echos Du Monde classique/Classical Views 
39 (3): 377–400.
Garnauf, R. 2009. “Slaves Doing Business: The Role of Roman Law in the Economy of a Roman Household.” 
European Review of History: Revue Europeenne D’histoire 16 (3): 331–346.
Garnsey, P. 1979. “Where Did Italian Peasants Live?” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 25: 
1–25.
Garnsey, P. 1988. Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and Crisis. Cam-
bridge etc.
Garnsey, P. 1991. “Child-Rearing in Ancient Italy.” In The Family in Italy from Antiquity to the Present, edited 
by D.I. Kertzer and R.P. Saller, 48–65. New Haven.
Garnsey, P. 1998. “Independent Freedmen and the Economy of Roman Italy under the Principate.” In Cit-
ies, Peasants, and Food in Classical Antiquity: Essays in Social and Economic History, edited by P. Garnsey 
and W. Scheidel, 28–44. Cambridge.
Garnsey, P. 1998. Cities, Peasants, and Food in Classical Antiquity: Essays in Social and Economic History. 
Cambridge etc.
Garnsey, P., and L. de Ligt. 2016. “Migration in Early-Imperial Italy: Herculaneum and Rome Compared.” In 
Migration and Mobility in the Early Roman Empire, edited by L. de Ligt and L.E. Tacoma, 72–94. Leiden.
Garnsey, P., ed. 1980. Non-Slave Labour in the Roman World. Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological 
Society: Supplementary Volume. Cambridge.
George, A. 2011. “Within Salvation: Girl Hawkers and the Colonial State in Development Era Lagos.” 
Journal of Social History 44 (3): 837–59.
George, M. 2006. “Social Identity and the Dignity of Work in Freedmen’s Reliefs.” In The Art of Citizens, 
Soldiers and Freedmen in the Roman World, edited by E. d’Ambra and G.P.R. Métraux, 19–29. Oxford.
Gibbs, M. 2011. “Trade Associations in Roman Egypt. Their Raison D’être.” Ancient Society 41: 291–315.
Gibbs, M. 2012. “Manufacture, Trade and the Economy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Roman Egypt, edited 
by C. Riggs, 38–56. Oxford etc.
Gibbs, M. 2013. “Artisans, Trades,and Guilds, Late Antiquity.” In The Encyclopedia of Ancient History.  http://
onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah12020/
abstract.
Gilbert, A. 2013. “Poverty, Inequality, and Social Segregation.” In The Oxford Handbook of Cities in World 
History, edited by P. Clark, 683–99. Oxford etc.
Golden, M. 1988. “Did the Ancients Care When Their Children Died?” Greece & Rome 35 (2): 152–63.
Goldsmith, R.W. 1984. “An Estimate of the Size and Structure of the National Product of the Roman Em-
pire.” Review of Income and Wealth 30: 263–88.
326 Bibliography
Goody, J. 1990. The Oriental, the Ancient and the Primitive: Systems of Marriage and the Family in the Pre-
Industrial Societies of Eurasia. Cambridge.
Gorz, A. 1989. Critique of Economic Reason. Translated by G. Handyside and C. Turner. New York.
Gowland, R.L., and P. Garnsey. 2010. “Skeletal Evidence for Health, Nutritional Status and Malaria in Rome 
and the Empire.” In Roman Diasporas: Archaeological Approaches to Mobility and Diversity in the Roman 
Empire, edited by H. Eckardt, 131–56. Journal of Roman Archaeology Supplement 78. Portsmouth.
Groen-Vallinga, M.J. 2013. “Desperate Housewives? The Adaptive Family Economy and Female Participa-
tion in the Roman Urban Labour Market.” In Women and the Roman City in the Latin West, edited by E. 
A. Hemelrijk and G. Woolf, 295–312. Leiden.
Groen-Vallinga, M.J., and L.E. Tacoma. 2015. “Contextualising Condemnation to Hard Labour in the Ro-
man Empire.” In Global Convict Labour, edited by C. De Vito and A. Lichtenstein, 49–78. Leiden.
Groen-Vallinga, M.J., and L.E. Tacoma. 2017. “The Value of Labour: Diocletian’s Prices Edict.” In Work, 
Labour and Professions in the Roman World, edited by K. Verboven and C. Laes, 104–32. Leiden.
Gummerus, H. 1913. “Darstellungen aus dem Handwerk auf Römischen Grab- und Votivsteinen in Italien.” 
Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Institut 28: 63–123.
Gummerus, H. 1915. “Die Römische Industrie: Wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen I, II.” Klio 14: 
129–89.
Gummerus, H. 1918. “Die Römische Industrie: Wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen III.” Klio 15: 
256–302.
Gummerus, H. 1926. “Cognomen als Beruf.” In Commentationes Philologicae in Honorem Professoris Emeriti 
Heikel J. A., edity by his disciples (n.n.), 48–74. Helsingfors.
Gummerus, H. 1932. Die Ärztestand Im Römischen Reiche Nach Den Inschriften. Helsingfors.
Günther, R. 1987. Frauenarbeit – Frauenbindung. Untersuchungen zu Unfreien und Freigelassenen Frauen in 
den Stadtrömischen Inschriften. München.
Hallett, J.P. 1984. Fathers and Daughters in Roman Society: Women and the Elite Family. Princeton, NJ.
Händel, A. 1983. “Zu Produktion und Distribution in der Stadt Rom Während des Prinzipats in Auswer-
tung der Inschriften.” In Studien zur Römischen Stadtentwicklung in Italien und Thrakien, Sonderband 
des Jahrbuchs für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 87–149. Berlin.
Händel, A. 1985. “Zur Interpretation von Inschriften mit Berufsbezeichnungen von Handwerkern und 
Händlern im Rom der Prinzipatszeit.” Klio 67: 498–501.
Hänninen, M-L. 2005. “From Womb to Family. Rituals and social Conventions connected to Roman Birth.” 
In Hoping for Continuity. Childhood, Education and Death in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, edited by K. 
Mustakallio, J. Hanska, H.-L. Sainio, and V. Vuolanto, 49–59. Roma.
Hareven, T. K. (1978). “Introduction: The Historical Study of the Life Course”. In T.K. Hareven Ed., Transitions. 
The Family and the Life Course in Historical Perspective. New York.
Harkness, A.G. 1896. ‘Age at Marriage and at Death in the Roman Empire’. The American Philological As-
sociation 27: 35–72.
Harland, P.A. 2005. “Familial Dimensions of Group Identity (I): ‘Brothers’ (ΑΔΕΛΦΟΙ) in Associations of the 
Greek East.” Journal of Biblical Literature 124 (3): 491–513.
Harland, P.A. 2007. “Familial Dimensions of Group Identity (II): ‘Mothers’ and ‘Fathers’ in Associations and 
Synagogues of the Greek World.” Journal for the Study of Judaism 38: 57–79.
Harlow, M., and L. Larsson Lovén, eds. 2012. Families in the Imperial and Late Antique World. London and 
New York.
Harlow, M., and R. Laurence, eds. 2002. Growing up and Growing Old in Ancient Rome: A Life Course Ap-
proach. London [etc.].
Harper, J. 1972. “Slaves and Freedmen in Imperial Rome.” American Journal of Philology 93 (2): 341–42.
Bibliography 327
Harper, K. 2010. “Slave Prices in Late Antiquity.” Historia. Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte 59 (2): 206–38.
Harper, K. 2011. Slavery in the Late Roman World, AD 275-425. Cambridge etc.
Harris, E. 2002. “Workshop, Marketplace and Household. The Nature of Technical Specialization in Classi-
cal Athens and its Influence on Economy and Society.” In Money, Labour and Land: Approaches to the 
Economies of Ancient Greece, edited by P. Cartledge, E.E. Cohen, and L. Foxhall, 67–99. London.
Harris, W.V. 1980. “Towards a Study of the Roman Slave Trade.” In The Seaborne Commerce of Ancient Rome, 
edited by J.H. d’Arms and E.C. Kopff, 117–40. Roma.
Harris, W.V. 1989. Ancient Literacy. Cambridge, Mass. etc.
Harris, W.V. ed. 1993. The Inscribed Economy. Production and Distribution in the Roman Empire in the Light of 
Instrumentum Domesticum. The Proceedings of a Conference Held at the American Academy in Rome on 
10-11 January, 1992. Journal of Roman Archaeology Supplementary Series 6. Ann Arbor.
Harris, W.V. 1994. “Child Exposure in the Roman Empire.” Journal of Roman Studies 84: 1–22.
Harris, W.V. 1999. “Demography, Geography and the Sources of Roman Slaves.” The Journal of Roman 
Studies 89: 62–75.
Harris, W.V. 2006. “A Revisionist View of Roman Money.” The Journal of Roman Studies 96 (January): 1–24.
Harris, W.V. 2011. Rome’s Imperial Economy : Twelve Essays. Oxford etc.
Hasegawa, K. 2005. The Familia Urbana during the Early Empire. A Study of Columbaria Inscriptions. Oxford.
Hawkins, C. 2006. Work in the City: Roman Artisans and the Urban Economy. Dissertation Chicago Univer-
sity.
Hawkins, C. 2012. “Manufacturing.” In The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy, edited by W. 
Scheidel, 175–94. Cambridge.
Hawkins, C. 2013. “Labour and Employment.” In The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Rome, edited by 
Paul M. Erdkamp, 336–51. Cambridge.
Hawkins, C. 2016. Roman Artisans and the Urban Economy. Cambridge.
Hawkins, C. 2017. “Contracts, Coercion, and the Boundaries of Roman Manufacturing Firms.” In Work, 
Labour and Professions in the Roman World, edited by K. Verboven and C. Laes, 36–61.
Hawkins, C. forthcoming. “Manumission and the Organization of Labour.” In The Oxford Handbook of 
Economies in the Classical World, edited by A. Bresson, E. Lo Cascio, and F. Velde. Oxford.
Hawkins, C., and E. Mayer, eds. forthcoming. The Urban Economy of the Roman World: Synthesizing Histori-
cal and Archaeological Approaches.
Helttula, A, T. Gestrin, M. Kahlos, R. Pentti-Tuomisto, P. Tuomisto, R. Vainio, R. Valjus. 2007. Le Iscrizioni 
Sepolcrali Latine nell’Isola Sacra. Acta Instituti Romani Finlandiae 30. Roma.
Hemelrijk, E.A. 2001a. “Inleiding: De Laudatio Turiae.” Lampas 34 (1): 5–17.
Hemelrijk, E.A. 2001b. “De Laudatio Turiae. Grafschrift Voor Een Uitzonderlijke Vrouw?” Lampas 34 (1): 
62–80.
Hemelrijk, E.A. 2004. “Masculinity and Femininity in the Laudatio Turiae.” The Classical Quarterly (New 
Series) 54 (1): 185–97.
Hemelrijk, E.A. 2008. “Patronesses and ‘Mothers’ of Roman Collegia.” Classical Antiquity 27 (1): 115–62.
Hemelrijk, E.A. 2010. “Women’s Participation in Civic Life: Patronage and ‘Motherhood’ of Roman Asso-
ciations.” In De Amicitia: Friendship and Social Networks in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, edited by K. 
Mustakallio and C. Krötzl, 49–62. Acta Instituti Romani Finlandiae 36. Rome.
Hemelrijk, E.A. 2012. “Fictive Motherhood and Female Authority in Roman Cities.” Journal of Gender Stud-
ies in Antiquity 2: 201–20.
Hemelrijk, E.A. 2015. Hidden Lives, Public Personae: Women and Civic Life in the Roman West. Oxford.
Hengstl, J. 1972. Private Arbeitsverhältnisse Freier Personen in Den Hellenistischen Papyri Bis Diokletian. 
Bonn.
328 Bibliography
Herfst, P. 1922. La travail de la femme dans la Grèce ancienne. Utrecht.
Herrmann-Otto, E. 1994. Ex ancilla natus: Untersuchungen zu den “hausgeborenen” Sklaven und Sklavinnen 
im Westen des Römischen Kaiserreiches. Stuttgart.
Herz, P. 2017. “Die Mobilität Römischer Soldaten in Friedenszeiten.” In The Impact of Mobility and Migra-
tion in the Roman Empire. Proceedings of the Twelfth Workshop of the International Network Impact of 
Empire (Rome, June 17-19, 2015), edited by E. Lo Cascio and L.E. Tacoma, with the assistance of M.J. 
Groen-Vallinga, 80–99. Leiden.
Heuvel, D. van den. 2008. “Partners in Marriage and Business? Guilds and the Family Economy in Urban 
Food Markets in the Dutch Republic.” Continuity and Change 23 (2): 217–36.
Hin, S. 2011. “Family Matters: Fertility and its Constraints in Roman Italy.” In Demography and the Graeco-
Roman World. New Insights and Approaches, edited by C. Holleran and A. Pudsey, 99–116. Cambridge.
Hin, S. 2013. The Demography of Roman Italy. Population Dynamics in an Ancient Conquest Society 201 
BCE – 14 CE. Cambridge.
Hin, S. 2016. “Revisiting Urban Graveyard Theory: Migrant Flows in Hellenistic and Roman Athens.” In 
Migration and Mobility in the Early Roman Empire, edited by L. de Ligt and L.E. Tacoma, 234–63. Leiden.
Hirschmann, V.E. 2004. “Methodische Überlegungen Zu Frauen in Antiken Vereinen.” In Roman Rule and 
Civic Life: Local and Regional Perspectives : Proceedings of the Fourth Workshop of the International 
Network Impact of Empire (Roman Empire, C. 200 B.C.-A.D. 476) Leiden, June 25-28. 2003, edited by E.A. 
Hemelrijk and L. de Ligt, 401–14. Amsterdam.
Hofmeester, K., and C. Moll-Murata. 2011. “The Joy and Pain of Work: Global Attitudes and Valuations, 
1500–1650 Introduction.” International Review of Social History 56 (Supplement S19): 1–23.
Hofmeester, K., J. Lucassen, L. Lucassen, R. Stapel, and R. Zijdeman. 2016. “The Global Collaboratory on 
the History of Labour Relations, 1500-2000: Background, Set-Up, Taxonomy, and Applications.” http://
hdl.handle.net/10622/4OGRAD, IISH Dataverse, V1.
Holderness, B.A. 1984. “Widows in Pre-Industrial Society: An Essay upon their economic Functions.” In 
Land, Kinship, and Life-Cycle, edited by R.M. Smith, 423–42. Cambridge.
Holleran, C. 2011. “Migration and the Urban Economy of Rome.” In Demography and the Graeco-Roman 
World. New Insights and Approaches, edited by C. Holleran and A. Pudsey, 155–80. Cambridge.
Holleran, C. 2012. Shopping in Ancient Rome. The Retail Trade in the Late Republic and the Principate. Oxford.
Holleran, C. 2013. “Women and Retail in Roman Italy.” In Women and the Roman City in the Latin West, 
edited by E.A. Hemelrijk and G. Woolf, 313–30. Leiden.
Holleran, C. 2016. “Labour Mobility in the Roman World: A Case Study of Mines in Iberia.” In Migration and 
Mobility in the Early Roman Empire, edited by L. de Ligt and L.E. Tacoma, 95–137. Leiden.
Holleran, C. 2017. “Getting a Job: Finding Work in the City of Rome.” In Work, Labour and Professions in the 
Roman World, edited by K. Verboven and C. Laes, 87–103. Leiden.
Holleran, C., and A. Pudsey, eds. 2011. Demography and the Graeco-Roman World. Cambridge.
Holleran, C., and A. Pudsey. 2011. “Introduction.” In Demography and the Graeco-Roman World. New 
Insights and Approaches, 1–13. Cambridge.
Honeyman, K., and J. Goodman. 1991. “Women’s Work, Gender Conflict and Labour Markets in Europe, 
1500-1900.” Economic History Review 44: 608–28.
Hope, V.M. 2009. Roman Death. The Dying and the Dead in Ancient Rome. London and New York.
Hopkins, K. 1964. “The Age of Roman Girls at Marriage.” Population Studies 18: 309–27.
Hopkins, K. 1966. “On the Probable Age Structure of the Roman Population.” Population Studies 20: 
245–64.
Hopkins, K. 1978. Conquerors and Slaves. Sociological Studies in Roman History 1. Cambridge, London, 
New York etc.
Bibliography 329
Hopkins, K. 1980. “Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire (200 B.C.-A.D. 400).” The Journal of Roman Studies 
70: 101–25.
Hopkins, K. 1983. Death and Renewal. Sociological Studies in Roman History 2. Cambridge.
Hopkins, K. 1987. “Graveyards for Historians.” In La Mort, Les Morts, et L’au-Dèla Dans Le Monde Romain. 
Actes Du Colloque de Caen, edited by F. Hinard, 113–26. Caen.
Hoven, B. van den. 1996. Work in Ancient and Medieval Thought: Ancient Philosophers, Medieval Monks and 
Theologians and their Concept of Work, Occupations and Technology. Amsterdam.
Howgego, C. 1992. “The Supply and Use of Money in the Roman World 200 BC- AD 300.” Journal of Roman 
Studies 82: 1–31.
Hübner, S.R. 2011. “Household Composition in the Ancient Mediterranean – What Do We Really Know?” In 
A Companion to Families in the Greek and Roman Worlds, edited by B. Rawson, 73–91. Malden, MA etc.
Hübner, S.R. 2013. The Family in Roman Egypt: A Comparative Approach to Intergenerational Solidarity and 
Conflict. Cambridge etc.
Huebner, S.R. 2007. “‘Brother-Sister’ Marriage in Roman Egypt: A Curiosity of Humankind or a widespread 
Family Strategy?” The Journal of Roman Studies 97: 21–49.
Huttunen, P. 1974. The Social Strata in the Imperial City of Rome. A Quantitative Study of the Social Repre-
sentation in the Epitaphs Published in the Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum Volumen VI. Acta Universitatis 
Ouluensis, Series B, Humaniora 3. Oulu.
Ivanov, P. 2013. “Book Review: The Roman Market Economy.” London School of Economics Blog. May 17. 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2013/05/17/book-review-the-roman-market-economy/
Jackson, R. 2005. “The Role of Doctors in the City.” In Roman Working Lives and Urban Living, edited by A. 
Mac Mahon and J. Price, 202–20. Oxford.
Johnson, A.C. 1936. Roman Egypt: To the Reign of Diocletian. Baltimore.
Jones, A.H.M. 1956. “The Economics of Slavery in the Ancient World.” Economic History Review 9: 185–204.
Jongman, W. 1988. The Economy and Society of Pompeii. Amsterdam.
Jongman, W. 1990. “Het Romeins Imperialisme en de Verstedelijking van Italië.” Leidschrift 7: 43–58.
Jongman, W. 2003. “Slavery and the Growth of Rome.” In Rome the Cosmopolis, edited by G. Woolf and C. 
Edwards, 100–122. Cambridge.
Jongman, W. 2007. “Consumption.” In The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, edited 
by W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R.P. Saller, 592–618.
Jonkers, E. J. 1933. Economische en Sociale Toestanden in het Romeinsche Rijk blijkende uit het Corpus Juris. 
Wageningen.
Joshel, S.R. 1986. “Nurturing the Master’s Child: Slavery and Roman Child Nursing.” Signs 12: 5–22.
Joshel, S.R. 1992. Work, Identity and Legal Status at Rome: A Study of the Occupational Inscriptions. Norman 
etc.
Judd, E.R. 2010. “Family Strategies: Fluidities of Gender, Community and Mobility in Rural West China.” The 
China Quarterly 204: 921–38.
Kampen, N. 1981. Image and Status. Roman Working Women in Ostia. Berlin.
Kearsley, R.A. 2001. Greeks and Romans in Imperial Asia. Inschriften Griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 59. 
Bonn.
Keegan, P. 2013. “Reading the ‘Pages’ of the Domus Caesaris: Pueri Delicati, Slave Education, and the Graf-
fiti of the Palatine Paedagogium.” In Roman Slavery and Roman Material Culture, edited by M. George, 
69–98. Toronto.
Kelly, J.M. 1966. Roman Litigation. Oxford.
Kessler, D., and P. Temin. 2007. “The Organization of the Grain Trade in the Early Roman Empire.” Economic 
History Review 60: 313–32.
330 Bibliography
Kessler, D., and P. Temin. 2008. “Money and Prices in the Early Roman Empire.” In The Monetary System of 
the Greeks and Romans, edited by W.V. Harris, 137–59. Oxford.
King, H., ed. 2005. Health in Antiquity. London etc.
Kirschenbaum, A. 1987. Sons, Slaves and Freedmen in Roman Commerce. Washington D.C. & Jerusalem.
Kleijwegt, M. 1991. Ancient Youth: The Ambiguity of Youth and the Absence of Adolescence in Greco-Roman 
Society. Amsterdam.
Kleijwegt, M. 2006. “Freedpeople: A Brief Cross-Cultural History.” In The Faces of Freedom. The Manumis-
sion and Emancipation of Slaves in Old World and New World Slavery, edited by M. Kleijwegt, 3–68. 
Leiden and Boston.
Kloppenborg, J.S. 1996. “Collegia and Thiasoi: Issues in Function, Taxonomy and Membership.” In Vol-
untary Associations in the Graeco-Roman World, edited by J.S. Kloppenborg and S.G. Wilson, 16–30. 
London and New York.
Kloppenborg, J.S. and Wilson, S.G. eds. 1996. Voluntary Associations in the Graeco-Roman World, London 
and New York.
Knapp, R. 2011. Invisible Romans: Prostitutes, Outlaws, Slaves, Gladiators, Ordinary Men and Women ... the 
Romans That History Forgot. London.
Kneissl, P. 1994. “Die Fabri, Fabri Tignuarii, Fabri Subaediani, Centonarii Und Dolabrarii Als Feuerwehern 
in Den Städten Italiens und der Westenlichen Provinzen.” In E Fontibus Haurire: Beitrage zur Römischen 
Geschichte und zu ihren Hilfwissenschaften, edited by R. Günther and S. Rebbenich, 133–46. Paderborn.
Knotter, A. 1994. “Problemen van de Family Economy. Gezinsarbeid en Arbeidsmarkt in Pre-Industrieel 
Europa.” In Samen Wonen, Samen Werken? Vijf Essays over de Geschiedenis van Arbeid en Gezin, edited 
by M. Baud and Th. Engelen, 35–71. Hilversum.
Knotter, A. 2004. “Poverty and the Family-Income Cycle: Casual Laborers in Amsterdam in the First Half of 
the 20th Century.” History of the Family 9: 221–37.
Koestner, E. 2017. “The Linouphoi of P. Giss. 40 II Revisited: Applying the Sociological Concept of Ethnic 
Colonies to Alexandria’s Linen-Weavers.” In The Impact of Mobility and Migration in the Roman Empire. 
Proceedings of the Twelfth Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire (Rome, June 17-19, 
2015), edited by E. Lo Cascio and L.E. Tacoma, with the assistance of M.J. Groen-Vallinga, 191–204. 
Leiden.
Kok, J. 2002. Rebellious Families: Household Strategies and Collective Action in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries. New York etc.
Köves-Zulauf, T. 1990. Römische Geburtsriten. München.
Koyama, M. 2013. “Preindustrial Cliometrics.” Economic Affairs 33 (2): 268–78.
Kroon, C. 2002. “How to Write a Ghost Story? A Linguistic View on Narrative Modes in Pliny Ep. 7.27.” In 
Donum Grammaticum: Studies in Latin and Celtic Philology and Linguistics in Honour of Hannah Rosén, 
edited by D. Shalev and L. Szawicky, 189–200. Louvain-la-Neuve.
Laes, C. 2010. “The Educated Midwife in the Roman Empire. An Example of ‘Differential Equations’.” In Hip-
pocrates and Medical Education: Selected Papers Read at the XIIth International Hippocrates Colloquium, 
Universiteit Leiden, 24-26 August 2005, edited by H.F.J. Horstmanshoff and C. van Tilburg, 261–86. 
Leiden.
Laes, C. 2011a. Children in the Roman Empire:Outsiders within. Cambridge etc.
Laes, C. 2011b. “Midwives in Greek Inscriptions in Hellenistic and Roman Antiquity.” Zeitschrift Für Papy-
rologie Und Epigrafik 176: 154–62.
Laes, C. 2013. “Raising a Disabled Child.” In Oxford Handbook of Childhood and Education in the Roman 
World, edited by J. Evans Grubbs, T.G. Parkin, and R. Bell, 125–46.
Bibliography 331
Laes, C. 2015a. “Masters and Apprentices.” In A Companion to Ancient Education, edited by M. Bloomer, 
474–82. Oxford.
Laes, C. 2015b. “Children and Their Occupations in the City of Rome (300-700 CE).” In Children and Family 
in Late Antiquity: Life, Death and Interaction, edited by C. Laes, K. Mustakallio, and V. Vuolanto, 79–109. 
Leuven.
Laes, C. 2016. “Educators in the Late Ancient City of Rome.” Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire/Belgisch 
Tijdschrift voor Filologie en Geschiedenis 94: 183–207.
Laes, C., and J. Strubbe. 2008. Jeugd in het Romeinse Rijk. Jonge Jaren, Wilde Haren? Leuven.
Langner, M. 2001. “Szenen aus Handwerk und Handel auf Gallo-Römischen Grabmälern.” Jahrbuch des 
Deutschen Archäologischen Institut 116: 299–356.
Larsson Lovén, L. 2003. “Funerary Art, Gender and Social Status: Some Aspects from Roman Gaul.” In 
Gender, Cult and Culture in the Ancient World from Mycenae to Byzantium: Proceedings of the Second 
Nordic Symposium on Gender and Women’s History in Antiquity, Helsinki 20-22 October 2000, edited by 
A. Strömberg and L. Larsson Lovén, 54–70. Partille.
Larsson Lovén, L. 2007. “Male and Female Work in Roman and Gallo-Roman Funerary Iconography.” In 
Geschlechterdefinitionen und Geschlechtergrenzen in der Antike, edited by E. Hartmann, U. Hartmann, 
and K. Pietzner, 169–86. Stuttgart.
Larsson Lovén, L. 2016. “Women, Trade, and Production in Urban Centres of Roman Italy.” In Urban Crafts-
men and Traders in the Roman World, edited by M. Flohr and A. Wilson, 200–221. Oxford.
Laslett, P. 1972. “Introduction: The History of the Family.” In Household and Family in Past Time, edited by 
P. Laslett and R. Wall, 1–89. Cambridge.
Laslett, P., and R. Wall, eds. 1972. Household and Family in Past Time. Cambridge.
Laurence, R. 1999. The Roads of Roman Italy: Mobility and Cultural Change. London etc.
Laurence, R. 2005. “Health and the Life Course at Herculaneum and Pompeii.” In Health in Antiquity, edited 
by H. King, 83–96. London and New York.
Laurence, R., and F. Trifilò. 2012. “Vixit plus Minus. Commemorating the Age of the Dead: Towards a 
Familial Roman Life Course?” In Families in the Imperial and Late Antique World, edited by M. Harlow 
and L. Larsson Lovén, 23–40. London and New York.
Le Gall, J. 1970. “Les Métiers des Femmes au Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.” Revue des Études Latines 
47 (2): 123–30.
Le Gall, J. 1971. “Rome, Ville de Faineants?” Revue des Études Latines 49: 266–77.
Le Play, F. 1871. L’Organisation de la Famille selon le vrai Modèle Signalé par l’histoire de toutes les Races et 
de tous les Temps. Paris.
Lelis, A.A., W.A. Percy, and B.C. Verstraete. 2003. The Age of Marriage in Ancient Rome. Lewiston, NY.
Lemercier, C. 2012. ‘Apprenticeship, Wages and Contracts during the Industrial Revolution. Lessons from 
the Parisian Case’. Paper presented at the ESSHC, Glasgow, April 14.
León, V. 2007. Working IX to V. Orgy Planners, Funeral Clowns, and Other Prized Professions of the Ancient 
World. New York.
Lightman, M., and W. Zeisel. 1977. “Univira: An Example of Continuity and Change in Roman Society.” 
Church History 46: 19–32.
Ligt, L. de and P. Garnsey. 2012. “The Album of Herculaneum and a Model of the Town’s Demography.” 
Journal of Roman Studies 25: 69–94.
Ligt, L. de, and L.E. Tacoma, eds. 2016. Migration and Mobility in the Early Roman Empire. Leiden.
Ligt, L. de. 1990. “Demand, Supply, Distribution. The Roman Peasantry between Town and Countryside. 
Rural Monetization and Peasant Demand.” Münstersche Beiträge zur Antiken Handels-, Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialgeschichte 9 (2): 24–56.
332 Bibliography
Ligt, L. de. 1991. “The Roman Peasantry. Demand, Supply, Distribution between Town and Countryside, 
2. Supply, Distribution and a Comparative Perspective.” Münstersche Beiträge zur Antiken Handels-, 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte 10 (1): 33–77.
Ligt, L. de. 1993. Fairs and Markets in the Roman Empire. Amsterdam.
Ligt, L. de. 1999. “Legal History and Economic History: The Case of the Actiones Adiecticiae Qualitatis.” 
Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis / Revue d’Histoire Du Droit / The Legal History Review 67 (3): 205–26.
Ligt, L. de. 2000. “Governmental Attitudes towards Markets and Collegia.” In Mercati Permanenti e Mercati 
Periodici nel Mondo Romano: Atti degli Incontri Capresi di Storia dell’Economia Antica, Capri 13-15 Ot-
tobre 1997, edited by E. Lo Cascio, 237–52. Bari.
Ligt, L. de. 2001. “D. 47.22.1 Pr-1 and the Formation of Semi-Public Collegia.” Latomus 60: 345–58.
Ligt, L. de. 2003. “Taxes, Trade and the Circulation of Coin: The Roman Empire, Mughal India and T’ang 
China Compared.” The Medieval History Journal 6: 231–48.
Ligt, L. de. 2004. “Poverty and Demography: The Case of the Gracchan Land Reforms.” Mnemosyne Series 
4 57 (6): 725–57.
Ligt, L. de. 2005. “Review of Lelis, Percy and Verstraete 2003.” Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 118 (1): 75–77.
Ligt, L. de. 2012. Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers: Studies in the Demographic History of Roman Italy, 225 
BC-AD 100. Cambridge etc.
Ligt, L. de. 2013. “Population and Migration.” In The Oxford Handbook of Cities in World History, edited by 
P. Clark, 147–63. Oxford.
Linden, M. van der, and J. Lucassen. 1999. Prolegomena for a Global Labour History. Amsterdam: Interna-
tional Institute of Social History.
Linden, M. van der, and L. Lucassen. 2012. Working on Labor: Essays in Honor of Jan Lucassen. Leiden etc.
Linden, M. van der, ed. 1993. The End of Labour History? International Review of Social History Supple-
ment 1. Cambridge.
Linden, M. van der. 2002. “Introduction.” In Rebellious Families: Household Strategies and Collective Action 
in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, edited by J. Kok, 1–23. New York, NY, etc.
Linden, M. van der. 2006. “The ‘Globalization’ of Labour and Working-Class History and its Consequences.” 
In Global Labour History: A State of the Art, edited by J. Lucassen, 13–36.
Linden, M. van der. 2008. Workers of the World: Essays toward a Global Labor History. Leiden etc.
Linden, M. van der. 2011. “Studying Attitudes to Work Worldwide, 1500–1650: Concepts, Sources, and 
Problems of Interpretation.” International Review of Social History 56 (Supplement S19): 25–43.
Linden, M. van der. 2012. “The Promise and Challenges of Global Labor History.” International Labor and 
Working-Class History 83: 57–76.
Linden, M. van der. 2013. “Global Labor History: Promising Challenges.” International Labor and Working-
Class History 84: 218–25.
Lindsay, H. 2001. “Adoption and Its Function in Cross-Cultural Contexts”. In Childhood, Class and Kin in the 
Roman World, edited by S. Dixon, 190–204. London and New York.
Lindsay, H. 2009. Adoption in the Roman World. Cambridge etc.
Lis, C., and H. Soly. 2012. Worthy Efforts: Attitudes to Work and Workers in Pre-Industrial Europe. Leiden.
Liu, J. 2008a. “The Economy of Endowments: The Case of the Roman Collegia.” In Pistoi dia tèn Technèn’. 
Bankers, Loans and Archives in the Ancient World. Studies in Honour of Raymond Bogaert, edited by K. 
Verboven, K. Vandorpe, and V. Chanowski-Sable, 231–56. Studia Hellenistica 44. Leuven.
Liu, J. 2008b. “Pompeii and Collegia: A new Appraisal of the Evidence.” Ancient History Bulletin 22 (1): 
53–69.
Liu, J.2009. Collegia Centonariorum: The Guilds of Textile Dealers in the Roman West. Leiden.
Bibliography 333
Liu, J.2013. “Professional Associations.” In The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Rome, edited by P.M. 
Erdkamp, 352–68. Cambridge.
Liu, J. 2017. “Group Membership, Trust Networks, and Social Capital: A Critical Analysis.” In Work, Labour 
and Professions in the Roman World, edited by K. Verboven and C. Laes, 203–26. Leiden.
Lo Cascio, E. 2009. “Urbanization as a Proxy of Demographic and Economic Growth.” In Quantifying the 
Roman Economy: Methods and Problems, edited by A.K. Bowman, 87–106. Oxford.
Lo Cascio, E., and P. Malanima. 2009. “GDP in Pre-Modern Economics (1-1820 AD).” Rivista di Storia Eco-
nomica 25 (3): 391–419.
Lo Cascio, E., and L.E. Tacoma, eds, with the assistance of M.J. Groen-Vallinga 2017. The Impact of Mobility 
and Migration in the Roman Empire. Proceedings of the Twelfth Workshop of the International Network 
Impact of Empire (Rome, June 17-19, 2015). Leiden.
Loane, H.J. 1938. Industry and Commerce of the City of Rome. The John Hopkins University Studies in 
Historical and Political Science 56. Baltimore.
Louis, P. 1965. Ancient Rome at Work. An Economic History of Rome from the Origins to the Empire. 2nd ed. 
London.
Lucassen, J. 2006. Global Labour History: A State of the Art. Bern etc.
Lucassen, J. 2007. Wages and Currency: Global Comparisons from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century. Bern 
etc.
Lucassen, J. 2013. “Outlines of a History of Labour.” IISH Research Paper 51, https://collab.iisg.nl/c/docu-
ment_library/get_file?p_l_id=273223&folderId=338337&name=DLFE-174901.pdf
Lucassen, J., T. De Moor, and J. Luiten van Zanden. 2008. “The Return of the Guilds: Towards a Global 
History of the Guilds in Pre-Industrial Times.” International Review of Social History 53 (Supplement 
S16): 5–18.
Lucassen, L. 2013. “Population and Migration.” In The Oxford Handbook of Cities in World History, edited by 
P. Clark, 664–82. Oxford etc.
Maat, G. 2005. “Two Millennia of Male Stature Development.” Journal of Osteoarchaeology 58: 803–21.
Mac Mahon, A., and J. Price, eds. 2005. Roman Working Lives and Urban Living. Oxford.
MacMullen, R. 1966. Enemies of the Roman Order: Treason, Unrest and Alienation in the Empire. Cambridge, 
MA etc.
MacMullen, R. 1974. Roman Social Relations, 50 B.C. to A.D. 284. New Haven, CT etc.
MacMullen, R. 1982. “The Epigraphic Habit in the Roman Empire.” The American Journal of Philology 103: 
233–46.
Maddison, A. 2007. Contours of the World Economy, 1-2030 AD. Oxford.
Malaspina, E. 2003. “La Terminologia Latina delle Professioni Femminili nel Mondo Antico.” Mediterraneo 
Antico 6 (1): 347–91.
Manacorda, D. 2005. “Appunti sull’Industria Edilizia a Roma.” In Interpretare i Bolli Laterizi di Roma e della 
Valle del Tevere: Produzione, Storia Economica e Topografia. Atti del Convegno all’École Française de Rome 
e all’Institutum Romanum Finlandiae, 31 Marzo e 1 Aprile 2000, Organizzato da Christer Bruun e François 
Chausson, edited by C. Bruun, 25–52. Acta Instituti Romani Finlandiae 32. Roma.
Martin, D.B. 1996. “The Construction of the Ancient Family. Methodical Considerations.” Journal of Roman 
Studies 86: 39–60.
Martin, S.D. 2001. “The Responsibility of Skilled Workers in Classical Roman Law.” The American Journal of 
Philology 122 (1): 107–29.
Maxey, M. 1938. Occupations of the Lower Classes in Roman Society. Chicago.
Mayer, E. 2012. The Ancient Middle Classes. Urban Life and Aesthetics in the Roman Empire. Cambridge Mass. 
and London.
334 Bibliography
McCann, L. 1999. “Seasons of Labor: Family, Work, and Land in a Nineteenth-Century Novia Scotia Ship-
building Community.” History of the Family 4 (4): 485–527.
McDermott, W.C. 1972. “M. Cicero and M. Tiro.” Historia 21: 259–86.
McGuire, R.H., J. Smith, and W.H. Martin. 1986. “Patterns of Household Structures and the World-Economy.” 
Review 10 (1): 75–97.
Meiggs, R. 1960. Roman Ostia. Oxford.
Mennella, G. and G. Apicella. 2000. Le Corporazioni Professionali nell’Italia Romana: un Aggiornamento al 
Waltzing. Napoli.
Migliardi Zingale, L. 2007. “Riflessioni in Tema di Apprendistato Femminile e Arte della Tessitura: In Mar-
gine a P. Oxy. LXVII 4596.” Aegyptus 87: 199–208.
Mincer, J., and S. Polachek. 1974. “Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of Women.” In Econom-
ics of the Family. Marriage, Children and Human Capital, edited by T.W. Schultz, 397–429. Chicago and 
London.
Minnen, P. van. 1987. “Urban Craftsmen in Roman Egypt.” Münstersche Beiträge zur Antiken Handelsge-
schichte 6 (1): 31–88.
Minnen, P. van. 1998. “Did Ancient Women Learn a Trade Outside the Home? A Note on SB XVIII 13305.” 
Zeitschrift für Papyrologie Und Epigrafik 123: 201–3.
Moatti, C. 2017. “Migration et Droit dans L’empire Romain: Catégories, Contrôles et Intégration.” In The 
Impact of Mobility and Migration in the Roman Empire. Proceedings of the Twelfth Workshop of the Inter-
national Network Impact of Empire (Rome, June 17-19, 2015), edited by E. Lo Cascio and L.E. Tacoma, 
with the assistance of M. J. Groen-Vallinga, 222–245. Leiden.
Moen, P. and E. Wethington. 1992. “The Concept of Family Adaptive Strategies.” Annual Review of Sociol-
ogy 18 (1): 233–51.
Mohler, S.L. 1940. “Slave Education in the Roman Empire.” Transactions and Proceedings of the American 
Philological Association 17: 262–80.
Möller, C. 1993. “Die Mercennarii in der Römischen Arbeitswelt.” Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte 110: 
296–330.
Mommsen, Th. 1843. De Collegiis et Sodaliciis Romanorum. Kiel.
Morel, J-P. 1992. “l’Artigiano.” In De Wereld van de Romeinen, translated by F. de Haan, edited by A. Giar-
dina, 229–260. Amsterdam.
Morley, N. 1996. Metropolis and Hinterland. The City of Rome and the Italian Economy 200 BC–AD 200. 
Cambridge.
Morley, N. 2008. “Urbanisation and Development in Italy in the Late Republic.” In People, Land and Politics: 
Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy, edited by L. de Ligt and Simon 
Northwood, 121–37. Leiden.
Morley, N. 2011. “Slavery under the Principate.” In The Cambridge World History of Slavery volume I, edited 
by K.R. Bradley and P. Cartledge, 265–86. Cambridge.
Morley, N. 2013. “Review of Temin.” Sehepunkte 13 (7/8). http://www.sehepunkte.de/2013/07/23247.html.
Mossé, C. 1969. The Ancient World at Work. Translated by J. Lloyd. London.
Mouritsen, H. 2004. “Freedmen and Freeborn in the Necropolis of Imperial Ostia.” Zeitschrift für Papyrolo-
gie und Epigrafik 150: 281–304.
Mouritsen, H. 2011a. The Freedman in the Roman World. Cambridge.
Mouritsen, H. 2011b. “The Families of Roman Slaves and Freedmen.” In A Companion to Families in the 
Greek and Roman Worlds, edited by B. Rawson, 129–44. Malden, MA etc.
Mouritsen, H. 2013. “Slavery and Manumission in the Roman Elite: A Study of the Columbaria of the Volu-
sii and the Statilii.” In Roman Slavery and Roman Material Culture, edited by M. George, 43–68. Toronto.
Bibliography 335
Mrozek, S. 1975. Prix et Rémunération dans l’occident Romain (31 av.n.è.-250 de n.è.). Gdańsk.
Mrozek, S. 1986. “Zur Verbreitung der Freien Lohnarbeit in der Römischen Kaiserzeit.” In Studien zur Alten 
Geschichte: Siegfried Lauffer zum 70. Geburtstag am 4. August 1981 dargebracht von Freunden, Kollegen 
und Schülern, edited by H. Kalcyk, B. Gullath, and A. Graeber, 2:705–16. Rome.
Müller, I. 2010. “Single Women in the Roman Funerary Inscriptions.” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigrafik 
175: 295–303.
Munck, B.D., S.L. Kaplan, and H. Soly. 2007. Learning on the Shop Floor: Historical Perspectives on Appren-
ticeship. New York.
Murphy, E.A. 2017. “Roman Workers and their Workplaces: Some archaeological thoughts on the Orga-
nization of Workshop Labour in Ceramic Production.” In Work, Labour and Professions in the Roman 
World, edited by K. Verboven and C. Laes, 133–46. Leiden.
Netting, R. Mc C., E.J. Arnould, and R.R. Wilk. 1984. “Introduction.” In Households. Comparative and Histori-
cal Studies of the Domestic Group, xiii–xxxviii. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London.
Neumann, G. 1981. “Zur Bildung der Lateinischen Handwerkerbezeichnungen.” In Das Handwerk in 
Vor- und Fruhgeschichtlicher Zeit, edited by H. Jankuhn, W. Janssen, R. Schmidt-Wiegand, and H. 
Tiefenbach, 133–40. Göttingen.
Nijf, O. van. 1997. The Civic World of Professional Organisations in the Roman East. Amsterdam.
Nijf, O. van. 2002. “Collegia and Civic Guards: Two Chapters in the History of Sociability.” In After the Past: 
Essays in Ancient History in Honour of H.W. Pleket, edited by W. Jongman and M. Kleijwegt, 305–39. 
Mnemosyne Supplementum 233. Leiden.
Nörr, D. 1965. “Zur Sozialen und Rechtlichen Bewertung der Freien Arbeit in Rom.” Zeitschrift für Rechtsge-
schichte 82: 67–105.
North, D.C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge.
North, D.C. 2005. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton.
Noy, D. 2000. Foreigners at Rome: Citizens and Strangers. London.
O’Hara, S.F. 1998. “Patria Potestas.” In Ancient History in a Modern University, 1:210–16. Grand Rapids and 
Cambridge.
Oerlemans, A.P.A, and L.E. Tacoma. 2014. “Three Great Killers: Infectious Diseases and Patterns of Mortal-
ity in Imperial Rome.” Ancient Society 44: 213–41.
Ogilvie, S.C. 2007. “Whatever Is, Is Right? Economic Institutions in Pre-Industrial Europe.” Economic History 
Review 60: 649–84.
Ogilvie, S.C. 2011. Institutions and European Trade: Merchant Guilds, 1000-1800. Cambridge Studies in 
Economic History. Second Series. Cambridge etc.
Ojo, M.O.D. 2013. “A sociological Investigation of the determinant Factors and the Effects of Child Street 
Hawking in Nigeria: Ageg E, Lagos State, under survey.” International Journal of Asian Social Science 3 
(1): 114–37.
Oppenheimer, V.K. (1974). “The Life-Cycle Squeeze: The Interaction of Men’s occupational and family Life 
Cycles.” Demography 11: 227–245.
Oppenheimer, V.K. (1982). Work and the Family: A Study in Social Demography. New York.
Ornstein, M., and G.J. Stalker. 2013. “Canadian Families’ Strategies for Employment and Care for Preschool 
Children.” Journal of Family Issues 34 (1): 53–84.
Oyefara, J.L. 2005. “Family Background, Sexual Behaviour, and HIV/AIDS Vulnerability of Female Street 
Hawkers in Lagos Metropolis, Nigeria.” International Social Science Journal 57 (186): 687–98.
Palmer, P.A. 1998. The Worlds of Unfree Labour: From Indentured Servitude to Slavery.
Paping, R. 2004. “Family Strategies concerning Migration and Occupations of Children in a Market-
Oriented Agricultural Economy.” The History of the Family 9 (2): 159–91.
336 Bibliography
Park, M.E. 1918. The Plebs in Cicero’s Day: A Study of their Provenance and of their Employment.” Cambridge, 
MA.
Parkin, T.G. 1992. Demography and Roman Society. Baltimore etc.
Parkin, T.G. 2003. Old Age in the Roman World : A Cultural and Social History. Baltimore.
Parkin, T.G. 2011. “The Roman Life-Course and the Family.” In A Companion to Families in the Greek and 
Roman Worlds, edited by B. Rawson, 276–90. Malden MA etc.
Parkin, T.G. 2013. “The Demography of Infancy and Early Childhood in the Ancient World.” In Oxford 
Handbook of Childhood and Education in the Roman World, edited by J. Evans Grubbs, T.G. Parkin, and 
R. Bell, 40–61.
Parkin, T.G., and J. Evans Grubbs. 2013. “Introduction.” In The Oxford Handbook of Childhood and Education 
in the Roman World, edited by J. Evans Grubbs, T.G. Parkin, and R. Bell, 1–13.
Patterson, J. 1998. “Trade and Traders in the Roman World: Scale, Structure, and Organisation.” In Trade 
and Traders in the Ancient City, edited by H. Parkins and C. Smith, 149–67. London.
Patterson, J.R. 1992. “Patronage, Collegia and Burial in Imperial Rome.” In Death in Towns. Urban Responses 
to the Dying and the Dead, 100-1600, edited by SR. Bassett, 15–27. Leicester.
Patterson, J.R. 1994. “The Collegia and the Transformation of the Towns of Italy in the Second Century 
AD.” In L’Italie d’Auguste à Dioclétien. Actes du Colloque International organisé par l’École Française de 
Rome, 227–38. Rome.
Patterson, J.R. 2006. Landscapes and Cities: Rural Settlement and Civic Transformation in Early Imperial Italy. 
Oxford etc.
Patterson, O. 1982. Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study. Cambridge, MA & London.
Pearl, O. 1985. “Apprentice Contract”. The Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists 22 (1–4): 255–59.
Pearse, J.L.D. 1976 “Three Alba of the Collegium Fabrum Tignariorum at Rome”. Bullettino della Commis-
sione Archeologica Comunale di Roma 85: 163-76.
Penner, L. 2012. “Gender, Household Structure and Slavery: Re-Interpreting the Aristocratic Columbaria 
of Early Imperial Rome.” In Families in the Greco-Roman World, edited by R. Laurence and A. Strömberg, 
143–58.
Penner, L. 2013. “The Epigraphic Habits of the Slaves and Freed Slaves of the Julio-Claudian Households.” 
Diss. University of Calgary.
Perry, J.S. 2006. The Roman Collegia. The Modern Evolution of an Ancient Concept. Leiden.
Pestman, P.W., and W. Clarysse. 1989. Familiearchieven uit het Land van Pharao: een Bundel Artikelen 
samengesteld naar Aanleiding van een Serie Lezingen van het Papyrologisch Instituut van de Rijksuniver-
siteit van Leiden in het Voorjaar van 1986. Zutphen.
Petermandl, W. 1997. “Kinderarbeit Im Italien Der Prinzipatszeit: Ein Beitrag zur Sozialgeschichte des 
Kindes.” Laverna 8: 113–36.
Petersen, L.H. 2003. “The Baker, his Tomb, his Wife, and her Breadbasket: The Monument of Eurysaces in 
Rome.” The Art Bulletin 85 (2): 230–57.
Petersen, L.H. 2006. The Freedman in Roman Art and Art History. Cambridge.
Petrikovits, H. von. 1981. “Die Spezialisierung des Römischen Handwerks.” In Das Handwerk in Vor- und 
Fruhgeschichtlicher Zeit, edited by H. Jankuhn, W. Janssen, R. Schmidt-Wiegand, and H. Tiefenbach, 
63–132. Göttingen.
Piccolo, M. 2003. “Osservazioni ad alcuni Papiri dell’Archivio di Tryphon.” Aegyptus 83: 197–213.
Pleket, H.W. 1988. “Labor and Unemployment in the Roman Empire: Some Preliminary Remarks.” In 
Soziale Randgruppen und Aussenseiter im Altertum. Referate com Symposium ´Soziale Randgruppen und 
Antike Sozialpolitik´, in Graz (21. Bis 23. September), edited by I. Weiler, 267–76. Graz.
Potter, D.S. 2009. Ancient Rome: A New History. New York.
Bibliography 337
Prior, M. 1985. “Women and the Urban Economy: Oxford 1500-1800.” In Women in English Society 1500-
1800, edited by M. Prior, 93–117. London.
Prowse, T.L. 2016 “Isotopes and Mobility in the Ancient Roman World.” In Migration and Mobility in the 
Early Roman Empire, edited by L. de Ligt and L.E. Tacoma, 205–33. Leiden.
Pudsey, A. 2011. “Nuptiality and the Demographic Life Cycle of the Family in Roman Egypt.” In Demogra-
phy and the Graeco-Roman World. New Insights and Approaches, edited by C. Holleran and A. Pudsey, 
60–98. Cambridge.
Pudsey, A. 2012. “Death and the Family: Widows and Divorcées in Roman Egypt.” In Families in the Imperial 
and Late Antique World, edited by M. Harlow and L. Larsson Lovén, 157–80. London and New York.
Pudsey, A. 2013. “Children in Roman Egypt.” In Oxford Handbook of Childhood and Education in the Roman 
World, edited by J. Evans Grubbs, T.G. Parkin, and R. Bell, 484–508. Oxford.
Purcell, N. 1987. “Tomb and Suburb.” In Römische Gräberstrassen. Selbstdarstellung, Status, Standard. Kollo-
quium in München vom 28.-30. Oktober 1985, edited by H. von Hesberg and P. Zanker, 25–41. München.
Ramin, J., and P. Veyne. 1981. “Droit Romain et Societe: Les Hommes libres qui passent pour Esclaves et 
L’esclavage volontaire.” Historia. Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 30 (4): 472–97.
Rathbone, D. 2006. “Poverty and Population in Roman Egypt.” In Poverty in the Roman World, edited by M. 
Atkins and R. Osborne, 100–114. New York.
Rathbone, D. 2009. “Earnings and Costs: Living Standards and the Roman Economy (First to Third 
Centuries A.D.).” In Quantifying the Roman Economy: Methods and Problems, edited by A.K. Bowman, 
299–326. Oxford.
Rawson, B, ed. 1991. Marriage, Divorce, and Children in Ancient Rome. Canberra.
Rawson, B. 1966. “Family Life among the Lower Classes at Rome in the First Two Centuries of the Empire.” 
Classical Philology 61 (2): 71–83.
Rawson, B. 1986a. The Family in Ancient Rome: New Perspectives. London etc.
Rawson, B. 1986b. “Children in the Roman Familia.” In The Family in Ancient Rome, edited by B. Rawson, 
170–200. London.
Rawson, B. 2003. Children and Childhood in Roman Italy. Oxford etc.
Rawson, B. 2005. “Circulation of Staff between Roman Households.” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und 
Epigraphik 151: 223–224.
Rawson, B., ed. 2011. A Companion to Families in the Greek and Roman Worlds. Malden, MA etc.
Reden, S. von (Bristol), “Arbeitsmarkt”, in: Brill’s New Pauly, Antiquity volumes edited by: H. Cancik 
and H. Schneider. Consulted online on 26 October 2016 <http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.
nl:2048/10.1163/1574-9347_dnp_e131620> First published online: 2006
Reden, S. von (Bristol), “Unemployment”, in Brill’s New Pauly, Antiquity volumes edited by: Hubert 
Cancik and , Helmuth Schneider. Consulted online on 26 October 2016 <http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.
leidenuniv.nl:2048/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e131610> First published online: 2006
Reden, S. von. 2014. “The Roman Market Economy by Peter Temin (Review).” Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 44 (4): 535–36.
Remijsen, S., and W. Clarysse. 2008. “Incest or Adoption? Brother-Sister Marriage in Roman Egypt Revis-
ited.” Journal of Roman Studies 98: 53–61.
Remus, H.E. 1996. “Voluntary Association and Networks: Aelius Aristides at the Asclepieion in Pergamum.” 
In Voluntary Associations in the Graeco-Roman World, edited by J.S. Kloppenborg and S.G. Wilson, 
146–75. London and New York.
Richardson, L. 1992. A New Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome. Baltimore etc.
Riddle, J.M. 1992. Contraception and Abortion from the Ancient World to the Renaissance. Cambridge and 
London.
338 Bibliography
Ridgeway, C.L. 2011. Framed by Gender. Oxford.
Rink, B. 1983. “Zur Bedeutung des Handwerks im Italischen Raum zur Zeit der Späten Römischen Repub-
lik.” In Studien zur Römischen Stadtentwicklung in Italien und Thrakien, Sonderband des Jahrbuchs für 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 55–86. Berlin.
Rives, J.B. 1999. P. Cornelius Tacitus – Germania. Clarendon Ancient History Series. Oxford.
Rizzo, F.P. 1993. La Menzione del Lavoro nelle Epigrafi della Sicilia Antica (per una Storia della Mentalità). 
Palermo.
Rose, H. 2007. “Vom Ruhm des Berufs. Darstellungen von Händlern und Handwerkern auf Römischen 
Grabreliefs in Metz.” In Römische Bilderwelten. Von der Wirklichkeit zum Bild und Zurück. Kolloquium 
der Gerda Henkel Stiftung am Deutschen Archäologischen Institut Rom 15.-17. März 2004, edited by F. 
Hölscher and T. Hölscher, 145–80. Archäologie und Geschichte 12. Heidelberg.
Rowland, R.J. 1977. “Some new Medici in the Roman Empire.” Epigraphica 39: 174–79.
Rowlandson, J., and R. Takahashi. 2009. “Brother-Sister Marriage and Inheritance Strategies in Greco-
Roman Egypt.” Journal of Roman Studies 99: 104–139.
Royden, H. 1988. The Magistrates of the Roman Professional Collegia in Italy from the First to the Third 
Century AD. Pisa.
Ruffing, K., and H-J Drexhage. 2008. “Antike Sklavenpreise.” In Antike Lebenswelten; Konstanz, Wandel, 
Wirkungsmacht: Festschrift für Ingomar Weiler zum 70. Geburtstag, edited by P. Mauritsch, 321–51. 
Wiesbaden.
Salares, R. 2007. “Ecology.” In The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, edited by W. 
Scheidel, I. Morris, and R.P. Saller, 27–34. Cambridge.
Sallares, R. 2002. Malaria and Rome: A History of Malaria in Ancient Italy. Oxford.
Saller, R.P. 1984. “Familia, Domus and the Roman Conception of the Family.” Phoenix 38: 336–55.
Saller, R.P. 1986. “Patria Potestas and the Stereotype of the Roman Family.” Continuity and Change 1 (1): 
7–22.
Saller, R.P. 1987. “Men’s Age at Marriage and its Consequences in the Roman Family.” Classical Philology 
82: 21–34.
Saller, R.P. 1994. Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family. Cambridge.
Saller, R.P. 1997. “Roman Kinship: Structure and Sentiment.” In The Roman Family in Italy: Status, Sentiment, 
Space, edited by B. Rawson and P.R.C. Weaver, 7–34. Oxford.
Saller, R.P. 2002. “Framing the Debate over Growth in the Ancient Economy.” In The Ancient Economy, ed-
ited by W. Scheidel and S. von Reden, 251–269, Edinburgh; reprinted in 2005 in The Ancient Economy: 
Evidence and Models, edited by J. Manning and I. Morris, 223–38. Stanford.
Saller, R.P. 2003. “Women, Slaves, and the Economy of the Roman Household.” In Early Christian Families in 
Context, edited by D. Balch and C. Osiek, 185–204. Grand Rapids.
Saller, R.P. 2007. “Household and Gender.” In The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, 
edited by W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R.P. Saller, 84–112. Cambridge.
Saller, R.P. 2011. “The Roman Family as Productive Unit.” In A Companion to Families in the Greek and Ro-
man Worlds, edited by B. Rawson, 116–28. Oxford.
Saller, R.P. 2013. “Human Capital and Economic Growth.” In The Cambridge Companion to the Roman 
Economy, edited by W. Scheidel, 71–86. Cambridge.
Saller, R.P., and B. D. Shaw. 1984. “Tombstones and Roman Family Relations in the Principate: Civilians, 
Soldiers and Slaves.” The Journal of Roman Studies 74: 124–56.
Salway, B. 2010. “Mancipium Rusticum Sive Urbanum: The Slave Chapter of Diocletian’s Edict on Maxi-
mum Prices.” In By the Sweat of Your Brow: Roman Slavery in Its Socio-Economic Setting, 1–20. Bulletin of 
the Institute of Classical Studies Supplements. London.
Bibliography 339
Scheidel, W. 1994. Grundpacht und Lohnarbeit in der Landwirtschaft des Romischen Italien. Frankfurt.
Scheidel, W. 1995. “The Most Silent Women of Greece and Rome: Rural Labour and Women’s Life in the 
Ancient World (I).” Greece & Rome 42 (2): 202–17.
Scheidel, W. 1996. “Reflections on the Differential Valuation of Slaves in Diocletian’s Price Edict and in the 
United States.” Münstersche Beiträge Zur Antiken Handelsgeschichte 15 (1): 67–79.
Scheidel, W. 1997. “Quantifying the Sources of Slaves in the Early Roman Empire.” Journal of Roman Stud-
ies 87: 160–63.
Scheidel, W., ed. 2001a. Debating Roman Demography. Leiden etc.
Scheidel, W. 2001b. “Progress and Problems in Roman Demography.” In Debating Roman Demography, 
edited by W. Scheidel, 1–81. Leiden.
Scheidel, W. 2002. “A Model of Demographic and Economic Change in Roman Egypt after the Antonine 
Plague.” Journal of Roman Archaeology 15: 97–114.
Scheidel, W. 2003. “Germs for Rome.” In Rome the Cosmopolis, edited by C. Edwards and G. Woolf, 158–76. 
Cambridge etc.
Scheidel, W. 2004. “Human Mobility in Roman Italy, I: The Free Population.” Journal of Roman Studies 94: 
1–26.
Scheidel, W. 2005a. “Human Mobility in Roman Italy, II: The Slave Population.” Journal of Roman Studies 
95: 64–79.
Scheidel, W. 2005b. “Real Slave Prices and the relative Cost of Slave Labor in the Greco-Roman World.” 
Ancient Society 35: 1–17.
Scheidel, W. 2006. “Stratification, Deprivation and Quality of Life.” In Poverty in the Roman World, edited by 
M. Atkins and R. Osborne, 40–59. Cambridge.
Scheidel, W. 2007a. “Demography.” In The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, edited 
by W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R.P. Saller, 38–86. Cambridge.
Scheidel, W. 2007b. “Roman Funerary Commemoration and the Age at First Marriage.” Classical Philology 
102 (4): 389–402.
Scheidel, W. 2008. “The Comparative Economics of Slavery in the Greco-Roman World.” In Slave Systems, 
Ancient and Modern, 105–26. Cambridge.
Scheidel, W. 2009. “Sex and Empire. A Darwinian Perspective.” In The Dynamics of Ancient Empires: State 
Power from Assyria to Byzantium, edited by I. Morris and W. Scheidel, 255–324.
Scheidel, W. 2010a. “Real Wages in Early Economies: Evidence for Living Standards from 1800 BCE to 1300 
CE.” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 53 (3): 425–62.
Scheidel, W. 2010b. “Economy and Quality of Life.” In The Oxford Handbook of Roman Studies, edited by A. 
Barchiesi and W. Scheidel, 593–608. Oxford.
Scheidel, W. 2011a. “The Roman Slave Supply.” In The Cambridge World History of Slavery volume 1, edited 
by K.R. Bradley and P. Cartledge, 287–310. Cambridge.
Scheidel, Walter. 2011b. “Monogamy and Polygyny.” In A Companion to Families in the Greek and Roman 
Worlds, edited by B. Rawson, 108–15. Oxford.
Scheidel, W. ed. 2012a. The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy. New York etc.
Scheidel, W. 2012b. “Epigraphy and Demography: Birth, Marriage, Family, and Death.” In Epigraphy and 
the Historical Sciences. Proceedings of the British Academy 177, edited by J. Davies and J. Wilkes, 
101–29. Oxford.
Scheidel, W. 2012c. “Physical Well-Being.” In The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy, edited by 
W. Scheidel, 321–33.
Scheidel, W. 2012d. “Epigraphy and Demography: Birth, Marriage, Family, and Death.” In Epigraphy and 
the Historical Sciences, edited by J. Davies and J. Wilkes, 101–29. Proceedings of the British Academy 
340 Bibliography
177. Oxford. Princeton/Stanford working papers in classics 2007, accessed 14-3-2013: https://www.
princeton.edu/~pswpc/pdfs/scheidel/060701.pdf.
Scheidel, W. 2014. “Roman Real Wages in Context.” In Quantifying the Greco-Roman Economy and beyond, 
edited by F. de Callataÿ, 209–18. Bari.
Scheidel, W., and S. von Reden, eds. 2002. The Ancient Economy. Edinburgh.
Scheidel, W., I. Morris, and R.P. Saller, eds. 2007. The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman 
World. Cambridge.
Schmidt, A. 2001. Overleven na de Dood. Weduwen in Leiden in de Gouden Eeuw. Amsterdam.
Schmidt, A. 2007. “Survival Strategies of Widows and their Families in Early Modern Holland, C. 1580-
1750.” History of the Family 12: 268–81.
Schultz, T.P. 1990. “Women’s changing Participation in the Labor Force: A World Perspective.” Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 38 (3): 457–88.
Schultz, T.P., ed. 1995. Investment in Women’s Human Capital. Chicago and London.
Schultz, T.W. 1961. “Investment in Human Capital.” The American Economic Review 51 (1): 1–17.
Schultz, T.W. 1980. Investing in People. The Economics of Population Quality. Berkeley etc.
Schulze, H. 1998. Ammen und Pädagogen. Sklavinnen und Sklaven als Erzieher in der Antiken Kunst und 
Gesellschaft. Mainz am Rhein.
Schulz-Falkenthal, H. 1972. “Zur Lehrlingsausbildung in der Römischen Antike – discipuli und discentes.” 
Klio 54: 193–212.
Schumacher, L. 2001. “Hausgesinde – Hofgesinde: Terminologische Überlegungen zur Funktion der 
´familia Caesaris´ im 1. Jh. n. Chr.” In Fünfzig Jahre Forschungen zur Antiken Sklaverei an der Mainzer 
Akademie.
Scott, J.C. 1976. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. Princeton.
Scott, J., and G. Marshall. 2009. A Dictionary of Sociology. Oxford reference online 2009, version 19943.
Shaw, B.D. 1987a. “The Age of Roman Girls at Marriage: some Reconsiderations.” Journal of Roman Studies 
77: 30–46.
Shaw, B.D. 1987b. “The Family in Late Antiquity: The Experience of Augustine.” Past & Present 115 (1): 3–51.
Shaw, B.D. 2001. “Raising and Killing Children: Two Roman Myths.” Mnemosyne 54 (1): 31–77.
Sigismund-Nielsen, H. 1987. “Alumnus, a Term of Relation that denotes Quasi-Adoption”. Classica et 
Mediaevalia 38: 142–88.
Sigismund-Nielsen, H. 1991. “Ditis Examen Domus? On the use of the Term Verna in Roman Epigraphic 
and Literary Sources.” Classica et Mediaevalia 42: 221–39.
Sigismund-Nielsen, H. 2006. “Collegia: A new Way for understanding the Roman Family.” Hephaistos 24: 
201–14.
Sigismund-Nielsen, H. 2013. “Slave and Lower-Class Roman Children.” In Oxford Handbook of Childhood 
and Education in the Roman World, edited by J. Evans Grubbs, T.G. Parkin, and R. Bell, 286–301.
Sijpesteijn, P.J. 1967. The Wisconsin papyri I. Lugdunum Batavorum/ Leiden.
Silver, M. 2011. “Contractual Slavery in the Roman Economy.” Ancient History Bulletin 25: 73–132.
Sirks, A.J.B. 1991. Food for Rome: The legal Structure of the Transportation and Processing of Supplies for 
the imperial Distributions in Rome and Constantinople. Studia Amstelodamensia ad Epigraphicam, Ius 
Antiquum et Papyrologicam Pertinentia. Amsterdam.
Smith, A. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
Solin, H. 1971. Beiträge zur Kenntnis der griechischen Personennamen in Rom. Commentationes humana-
rum litterarum 48. Helsinki etc.
Solin, H. 2000. “Nouvelle Interprétation, Nouvelle Lecture et Identité D’inscriptions.” Arctos 34: 156–92.
Bibliography 341
Sparreboom, A. 2009. Wet-nursing in the Roman Empire. Indifference, Efficiency and Affection, Mphil thesis 
Free University, Amsterdam.
Spicksley, J. 2012. The Business and Household Accounts of Joyce Jeffreys, Spinster of Hereford, 1638-1648. 
Oxford.
Stapel, R. 2016. Taxonomy of labour relations, http://hdl.handle.net/10622/OJYQOR, IISH Dataverse, V1.
Stringer, M. 2012. “Human Capital: Valuing Labour in Ancient Rome.” Working paper, accessed August 14 
2013. http://www.academia.edu/1723535/Human_Capital_Valuing_Labour_in_Ancient_Rome.
Strobel, K. 1991. “Handwerk im Heer – Handwerk Im Zivilen Sektor. Neue Zeugnisse zu Berufsbezeich-
nungen und zur Verknüpfung zweier sozialer und wirtschaftlicher Sektoren mit einem Anhang zum 
neuen Pridianum aus Vindolanda.” Ktema 16: 19–32.
Strong, D., and D. Brown. 1976. Roman Crafts. London.
Syme, R. 1987. “Marriage Ages for Roman Senators.” Historia 36: 318–32.
Syme, R. 1989. The Augustan Aristocracy. 2nd ed. Oxford.
Szaivert, W., and R. Wolters. 2005. Löhne, Preise, Werte: Quellen Zur Römischen Geldwirtschaft. Darmstadt.
Szilágyi, J. 1963. “Prices and Wages in the Western Provinces of the Roman Empire.” Acta Antique Aca-
demiae Hungaricae 11: 325–89.
Tacoma, L.E. 2006. Fragile Hierarchies. The Urban Elites of Third-Century Roman Egypt. Leiden.
Tacoma, L.E. 2016. Moving Romans. Migration to Rome in the Principate. Leiden.
Tacoma, L.E. 2017. “Bones, Stones, and Monica. Isola Sacra Revisited.” In The Impact of Mobility and Migra-
tion in the Roman Empire. Proceedings of the Twelfth Workshop of the International Network Impact of 
Empire (Rome, June 17-19, 2015), edited by E. Lo Cascio, L.E. Tacoma, and M.J. Groen-Vallinga. Leiden.
Tacoma, L.E. forthcoming. “The Labour Market.” In A Companion to the City of Rome, edited by C. Holleran 
and A. Pudsey. Wiley-Blackwell.
Tacoma, L.E., and R. Tybout. 2016. “Moving Epigrams: Migration and Mobility in the Greek East.” In Migra-
tion and Mobility in the Early Roman Empire, edited by L. de Ligt and L.E. Tacoma, 345–89. Leiden.
Tate, G. 1991. “Les Métiers dans les Villages de la Syrie du Nord.” Ktema 16: 73–78.
Taylor, D. 1979. Work in Ancient Greece and Rome. 2nd ed. London.
Temin, P. 1980. “Modes of Behavior.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1 (2): 175–95.
Temin, P. 2001. “A Market Economy in the Early Roman Empire”. Journal of Roman Studies 91: 169–81.
Temin, P. 2004a. “The Labor Market of the Early Roman Empire.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 34 (4): 
513–38.
Temin, P. 2004b. “Financial Intermediation in the Early Roman Empire.” Journal of Economic History 64: 
705–33.
Temin, P. 2006. “Estimating the GDP of the Early Roman Empire.” In Innovazione Tecnica e Progresso Eco-
nomico nel Mondo Romano, edited by E. LoCascio, 31–54. Roma.
Temin, P. 2013a. The Roman Market Economy. Princeton.
Temin, P. 2013b. “Statistics in Ancient History.” Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Department of Economics, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/77609.
Terpstra, T. 2008. “Roman Law, Transaction Costs and the Roman Economy: Evidence from the Sulpicii 
Archive.” In Pistoia dia tèn Tèchnen: Bankers, Loans and Archives in the Ancient World, edited by K. 
Verboven, K. Vandorpe, and V. Chankowski, 345–69. Leuven.
Terpstra, T. 2013. Trading Communities in the Roman World: A Micro-Economic and Institutional Perspective. 
Leiden.
Thonemann, P. 2013. “Who made the Amphora Mountain?” The Times Literary Supplement, August 9.
Tilly, C., and C. Tilly. 1998. Work under Capitalism. Boulder, Colo, etc.
Tilly, L.A., and Scott, J.W. 1978. Women, Work and the Family. New York, London etc.
342 Bibliography
Todd, B. 54-91. “The Remarrying Widow: A Stereotype Reconsidered.” In Women in English Society 1500-
1800, edited by M. Prior. London.
Tran, N. 2006. Les Membres des Associations Romaines: Le Rang Social des Collegiati en Italie et en Gaules, 
sous le Haut-Empire. Rome.
Tran, N. 2007a. “Les Procédures D’exclusion des Collèges Professionels et Funéraires sous le Haut-Empire: 
Pratiques Épigraphiques, Norme Collective et Non-Dits.” In Les Exclus Dans l’Antiquité. Actes Du Col-
loque Organisé Par L’université Lyon III Les 23 et 24 Septembre 2004, edited by C. Wolff, 119–38. Paris.
Tran, N. 2007b. “La Mention Épigraphique des Métiers Artisanaux et Commerciaux en Italie Centro-
Méridionale.” In Vocabulaire et Expression de L’économie dans le Monde Antique, edited by J. Andreau 
and V. Chankowski, 119–41. Bordeaux.
Tran, N. 2011. “Les Collèges professionnels Romains: ‘Clubs’ ou ‘Corporations’? L’exemple de la Vallée du 
Rhône et de CIL XII 1797 (Tournon-Sur-Rhône, Ardèche).” Ancient Society 41: 197–219.
Treggiari, S. 1969a. Roman Freedmen during the Late Republic. Oxford.
Treggiari, S. 1969b. “The Freedmen of Cicero.” Greece & Rome 16 (2): 195–204.
Treggiari, S. 1973. “Domestic Staff at Rome during the Julio-Claudian Period.” Histoire Sociale/Social His-
tory 6: 241–55.
Treggiari, S. 1975a. “Family Life among the Staff of the Volusii.” Transactions of the American Philological 
Association (1974-) 105: 393–401.
Treggiari, S. 1975b. “Jobs in the Household of Livia.” Papers of the British School at Rome 43: 48–77.
Treggiari, S. 1976. “Jobs for Women.” American Journal of Ancient History 1: 76–104.
Treggiari, S. 1979a. “Lower Class Women in the Roman Economy.” Florilegium 1: 65–86.
Treggiari, S. 1979b. “Questions on Women Domestics in the Roman West.” In Schiavitù, Manumissione e 
Classi Dipendenti nel Mondo Antico, 185–201. Roma.
Treggiari, S. 1980. “Urban Labour in Rome: Mercenarii and Tabernarii.” In Non-Slave Labour in Graeco-
Roman Antiquity. Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 6, edited by P. Garnsey, 48–65. 
Cambridge.
Treggiari, S. 1991. Roman Marriage. Iusti Coniuges from the Time of Cicero to the Time of Ulpian. Oxford.
Umar, F.M. 2009. “Street Hawking: Oppressing the Girl Child or Family Economic Supplement?” Journal of 
Instructional Psychology 36 (2): 169–74.
Vandoni, M. 1974. Testi per il Corso di Papirologia: I Documenti di Trifone (dai Papiri di Ossirinco). Milano.
Venticinque, P.F. 2009. Common Causes: Guilds, Craftsmen and Merchants in the Economy and Society of 
Roman and Late Roman Egypt. Dissertation University of Chicago.
Venticinque, P.F. 2010. “Family Affairs: Guild Regulations and Family Relationships in Roman Egypt.” Greek 
and Roman Byzantine Studies 50 (2): 273–94.
Verboven, K, and C. Laes, eds. 2017. Work, Labour and Professions in the Roman World. Leiden.
Verboven, K. 2002. The Economy of Friends: Economic Aspects of Amicitia and Patronage in the Late Repub-
lic. Brussel.
Verboven, K. 2007. “The Associative Order. Status and Ethos among Roman Businessmen in Late Republic 
and Early Empire.” Athenaeum 95: 861–93.
Verboven, K. 2012a. “The Freedman Economy of the Roman Empire.” In Free at Last! The Impact of Freed 
Slaves on the Roman Empire, edited by S. and T.R. Ramsby, 88–109. London.
Verboven, K. 2012b. “City and Reciprocity: The Role of Cultural Beliefs in the Roman Economy.” Annales: 
Histoire, Sciences Sociales. 67 (4): 597–627.
Verboven, K. 2015. “The Knights who say NIE. Can Neo-Institutional Economics live up to its Expectation 
in Ancient History Research?” In Structure and Performance in the Roman Economy. Models, Methods 
and Case Studies, edited by P.M. Erdkamp and K. Verboven, 33–58. Leuven.
Bibliography 343
Verboven, K. 2017a. “Work, Labour, Profession. What’s in a Name?” In Work, Labour and Professions in the 
Roman World, edited by K. Verboven and C. Laes, 1–19. Leiden.
Verboven, K. 2017b. “Guilds and the Organisation of Urban Populations during the Principate.” In Work, 
Labour and Professions in the Roman World, edited by K. Verboven and C. Laes, 173–202. Leiden.
Vries, J. de 1984. European Urbanization, 1500-1800. London.
Vuolanto, V. forthcoming. “A Working Child: Selling, Pawning and Apprenticing of Freeborn Children in 
Late Antiquity.” In Religion and Childhood. Socialisation in Pre-Modern Europe from the Roman Empire to 
the Christian World, edited by K. Mustakallio. Rome.
Walker-Ramisch, S. 1996. “Voluntary Associations and the Damascus Document. A Sociological Analysis.” 
In Voluntary Associations in the Graeco-Roman World, edited by J.S. Kloppenborg and S.G. Wilson, 
128–45. London.
Wall, R. 1986. “Work, Welfare and the Family: An Illustration of the Adaptive Family Economy.” In The World 
We Have Gained. Histories of Population and Social Structure. Essays Presented to Peter Laslett on His 
Seventieth Birthday, edited by L. Bonfield, R.M. Smith, and K. Wrightson, 261–94. Oxford.
Wall, R. 2007. “Widows and unmarried Women as Taxpayers in England before 1800.” The History of the 
Family 12 (4): 250–67.
Waltzing, J-P. 1895. Étude Historique sur les Corporations Professionnelles chez les Romains depuis les Origi-
nes jusqu’à la Chute de l’Empire d’Occident. Brussel.
Watson, J.L. 1980. “Slavery as an Institution, Open and Closed Systems.” In Asian and African Systems of 
Slavery, 1–16. Berkeley and Los Angeles.
Weaver, P.R.C. 1972. Familia Caesaris: A Social Study of the Emperor’s Freedmen and Slaves. Cambridge.
Weaver, P.R.C. 2004. “P. Oxy. 3312 and joining the Household of Caesar.” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und 
Epigrafik 149: 196–204.
Weaver, P.R.C., Repertorium Familiae Caesarum, http://www.uni-koeln.de/phil-fak/ifa/altg/eck/weaver.
htm
Welwei, K-W. 2000. Sub Corona Vendere: Quellenkritische Studien zu Kriegsgefangenschaft und Sklaverei in 
Rom bis zum Ende des Hannibalkrieges. Stuttgart.
White, L.H. 2008. “Can Economics rank Slavery against Free Labor in Terms of Efficiency?” Politics Philoso-
phy Economics 7: 327–40.
Wilensky, H. 1963. “The Moonlighter: A Product of Relative Deprivation.” Industrial Relations 3: 105–24.
Williams, C.A. 2004. Martial’s Epigrams Book Two. Oxford.
Wilson, A., and K. Schörle. 2009. “A Baker’s funerary Relief from Rome.” Proceedings of the British School at 
Rome 77: 101–24.
Wilson, A., and M. Flohr, eds. 2016. Urban Craftsmen and Traders in the Roman World. Oxford.
Wilson, S.G. 1996. “Voluntary Associations: An Overview.” In Voluntary Associations in the Graeco-Roman 
World, edited by J.S. Kloppenborg and S.G. Wilson, 1-15. London and New York.
Winn, P. 2012. “Global Labor History: The Future of the Field?” International Labor and Working-Class His-
tory 82: 85–91.
Woolf, G. 1992. “Imperialism, Empire and the Integration of the Roman Economy.” World Archaeology 23 
(3): 283–93.
Woolf, G. 2000. “Literacy.” In The Cambridge Ancient History. Vol. 11: The High Empire, AD 70-192, 857–97. 
Cambridge.
Woolf, G. 2006. “Writing Poverty in Rome.” In Poverty in the Roman World, edited by M. Atkins and R. 
Osborne, 83–99. Cambridge.
Woolf, G. 2013. “Female Mobility in the Roman West.” In Women and the Roman City in the Latin West, 
edited by E.A. Hemelrijk and G. Woolf, 351–68. Leiden.
344 Bibliography
Woolf, G. 2017. “Moving Peoples in the Early Roman Empire.” In The Impact of Mobility and Migration in 
the Roman Empire. Proceedings of the Twelfth Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire 
(Rome, June 17-19, 2015), edited by E. Lo Cascio and L.E. Tacoma, with the assistance of M.J. Groen-
Vallinga, 25–41. Leiden.
Zambon, A. 1935. “Didaskalikai [Greek].” Aegyptus 35: 3–66.
Zimmer, G. 1982. Römische Berufsdarstellungen. Berlin.
Zuiderhoek, A. 2013. “Workers of the Ancient World: Analyzing Labour in Classical Antiquity.” Workers of 




weRk In de RomeInse weReld.  
soCIAle stRuCtuRen In RelAtIe tot de stedelIjke ARbeIdsmARkt In 
het RomeIns ItAlIë VAn de eeRste dRIe eeuwen nA ChRIstus
Het Romeinse Rijk was bovenal een agrarische samenleving. In de vroege keizertijd 
was daarnaast echter een verstedelijkte economie ontstaan die zijn weerga niet kende. 
Niet alleen studenten van de Oudheid, maar ook overige geïnteresseerden zijn over het 
algemeen bekend met de overblijfselen daarvan, zoals werkplaatsen in Pompei en het 
monument van de bakker Eurysaces bij de Porta Maggiore in Rome. Het Rijksmuseum 
van Oudheden in Leiden heeft een mooie collectie gereedschappen liggen waardoor 
het werkende leven in de Romeinse keizertijd inzichtelijk wordt: de schedelboor of 
de eendenbek van de Romeinse dokter ziet er nog vrijwel exact hetzelfde uit als de 
medische hulpstukken die vandaag de dag in Nederland worden toegepast. Werkende 
Romeinen zijn herkenbaar en daarom geliefd. In wetenschappelijke publicaties zijn der-
gelijke vondsten veelvuldig voor het voetlicht gebracht. De populariteit van de ‘gewone 
Romein’ en zijn herkenbaarheid bieden handvatten bij de studie van arbeid en arbeiders 
in de Romeinse wereld, maar juist in die familiariteit schuilt ook het gevaar. De praktijk 
van de Romeinse dokter zag er naar alle waarschijnlijkheid volkomen anders uit dan nu.
Tot voor kort richtte het bestaande onderzoek zich impliciet op de groep van vrijge-
boren mannen in met name steden van Italië. Dat liet de vrouwelijke helft van de bevol-
king grotendeels buiten beschouwing, om nog maar niet over slaven en vrijgelatenen 
te spreken. Voor elke opdracht was er een veelvoud aan arbeidskrachten beschikbaar 
en het volstaat daarom niet om het werk van vrijgeborenen, mannen, of slaven los te 
bezien. De familiariteit met het bewijsmateriaal gaf daarnaast de illusie van overvloed, 
waarbij dreigde te worden vergeten dat het hier slechts een klein percentage van de 
bronnen uit de Romeinse keizertijd betrof dat werd uitvergroot – zeker zolang de ver-
binding tussen literaire, documentaire, juridische en materiële bronnen niet structureel 
gelegd werd. Veel van het materiaal is dus bekend. De gewenste integrale aanpak van 
de bronnen komt inmiddels steeds vaker naar voren in detailstudies van onderdelen 
van de Romeinse economie (bijv. Wilson en Flohr 2016). De laatste decennia hebben 
ook grote ontwikkelingen laten zien in de manier waarop de Romeinse economie bestu-
deerd wordt (bijv. Bang 2008; Temin 2013a). Ondanks deze vruchtbare voedingsbodem 
ontbreekt tot nog toe een integrale analyse van werk en de gehele stedelijke bevolking 
binnen het kader van de recente inzichten over de Romeinse economie, en dat is de 
lacune waarin dit proefschrift wil voorzien.
‘Werk en de stedelijke bevolking’ is niet hetzelfde als de ‘beroepsbevolking’ van 
Romeins Italië in de eerste drie eeuwen na Christus. De wellicht wat omslachtiger for-
mulering is bewust gekozen. Werk omvat beroepsmatige arbeid, maar ook onbetaalde 
bezigheden die (gezins-)arbeid faciliteren. Daarnaast reflecteert de keuze voor ‘werk en 
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de stedelijke bevolking’ als onderwerp het belang van de context waarbinnen werk func-
tioneert. Een individuele arbeider moet niet op zichzelf bezien worden. Hij of zij was één 
van vele radertjes die de Romeinse arbeidsmarkt draaiende hield waarbij aansluitende 
grote en kleinere tandwielen de draairichting mede bepaalden. Die tandwielen kunnen 
uitgelegd worden als verscheidene sociale en culturele factoren waardoor de Romein 
bewust en onbewust beïnvloed werd. Dit proefschrift laat zien op welke manier daarbij 
richting werd gegeven door de centrale raderen van familiebanden, en dwarsverbanden 
met anderen. Het onderzoek richt zich op de periode van de vroege keizertijd, van keizer 
Augustus (31 v. Chr.–14 n.Chr.) tot en met keizer Diocletianus (284–305 n.Chr.), hetgeen 
samenvalt met de periode waarvoor het bewijsmateriaal het meest overvloedig is. Geo-
grafisch beperkt dit onderzoek zich tot Italië, waar de bevolkingsdichtheid en de mate 
van verstedelijking hoger lag dan elders in het Rijk, en waar de uitzonderlijke stad Rome 
de motor was van de economie.
De Romeinse elite propageerde een ideaal van niet hoeven werken. Een dergelijk 
ideaal was voor de overige 95 procent van de samenleving onhaalbaar. De stem van de 
nonelite is met name te horen in beroepsinscripties, die de belangrijkste bron vormen 
voor mijn onderzoek naar de stedelijke arbeidsmarkt. Romeins Italië heeft ongeveer 
twee- tot drieduizend beroepsinscripties voortgebracht, hetgeen kan worden aange-
vuld met ongeveer honderd afbeeldingen en tweehonderd inscripties van (beroeps-)
associaties. Er worden nog regelmatig nieuwe inscripties gevonden en gepubliceerd. 
Om deze reden is hier geen lijst of database van documenten opgenomen, maar een 
nieuwe catalogus van beroepen (appendix 1) waarmee de lezer via digitale databases 
op eenvoudige wijze de relevante teksten inclusief eventueel latere addenda kan op-
roepen.
Alleen al de aantallen geven aan dat de beroepsinscripties geen afspiegeling vormen 
van de beroepsbevolking, waarbij ook overige bekende problemen van representati-
viteit in de epigrafische bronnen nog een rol spelen. Veel inscripties bieden weinig tot 
geen context. Om de context van werk in de Romeinse samenleving te reconstrueren 
wordt in dit proefschrift waar mogelijk eveneens gebruik gemaakt van literaire, docu-
mentaire, juridische en materiële bronnen. De bredere context van sociale structuren 
waarbinnen het antieke bewijsmateriaal moet worden gelezen, komt echter vooral in 
beeld onder invloed van de New Institutional Economics (NIE) dat de weg heeft vrij-
gemaakt naar vergelijkingen met andere historische samenlevingen. Moderne studies 
naar arbeid en werk laten zien hoezeer individuele arbeidsmogelijkheden ingebed zijn 
in socio-culturele structuren. Het wordt steeds duidelijker dat een historische arbeids-
markt vrijwel nooit volledig geïntegreerd is maar dat er een onderverdeling optreed op 
basis van cultureel bepaalde aspecten, waarbij gedacht moet worden aan verschillen 
in kansen tussen man en vrouw, of verschillen op basis van afkomst. Dit fenomeen 
heet arbeidsmarktsegmentatie en blijkt een vruchtbare manier om naar de Romeinse 
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arbeidsmarkt te kijken – er allereerst van uitgaande dat er mag worden gesproken van 
een arbeidsmarkt in een dergelijke pre-industriële samenleving.
hoofdstuk 2 zet uiteen in hoeverre economische theorieën van marktwerking en 
arbeidsmarkt inzicht kunnen geven in de stedelijke arbeidsmarkt van Romeins Italië. 
Het voert te ver om met Temin (2013a) te spreken van een geïntegreerde Romeinse 
markteconomie op rijksniveau. Op kleinere schaal daarentegen valt er binnen de stede-
lijke context van Romeins Italië zeker te spreken van lokaal of regionaal georiënteerde 
markten, ook waar het arbeid betreft. Het regionale karakter geeft al aan dat deze op 
steden georiënteerde arbeidsmarkten niet volkomen geïntegreerd waren; integratie 
werd in hoge mate belemmerd door beperkte en trage informatiestromen. De nadruk 
die sociologen ook tegenwoordig op segmentatie van de arbeidsmarkt leggen blijkt 
bovendien evenzo van belang in Romeins Italië. De bevindingen van dit onderzoek 
laten zien dat het onderscheid tussen mannen en vrouwen een belangrijkere factor 
was voor kansen op de arbeidsmarkt dan het onderscheid tussen slaven en vrijen. De 
aanwezigheid van slavernij sluit de toepassing van het concept arbeidsmarkt voor de 
Romeinse samenleving dus niet uit, zolang we in acht nemen dat de Romeinse arbeids-
markt niet alleen in arbeid, maar ook in arbeiders handelde. Zowel mannelijke slaven 
als vrijgeboren mannen hadden toegang tot een vorm van beroepsonderwijs en vooral 
vrouwen werden in hun mogelijkheden beperkt. Niettemin waren er ook geschoolde 
vrouwen en is het waarschijnlijk dat, los daarvan, iedereen die daartoe in staat was 
ook daadwerkelijk moest bijdragen aan het familie-inkomen. De levensstandaard in 
Romeins Italië was over het algemeen laag en de vraag naar werk kon sterk fluctueren. 
Arbeidsmarktsegmentatie werd mede bepaald en bevestigd door de sociale structuren 
in de samenleving, met name door middel van familiebanden (hoofdstuk 3 en 4), maar 
ook door niet-familiale collectieven (hoofdstuk 5).
Familie en flexibele arbeidsstrategieën van de familie vormen het onderwerp van de 
volgende twee hoofdstukken, waarbij een onderscheid moet worden gemaakt tussen 
nonelite huishoudens (hoofdstuk 3) en elite huishoudens of domus (hoofdstuk 4). In 
beide gevallen omvat de familie zowel een kerngezin als één of meer slaven en eventu-
ele vrijgelatenen, maar in het geval van de nonelite huishoudens waren de familieleden 
zelf eveneens arbeiders, terwijl de elite overal mensen voor in dienst had en niet zelf de 
handen vuil hoefde te maken.
De strategieën van nonelite families (hoofdstuk 3) beginnen al bij demografische 
aspecten als huwelijksbanden en het beïnvloeden van de fertiliteit om het aantal ge-
zinsleden te bepalen: kinderen waren gewenst en konden een belangrijke economische 
bijdrage leveren aan het gezinsinkomen, maar kinderen krijgen, adopteren, of opnemen 
was voor de nonelite in eerste instantie ook een grote kostenpost waarbij het nog 
maar de vraag was of die investering in tijd en geld zich later uit zou betalen. Diezelfde 
overwegingen speelden mee bij de aankoop en het vrijlaten van slaven. En het gold 
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eveneens voor het al dan niet investeren in menselijk kapitaal van kind of slaaf (of 
slavenkind), vaak door middel van een vorm van beroepsopleiding. Het economische 
principe van intergenerationele afhankelijkheid laat zien dat gezinnen die het beter 
hadden dankzij een opleiding ook regelmatiger konden investeren, maar dat vele an-
dere gezinnen de inzet van alle gezinsleden inclusief vrouwen en kinderen hard nodig 
hadden om te kunnen overleven en daarom geen tijd of geld beschikbaar hadden om 
hun kinderen een betere opleiding te geven. Dit principe verklaart zowel het feit dat 
er altijd vrijgeboren ambachtslieden te vinden waren in de Romeinse samenleving, als 
het feit dat hun aantallen nooit echt sterk toenamen. De aanwezigheid van slaven in de 
nonelite huishoudens en de blijvende banden met hun vrijgelatenen, maakte dat de 
Romeinse gezinnen theoretisch meer strategieën beschikbaar hadden dan hun vroeg-
moderne tegenhanger om fluctuerende arbeidsomstandigheden het hoofd te kunnen 
bieden. Het bestaan van familiebedrijfjes met één of meer slaven, komt overeen met 
het archeologische beeld van de Romeinse stad die gekenmerkt werd door vele kleine 
werkplaatsen/winkels (tabernae). Deze dissertatie laat echter zien dat loonarbeid voor 
sommige gezinnen minstens zo belangrijk was en dat we daarom het traditionele beeld 
van het Romeinse gezin als locus van werk en huishouden los moeten laten, ten faveure 
van een breder spectrum van familiestrategieën.
De slavencomponent van het huishouden speelt een nog veel grotere rol binnen de 
elite domus van hoofdstuk 4. Waar demografische aspecten van het eigen gezin belang-
rijk waren voor de nonelite, is het adaptieve element binnen de elite huishoudens vooral 
te vinden onder de aanzienlijke aantallen slaven en ex-slaven. Financiële overwegingen 
zullen een minder grote rol gespeeld hebben in economische strategieën dan voor de 
nonelite. Elite domus waren bovendien een belangrijke factor voor de werkgelegenheid 
in met name grotere steden – en dat gold bovenal voor de stad Rome. In die stad waren 
ook de ondergrondse columbaria te vinden, graftombes die gerelateerd kunnen worden 
aan dergelijke elite domus en waar, dankzij een unieke vorm van individuele herdenking 
in inscripties voor vrijwel iedere ‘bewoner’, veel van de beroepsinscripties vandaan 
komen, die meestal slaven of vrijgelatenen betreffen. Mijn onderzoek liet zien dat het 
inderdaad waarschijnlijk is dat de staf van de elite huishoudens met name uit slaven 
en ex-slaven bestond. Dat geeft echter geen antwoord op de vraag of deze voorkeur 
voor arbeiders van slavenafkomst in de elite huishoudens ook de werkgelegenheid van 
vrijgeborenen significant limiteerde. In lijn met de verwachtingen lijkt het erop dat de 
beroepen in huiselijke context waar vrouwen traditioneel werk konden vinden inder-
daad grotendeels door de slaven en ex-slaven uit de domus werden uitgevoerd en dat 
voor vrijgeboren vrouwen de mogelijkheden daarmee enigszins beperkt werden. De 
aanwezigheid van de elite was niettemin waarschijnlijk ook een belangrijke motor voor 
de werkgelegenheid voor vrije ambachtslieden en arbeiders in de grotere steden, zij het 
dan niet zozeer in maar eerder voor het huishouden: de domus waren niet geheel autar-
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kisch, lang niet alle benodigde diensten waren vertegenwoordigd in één huishouden. 
De analyse vestigt echter ook de aandacht op het bestaan van domus-netwerken (verg. 
Penner 2013), een fenomeen dat nog verder onderzocht dient te worden en inhoudt dat 
huishoudens complementair waren en van elkaars arbeiders gebruik konden maken.
Elite huishoudens waren ook cruciaal voor de mogelijkheden tot arbeidsopleidingen 
die slaven ter beschikking stonden. De leidende familie kon ervoor kiezen om slaven in-
tern of extern extra beroepsvaardigheden op te laten doen; dit bestendigt het beeld dat 
er voor slaven relatief goede kansen tot scholing lagen, hetgeen ook na vrijlating hun 
mogelijkheden op de arbeidsmarkt sterk verbeterde en daarmee de overrepresentatie 
van vrijgelatenen verklaart onder geschoolde ambachtslieden in beroepsinscripties. 
Zowel in het geval van de nonelite als de elite huishoudens bleven banden met vrijge-
latenen vaak bestaan. Op die manier werden familiebanden als het ware uitgebreid met 
een sterke tak van (hoogopgeleide) vrijgelatenen die een betrouwbare zakenpartner 
vormden, een familiebedrijf konden voortzetten, of die simpelweg konden worden 
ingeschakeld als er veel vraag naar (geschoold) werk was. ‘Familiebedrijven’ in de Ro-
meinse samenleving konden dus een veelvoud aan vormen aannemen.
Los van familiebanden werd de plaats van een individu mede bepaald door zijn of 
haar plaats in andere intermenselijke dwarsverbanden (hoofdstuk 5). In Romeins Italië 
springen dan met name de professionele associaties (collegia) in het oog: groepen 
met namen als ‘de associatie van de bouwers’ (collegium fabrum). Terecht wordt in de 
wetenschappelijke literatuur recentelijk echter benadrukt dat de naam van een derge-
lijke groep niet zoveel zegt over hun belangrijkste punt van overeenkomst en dat alle 
vrijwillige associaties in meer of mindere mate gezamenlijke sociale en economische 
belangen behartigden (Wilson 1996). Associatie met anderen in welke vorm dan ook 
levert automatisch ook economische connecties op. Juist het feit dat ze niet alleen 
economische samenwerking vertegenwoordigden, maar ook sociale, religieuze en ook 
familiale banden, maakte dat de collegia functioneerden als een vertrouwensnetwerk, 
hetgeen (economische) samenwerking vergemakkelijkte in een wereld waarin de be-
trouwbaarheid van een ander (zakenpartner, werkgever of werknemer) niet makkelijk 
te verifiëren of wettelijk te handhaven was – en het was daarom enorm waardevol. 
Niet-familiale dwarsverbanden vormden een welkome aanvulling op de familiebanden, 
en soms namen ze daadwerkelijk de plaats in van familie voor migranten, weduwen en 
anderen die (tijdelijk) zonder familie waren.
Slechts een minderheid van de bevolking was lid van een associatie, ook in de bloei-
periode van de collegia in de tweede en derde eeuw. Het is interessant dat ook hier het 
statusonderscheid tussen slaaf en vrij minder belangrijk was dan sekse: vrouwen waren 
zeer ondervertegenwoordigd, slaven niet. De armen konden zich niet veroorloven lid 
te worden van associaties, en aanvullende eisen voor het lidmaatschap van individuele 
associaties onderstreepten de exclusiviteit die ook het vertrouwen binnen het netwerk 
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moest waarborgen. De collegia waren sterk hiërarchisch van aard en reflecteerden 
daarin enerzijds de hiërarchie van de samenleving, anderzijds boden zij in hun interne 
rangorde de mogelijkheid om macht te verwerven aan hen die deze mogelijkheid nau-
welijks hadden buiten de grenzen van een associatie. Een belangrijke bevinding is ook 
dat de frequentie en de rol van associaties heel sterk plaatsgebonden was: Rome en 
Ostia vertonen de meeste, en de meeste variatie in, associaties. In Ostia, en meer in het 
algemeen buiten Rome, was het prestige van leden echter vele malen hoger dan in de 
hoofdstad waar zij overschaduwd werden door de Keizer en de senatoriale elite. Col-
lectieve actie van associaties op het gebied van de economie werd vooral zichtbaar en 
zinvol buiten de stad Rome.
Uit mijn onderzoek komt naar voren dat de economische functies van sociale netwer-
ken als familie en associaties van integraal belang waren voor de Romeinse economie, 
waar vertrouwen en zekerheden in economische transacties schaars waren. Deze insti-
tuties gaven mede vorm aan de arbeidsmarkt en maakten het mogelijk dat de Romeinse 
economie zozeer tot bloei heeft kunnen komen. Deze bevindingen sluiten aan bij 
recente ontwikkelingen in de geschiedenis van arbeid en arbeidsrelaties (hoofdstuk 6). 
Aanvankelijk richtte dit onderzoeksveld zich vooral op de Industriële Revolutie en latere 
periodes. Inmiddels wordt vanuit arbeidsgeschiedenis erkend dat loonarbeid ook voor 
kon komen in pre-industriële samenlevingen, naast andere vormen van arbeid, inclusief 
slavenarbeid. Prijstheorie en arbeidsmarkttheorie worden eveneens niet meer zo rigide 
toegepast omdat het steeds duidelijker wordt dat in alle historische samenlevingen ook 
socio-culturele aspecten een rol spelen in de economie. Mijn analyse van de Romeinse 
samenleving brengt sterk naar voren hoe die socio-culturele aspecten ten grondslag 
liggen aan de beginselen van een markteconomie. Het wordt dus hoog tijd om de inter-
actie tussen oudhistorici en historici van de vroegmoderne periode te verbeteren. Een 
vingeroefening waarbij de bevindingen uit het onderzoek van deze dissertatie worden 
geïncorporeerd in het universele schema van arbeidsrelaties van de ‘Global Collabora-
tory on the History of Labour Relations 1500–2000’ laat zien hoe goed een schematisch 
overzicht de differentiatie van arbeidsrelaties in een historische samenleving kan 
schetsen. Het brengt echter eveneens naar voren waar de lacune zit omdat horizontale 
arbeidsrelaties zoals associaties en andere niet-familiale arbeidscollectieven nog niet 
kunnen worden geïncorporeerd. Het zijn juist deze relaties die voor het begrip van de 
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Is it legitimate to speak of a 
labour market in early imperial 
Roman Italy? The Roman 
World of Work argues that the 
economic concepts of a labour 
market and labour market 
segmentation hold explanatory 
power for understanding labour 
in the cities of Roman Italy. It 
illustrates that the position of an 
individual in the labour market 
was determined by individual 
characteristics such as sex, legal 
status and skill levels. These 
factors were given meaning and 
fi lled in by family and non-familial 
relations. An individual cannot 
therefore be viewed on his or her 
own, but should be understood 
in the context of the prevailing 
social structures. Family and 
non-familial collectives provided 
intersecting trust networks 
that were crucial to economic 
interaction in Roman society, 
where reliable information was 
scarce and economic insecurity 
loomed large.
